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This thesis is a comparative analysis of the concept of military loyalty in the armies 
of Greek city-states and Hellenistic kingdoms, combining ancient evidence with the 
use of modern theories of organisational structures and combat motivation. It 
presents a basic contrast between Polis armies, which displayed high levels of 
loyalty, and Royal armies, which suffered from frequent cases of non-compliance 
and disloyalty, and argues that this contrast is a consequence of two fundamentally 
different ways of generating compliance and loyalty. Polis armies, it will be shown, 
predominantly exercised normative power, i.e. they relied on a combination of 
symbolic incentives and rewards, and a civic ideology of sacrifice for the common 
good; correspondingly, the soldiers, over whom this power was exercised, 
predominantly displayed moral involvement with their army, that is they complied 
voluntarily, out of a belief in the righteousness of their cause and in the alignment of 
their own benefit with that of their organisation. Royal armies, on the other hand, 
primarily utilised remunerative power, i.e. the allocation and manipulation of 
material rewards, which in turn was met by predominantly calculative involvement 
from the soldiers, i.e. a utilitarian assessment of risk and reward. These two 
compliance relationships – normative-moral and remunerative-calculative – lay at 
the heart of the different levels of loyalty we find in Polis and Royal armies. 
Nevertheless, at times this distinction broke down, revealing areas of overlap and a 
complex layering of motivations and types of power. The argument will be 
developed over the course of five chapters. 
 Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework. It explains Amitai Etzioni’s 
Compliance Theory, detailing the three congruent compliance models organisations 
may use. These models are based on the type of power the organisational elites 
(generals and officers) apply, and the type of involvement present in the lower 
participants (soldiers): normative power and moral involvement, remunerative 
power and calculative involvement, and lastly, coercive power and alienative 
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involvement. I will also stress the importance of the socio-political system over that 
of primary groups for the generation of compliance and loyalty. Chapter 2 presents 
the evidence for the different levels of loyalty in Polis and Royal armies, showing how 
citizen forces were robustly cohesive in the field, whereas the armies of the 
Successors and Hellenistic kings frequently succumbed to treachery, non-
compliance, and disloyalty. I argue that one of the main reasons for this contrast lay 
in the powerful socio-political system that enveloped Polis armies, allowing them to 
develop a normative-moral compliance relationship. At the same time, however, it 
caused intense political infighting. Chapter 3 will explore one feature of the socio-
political system: funerary practices. We shall analyse how armies and societies 
commemorated their soldiers, and witness the effects of civic ideology on the 
expressive content in soldiers’ epitaphs. The evidence suggests strong normative 
elements for Polis armies, but does not allow us to draw firm conclusions regarding 
Royal armies. Chapter 4 will discuss the third type of congruent compliance 
relationship, i.e. coercive-alienative. I describe how neither army had access to, or 
need of, an effective coercive apparatus, as both had found other ways to create and 
maintain compliance. Chapter 5 will analyse the reward structures of Polis and Royal 
armies, and I will draw attention to the overall symbolic nature of rewards in citizen 
armies, and the largely material aspects of Royal army rewards, while pointing out 
ways in which Royal army elites strove to exert normative power through settling 
soldiers. This reflects the predominant types of power and involvement that 
characterised these organisations. Finally, a concluding section highlights the 
contrasts that were revealed in this thesis, but also discusses areas of convergence 
where the ‘Polis army vs. Royal army’ dichotomy broke down: creating and 
maintaining loyalty is a complex task, and military organisations employ more than 







This thesis is a comparative analysis of military loyalty in the armies of ancient Greek 
city-states on the one hand, and of the Hellenistic kingdoms that emerged after the 
death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC on the other. I combine ancient evidence and 
modern theories of organisational structures and combat motivation. It presents a 
contrast between city-state (or Polis) armies, which displayed high levels of loyalty, 
and the armies of the kingdoms (or Royal armies), which suffered from frequent 
cases of disloyalty, and argues that this contrast is a consequence of two 
fundamentally different ways of fostering loyalty.  Polis armies, it will be shown, 
mainly relied on a combination of symbolic incentives and rewards, and an ideology 
of sacrifice for the common good. Consequently, the soldiers followed orders more 
or less voluntarily, out of a belief in the righteousness of their cause. Royal armies, 
on the other hand, primarily relied on material rewards and incentives, which meant 
that soldiers generally followed orders out of a calculated assessment of risk and 
reward. The argument will be developed over the course of five chapters. 
 Chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework. It explains Compliance 
Theory, detailing the three compliance models organisations use, based on the type 
of power the organisational elites (generals and officers) apply, and the type of 
involvement present in the lower participants (soldiers): normative-moral, 
remunerative-calculative, and coercive-alienative. Chapter 2 then presents the 
evidence for disloyalty in Polis and Royal armies, showing how city-state forces were 
generally loyal, whereas the armies of the Hellenistic warlords frequently 
experienced treachery. I argue that one of the main reasons for this contrast lay in 
the powerful socio-political system that enveloped Polis armies. Chapter 3 will 
explore one feature of the socio-political system: funerary practices. I analyse how 
armies and societies commemorated their soldiers, and what effects civic ideology 
had on the inscriptions on soldiers’ tombs. Chapter 4 will discuss the role of coercion 
and punishment in Polis and Royal armies. I describe how neither army relied on 
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coercion, as both had found other ways to create loyalty. Chapter 5 will analyse the 
reward structures of Polis and Royal armies, and highlight the overall symbolic 
nature of rewards in Polis armies, and the largely material aspects of rewards Royal 
armies. This reflects the predominant types of power and involvement that 
characterised these organisations. Finally, a concluding section highlights the 
contrasts that were revealed in this thesis, but also discusses areas of convergence 
where the ‘Polis army vs. Royal army’ dichotomy broke down: creating and 
maintaining loyalty was a complex task, and military organisations employed more 
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1. Research Questions 
 
Two episodes, one pertaining to a Hellenistic Royal army, the other to a Classical 
Polis army, will help to illuminate the issues this thesis aims to explore. First, the 
revolt of the Greek military settlers in 323: soon after Alexander’s death, some 
23,000 settlers in the Upper Satrapies (roughly Sogdiana, Bactria, Aria) rose up in 
rebellion with the desire to make their way back to the Greek homeland. The regent 
Perdikkas dispatched a force of Macedonian troops under Peithon, son of Krateuas, 
to deal with the rebels.1 Diodoros, basing his account on Hieronymos of Kardia, 
informs us that Peithon took up the command eagerly, as he was in fact planning to 
win over the rebels and carve out a dominion of his own. Suspecting this, Perdikkas 
apparently ordered him to wipe out the rebel Greek army and then to distribute the 
spoils of war among his Macedonians.2 Peithon went east and began by bribing 
some three thousand of the Greeks to join his side; their defection put the rebels to 
flight and ensured Peithon’s victory.3 But instead of following Perdikkas’ orders to 
execute the Greeks, he struck a deal with them: in return for pledges of safe conduct, 
the rebels agreed to return to their settlements. Peithon’s Macedonians, who had 
                                                          
1 His original force contained only 3,000 Macedonian infantry and 800 horse (Diod. Sic. 18.7.3), with 
an additional 10,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry to be supplied by the local satraps (Anson 2004, 239 
with n. 25). 
2 Diod. Sic. 18.7.4-5. 
3 Diod. Sic. 18.7.5-6. 
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been promised the plunder left by the dead Greeks, felt short-changed, and secretly 
made plans that led to the killings of hundreds, perhaps thousands of the Greek 
settlers; their possessions the Macedonians claimed for themselves.4  
 The representation of the Macedonians was influenced by the anti-
Macedonian slant of Diodoros’ source and negative stereotypes of mercenary 
behaviour.5 The problems with Diodoros’ own account notwithstanding, the episode 
contains several elements we will be dealing with throughout this thesis.6 At their 
heart are two questions: where did the Macedonian soldiers’ loyalties lie, and how 
did their generals try to motivate them to obey? Perdikkas promised the troops the 
plunder from their defeated foes, and it appears that they were not above acting 
against the wishes of Peithon to obtain them. Peithon himself used bribery to cause 
the betrayal of parts of the Greek army. It appears that material rewards played a 
significant role in determining the loyalties of these soldiers, and that their generals 
exploited this dynamic to great effect. We may contrast this case with an episode 
preserved by Xenophon. 
 In 408, the Athenians were besieging Byzantion, which was being held and 
defended by Peloponnesian troops under Spartan command. Some of the citizens 
of Byzantion, however, managed to betray the city to the Athenians, who entered 
at night and forced the garrison to surrender. For his part in the betrayal, Anaxilaos, 
one of the conspirators, was later brought to trial at Sparta. Surprisingly, he was 
acquitted, on the grounds that he was a citizen of Byzantion, and not of Sparta, and 
therefore under moral obligation to act for the benefit of his polis. He had accepted 
no money, and had been motivated by a desire to save his fellow citizens from 
starvation, not to harm Sparta.7 The logic of his case is clear: ‘As a citizen of 
Byzantion, he should be judged by what he had done for his community, not for the 
Spartans’.8 
                                                          
4 Diod. Sic. 18.7.9. 
5 Schober 1981, 35. 
6 See Schober 1981, 27-37, and Holt 1989, 87-91 for a more realistic interpretation of the events. 
7 Xen. Hell. 1.3.14-22, cf. Diod. Sic. 13.66-67 and Roberts 2017, 257-59. 
8 Harris 2013, 274-75. 
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 Once more, this case contains concepts that are of central importance for this 
thesis: civic loyalty belonged to one’s own polis, regardless of the military 
circumstances. This imperative to act for the good of one’s community could even 
be respected by one’s enemies. Furthermore, Anaxilaos defended himself by 
claiming that he had not been bribed, suggesting that the addition of material 
elements would corrupt his otherwise purely moral reasons for betraying the city. 
Polybios expressed a very similar idea in his definition of treachery: those who act 
with their polis’ best interests at heart, and not for personal gain, should not be called 
traitors.9 
 These episodes illustrate two very different concepts of loyalty; in the actions 
of the Macedonians, personal material advantage appears to have been the deciding 
factor: their allegiance was to themselves first, and the direction of their loyalty was 
determined primarily by calculative considerations. In the case of Anaxilaos, we were 
presented with a loyalty that was directed at the abstract idea of the polis itself, 
necessitated by the moral obligation to act for the good of one’s community, 
whatever the circumstances. This helps to frame the questions posed by this study: 
what processes governed the dynamics of loyalty in ancient socio-military 
organisations? How can we define loyalty in the context of a polis, where betraying 
one’s city can be cast as acting in its best interests? Are these two cases 
representative of a wider reality, in which material gain determined the loyalties of 
Royal army soldiers, and moral considerations those of a polis’ citizens? Finally, how 
did those in power attempt to generate compliance from their soldiers? To answer 
these questions, and to prepare the ground for the analysis that is to follow, we will 
begin with two preliminary definitions. 
 Firstly, this thesis will deal primarily with two types of military organisation, 
referred to henceforth as Royal armies on the one hand, and Polis armies on the 
other. This distinction is to a degree modelled on John Ma’s separation of ‘Big War’ 
and ‘Small War’: the former being the warfare carried out by the large Hellenistic 
kingdoms on an ‘international’ scale, and the latter the warfare conducted by 
                                                          
9 Polyb. 18.13-15. 
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individual poleis on a smaller and more local scale.10 Royal armies, then, are those 
forces commanded by the kings and warlords of the Hellenistic period, such as the 
Successor armies and those serving the various kingdoms during the centuries after 
Alexander’s death. For simplicity’s sake, these will be called ‘Royal’ even if the 
commanding general was not, or not yet, a king. This is done to distinguish them 
more easily from the second type of army, the Polis army: these are the forces 
fighting for individual poleis, composed primarily of citizen troops under the direct 
authority of the polis government. Furthermore, while the opposition between the 
two types of military organisation is based largely on their economic and socio-
political dimensions, it is not based on chronology: the differentiation is not between 
Classical and Hellenistic, but between polis-based and kingdom-based armies. 
 The second point that needs clarification is the concept of loyalty itself, and 
its relation to compliance (for a fuller account of which, see Chapter 1). Throughout 
this thesis, loyalty will refer to the willingness to act for the benefit of the object of 
one’s loyalty out of a moral conviction that it is the right thing to do. In contrast, 
compliance is the willingness to follow a specific directive, regardless of any 
personal, moral, or emotional connotations. Generating compliance, thus, is not the 
same as generating loyalty: compliance means obedience, whereas loyalty means 
obedience with an added moral dimension. For a military organisation, compliance 
is ideally always underpinned by loyalty: as will become clear, the utilitarian 
considerations that lead to compliance can just as easily cause noncompliance, 
whereas loyalty tends to reinforce itself and produces higher levels of compliance. 
Now that we have set out the broad parameters of this analysis, we can look at how 




                                                          
10 Ma 2000. 
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2. Current Scholarship 
 
Military loyalty (or disloyalty) in the ancient world has not been dealt with in any 
comprehensive manner. As part of wider Greek military history, individual aspects 
of loyalty, and symptoms of disloyalty (such as betrayal, mutiny, or desertion) have 
been the subject of various articles. Winnicki 1992 dealt with the reward structures 
in the Ptolemaic army, investigating how the authorities used remuneration to 
increase participation in campaigns. Overall, however, his work dealt more with 
compliance than with loyalty, as he traced the lengths to which some Ptolemaic 
rulers had to go in order to ensure the obedience of their troops. Elizabeth Carney’s 
study of discipline in the Macedonian army is similarly preoccupied with compliance, 
although she recognised its connection to loyalty by observing the growing 
importance of personal bonds between soldiers and generals as armies grew more 
complex in social and ethnic terms.11 This bond, and the loyalty it could create, she 
placed at the heart of the compliance structure of Alexander’s army. Her work is 
important because it attempts to identify the underlying causes of certain behaviour 
by soldiers: what others had labelled as mutinies, she interpreted as a breach of the 
trust between troops and general, by analysing what it was that motivated them to 
comply in the first place. This approach is also at the centre of the present 
investigation. Peter Mittag adopted a similar method in his short article on the 
loyalty of the Seleukid army: he concluded that ‘money was the most important 
factor of loyalty’ in the case of mercenaries, and that military settlers, or katoikoi, 
acted out of allegiance to the legitimate representatives of the Seleukid royal 
house.12 This contrast between mercenaries and katoikoi, however, goes against the 
evidence for the revolt of Molon, as it does not explain why the katoikoi of Asia Minor 
at first joined Molon’s rebellion against Antiochos III, their rightful king. It appears 
that we require a more nuanced picture of the complex motivations that drove 
mercenaries and Seleukid military settlers. 
                                                          
11 Carney 1996, 30. 
12 Mittag 2008, 49. 
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 Sandra Scheuble-Reiter, who analysed the epigraphic material pertaining to 
Egyptian garrison commanders (phrourarchs), arrived at the same simplistic 
conclusion regarding Hellenistic mercenaries: ‘Das einzige Band zwischen diesen 
Söldnern und der Krone stellte der Sold dar’.13 She based this on evidence from 
Polybios, who recounts how the courtier Sosibios attempted to buy the allegiance of 
the Ptolemaic mercenaries after the death of Ptolemy IV in 203, and set about hiring 
new ones, hoping they would be loyal to him personally, as he was the one paying 
them.14 Here the distinction between loyalty and compliance is especially important: 
in her argument, Scheuble-Reiter talks about the loyalties of mercenaries, when she 
probably means compliance. For while it might be true that their compliance was up 
for sale, their loyalties were not: she seems to have ignored that Sosibios desired to 
hire new troops precisely because he was unsure of the existing mercenaries’ 
loyalties, which he suspected were to the legacy of the dead king and his murdered 
wife Arsinoe III. This suggests once more that the notion that mercenaries were 
motivated by money alone, and ‘state’ troops by loyalties to legitimate rulers, needs 
revision. 
 A more nuanced approach is necessary, which makes no previous 
assumptions about the motivations of soldiers, be they mercenaries or not, but 
rather focuses on what actually determined a soldier’s loyalty in the first place. As an 
example of such an approach we can take John Hyland’s article on the desertion of a 
group of soldiers recorded in Xenophon’s Anabasis. While he does not develop a 
general picture of loyalty in the army of the Ten Thousand, he goes into great detail 
in trying to identify the individual motivations of some twenty soldiers who deserted 
the Greek side at the beginning of the march back. He rejects Xenophon’s one-
dimensional explanation that they had been bribed or corrupted by the Persians, and 
offers instead a combination of shock in the aftermath of the massacre of the Greek 
commanders, fear of an imminent Persian attack, the lack of any overall command, 
and the absence of any coercive measures to prevent desertion (discussed in section 
                                                          
13 Scheuble 2009, 35. 
14 Polyb. 15.25.16-18, cf. 15.25.20, 29-31, 15.26.1-9. 
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2.4).15 Such a close examination allows us to suggest that their desertion was not 
necessarily a case of disloyalty to the Greek cause, but rather an isolated instance of 
noncompliance, based on a calculative mindset: weighing up all the relevant factors, 
the men decided that staying with the Greek army would be detrimental to their 
survival, causing them to desert – they even carried along one of their wounded 
comrades. This offers us a glimpse of the underlying motivations of some of these 
mercenaries: not simply money and adventure, but group cohesion and personal 
safety. Abstract considerations of loyalty did not seem to have been a central part of 
the equation. 
 All of these works, however, share a relatively narrow focus, and none of 
them developed a systematic approach to studying military loyalty. This thesis 
addresses this issue. By making use of modern theoretical models to aid us in 
understanding the organisational structures of ancient militaries, we will investigate 
how these organisations went about securing compliance and loyalty from their 
members. As stated previously, the subjects of this study will be the Polis armies of 
the Classical and Hellenistic periods, and the Royal armies of the early Successors 
and the emergent Hellenistic kingdoms. Including the armies of Philip II and 
Alexander III is beyond the scope of this thesis; another reason behind the choice of 
focus is the vacuum of power that Alexander’s death created, as it is fertile ground 
for a structural study of military loyalty. It provided all the major players, soldiers and 
generals alike, with ample scope to act, and because of the intense and frequent 
military activity that took place we are also relatively well informed about this 
period. 
 In opposition to the scholarship discussed above, which focused on one 
group of soldiers, or a few isolated incidents of noncompliance, the present study 
will adopt a broad perspective: it spans the world of the Greek poleis as well as that 
of the Hellenistic kingdoms, roughly covering a period of four hundred years in its 
goal to overcome the largely artificial separation between ‘Classical’ and ‘Hellenistic’ 
that besets so many works on Greek warfare. Necessarily, this breadth will come at 
                                                          
15 Hyland 2010, 247-48. 
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the cost of some depth. The aim is to identify the fundamental elements contained 
in the compliance structures of Polis and Royal armies, and to highlight areas of 
contrast and overlap. The nature of the available evidence is a further limiting factor, 





The ancient evidence used in this thesis falls mainly into two categories: literary and 
epigraphic, with the former representing the bulk of the material. This is largely a 
consequence of necessity: most of the discussion will be concerned with acts of 
treachery, noncompliance, and disloyalty, and such cases are more often mentioned 
in historiography, court speeches, or political and military treatises. Inscriptions, 
both public and private, rarely mention military betrayal or any underlying reasons 
or motivations. For the Classical period, the narratives of Herodotos, Thucydides, 
and Xenophon are indispensable, as they preserve the basic military history and 
naturally deal with the actions and motivations of armies and individuals. This can 
be supplemented with the material from the Attic orators, which can contain details 
of a more personal nature and allow us a glimpse of everyday military life and the 
concerns of those who served in citizen armies. Other works, such as the military 
treatises of Aineias Taktikos (fourth century BC) or Polyainos (second century AD), 
offer valuable, albeit episodic, insights into the natures of Polis and Royal armies and 
preserve a number of cases that shed light on the behaviour of individual soldiers 
and commanders.16 Their relevance also lies in shifting the focus from Athens to 
other, less well-known communities. 
 For the era of the Successors, books 18-20 of Diodoros’ universal history, 
written in the first century BC, remain essential, being the most substantial narrative 
of the military history after Alexander’s death. He also displayed a useful interest in 
                                                          
16 On Polyainos, see generally the volume edited by Brodersen (2010), and in particular the 
contributions by Wheeler (7-54, on stratagem collections and the military dimensions of Polyainos’ 
work) and Geus (55-68, on Polyainos’ life). 
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the material aspects of warfare, such as payment and plunder, which is vital to our 
understanding of the reward structures in Royal armies. His account can be 
combined with the history of the diadochoi written by Arrian in the second century 
AD, which survives in a few fragments, and Justin’s epitome of the Historiae 
Philippicae originally composed by Pompeius Trogus in the Augustan era.17 
Pompeius, who covered the entire Hellenistic period, becomes more important for 
events after 301, which is the point from which Diodorus’ narrative survives only in 
fragments. After a dearth of narrative history for most of the third century, the 
second-century BC historian Polybios becomes our main source for the events of the 
late third century and beyond. 
 Naturally, there is a danger that we are being presented with stereotypical 
depictions of the behaviour of Macedonian or Greek soldiers and their commanders. 
Further, it is unclear whether this reflects the bias of the surviving author or of the 
sources he used. Diodoros in particular could be seen as providing a largely derivative 
account, seen by some as mindlessly following the stereotypes and topoi he found in 
his sources.18 For our purposes this might be a particular problem, as it is believed he 
based much of his account of the period of the Successors on the writings of 
Hieronymos of Kardia, who might have been hostile to some of the Macedonians he 
wrote about, but favourable to the Antigonids, at whose court he lived after the 
death of Eumenes.19 Ultimately, we have no way of knowing to what degree 
Diodoros interacted with his sources.20 What is more, the supposed reliance on 
Hieronymos as the main source for books 18-20 has recently been questioned in 
favour of a more diversified method on Diodoros’ part.21 We should also note that 
                                                          
17 For the possible dates of Justin, see Yardley 1994, 3-4. 
18 See appendix six in Morton 2012 for a critical discussion of the tradition that Diodoros was merely 
‘a slavish copyist’. On the composition of the Bibliotheke and Diodoros’ historiographical method, see 
Green 2006, 7-34, and Morton 2013 for an in-depth analysis of Diodoros’ portrayal of Eunos and the 
Sicilian slave wars of the second century. 
19 Schober 1981, 35. 
20 The conclusion in Rathmann 2014, 52 is sobering: ‘Schaut man auf die belastbaren Ergebnisse von 
gut 150 Jahren quellenkritischer Forschung zu Diodor, so ist das Resultat ernüchternd. Im Prinzip sind 
alle denkbaren Autoren als potentielle Vorlagen für jedes einzelne Buch genannt worden’. 
21 Rathmann 2014, 80-94. For the view that Hieronymos was the chief source for these books, see 
Roisman 2010, who also highlights Hieronymos’ heavy focus on great individuals and his usually 
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there are only nineteen extant fragments of Hieronymos, rendering hazardous any 
general assumptions as to his overall aims and agendas.22 To avoid a discussion of 
the possible combinations of sources for each passage from Diodoros, we will focus 
instead on the actions of the soldiers he described, and arrive at our own conclusions 
as to their motivations. After all, it is unlikely that Hieronymos could simply invent 
the mass defection of thousands of troops during a battle, regardless of how he then 
chose to characterise the troops. What is more, the picture we find in Diodoros is 
neither isolated nor idiosyncratic: it is corroborated by the material from Polybios, 
Plutarch, Justin, Curtius, Arrian, Polyainos, in addition to epigraphic material that 
sheds light on the power structures of Royal armies. 
 This brings us to the second category of evidence used in this thesis. While 
our literary sources provide us with the grand perspective of the themes under 
discussion, they rarely reliably reported the individual motivations that prompted 
soldiers or commanders to act. Indeed, in the case of the ancient world, such 
information is near impossible to come by at all: we lack any meaningful data 
pertaining to the personal opinions, values, and considerations that caused men to 
comply, or promoted feelings of loyalty. Modern studies of combat motivation 
usually rely on surveys, often taken in the immediate aftermath of actual combat. 
For Polis and Royal armies, unsurprisingly, no such approach is possible, which is 
another reason the present study takes a broader view of compliance and loyalty. 
 Epigraphy, on the other hand, allows at least a modicum of insight into the 
minds and motivations of ancient men and women. How communities and 
individuals chose to portray military service, what they professed to have fought and 
died for, and how they commemorated and honoured past sacrifices can all tell us a 
great deal about perceptions of war, courage, and loyalty. Hence a whole chapter of 
this thesis is dedicated to the funerary practices of soldiers and armies, the evidence 
for which is largely inscriptional. No claim can be made of its comprehensiveness: 
                                                          
negative representation of the troops under their command. On the history of Hieronymos, see 
Hornblower 1981. 
22 Rathmann 2014, 57. On the reliability and biases of Hieronymos, see chapter 1 in Roisman 2012. For 
the fragments, see FGrH 154. 
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the material is too vast and varied to be dealt with in sufficient detail in a single 
chapter; a study of the funerary epitaphs of citizen soldiers alone would easily offer 
enough material for a separate dissertation. The evidence presented here is not 
supposed to be read in isolation, rather it is intended to provide an illustration of 
certain themes that will also be encountered in other parts of the discussion. 
 
 
4. Outline of Thesis 
 
This thesis deals with the dynamics of loyalty in the armies of Greek poleis and 
Hellenistic kingdoms. It seeks to explain the reasons behind two very different 
pictures: Polis armies appear to have displayed high levels of loyalty, whereas Royal 
armies suffered from frequent cases of noncompliance and disloyalty. The overall 
argument shall be that these two types of military organisation utilised two 
fundamentally different methods of generating loyalty and compliance. At the same 
time, I will highlight the complex nature of these methods and areas of convergence 
between Royal and Polis armies. To aid us in understanding the internal structures 
of these organisations, we shall employ theoretical models that deal with the 
application and reception of power. 
 Chapter 1 will outline Amitai Etzioni’s compliance theory, the concepts of the 
primary group and military cohesion, and the socio-political system. Compliance 
theory holds that all complex organisations operate under a certain compliance 
relationship, which is a combination of the type of power exerted by the 
organisational elites, and the type of involvement expressed by an organisation’s 
lower participants. There are three congruent compliance relationships, or power-
involvement combinations, defined by the predominant types of power and 
involvement present in them: normative-moral, remunerative-calculative, and 
coercive-alienative. I argue that Polis armies utilised a normative-moral compliance 
relationship, and Royal armies a remunerative-calculative one, while neither army 
contained significant coercive-alienative elements. The second theoretical model, 
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i.e. primary groups and cohesion, deals with the internal structures of small groups 
of individuals and the processes that lead to more or less cohesion. I will argue that 
cohesion is of secondary importance when considered next to involvement: the 
crucial distinction between social cohesion and task cohesion reveals that the 
willingness to carry out a certain task generates compliance and loyalty more 
effectively than high levels of social cohesiveness. Lastly, the importance of the 
socio-political system: a strong socio-political ideology, identity, and the perceived 
effectiveness of the system contribute greatly to the creation of moral involvement. 
Military organisations that are embedded into a strong socio-political system will 
thus benefit from higher levels of cohesion and loyalty. 
 Chapter 2 presents the contrasting images of disloyalty we find in our 
sources. I shall begin by discussing Polis armies, showing that citizen forces 
displayed high levels of task cohesion while on campaign. There are no clear-cut 
cases of a citizen army fracturing in the field and turning on itself, which at first 
glance seems to be at odds with the evidence for fierce internal divisions and stasis 
that caused regular outbreaks of civil war. This double-nature, it will be argued, has 
its origin in the intense socio-political interactions that marked civic life in the socio-
political system of a polis, and was at the same time a source of military loyalty in 
the field and a cause for internal political strife at home. Underlying this complex 
pattern, however, was a moral involvement with the polis, which points to the 
existence of a normative-moral compliance relationship in Polis armies. Following 
on, we shall analyse the evidence for Royal armies. Disloyalty and noncompliance 
were a regular occurrence: armies often fractured, with contingents or whole forces 
changing sides during a battle or a campaign.  Bribery and treachery were common 
among both the organisational elites (generals and officers) and the lower 
participants (soldiers). At the core of these issues usually lay some form of material 
reward: military pay, plunder, or the soldiers’ possessions. This points towards a 
remunerative-calculative compliance relationship. The last segment of the chapter 
treats desertion, and argues that Polis armies generally suffered from this much less 
than Royal armies: in the former, it was a symptom of social and ethnic 
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differentiation, whereas in the latter it was a reflection of the highly calculative 
involvement of the lower participants. 
 Chapter 3 discusses how the private and public burials of soldiers reflected 
the compliance relationships of Polis and Royal armies. It demonstrates how a 
strong socio-political system has a direct impact on the type of power a military 
organisation applies, and reveals the type of involvement with which such power was 
met. In the case of Polis armies, I will trace how the civic continuum, or the concept 
of a shared past, present, and future, helped to shape the expressive elements of 
funerary practices. Public burial contained powerful emotional and exhortative 
elements, connecting the sacrifice of the fallen soldiers with the actions of their 
forefathers and the rest of the community. This public expression of normative 
power – inspiring its citizens to strive for the benefit of the community, was mirrored 
in private burial practices: funerary epigrams reveal a strong symbolic bond between 
citizen and community, and present loyal military service as a moral obligation of the 
citizen, as a way to bring glory to his family and his πάτρα, the land of his fathers. In 
the case of Royal armies, the evidence is less clear: beginning by identifying the 
existence of a tangible remunerative element in the funerary practices in the army 
of Alexander the Great, the discussion will then trace how soldiers were at the risk of 
losing their connection to a greater socio-political system by dying on campaign and 
being buried far from home, if at all. These soldiers’ epitaphs on the whole do not 
express a bond to a πάτρα, or a more abstract motivation for fighting, as do the 
epitaphs for citizen-soldiers. In terms of compliance theory, I will argue that the 
funerary practices of Polis armies actively supported a normative-moral compliance 
relationship, whereas Royal armies could not as readily benefit from the normative 
influence of a socio-political system. 
 Chapter 4 deals with the application of coercive power, in the form of physical 
coercion and corporal punishment, in Polis and Royal armies. I shall argue that 
neither type of army had need of a powerful or sophisticated coercive apparatus. 
Corporal punishments were not part of the compliance model in Polis and Royal 
armies, and were indeed met with strong alienative reactions when they were 
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enforced. The reason lies in the fact that they relied on other types of power to 
generate compliance and loyalty. Consequently, if coercive power was not the 
predominant type that sustained either compliance relationship, these armies must 
have relied on remunerative or normative power instead. 
 Chapter 5 analyses the reward structures for Polis and Royal armies. Civic 
armies relied primarily on symbolic rewards to motivate their soldiers to comply and 
to generate lasting loyalties among the troops. These rewards were embedded into 
the socio-political system, reinforcing and reflecting the core norms and values each 
community decided to promote. Common themes were sacrifice for the ancestral 
land, and individual and communal glory. Only rarely did Polis armies hand out 
primarily monetary rewards. Nor did inter-polis warfare provide the opportunities 
for individual enrichment of the average soldier. Spoils were not usually on a large 
scale, and any plunder that was acquired became public property, reinforcing once 
more the central role of the socio-political system of the polis: loyalty was not a 
response to material rewards, but an expression of the connection between 
individual and society. Polis armies, then, relied primarily on normative power to 
support their compliance relationship. Royal armies, on the other hand, depended 
on the application of remunerative power: the warfare of the Hellenistic warlords 
and kings offered ample scope for the acquisition of plunder. Soldiers expected 
rewards and payments, and service with in a Royal army could provide a short-cut to 
wealth. Generals responded by using material rewards as incentives for compliance 
and as supports for loyalty. Because plunder represented such an important source 
of power in these armies, its distribution was usually regulated and overseen by the 
king himself. The last section of the chapter covers the settlement of soldiers, and 
views this practice from the perspective of bridging the gap between moral and 
calculative involvement. Royal army generals were aware of the drawbacks of 
remunerative power, as it reinforced a cycle of betrayal and disloyalty; settling 
soldiers and thus providing them with quasi-polis structures could lead to the 
development of moral involvement, and positively affect the compliance 
relationship: if soldiers were motivated not only by the prospects of plunder, but also 
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by a desire to protect and advance the interests of their kingdom, loyalty was set on 
a firmer footing. 
 A concluding section will form a picture of contrast and complexity: Polis and 
Royal armies used different compliance relationships, but there were several areas 
of overlap. While the normative-moral elements in a Polis army predominate, there 
was also remuneration in the form of cash rewards, and coercion in the form of 
capital punishment. In Royal armies, the remunerative-calculative relationship was 
combined with strong personal bonds between the commanders and their troops, 
and normative expressions of legitimacy that resonated with soldiers who preferred 


















The study of ancient Greek warfare has in the recent past been revitalised by an 
interest that goes beyond strategy and tactics, or equipment, and focuses instead 
on the individuals who did the actual fighting. This so-called ‘Face of Battle’ 
approach (after John Keegan’s famous book) has yielded stimulating results, and 
fuelled a fierce debate about the reality of combat in the Classical period. At the 
heart of the issue lie the mechanics of phalanx warfare – unfortunately, most other 
combat contexts have been relegated to a position of secondary importance, 
regardless of their ubiquity. The polarisation is usually between the ‘orthodox’ view, 
proposing a physical interpretation of what some ancient sources call othismos and 
imagining a shoving match between two opposing phalanxes, and the ‘heretic’ view, 
which suggests a more metaphorical interpretation and allows much more scope for 
individual fighting, skill-at-arms, and a greater fluidity of combat.23 No clear answer 
to the question is in sight, but in the course of the discussion there has been an influx 
of new evidence drawn from contemporary combat situations, or based on modern 
approaches to combat theory. Adam Schwartz’ Reinstating the Hoplite, for example, 
                                                          
23 For the ‘orthodox’ concept of the othismos as the decisive part in phalanx fighting, e.g. Cartledge 
1977, 16: ‘fighting consisted chiefly of a concerted shoving (ōthismos) akin to the tight scrummaging 
of modern rugby football’. See further Holladay 1982, 94-7, and Luginbill 1994. A good overview of 
the traditional arguments in favour of the othismos-theory can be found in Schwartz 2009, 183-200. 
Against this view see Krentz 1985, Cawkwell 1989, Goldsworthy 1997, and Matthew 2009. The 
discussion in Lendon 2010, 307-13 is balanced but largely in favour of the orthodox view. 
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made use of modern riot police to find parallels for the use of shields in close quarter 
combat, and Jason Crowley has used various theories of combat motivation, such as 
primary group and unit cohesion, to gain insights into the psychology of Athenian 
hoplites.24 Invariably, however, the focus has remained fixed on the phalanx. 
 In the sense that the present work employs modern theories of combat and 
organisational structures, it can be seen as a continuation of this trend; a great debt 
is owed especially to the works of Jason Crowley and Stephen Wesbrook, whose 
study of military disintegration in turn provided the basis for Crowley’s analysis.25 
But at the same time it moves away from the iconic phalanx and the questions of 
how exactly it worked, to investigate a relatively unexplored issue: that of military 
loyalty. Utilising similar theories as those employed by Crowley to analyse the 
Athenian military system, this study intends to zoom out and consider not one army 
in particular, but rather two different military systems: Polis armies on the one hand, 
and Royal armies on the other. This chapter’s aim is to explain the two main 
theoretical models that will be used. Firstly (section 1.2), Amitai Etzioni’s theories on 
the structures of complex organisations and compliance, which also formed the 
basic framework for both Crowley and Wesbrook, will help to classify and analyse 
both Polis and Royal armies in organisational terms; secondly (section 1.3), modern 
theories of combat motivation will aid us in understanding the nature of the military 




1.2 Involvement and Power: Amitai Etzioni’s Compliance Theory 
 
In the broadest sense, any army is an organisation. It usually has a hierarchy, fixed 
internal structures, and certain goals it aims to achieve with the means at its 
disposal. Such a general characterisation is obviously of little analytical use, but once 
                                                          
24 Schwartz 2009, and Crowley 2012. 
25 Wesbrook 1980. 
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an organisation has been further classified regarding its dominant structural features 
and means of attaining its goals, it becomes possible to compare it to other 
organisations, which in turn serves the purpose to highlight parameters such as 
internal cohesion, personnel, or organisational effectiveness. It is precisely this 
comparative aspect that makes classification important, and justifies the use of a 
theoretical framework in order to describe the organisations to be discussed in this 
thesis, namely Polis and Royal armies of the Classical and Hellenistic periods. 
 Our approach will be based on what is known as compliance theory, 
developed over the course of several publications in the latter half of the twentieth 
century by sociologist Amitai Etzioni.26 In its simplest terms, the theory states that 
most organisations are made up of two basic elements: lower participants on the 
one side, and the organisational elites on the other. The lower participants are those 
over whom power and control is exercised, while the organisational elites are those 
exercising that power and control. Etzioni identifies three forms such power can 
take: coercive, remunerative, and normative. 
 
Coercive power rests on the application, or the threat of application, of physical 
sanctions […]. Remunerative power is based on control over material resources and 
rewards through allocation of salaries and wages, commissions and contributions […]. 
Normative power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and 
deprivations through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation 
of esteem and prestige symbols, administration of ritual […]. 
(Etzioni 1975, 5) 
 
To take examples from the modern world: coercive power would be applied by a 
prison to its inmates, restricting their movement and contact with the outside world, 
and regulating their daily lives; breaking the rules might lead to an extension of the 
sentence or other sanctions of a coercive nature. Remunerative power is applied by 
a factory to its employees, who receive a wage, along with financial incentives such 
as bonuses for meeting organisational targets or prospects of promotion. 
Infringements of protocol can be penalised by disciplinary actions, by the blocking 
                                                          
26 The fullest treatment can be found in Etzioni 1975; see also Etzioni 1964 and 1969. For a critical (and 
overall favourable) appraisal of the theory, see Drummond 1993. 
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of career advancement, or in extreme cases, by sacking the employee. Lastly, 
normative power is applied by a charitable institution to its volunteers, whose 
commitment has to be managed mainly by symbolic means and the use of 
information and inspirational leadership to maintain their belief in the cause and 
thus their willingness to comply; there would be little need of any coercive 
apparatus, as by definition the volunteers would not normally allow themselves to 
be forced to work. 
 In turn, the lower participants of each organisation are defined according to 
their involvement with the organisation. Involvement depends on the orientation of 
the lower participants, which is defined by two parameters: intensity and direction. 
In terms of intensity, orientation ranges from high to low, and in terms of direction, 
from positive to negative.27 Combining intensity and direction, then, gives us several 
types of orientation, and just as with the power applied by the organisation, 
involvement tends to take one of three forms: alienative, calculative, or moral. 
 
Alienative involvement designates an intense negative orientation […]. Calculative 
involvement designates either a negative or a positive orientation of low intensity. […] 
Moral involvement designates a positive orientation of high intensity. 
(Etzioni 1975, 10) 
 
Generally speaking, a positive orientation results in commitment to the organisation 
and its goals, whereas a negative orientation results in alienation or hostility. 
Coercive power tends to create more alienation than remunerative power, and in 
turn remunerative power more than normative power. To go back to our modern 
examples: a prison inmate who is exposed to coercive power from his organisation 
(the prison) would usually have an intensely negative orientation to it, hence we 
would call his involvement alienative. This type of involvement is marked by mistrust 
and hostility towards the organisation and its elites, very low commitment, and 
patterns of noncompliance that can only be dealt with by the use of physical 
                                                          
27 Etzioni 1975, 8-9; he describes involvement as ‘the cathectic-evaluative orientation of an actor to 
an object’. See also Drummond 1993, 27: ‘a psychological attachment evidenced by the willingness of 
participants to devote energy and loyalty to the organization’. 
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coercion. A factory worker who experiences the application of remunerative power 
by his organisation might have a positive or negative orientation of relatively low 
intensity, and so his involvement would be calculative. This type of involvement 
often rests on the lower participant’s assessment of risk and reward, where 
commitment and compliance are based on utilitarian values and self-interest. Lastly, 
a volunteer in a charitable organisation which applies normative power would 
usually have a highly positive orientation towards his organisation and a very low 
level of alienation, hence his involvement would be moral. This type of involvement 
is carried by personal conviction, and displays high commitment and belief in the 
organisation and its goals; compliance is voluntary and not dependent on material 
rewards or fear of sanctions.28 
 There are, then, three types of power that may be applied by the 
organisational elites, i.e. coercive, remunerative, and normative, and three types of 
involvement from the lower participants, i.e. alienative, calculative, and moral. 
Taken together, this yields a total of nine possible combinations of power and 
involvement under which an organisation can operate. The combination of power on 
the one hand, and involvement on the other, is known as the ‘compliance 
relationship’ (hence the designation compliance theory), as it is this combination 
which largely determines an organisation’s effectiveness in generating compliance 
in order to achieve its goals. However, it is crucial to note that not all combinations 
are equally effective at generating compliance. In fact, there are three types of 
compliance relationship that are the most functional: a) coercive power and 
alienative involvement, b) remunerative power and calculative involvement, and c) 
normative power and moral involvement. These three types are called congruent 
compliance relationships, and they are the most common simply because they are 
the most effective, as the power employed corresponds to and reinforces the 
involvement of the lower participants, and vice versa (see Fig. 1). Organisations that 
run on other combinations will usually attempt to move towards one of the three 
congruent ones to increase effectiveness; this can be achieved either by changing 
                                                          
28 Etzioni 1964, 60. 
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the type of power applied, or by changing the orientation and thus the involvement 
of the lower participants, e.g. by different methods of recruitment (usually increased 
selectivity) or socialisation.29 
 Most complex organisations, however, do not rely exclusively on one type of 
power, but at times makes use of two or even all three. Nevertheless, one type will 
normally predominate, as often the application of two different means of control 
leads to neutralisation, where the two types cancel each other out (one might 
imagine a prison relying equally on coercive and normative power).30 In terms of 
classification, then, organisations will be defined according to the type of power they 
rely on primarily. Equally, lower participants are not limited to only one type of 
involvement; acting out of a strong belief and a sense of moral commitment to an 
organisation’s goals on the one hand, and being influenced by financial incentives on 
the other, do not have to be mutually exclusive. Equally, if a lower participant is 
morally involved with an organisation, he or she can still feel alienation towards 
certain aspects of that organisation, such as its means of achieving its goals, or a 
particular style of leadership. Just as with types of power, there is usually a 
predominant or primary type of involvement. Equally, there are combinations that 
might not be as common, effective, or sustainable as others (e.g. a strong alienative 










involvement    
Calculative 
involvement    
Moral 
involvement    
 
                Fig. 1: Possible compliance relationships, highlighting the three congruent combinations 
 
                                                          
29 Etzioni 1975, 12-14, Wesbrook 1980, 247-8. 
30 Etzioni 1975, 6-8, 23: most organisations operate with parts of all three compliance relationships. 
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 Now that we have sketched the outline of compliance theory, our purpose 
requires that we apply it to military organisations in general, and to the Greek Polis 
and Royal armies of the ancient Mediterranean in particular.31 As we have noted 
earlier, every army is an organisation, and as such we can identify both the 
predominant types of power exercised by the organisational elites (kings, warlords, 
generals, officers, and magistrates), and the types of involvement on the parts of the 
lower participants (the soldiers). It might be helpful to consider briefly some 
relatively modern examples before moving on to the armies of the ancient past. 
 To illustrate an organisation of the coercive-alienative type, we might turn to 
the armies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, such as those of the 
British Empire or Frederick the Great: these were marked by forced recruitment, 
frequent physical sanctions (flogging, executions), and the use of force to ensure 
compliance on the battlefield. The tactics of the time reflect this approach, as 
columns, lines, and squares of men moving and acting in unison, wearing bright 
colours and gathered around prominent standards, are more easily controlled and 
coerced by their sergeants and commanding officers. On the soldiers’ parts, 
alienation was relatively high, and compliance a result not of conviction, but of 
compulsion; this is supported by comparatively high rates of desertion.32 A more 
recent illustration of this dynamic can be found in interviews conducted with 
captured members of the Iraqi army that fought the coalition forces during the 2003 
operation Iraqi Freedom: the prisoners of war indicated that their main motivator was 
coercion through fear.33 Next, the mercenary armies of Renaissance Europe can 
serve as an example of the remunerative-calculative type: the condottieri attracted 
followers with promises of wages, plunder, and ransom money, and compliance in 
such organisations was stable as long as the rewards justified the risk. Once the 
danger no longer seemed worth the remuneration, or once the money had run out, 
                                                          
31 For a detailed application of Etzioni’s theory to modern western armies, see Wesbrook 1980; 
Crowley 2012 used Wesbrook’s model as a basis for his analysis of the Classical Athenian hoplite. 
32 Wesbrook 1980, 249. Another example where coercion led to high desertion rates was the German 
army in Western Europe during World War II: the highest proportion of deserters was found among 
those forced into military service (Shils & Janowitz 1948, 285). 
33 Wong et al. 2003, 6-9; the study does not indicate how representative such responses were. 
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disintegration was swift: the men either deserted or switched sides, often turning to 
brigandage and looting (cf. the sack of Rome in 1527).34 Finally, most modern armies 
of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries can be described as belonging to the 
normative-moral type. In most developed societies, it is no longer viable to attract 
soldiers on a mass-scale simply with promises of pay and adventure alone, as the 
dangers and depredations of war are such as to deter most people. In addition, for a 
calculative mindset, peacetime endeavours offer many other safer and more 
lucrative options. Equally, the coercive-alienative model is problematic nowadays, 
as societies generally hold the belief that it is wrong to force men and women to 
fight; moreover, the realities of the dispersed modern battlefields are extremely ill-
suited to effectively controlling the behaviour of one’s combatants through physical 
coercion.35 This makes recourse to normative power the most effective option to 
attract volunteers and to ensure their continued commitment to the army’s goals 
throughout their careers as professional soldiers. 
 Turning to the Greek armies of the ancient Mediterranean, this study will 
argue that Polis armies operated on a predominantly normative-moral compliance 
relationship, and that Royal armies operated on a predominantly remunerative-
calculative one. In other words, to generate compliance with their demands, Polis 
armies relied primarily on the moral involvement of their citizen soldiers, which was 
mainly reinforced by the application of normative power. Soldiers in Royal armies, 
on the other hand, were predominantly calculatively involved, a situation which was 
reinforced by the exertion of remunerative power. This fundamental difference can 
help to explain the various degrees of loyalty and commitment we find in the 
respective organisations: in Polis armies, men complied because they believed it was 
the right thing to do and in response to symbolic expressions of normative power, 
such as the civic ideology of sacrifice for one’s native land. This ensured relatively 
                                                          
34 Wesbrook 1980, 249. See Mallett & Shaw 2012, 209-11 for several examples and a discussion of the 
importance of payment in the armies of the Italian Wars. Nevertheless, there are also instances of 
extreme loyalty of mercenaries to their condottiere, as in the case of the murdered Boldrino de 
Panicale: his men carried his remains with them for two years in their quest for revenge (Mallett 1974, 
59-60). On condottieri generally, see Trease 1970. 
35 Wesbrook 1980, 250-1. 
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high levels of loyalty. In Royal armies, compliance was secured by the provision of 
material rewards in response to the soldiers’ demands for payment and plunder. This 
led to relatively frequent occurrences of disloyalty and noncompliance. These are of 
course highly simplified concepts, and the remaining chapters will make clear that 
often there was considerable overlap between the two models: citizen soldiers were 
just as amenable to the prospects of wealth, and those serving in Royal armies could 
develop strong personal ties of loyalty to their generals or kings. 
 To help us understand these complex motivations of the lower participants, 
and how the nature of the interactions between them and the organisational elites 
impacted on their organisation’s effectiveness, we will need to employ further 
theoretical methods. These will be focused on the individuals themselves, the 
groups they formed, and the wider socio-political system they inhabited. This will 
allow us to set the analysis of the organisational structures against the background 
of the social, cultural, and political world these soldiers lived in. 
 
 
1.3 Small Groups, Big Ideas: Combat Motivation and the Socio-Political System 
 
Analysing the reasons behind men’s and women’s willingness to enter combat and 
kill their enemies is a daunting task. What motivates people to go to war is a highly 
complex and multidimensional web of emotions, ideals, and beliefs, combined with 
external factors, that seems impossible to disentangle satisfactorily. This holds true 
for our own age, and even more so for a period in history dating back some two and 
a half millennia, when completely different social, cultural, and religious attitudes 
dominated the ways people perceived violence, death, and war itself. It is important 
to keep these limitations in mind, and to realise that any investigation will be 
inherently limited and fail to cover every single contributing factor that played its 
part in ancient soldiers’ combat motivation and willingness to comply. 
 One particular danger is to use too narrow an approach and focus on only one 
aspect of combat motivation; this does an injustice to the multiplicity of reasons that 
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underlie the willingness to fight: a ‘holistic approach, combining individual, 
organizational, and social factors with situational ones, offers a more complete 
explanation of combat motivation’.36 Following this piece of advice, we will use 
several paths of inquiry to arrive at a more balanced picture of combat motivation in 
the ancient world. The ‘individual’ and ‘social’ factors will be addressed in the 
following sections on group cohesion and the socio-political system, while the 
‘organisational’ part we have already dealt with using Etzioni’s model of analysing 
organisational compliance patterns. Lastly, we will discuss the ‘situational’ elements 
throughout our discussion of Polis and Royal armies in the remaining chapters of this 
study. 
 The term ‘primary group’ was probably first used in 1909.37 In its simplest 
form, in a military context it denotes a small group of individuals whose 
interdependence and affiliation provide them with the physical and psychological 
support needed to be effective in combat and to sustain their efforts to fight the 
enemy. Group standards are upheld through the internal allocation of non-material 
rewards such as recognition and approval (or contempt and disapproval, depending 
on the situation), whereas the mutual support members can offer each other enables 
them to sustain combat and continue to function as members of their organisation.38 
At its heart, a primary group is a relatively small number of individuals that share a 
bond of dependence and emotional attachment. This can be based on friendship or 
love, or on respect and admiration, or on a set of shared values and beliefs, or on 
various combinations of these elements. This affiliation creates a sense of security, 
loyalty, duty, and obligation to work for the benefit and success of the group, and 
most importantly, to protect it against outside attacks. One soldier has likened these 
effects to familial ties: ‘It is just like a big family. Nothing can come to you without 
going through them first. It is kind of comforting’. Another spoke about the strong 
emotional bonds of trust and obligation he felt towards a member of his primary 
                                                          
36 Kellett 1982, 333, cf. 97. 
37 Kellett 1982, 41, cf. Crowley 2012, 7. For a succinct review of the post-World War II literature on 
cohesion, see Wong et al. 2003, 1-5. 
38 What follows is only an overview; for more detail see Wesbrook 1980, 251-2, Kellett 1982, 97-101, 
and more recently the discussion in Crowley 2012, 5-15. 
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group: ‘That person means more to you than anybody. You will die if he dies. That is 
why I think we protect each other in any situation. I know that if he dies and it was 
my fault, it would be worse than death to me’.39 
 The basic foundation of primary group cohesion is tripartite: it is built on 
interpersonal attraction, interdependence, and normative integration.40 The first of 
these, interpersonal attraction, simply means that the group members like each 
other, responding positively to each other’s characters and displaying a willingness 
to invest energy on each other’s behalf. The exact relationship between cohesion 
and interpersonal attraction, however, is not entirely clear; research in social 
psychology indicates that attraction develops in any group, simply because being a 
member of a group leads to a positive inclination towards other members of the 
same group. It is therefore possible that attraction is a result, and not a cause of 
group membership and identity.41 The second element, interdependence (also 
known as functional or structural integration), means that the group is held together 
and strengthened by the necessity, willingness, or compulsion to perform various 
tasks that are seen to be beneficial to the group itself. The third element, normative 
integration, describes the existence of commonly held values and goals in the group, 
which can be worked towards and can define the basic outlook of the group as a 
whole. Taken together, the interplay between these three basic components largely 
determines the strength of the bonds that hold together the group and affect the 
levels of interaction; different combinations of the components will yield groups of 
varying strength and cohesion. 
 The concept of cohesion itself needs to be further refined. Cohesion can be 
divided into two aspects, social cohesion, and task cohesion: 
 
  
                                                          
39 Wong et al. 2003, 10-11, 13. It is important to note the limitations of this type of material: self-
reporting and anecdotal or impressionistic evidence is of questionable value for establishing causality 
(MacCoun et al. 2005, 4-5); it can also be highly unrepresentative and is often difficult to verify 
scientifically (MacCoun 1993, 285). 
40 Wesbrook 1980, 251-2, Kier 1998, 20. 
41 Kier 1998, 20-21. 
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Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of 
friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group 
is socially cohesive to the extent that its members like each other, prefer 
to spend their social time together, enjoy each other’s company, and feel 
emotionally close to one another. 
 
Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to 
achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group 
with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common 
goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to 
achieve that goal. 
(MacCoun 1993, 291) 
 
There is only limited evidence for a connection between social cohesion and 
effectiveness, whereas it appears that task cohesion is closely bound up with good 
performance.42 Put differently, how well individuals in a group like each other is not 
the deciding factor for how well they perform the tasks set for the group. What 
matters most is the degree to which each member of the group believes in the value 
of achieving a certain goal. Some studies have even shown that strong social 
cohesion can be detrimental to performance.43 The task for any (military) 
organisation, then, lies in generating high levels of task cohesion, i.e. a strong 
commitment in each individual to the overall goals and wellbeing of their 
organisation. How well ancient Greek Polis and Royal armies managed this remains 
to be discussed. 
 There are several other factors that play an important role in creating and 
maintaining the strength of primary groups, namely personnel stability, 
homogeneity, exposure, success, and communication.44 We will briefly discuss each 
of them in turn. 
 Personnel stability is an important requirement for the formation of social 
cohesion. Only if the makeup of a group remains essentially the same is there scope 
for the development of interpersonal attraction and the process of normative 
integration. Constant changes, like the frequent extraction or repeated short-term 
                                                          
42 MacCoun 1993, 292-93. 
43 Kier 1998, 17: ‘the most efficient groups are often those that indulge in the least social activity’. 
44 Wesbrook 1980, 266-8. 
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inclusion of individual members (which is known as ‘turbulence’), have a negative 
impact on group cohesiveness and can lead to alienation and isolation within a 
group.45 Put simply, the more time the members have to get know each other, the 
more potential there is for the formation of bonds of loyalty, affection, and a sense 
of mutual obligation. 
 This factor is closely related to homogeneity. Generally speaking, the 
existence of similarities within a group can have a strong positive effect on 
normative integration as well interpersonal attraction, as they often go hand in hand 
with similar values and outlooks. This usually includes race and ethnicity, social and 
geographical background, gender, age, and occupation. A homogenous group is 
more likely to develop higher levels of social cohesion. It should be noted that the 
positive homogeneity-cohesion correlation does not seem to affect task cohesion 
(and thus performance) in a significant way.46 The abovementioned study of the Iraqi 
army revealed that there was very little cohesion of any type among groups that 
were composed of men from a variety of ethnicities, tribes, and regions; the 
emotional ties that existed were almost exclusively to members of the same tribal or 
regional background. Soldiers consequently reported relatively low levels of 
commitment and obligation to their comrades, which made itself felt in high rates 
of desertion and surrender.47 The importance of homogeneity has been challenged 
on the grounds that modern armies ‘take pride in bringing together disparate 
individuals, submerging individual identities, and creating a group identity’.48 This 
argument, however, easily eliminates itself: where a group identity already exists 
because of homogeneity, there is no need to artificially create it. 
 The third factor, exposure, refers to the group’s exposure to stress and 
external threats, which especially aids the creation of interpersonal attraction or 
social cohesion. Furthermore, if the group can imagine a successful coordinated 
                                                          
45 This was a critical problem for the US forces during the 1970s, who operated a system that replaced 
individuals rather than entire units. The implementation of a new Unit Manning System in 1981 that 
rotated whole units was eventually judged to have failed (MacCoun 1993, 300-1, Kier 1998, 10-11). 
46 MacCoun 1993, 306-7. 
47 Wong et al. 2003, 8. 
48 Kier 1998, 22. 
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effort that would remove the threat, task cohesion can also increase.49 Sharing the 
experience of a dangerous or intensely stressful situation can help to fuse individuals 
together through the cultivation of mutual trust and dependence. The more the 
group has endured together, the more likely it will be to possess strong personal links 
within, which in turn makes it more likely to meet future challenges successfully. 
 This factor is bound up with the next one, success: while exposure to certain 
situations has the effect of strengthening interpersonal attraction regardless of the 
situation’s outcome, sharing in the successful completion of a dangerous task not 
only improves interpersonal attraction, it also greatly boosts functional integration 
and task cohesion. The group learns who is dependable, the members receive 
respect and appreciation for their skill in fulfilling various tasks, and together they 
amass a repository of experience based on success that can boost morale, loyalty, 
and confidence for future operations. This is supported by several studies that not 
only identify a correlation between success and cohesion, but also postulate a causal 
relationship between the two, where success leads to increased cohesion – rather 
than the other way around.50 
 Lastly, communication: regular and intensive communication within the 
group has a positive effect on all of the preceding elements that help to foster group 
cohesion. It helps the members to learn about each other, facilitates the absorption 
of new members and ideas, limits the potential for friction and conflict, aids in 
efficiently fulfilling tasks, and acts as a channel through which the group sets and 
communicates its standards and expectations. 
 It should be evident by now that the circumstances leading to the formation 
of strong primary groups among soldiers are manifold and difficult to measure; some 
form of cohesion manifests itself almost automatically wherever men and women 
are thrown together, but there are several variables that affect the resultant 
intensity, scope, and longevity of such cohesion, and indeed the speed at which it 
                                                          
49 MacCoun 1993, 304-5, with fig. 10-1. 
50 MacCoun 1993, 294, 303-4 (indicating that both social and task cohesion can be affected), and Kier 
1998, 13. Also Shils & Janowitz 1948, 287-88, who highlight the interrelatedness of communal 
experience, success, and personnel stability. 
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forms.51 Nevertheless, powerful primary groups and the comprehensive support and 
protection they can provide to their members are still seen to play a crucial role in 
determining a soldier’s will to fight (although this willingness must not be confused 
with effectiveness).52 
 There are, however, serious problems inherent in the theory of the 
importance of primary groups. As these have been discussed in detail elsewhere, for 
our purposes it suffices to deal with the most striking one: the transformation of a 
primary group into a so-called defensive group.53 
 Seen from the eyes of an army’s organisational elites, it is, ironically, the very 
strength of the primary group itself that poses the greatest threat to its compliance 
relationship. Under the right circumstances, social cohesion, or the psychological 
bonds of loyalty and friendship that hold a group together and enable it to sustain 
combat can be turned against the military organisation it is supposed to be serving. 
If the soldiers view the demands placed on them by their superiors as threatening 
the survival of their group, it is precisely the close attachment and sense of mutual 
obligation to protect each other that can lead them to act in opposition to the 
organisation of which they are a part. The authority that puts the group in danger 
might be seen as disruptive, illegitimate, coercive, or even murderous, and as such it 
poses a threat to its continuous existence. This can spell havoc for compliance 
patterns, as the group might begin to resist orders, passively or actively.54 Socially 
cohesive primary groups can even discourage zealous soldiering: members who 
                                                          
51 Cf. Kier 1998, 8. 
52 As argued by Wong et al. in their 2003 study of combat motivation among US soldiers deployed in 
operation Iraqi Freedom. The analysis concluded that cohesion was a critical factor in determining the 
soldiers’ willingness to fight. The work has been challenged by MacCoun et al. 2005, although they 
misrepresent the study’s purpose in claiming that it seeks to explain combat effectiveness, when in 
reality it is concerned with combat motivation (cf. the response in Wong 2006). 
53 Crowley 2012, 11-15, Strachan 2006, 211-13. One issue is the rapid erosion of primary groups in 
sustained combat; there are several examples of units continuing to fight long after the original 
primary groups have been largely depleted, which suggests there are other, equally important factors 
at work in maintaining combat motivation. See also Kier 1998, 11-19, arguing that there is no 
significant correlation between cohesion and performance. 
54 Wesbrook 1980, 256-9, Fennell 2014, 804, Strachan 2006, 213. An extreme form of such refusal is 
‘fragging’ – the assassination of fellow soldiers (usually superior or non-commissioned officers). This 
phenomenon was particularly frequent during the Vietnam War, with almost 800 incidents (Kier 1998, 




display a strong desire for action, or who tend to go beyond what could be called the 
normal requirements of duty, can also be seen as a threat to the group’s survival.55 
Intensive in-group communication can also have a negative effect, by legitimising 
and enabling behaviour such as individual or collective desertion.56 In such a 
situation, the affiliated members have turned into a defensive group, which can no 
longer be relied upon to carry out its orders to achieve the organisational goals. 
 Primary groups, then, are a double-edged sword. The key to their strength 
lies in their overall cohesion, but it is this cohesion that may cause noncompliance. 
When loyalties are tested and a choice has to be made between protecting the 
group’s interests and carrying out orders that threaten them, individuals might 
choose the group over the organisation. It is in this context that Etzioni’s concept of 
power and involvement becomes essential. So far, we have looked at primary groups 
in a one-dimensional manner by only discussing their types of cohesion. An equally 
important factor, however, is the type of a group’s involvement with its organisation: 
alienative, calculative, or normative. This will largely determine whether the social 
cohesion that fuels the group’s efforts will also lead to task cohesion, and thus to 
compliance with organisational aims. 
 It is vital to understand that social cohesion alone does not automatically 
make for effective combat performance or loyal soldiers; it merely ensures that any 
action taken by the group will be more effective, but it does not determine the 
nature of the action.57 ‘Cohesion is like a pipe through which any kind of normative 
content may flow. The higher the peer cohesion, the better the flow, but the 
substance communicated is not determined thereby’.58 It is easy to see how the 
different types of involvement could impact on the behaviour of a cohesive primary 
group: one that is alienated from its organisation will actively or passively resist it 
and look primarily to its own interest. A group that is calculatively involved might go 
either way, depending on the exact situation and the weighing up of risk, reward, 
                                                          
55 Kellett 1982, 101-4. 
56 As reported by German deserters who stated they only felt able to desert after talking the step over 
with their comrades and receiving approval or acquiescence (Shils & Janowitz 1948, 286). 
57 Kier 1998, 8. 
58 Etzioni 1975, 283. 
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and the potential for success. A group that is morally involved, however, might be 
able to comply in spite of the dangers to itself: as moral involvement rests on strong 
commitment and a positive orientation to the organisation, compliance would be 
desired if it is seen to contribute to securing organisational goals – the benefit of the 
group and that of the organisation are equated.59 Moral commitment, consequently, 
comes closest to generating task cohesion. The type of involvement that is present 
in an organisation’s lower participants is thus of crucial importance: hence this study 
combines models of compliance theory and combat motivation. If cohesion is the 
weapon, involvement is the hand that wields it. 
 There are of course other forces besides primary groups that form part of the 
complex structure of combat motivation and loyalty. And not all of them are to be 
found within the military organisation itself. Some, like the socio-political system 
into which most armies are embedded, exert their influence in ways less direct, but 
at least equally important. As Wesbrook has argued, the existence of moral 
commitment to a socio-political system can sustain the combat motivation of troops 
who might otherwise lack the support of a primary group.60 In other words, forces 
with the ability to influence the type of involvement in an organisation’s lower 
participants can have the greatest impact on their compliance patterns. To 
understand this, we must look in more detail at the concept of the socio-political 
system itself, as throughout this study it will be shown to play the most fundamental 
role in a Polis army’s compliance relationship. 
 The basic proposition of this theory is that the more involved soldiers are with 
their socio-political system, the more effectively they will perform in combat. To 
borrow an image from Crowley, the socio-political system forms a layer surrounding 
not only the soldier, but also his primary group.61 It fulfils similar normative functions 
to the primary group, albeit on a larger scale and further removed from the 
individual. And in contrast to the small group, which is based entirely on one’s 
immediate human surroundings, the socio-political system operates almost 
                                                          
59 Wesbrook 1980, 251. 
60 Wesbrook 1980, 260. 
61 Crowley 2012, 18, fig. 3. 
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exclusively on the abstract level. Its presence on the battlefield is limited to the inside 
of a soldier’s mind.62 
 Three main components characterise a socio-political system: socio-political 
identity, socio-political ideology, and the system’s effectiveness as viewed by its 
members.63 The first aspect depends on the strength of the community and its 
ability to build and maintain a sense of shared identity and belonging to a larger 
whole that transcends yet contains a soldier’s group. This process is stimulated by 
high levels of social interaction and political participation, as well as the existence of 
stable societal parameters that define the system’s members in opposition to the 
outside world. The second aspect, ideology, is closely connected to the first one; 
national, or socio-political identity can be reinforced by the cultivation of an ideology 
that supports and amplifies the salient elements that are contained within the 
identity itself. This usually means ‘a shared set of values, beliefs, and practices 
concerned with social and political life that define what is right and proper’.64 The 
third aspect depends on whether or not the system is perceived to be effective in 
meeting the needs of its members, be they social, religious, or political. A positive 
perception augments commitment to and belief in both the shared identity and 
ideology, and results in a stronger moral involvement with the entire socio-political 
system. A negative perception, on the other hand, can create alienation, and 
distances the members from the system; in extreme cases this can lead to rejection, 
and ultimately to attempts to subvert and change the system. 
 To illustrate this in terms of the ancient world, a polis represents a prime 
example of a socio-political system: it is usually marked by intense social and political 
interaction; it cultivates a civic identity in opposition to members of other political 
units; it promotes a civic ideology (e.g. of unity and sacrifice for the common good); 
it is usually perceived as effective by the majority of its citizens, leading to high levels 
of moral involvement, and thus to increased loyalty to the polis itself. However, 
should the socio-political system’s effectiveness ever be viewed negatively by the 
                                                          
62 Crowley 2012, 80. 
63 Wesbrook 1980, 253-4. 
64 Wesbrook 1980, 253-4. 
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majority of the citizens, or by a group powerful enough to oppose the majority, 
attempts at subversion, most commonly in the form of political infighting (stasis), 
will be the consequence. 
 In an ideal case, however, the socio-political system imbues its members with 
a strong moral commitment to work for its benefit and that of its other members. 
For a morally committed individual, noncompliance with the system’s demands 
would constitute a psychological break with it and with the ties that bind together 
the community, both in physical and in abstract terms. For the military in particular, 
this moral involvement is of the highest importance: if the military organisation is 
seen as an extension of the socio-political system, morally involved soldiers will 
perceive their orders and the origin of their authority as legitimate, usually resulting 
in compliance.65 A strong socio-political system, then, is essential in guiding the type 
of involvement of its lower participants to ensure an alignment between their goals 





It should be evident that cohesion alone does not make for loyal soldiers. To be sure, 
socially cohesive groups will be effective in performing certain tasks, but it is 
ultimately up to the group to decide whether the tasks it performs work for or 
against its organisation. Task cohesion, or the degree to which the group believes in 
the effectiveness and righteousness of achieving a certain objective by performing a 
certain task, can be seen to be of much higher importance: it determines to what 
degree the goals and benefit of the individual and his or her group overlap with those 
of the organisation. Military loyalty, as a consequence, is largely determined by the 
soldiers’ willingness to comply with the demands of their organisational elites, 
regardless of the social dimension of any particular situation. What is more, this 
                                                          
65 Wesbrook 1980, 254. 
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broad picture seems to be confirmed by the material to be discussed in the later 
chapters. 
 For Polis armies, there was certainly intense socialisation that occurred in the 
forms of living and growing up as part of a clearly defined socio-political group, and 
frequent and intense socio-political, religious, and cultural interactions. In Royal 
armies, where we also find high levels of social cohesion owing to the fact that 
groups of soldiers campaigned together for years or decades, or ended up settling in 
the same military colonies, acts of disloyalty were relatively frequent. Yet in terms 
of loyalty, these two types of armies displayed rather different realities: citizen 
armies appear to have been robustly loyal to their polis, whereas in Royal armies acts 
of disloyalty were relatively frequent. The main difference, then, might lie in 
different levels of task cohesion, and here the role of the socio-political system is 
paramount. In its most developed form, it contributed to the moral involvement of 
citizen soldiers, who could thus identify the benefit of the polis with their own. Royal 
armies, on the other hand, had to make do with a much-reduced version: the socio-
political system of these armies was removed and dispersed, geographically and 
psychologically, while the main component was the military one, socio-political 
aspects playing only a secondary role. 
 Yet it would be dangerous to insist on too strong a separation between the 
two models: as we shall see, each army had to overcome its own inherent obstacles 
in generating and maintaining loyalty, and at times they chose similar approaches to 
do so. The ensuing complexities and tensions that characterised the compliance 
relationships of Polis and Royal armies will be explored in the course of this study. 
First, however, it is necessary to present the evidence for the differing levels of 













Now that the theoretical background has been set, this chapter will open up the 
investigation proper, by presenting the basic premise that underlies the approach 
adopted by this study: armies composed of citizens from a polis benefited from a 
much higher degree of loyalty than the armies of the Hellenistic warlords and kings. 
Or, to put it the other way around, Royal armies suffered from acts of disloyalty 
much more frequently than Polis armies. As stated in the introduction, the aim is not 
to create a clear-cut dichotomy between Hellenistic and Classical armies: the 
phenomenon under discussion pertains to Polis armies generally, irrespective of the 
evidence falling before or after the death of a young Macedonian king in 323; as a 
point of contrast I have chosen the Royal armies of the Successor kingdoms, but 
whether other Royal armies fall into the same pattern is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
 To demonstrate this basic premise, we will diachronically analyse several 
instances of disloyalty, such as treachery on the battlefield, bribery, and desertion. 
The emerging patterns should make it clear that we are dealing with fundamentally 
different military organisations. The precise reasons for these differences, however, 
have yet to be fully explored. To this end, we will probe how much explanatory power 
can be derived from the application of modern theoretical models to the behaviour 
of ancient soldiers as we find it presented in our sources. Whenever possible, we will 
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try to gain a deeper understanding of people’s motivations by analysing their 
behaviour using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1: the primary 
group, levels of cohesion, the importance of the socio-political system, and the 
predominant compliance relationships. 
 Beginning with Polis armies, we will note the relative absence of battlefield 
betrayal, a circumstance that went hand in hand with frequent occurrences of 
treachery during stasis. This double-nature of civic armies points to a complex 
layering of motivations and will have to be carefully examined. As we will see, the 
robust cohesion militia forces displayed while on campaign came at the price of 
fierce internal competition that often spilled over into violent civil war. In contrast, 
the discussion of Royal armies will reveal how common disloyalty was in these 
forces, and how both soldiers and generals exploited this dynamic to the full. Lastly, 
desertion and its implications for our assessment of Royal and Polis armies will be 
treated at the end of the chapter. Ultimately, we will draw conclusions as to what 
the predominant compliance relationships in the respective organisations might 
have been, and how this could help us to understand and interpret the behaviour of 
ancient soldiers. For Polis armies, the evidence suggests a normative-moral 
compliance relationship, where acts of disloyalty were rare as they would usually 
harm the interests of both lower participants (the soldiers) and organisational elites 
(officers and generals). For Royal armies, the evidence points towards a 
remunerative-calculative compliance relationship, where disloyalty was a frequent 
occurrence – owing to the unreliable nature of this compliance model, where the 
interests of the elites and lower participants often opposed each other. 
 
 
2.2 United We Stand, Divided We Open the Gates: Disloyalty in Polis Armies 
 
Investigating the levels of loyalty within an ancient Greek polis is a complicated 
matter. There seems to be an apparent paradox confronting us: one the one hand, 
we have the image of the unified polis, represented by its citizen body, its 
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institutions, and its civic and religious culture. This image is projected in various 
sources, such as civic oaths that had to be taken by young (male) members of society 
on the verge of becoming adults, or speeches of various contexts, attesting to the 
united spirit of the polis and the unanimity that pervades the citizen body.66 
 
I shall not disgrace the sacred weapons that I bear nor shall I desert the comrade at my 
side […], I shall not hand down a lessened fatherland, but one that is increased in size 
[…], and I shall be obedient to those who on any occasion are governing prudently […], 
and I shall honour the sacred rites that are ancestral. 
(Athenian ephebic oath, GHI 88, 1-16) 
 
The emphasis is on civic cohesion and loyalty in the face of the enemy, and on 
obedience to the authorities. The oath does not make explicit why the young citizens 
should swear to fight for their fatherland (πάτρα) and uphold its laws, or what they 
might receive in return: the righteousness of their loyalty is taken for granted, their 
oath simply reaffirming a natural state of mind. We see here a proud declaration of 
moral commitment, where compliance is valued as a good in its own right, not as a 
service in exchange for rewards: the young Athenians were expected to fight and 
obey because it was the right thing to do. Their commitment was supposed to 
transcend blind obedience. Ideally, their involvement should lead them to obey only 
those who governed ἐμφρόνως, or reasonably: this assumes an ideal form of polis 
and government that all citizens should envision and adhere to, enabling them to 
oppose those who subverted it. Compliance and unity go hand in hand. 
 In contrast, there is the image of the divided polis, where civic strife, 
disloyalty, treachery, and bloody violence are presented as common occurrences. 
We find this situation at its most obvious in the many examples of increasingly 
violent stasis recorded in historiographical works such as Thucydides, but it also 
pervades Aineias Taktikos’ fourth-century military manual on surviving a siege, 
where most of his advice revolved around the need to prevent disloyal elements 
                                                          
66 Another example of this overt unanimity is the democratic decision-making process itself, which 
according to Canevaro 2018a (forthcoming) was based on creating consensus, and not simply on 
majority rule: as evidence, he points out that Hellenistic inscriptions containing actual numbers on 
the deliberative process all record unanimous, or nearly unanimous, results. 
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within the city from starting a revolution or making contact with the enemy.67 This 
double nature, of unity on the one hand and division on the other, will be the focus 
of this section. First, we will demonstrate that Polis armies practically never 
fractured internally when on campaign or deployed for battle; methodologically, this 
will be achieved by pointing to the absence of evidence: our sources simply do not 
record any significant events of such a nature. The fallacy of ‘absence of evidence is 
not evidence of absence’ will be avoided by discussing those episodes that seem to 
reveal treachery in Polis armies: looked at more closely, however, each of them can 
be shown to fit into the pattern of cohesive citizen armies. Secondly, we will discuss 
the flip side: stasis and its effects on civic loyalty. The aim is not to present both 
realities as mutually exclusive, but to connect them as two sides of the same coin: 
citizens’ deep involvement with their socio-political system was a main cause both 
for the maintenance of military loyalty when a polis was under effective 
government, but also for the breakdown of civic cohesion once political battle-lines 
had been drawn.68 
 To begin with Herodotos: he preserves several episodes of potential 
treachery on the battlefield, but all of them can be explained by understanding their 
political background. We learn, for example, that in 506 the Peloponnesian army led 
by the Spartan kings Demaratos and Kleomenes disintegrated before giving battle 
because the Corinthians refused to comply, followed quickly by the departure of 
Demaratos himself.69 Each citizen force maintained its internal cohesion, and while 
the Corinthians’ decision to desert the allied army could be seen as disloyalty to the 
Spartans, it nevertheless reflects a unified citizen body (even if not every single 
Corinthian soldier opposed the campaign). Moreover, the breaking up of the Spartan 
army was not treachery, but a political move by Demaratos to discredit his colleague: 
the two were bitter rivals.70 Another example of a Greek coalition force breaking 
                                                          
67 Examples of this ‘Janus-motif’ (Whitehead 2001, 25): Aen. Tact. 1.3, 1.6-7, 2.1, 2.7-8, 3.3, 9.2 (cf. 
23.3), 10.3, 10.5-6, 10.7, 10.15, 10.20, 10.23-25, 10.25-26, 17.1-5, 18.2, 22.4-10, 22.12-13, 22.19, 23.6-
11, 30.1. 
68 On this dynamic and the inherent tensions at the heart of civic ideology and norms, see chapter 5 
in Gray 2015. 
69 Hdt. 5.75.1. 
70 Hdt. 6.51, 64-65. 
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apart dates to the battle of Salamis during the Ionian Revolt in 498: the Cretan allied 
army fell apart after first the Kourians and their king left the battle, and then the 
Salaminians and their chariots followed suit, enabling the Persians to gain victory.71 
Once more we see that individual polis contingents act together, and the fissures in 
the allied army ran along clearly defined lines, with each polis acting as one. 
 Herodotos recounts another instance from the Ionian revolt: at the naval 
engagement at Lade in 494, the Samians decided to abandon the Ionian alliance 
after witnessing the unwillingness of the Ionians to train and considering the odds 
stacked against them. Their ships sailed away just as the battle commenced, 
resulting in a quick rout. However, eleven of the Samian trierarchs decided to stay 
and fight, and were later awarded a stele in the Samian agora to commemorate their 
bravery.72 The Persians, for their part, rewarded the Samians for their treachery (in 
Herodotos’ words, διὰ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τῶν νεῶν, an unusual way to describe 
desertion) by sparing their temples; they still supported the return of the tyrant 
Aiakes, which prompted many of the aristocrats who opposed him to emigrate.73 
This might help to explain the motivation of the eleven trierarchs: they would have 
been part of the elite, and were probably among Aiakes’ political opponents. Their 
behaviour then, might have been caused by political opposition to Aiakes and the 
Persians, both of whom threatened their own power at home. Defeating the 
Persians in battle was their best chance at winning their independence. Together 
with the voluntary exile of some aristocrats to escape Aiakes, this points to deep 
political tensions at the time of the battle, which is not surprising given that it 
occurred during a wide-spread rebellion from the Persian Empire that could easily 
polarise factional politics. 
 Herodotos also preserves the story of the shield signal that was supposedly 
sent to the Persians by the Alkmaionidai after the battle of Marathon in 490, but 
refuted it decidedly; despite much scholarly discussion, nothing could ever be 
                                                          
71 Hdt. 5.113. 
72 Hdt. 6.13-14. 
73 Hdt. 6.22, 25. 
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proven.74 At any rate, this episode, if historical at all, did not occur in battle or on 
campaign, and should be treated as a political manoeuvre, not military betrayal. Yet 
Greek terminology makes no such clear distinction between military or political 
disloyalty: προδίδωμι is used to describe the betrayal of a city as well as the 
acceptance of earth and water from the Persians.75 Herodotos offers two more 
examples of treachery during a battle: as the fight at Thermopylai was drawing to its 
close, the Thebans quickly surrendered to the Persians, professing to have been 
forced along against their own wishes.76 Again, we can see a polis force acting as 
one: the coalition was broken, but not its individual components. Lastly, we are told 
that after the battle of Mykale, the Milesians betrayed and attacked the fleeing 
Persians; in this case, the division ran along ethnic and political lines, with the 
Milesian soldiers seemingly united in the desire to turn on their erstwhile masters.77 
Herodotos, then, offers no clear example of a citizen army fracturing and turning on 
itself or joining the enemy. As we now turn to the evidence from Thucydides, the 
close connection between polis politics and army loyalty will be equally apparent. 
 Thucydides records only three relevant episodes involving treachery – apart 
from simply being extremely rare, considering the length of his historiographical 
work, this is even more significant as he was dealing with what was arguably the 
most fractious period of inter-polis politics and warfare, which ‘led to acts of unusual 
brutality and cruelty, desecration of religious sites and rituals, and overall disregard 
for the genuinely Hellenic customs, codes of morality and civic loyalty’.78 
At the Battle of Tanagra in 457, a Spartan-led force of Peloponnesians and 
Boiotians fought against an Athenian coalition, including their allies the Thessalians, 
who sent a contingent of horsemen. At some point the Thessalian cavalry defected 
                                                          
74 Hdt. 6.115, 121-24; for an overview of the debate, see Gillis 1969, arguing that the Alkmaionidai 
were certainly the most likely to medise; for a discussion of the persistence of their supposed 
treachery, see Athanassaki 2013. 
75 Hdt. 8.128.1-2, 6.49.3. 
76 Hdt. 7.233. 
77 Hdt. 9.104. 
78 Price 2004, 4. 
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to the Spartans, who subsequently won the battle.79 Thucydides uses the verb 
μεθίστημι to describe the defection, while Diodoros has μεταβάλλω. There seems 
to have been no specific term for defection during a battle; instead we find generic 
terms for ‘changing sides/place’ or ‘turning around’ – below we will see a similarly 
general approach to terminology when it comes to desertion. The motivations for 
this betrayal are obscure; Thessaly had been successfully allied with Athens in the 
past, and there was deep-seated hostility between Sparta and Thessaly.80 Whatever 
the precise cause, we should note that it involved two separate political entities, i.e. 
Athens (and her allies) and Thessaly: yet again the rupture is not within one Polis 
army, but between separate citizen militias, each representing their own political 
organisation. The internal cohesion of the Thessalian cavalry is attested by their 
united defection. 
In the context of Tanagra, we should also mention Plutarch’s biography of 
Kimon: he adds the detail that Kimon, recently exiled, offered to fight alongside his 
deme Oineis, but the generals were instructed by the council not to accept his aid, 
fearing that he might secretly join the Spartans and lead them against Athens.81 
Taking into account that Plutarch in this chapter was concerned with making a point 
about how in the olden days the common good overrode personal enmity, we can 
still make two observations: one, even as an exile, Kimon offered to fight alongside 
his demesmen, which hints at the personal bonds and feelings of affiliation that 
existed between them. Secondly, the story implies that it was possible to imagine 
Kimon and his supporters turning traitors on the battlefield, routing the remaining 
Athenians, and then returning to Athens backed by the Spartans. A Polis army 
                                                          
79 Thuc. 1.102.4, 107.2-7, cf. Hdt. 9.35.2 and Diod. Sic. 11.79.5-80.2, who is our only source for the 
Thessalian cavalry attack on an unsuspecting Athenian supply convoy (Green 20o6, 158 n. 324; for the 
problems of Diodoros’ use of Ephoros as a source for books 11-15, see Andrewes 1985). The sequence 
of the battle is not entirely clear, but possibly it involved an indecisive initial engagement followed by 
an evening meal; the Thessalians ate early and managed to surprise the Athenian convoy who 
assumed they were still their allies. A second encounter then took place which was ended by nightfall. 
For more details, see Reece 1950, Walters 1978 (on a second battle at Tanagra), Roisman 1993 (esp. 
84 n. 46 for bibliography), and Plant 1994 (arguing that the Spartans were not brought to battle by 
accident). 
80 Cf. Morrison 1942, 59-62: ‘Spartan hostility to Thessaly is a permanent factor in Greek history for 
the [fifth] century’. 
81 Plut. Cim. 17.2-6. 
44 
 
turning on itself might not have been as inconceivable as the absence of evidence 
for it occurring might at first suggest, and the reason is the usual: internal political 
division. 
In fact, the detrimental effects of political infighting can be witnessed in 
another instance recorded by Thucydides: during the stasis at Corcyra in 427, the 
democrats managed to secure a victory that led to an uneasy settlement enforced 
by the Athenians; eventually a Peloponnesian fleet arrived, and the ensuing naval 
engagement commenced with the desertion of two Corcyraean ships to the 
Peloponnesians, while other vessels were rendered ineffective owing to division 
among the crews.82 Here we seem to have an example of citizens of the same polis 
(Corcyra) facing a foreign enemy (the Peloponnesians) betraying each other and 
defecting to the opposing side during an engagement. This battle occurred a mere 
seven days after the two factions in the stasis were fighting each other; the 
democrats came out on top, but further bloodshed was only prevented by the arrival 
of the Athenian general Nikostratos.83 The effects of this violent clash were still 
simmering, then, when the Peloponnesian ships arrived.84 It seems that stasis was a 
prime factor in any treachery among polis forces. 
The last example from Thucydides is slightly cryptic: he informs us that in 
424/3, Brasidas, en route to Amphipolis, was able to overcome a small force guarding 
a bridge over the Strymon owing to stormy weather, surprise, and treachery in their 
ranks.85 The Greek text is unclear: the word used by Thucydides is προδοσία (a 
cognate of προδίδωμι), generically meaning ‘treachery’ or ‘betrayal’. He also tells us 
that the neighbouring polis of Argilos desired control of Amphipolis. Hence they 
colluded with compatriots in Amphipolis and arranged to betray the city from within 
and admit Brasidas’ force.86 This makes it probable that the treachery among the 
troops at the bridge was carried out by accomplices of Argilos, either metics (i.e. 
citizens of Argilos) who lived in Amphipolis, or individuals who had joined the colony 
                                                          
82 Thuc. 3.75-77.2. 
83 Thuc. 3.75.4. 
84 Rawlings III 1978, 135 n. 7. 
85 Thuc. 4.103.5. 
86 Thuc. 4.103.1-4. 
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at its founding under Hagnon some thirteen years earlier, in 437/6, relinquishing their 
citizenship from Argilos to adopt that of the new polis.87 Thus, if the traitors were 
outsiders, most likely from Argilos, we are not faced with the soldiers of one polis 
betraying each other, but with an act of betrayal between two separate socio-
political entities – Argilos and Amphipolis. In addition, if the traitors were indeed 
citizens of Amphipolis who had been enfranchised at the polis’ foundation, the story 
suggests that thirteen years were not enough to erode the affiliations these 
individuals had with the polis into which they had been born. This would fit well with 
the general point we have made about the importance of the intense socialisation 
that occurs in the socio-political context of polis life. Nothing more on treachery, 
however, is to be gained from Thucydides: based on his evidence, we would have to 
conclude that during the Peloponnesian War, citizen armies in the field were 
extremely robust, maintaining their loyalty to their states and commanders at least 
until the return to the political arena at home. 
The evidence from Xenophon is equally sparse. In 409, the colonists of 
Herakleia Trachinia were arrayed against their enemies the Oitaians when they were 
somehow betrayed by the Achaians of Phthiotis, resulting in the deaths of some 
seven hundred Herakleians and the Spartan garrison commander.88 No further 
details are provided, and once more the Greek word for the betrayal, προδίδωμι, 
allows no insight into how or why it took place; but we know that there was long-
standing enmity between the colonists and the Achaians of Phthiotis: the latter were 
first excluded from joining the (re-)foundation in 426, and in 413 king Agis had 
extorted hostages from them.89 They did not betray their own army, but an old 
enemy and rival: this points to the cohesion among both communities and a sense 
of shared memory, history and honour that informed their actions. 
                                                          
87 Thucydides (4.103.4) used the ambiguous term τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας to describe those in 
Amphipolis who collaborated with Argilos. See CT ad loc. for discussion. It is also possible that an 
Athenian citizen was killed in the betrayal at the bridge: the casualty list IG I² 949 (= IG I³ 1184, cf. 
Bradeen & Lewis 1979, 244) has been dated to 423 based on the appearance of one casualty from 
Amphipolis (Bradeen 1969, 155-56): ἐμ Ἀμφιπόλει· | Φιλόφρον (44-45). 
88 Xen. Hell. 1.2.18. 
89 Thuc. 3.92.5, 8.3.1 
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So far, then, we have seen that betrayal in Polis armies always had a political 
dimension, and there are no examples of citizens troops defecting during a battle to 
fight against their own side. This is precisely what we would expect if the 
predominant type of involvement among the lower participants was indeed moral: 
compliance was seen as a good in its own right, was normally voluntary, and rested 
on the belief that one’s own goals were aligned with those of the military 
organisation one fought for. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the wars 
of the Classical period contain no blatant examples of noncompliance in Polis armies. 
Going beyond our primary historiographical sources for polis warfare, we 
might expect to find evidence for citizens betraying each other on the battlefield in 
Polyainos’ collection of military stratagems, which is replete with deception and 
surprises. But again we are disappointed: the closest we get is the story of the 
Thespians who were unwilling to fight at Leuktra in 371, for which reason 
Epameinondas let them withdraw before the battle.90 According to Pausanias, the 
Theban general feared the Thespians might desert during the battle, and thus 
allowed them to leave (followed by other Boiotian contingents).91 However, there 
was a century-old hostility between Thebes and Thespiai: the Thebans had informed 
the Persian army of Thespiai’s refusal to medise, upon which Xerxes ordered the city 
burned to the ground; moreover, the Thespians had died alongside the Spartans at 
Thermopylai, and Theban envy eventually led them to tear down the walls of 
Thespiai after the city was left defenceless by its high losses at the battle of Delion 
in 424.92 After the battle of Nemea, Thespiai allied with Sparta; little wonder, 
therefore, that they were reluctant to follow Theban orders at Leuktra.93 This is 
evidence for the longevity of political rivalries between various poleis, but not for 
disloyalty among a citizen army. 
In another stratagem, we learn that the Spartan Kleandridas tricked the 
Terinaians who were arrayed against him into believing they had traitors in their 
                                                          
90 Polyaenus, Strat. 2.3.3. 
91 Paus. 9.13.8. 
92 Hdt. 7.202, 8.50; Thuc. 4.96.3, 133.1. 
93 Xen. Hell. 5.4.10. 
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army, which prompted them to retreat to defend their nearby city.94 For this to have 
worked, it must at least have been a possibility that part of the Terinaian army would 
turn on the rest, to be joined by the Spartans. In this case, the word προδότης would 
then refer to actual traitors on the battlefield, just as it could refer to the betrayal of 
all Greece when applied to those who joined the Persians during Xerxes’ invasion.95 
But the fact that they are reported as immediately retreating back to defend their 
city implies that the treachery was expected to take place in the city itself, perhaps 
in the form of a coup, or someone opening the gates during a siege. Indeed, 
Kleandridas also managed to dupe the Tegean oligarchs into betraying their polis to 
him by similar trickery: exploiting the political tension inside the city, he spared the 
elite’s property outside the city, which made the demos suspicious, and caused the 
oligarchs to betray the city to save themselves.96 Once more the close connection 
between internal politics and treason is manifest. 
Epigraphic evidence pertaining to Hellenistic poleis seems to support the 
general impression that citizen armies were relatively resistant to betrayal from 
within, but with this type of evidence we again encounter the problem of the double 
nature of civic cohesion: public inscriptions are more likely to project an image of 
unity and cohesion than list the instances of betrayal. For example, an honorific 
inscription from Apollonia Pontike, dated to the first half of the second century, 
records a war with the neighbouring city of Mesembria, in which it was aided by allies 
from Istros and elsewhere; the conflict ended in Apollonia’s favour, hence the 
honorific inscription for Hegesagoras, the general sent from Istros.97 The text 
presents each civic army as a loyal and cohesive force, and Hegesagoras as a 
courageous and competent general, but provides only the roughest outline of the 
campaign. On the face of it this fits well with the evidence from the Classical period, 
but it is important to bear in mind the possibility that acts of treachery might have 
been omitted to preserve the outward image of a united polis. A perhaps more 
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realistic picture is offered by an inscription from Dreros on Crete, dated to c. 220: it 
records a civic oath to be taken during a war with Lyttos. The citizens have to swear 
not to betray (προδωσεῖν) the city, forts, or inhabitants of Dreros or its ally 
Knossos.98 We might dismiss this fear of betrayal as owing to the immediate dangers 
of an ongoing war, but a similar oath – not to betray the city, territory, ships, citizens, 
or their possessions, and not to admit an enemy into their land – was sworn in Itanos, 
without the pressing concern of a war.99 
It is apparent that treachery from within was as tangible a threat as it was 
during the Peloponnesian War, and the overriding concern seems to have been the 
same: to prevent political disloyalty that might lead to the capture of the city by 
opening the gates. Neither oath mentions betrayal of the army on the battlefield, 
but both make a powerful point of political conspiracies: the oath from Dreros 
invokes a painful death and a list of curses for anyone who causes stasis, or who 
forms or participates in a conspiracy (συνω<μ>οσίας), or who fails to report one; in 
Itanos, the citizens swear not to plan or join a conspiracy (συνωμο[σίαν]), and 
immediately to report any such behaviour.100 This tendency to prioritise concern for 
political betrayal over fear of military disloyalty in the army indicates that the latter 
was indeed uncommon, both in Classical as well as in Hellenistic Polis armies, and 
that the real danger came from political factions colluding with outside forces to 
effect a change of government. 
The overview presented so far should make it clear that disloyalty among 
citizen armies was not a common occurrence. No clear-cut examples survive, and 
when we encounter treachery, we find upon closer inspection that it involved two or 
more separate political entities: the individual armies acted as one without 
disintegrating. Polis militias, it seems, were somehow able to maintain army loyalty 
and unit cohesion for the duration of a campaign, regardless of any internal dissent 
in the army or political opposition at home, which existed in virtually every city-state. 
                                                          
98 Syll.³ 527 (= Austin 109), 49-60: καὶ μήτε τὰμ πόλιν προδωσεῖν τὰν τῶν Δρηρίων, μήτε οὐρεῖα 
τὰ τῶν Δρηρίων μηδὲ τὰ τῶγ Κν[ω]σίων, μηδὲ ἄνδρας τοῖς πολεμίοις προδωσεῖν μήτε Δρηρίους 
μήτε Κνωσίους. 
99 Syll.³ 526 (= Austin 108, dated to the beginning of the third century), 9-16. 
100 Syll.³ 527, 60ff. (Dreros); Syll.³ 526, 16-21 (Itanos). 
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It is extremely important to stress that the absence of such overt disloyalty does not 
mean that all citizens were permanently of one mind, or that every soldier agreed 
with the goals of the campaign, his government at home, or the individuals in 
command. Rather, a polis’ socio-political organisation appears to have been of such 
a nature as to prevent disloyalty and disintegration of its army while on campaign, 
containing any misgivings and channelling its members’ energies into achieving the 
task at hand. This points towards relatively high levels of task cohesion among 
citizen armies: regardless of social cohesion – which might be strong or weak 
depending on the various political and social constellations – Polis armies generally 
managed to act as one in attempting to achieve the goals set by their organisation. 
This is even more noteworthy – not to say paradoxical – considering that we have 
extensive evidence of how little cohesion of any kind there was at times: poleis 
regularly fell into violent stasis that saw members of the same state betraying and 
killing each other in order to secure control of the city. 
Moreover, there are countless examples of besieged cities being betrayed to 
an outside enemy by a group of conspirators within, usually comprised of citizens 
desiring a change of government.101 Clearly, members of a single polis were more 
than able to turn on each other for personal gain, and it is difficult to uphold the 
image of a unified citizen body composed of loyal individuals who believed in, and 
acted for, the common good when faced with the many scenes of treachery, 
assassination, murder, and open conflict that so often plagued polis communities 
caught in stasis. More than that, stasis could even resemble open war, akin to the 
conflict between two separate city-states.102 Based on the evidence for betrayal 
during a siege and stasis alone, one would be more than justified in expecting Greek 
armies on the march to exhibit equally fractious and treacherous behaviour. After 
all, the ultimate aim of betraying a city to the enemy – to ensure that with the 
                                                          
101 To cite a selection: Hdt. 6.88, 6.101, 8.128; Thuc. 1.55.1, 4.7, 4.49.1, 4.52.3, 4.66-68, 4.76.1-4 and 
89, 4.103, 4.110-12, 4.121.2, 5.3.5, 5.116.3, 6.74.1, 7.48.2, 8.60.1; Xen. Hell. 1.3.16-20, 3.2.27-29; Aen. 
Tact. 4.1-4, 11.3-6, 11.7-10, 28.5; Diod. Sic. 14.15.1-2, 16.53.2-3; for examples from the Hellenistic 
period, e.g. Polyb. 2.55.2-3 (cf. Plut. Cleom. 23-35), 2.57.2-3 (cf. 2.58.4), 5.92.4, 5.96.4-8. 
102 Gehrke 1985, 245. Probably the most famous description of stasis is Thucydides’ analysis of the 
conflict in Corcyra (Thuc. 3.81-85), which according to Price 2004, 13 is a foil for other cases of stasis. 
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besiegers’ help, the traitorous faction could be placed in charge of the city and 
henceforth be loyal to its former enemies (usually after purging the city of political 
opponents, either by execution or exile) – could just as easily be achieved by turning 
traitor on the battlefield and joining the opposing army. The evidence relating to the 
stasis in Corcyra in 427 shows that several hundred citizens had been in league with 
the oligarchs; the sudden defection of so large a force certainly could have been able 
to turn the tide in a battle.103 After defeating the ‘loyalist’ force, the traitors could be 
installed as rulers and left to govern the city in accordance with any negotiations held 
between them and the attackers; foreign involvement in stasis was not unusual: in 
more than two thirds of our cases another polis was implicated in one way or 
another.104 It is obvious that there were disloyal elements within probably every polis 
community, and equally obvious that these elements were willing to use armed 
violence against their fellow citizens or admit/invite an enemy to the city – yet there 
remains the question as to why citizen armies were seemingly unaffected by this 
factionalism and able to avoid disintegration, as they suffered no significant acts of 
disloyalty.105 
One possible explanation is that it could have been too difficult to defect on 
campaign or during a battle. It might be no coincidence that the two clearest cases 
of betrayal, Lade and Corcyra, occurred in naval engagements, where it might have 
been less problematic to organise defection than on land: individual ships were more 
isolated, self-contained, and autonomous – physically and psychologically – than 
groups of men in a large army on firm ground; moreover, there was no equivalent of 
cavalry that could quickly bear down on those trying to defect. Consequently, 
betrayal at sea might have been easier to organise than on land. But in both cases, 
                                                          
103 The democratic leaders were enrolling the suspicious citizens on triremes to be sent away with the 
Athenians, upon which they sought sanctuary at the temple of the Dioskouroi; some four hundred 
more took refuge at the Temple of Hera (Thuc. 3.75.5: these men were almost certainly different from 
those who were to be enrolled on the ships: CT ad loc.). Later, five hundred exiles are mentioned as 
those who managed to flee the city (Thuc. 3.85.1-2, cf. Price 2004, 7 n. 2.). For the large scale of most 
staseis, see Gehrke 1985, 242 with n. 13. 
104 Gehrke 1985, 268. 
105 According to Price 2004, 25, Thucydides’ understanding of war included individuals’ changing 
perceptions of what was acceptable: warfare transformed the rules, resulting in behaviour that would 
have been unimaginable in peacetime. 
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the enemy had to be informed beforehand, signs had to be agreed upon, and terms 
negotiated; all this under the watchful eyes of one’s fellow soldiers. However, very 
similar organisational difficulties faced those who wanted to betray their city to the 
enemy from within: how to get messages in and out, where and how to hold secret 
meetings, how to identify the conspirators to the enemy, how and when to use force, 
how to procure arms and armour, and so on. The betrayal of Siphai to the Athenian 
general Demosthenes failed because of miscommunication, confusion about exact 
dates, and someone turning informer on the plotters.106 In fact, being on the march 
might have made the entire enterprise easier, as the plotters had obvious reasons 
for bearing arms, could camp together, and exploit such things as night watches to 
get messages to the enemy (just as traitorous city guards were one of the main weak 
spots of a city’s defences, at least according to Aineias Taktikos).107 
It appears equally unlikely that switching sides during a battle was generally 
regarded as too dangerous to be attempted, as overall battlefield confusion, nerves, 
bad timing, a last-minute change of plan, or an uninformed enemy could all lead to 
failure or worse – the Thebans who defected at Thermopylai were at first cut down 
by the Persians before it emerged they were attempting to change sides.108 Yet such 
risks did not stop conspirators from betraying their city to the enemy, either. The 
dangers of plotting to hand over a city could be just as life-threatening: the 
conspirators in Sicilian Messana, planning to open the gates to the Athenians, were 
given away by Alkibiades, seized by their fellow citizens and immediately put to 
death.109 Difficulties of this nature alone, therefore, cannot account for the 
contrasting behaviour of would-be traitors within a citizen community. 
Rather, the answer lies in the very nature of a polis’ political and military 
organisation. We have already noted that those cases that came closest to bringing 
citizens to betray each other involved a powerful political element. Where there was 
strong political tension or outright conflict, the willingness to act disloyally was 
                                                          
106 In 424/3: Thuc. 4.76.1-4, 89. 
107 E.g. Aen. Tact. 3.3; he often implicitly assumes the guards to be mercenaries, but in cases like this 
one he is referring directly to citizens posted on the walls. 
108 Hdt. 7.233.2. 
109 Thuc. 6.74.1. 
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greater; it is no coincidence that our only clear case of defection during a battle (the 
two Corcyraean crews) occurred but a few days after a bloody civil war. Conversely, 
this would mean that a city at relative peace with itself could be reasonably confident 
that its troops were less likely to act disloyally.110 In other words, a polis which has 
functioning governing bodies and an intact and effective military organisation would 
be able to send out an army whose loyalty among itself and towards the government 
would not be in question, as there was no stasis and therefore no open division. Only 
where there was factional political infighting would parts of the army consider 
joining the enemy to defeat their rivals and assume power at home. However, as a 
city torn apart by violent internal division would be generally unable to send out 
armies in the first place, we hardly ever hear about citizen armies fracturing while on 
campaign. 
It seems that we are dealing with two types of disloyalty: on the one hand 
military disloyalty, which was extremely rare, and on the other hand political 
disloyalty, which found frequent expression in the many cases of betrayal during a 
siege or violence in a civil war or coup d’état. Conversely, we can imagine two types 
of loyalty: one, a military loyalty, where the army represented a socio-political unit 
that had to be protected regardless of one’s personal feelings towards its current 
internal organisation; the other, a political loyalty, directed not at the state as a 
whole, but at one’s own vision of what that state should be. Betraying the army could 
then be viewed as wrong no matter what, whereas betrayal of the state could be 
justified by portraying one’s fellow-citizens as traitors themselves, as they held a 
fundamentally different view regarding the ideal organisation of communal life.111 
Thus, the absence of military disloyalty represents a polis as a functioning 
socio-political system that can draw on the benefits of its predominant compliance 
relationship to prevent any socio-political oppositions from spilling over into open 
                                                          
110 The ideal opposite to a city in the grip of stasis would be one ruled by homonoia (Price 2004: 62). 
Even Aineias Taktikos could imagine such a state (Aen. Tact. 22.21). 
111 This double-nature conceptualisation of loyalty helps explain the cases of political betrayal of one’s 
city, rather than a strict class-based divide, as suggested by Herman 1987, 156-61, who argued for the 
importance of aristocratic alliances, where the elites from all cities worked together and betrayed 
their ‘inferiors’ (the demos), as they fell outside the concept of xenia-relationships. 
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conflict. The latter represents the temporary breakdown of this system, caused by 
the political factionalism that was itself the result of the intensely competitive 
political interaction and participation characteristic of polis life. Ironically, however, 
it was this very aspect of polis life that was one of the most important factors in 
maintaining the normative-moral compliance relationship that was the hallmark of 
a polis’ organisational structure. The intense socialisation that took place within a 
polis community was at the same time the reason for its cohesion and disintegration: 
either side in a civic conflict could see itself as the legitimate embodiment of its city 
and not as a traitorous faction. An example of how betrayal and an attempt at 
revolution could be depicted as a loyal act to save a society from itself can be found 
in the Thebans’ justification for their attack on Plataia in 431, in which they had help 
from the inside; Thucydides has them argue that the conspirators risked their lives 
for the common good and the freedom of Plataia – hence there was no crime or 
betrayal at all, as their intentions were not mercenary or aimed at personal gain, but 
of a moral nature: after all, they were only trying to save their homeland.112 In this 
case, the moral involvement that citizens felt towards their socio-political system 
was used as a justification for trying to subvert it. In addition, citizens who had been 
exiled during stasis were still able to portray their cause as that of the true state, 
whereas their opposition back home was viewed as alien and hostile – and therefore 
a legitimate target of disruption and violence, carried out if necessary in collusion 
with a former enemy.113 
We can see that civic loyalty and cohesion formed a double-edged sword: if 
a polis was run effectively and did not suffer from disruption owing to stasis, it was 
able to send out an army that would not betray the city or turn on itself. However, if 
the latent political fissures grew too destabilising, disloyal acts ranging from 
assassinations and betraying the city to an enemy, to the eruption of outright civil 
war, became common. This brings us back to the important distinction between task 
cohesion and social cohesion: on a macro-level, a militia army in the field was united 
                                                          
112 Thuc. 3.65; cf. Price 2004, 116, 123. 
113 Gehrke 1985, 224-27. On stasis see further Seibert 1979, Lintott 1982, Loraux 1997, Kalimtzis 2000, 
Wolpert 2002, Forsdyke 2005, Gray 2015. 
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mainly by task cohesion: they had been sent out as a group to achieve a certain goal 
to advance the interests of their state. However, groups within such an army would 
also be united and separated by social cohesion and political affiliations, but these 
divisions did not normally prevent the army from operating effectively (regardless of 
eventual success or failure). Political factionalism and stasis, however, were 
governed more by social cohesion than by task cohesion: joining one side or the 
other depended primarily on the various familial, social, religious, and political 
microcosms that bound groups of citizens to each other. This situation is akin to the 
formation of defensive primary groups in modern armies: strong social cohesion can 
lead to opposition to a group’s organisation if that organisation is perceived as no 
longer serving, or indeed as harming, the interests of the group – at this point the 
group might refuse compliance or actively seek to work against the organisation’s 
structure. Ultimately, this leads to the breakdown of an effective compliance 
relationship, which in turn threatens the entire organisation. A relatively reliable way 
to prevent the formation of defensive groups is to ensure that social cohesion is 
governed by task cohesion: the willingness to achieve the organisation’s goals has 
to override individual opposition and division among the lower participants. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 1, a normative-moral compliance relationship is best 
suited to this task: moral involvement includes an effort to equate the organisation’s 
benefit with one’s own benefit, and a willingness to accept personal sacrifice to 
further any goals set by the organisation; both factors lead to higher levels of task 
cohesion. 
A citizen army on the march, as the military embodiment of a functioning 
state with an effective normative-moral compliance relationship, would 
consequently benefit from higher levels of task cohesion and thus reduce the risk of 
disloyalty and noncompliance. Conversely, once the compliance relationship had 
been sufficiently weakened by internal division to cause a breakdown, social 
cohesion came to the fore, and the moral involvement that had previously been 
present gave way to considerations of a more calculative nature, often aimed at a 
(violent) restructuring of the organisation itself: political revolution. Stasis, then, 
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means that a polis could no longer benefit from the cohesion that moral involvement 
brought, as its members had grouped together to advance the goals of their faction, 
not those of the community as a whole: we have already noted that any side in such 
a conflict could claim to act for the common good, which makes identification and 
classification of civic disloyalty even more hazardous. Nevertheless, we could 
categorise a betrayal on the battlefield as military disloyalty, and opening the gates 
to the enemy to effect a change of government as political disloyalty. As we have 
seen, military disloyalty was extremely rare in Polis armies, while political disloyalty 
was comparatively common in the city itself. As long as the predominant compliance 
relationship was intact, soldiers remained loyal and displayed high levels of task 
cohesion, even if there were divisions or strong misgivings about the present 
situation or the task at hand. For an illustration of this double-edged dynamic we 
might look at the Athenian Sicilian Expedition: even though the soldiers desired to 
return to Athens after their circumstances had worsened significantly, they 
continued to comply with their generals’ orders and even under the most intense 
pressure the army did not disintegrate until the very end; had Nikias given in to the 
men and sailed home, however, they might have presented him as a corrupt traitor 
who had been bribed to withdraw.114 
Bribery is another area where we have relatively little evidence for Polis 
armies. Partly this will be because a successful bribe would have been a well-guarded 
secret; but its rarity compared to Hellenistic Royal armies might also point to 
structural causes. Moreover, the cases we know of tend to involve bribery on a 
political level, and never do we find citizens bribed to change sides and join the 
enemy. For example, in 424 three Athenian generals were convicted of bribery for 
coming to terms with the Sicilians instead of gaining control over them: two were 
banished and one was fined.115 It was not uncommon for Athenians to discipline 
generals with whom they were dissatisfied: Perikles himself was fined, and 
                                                          
114 Thuc. 7.48. Nikias himself went on the campaign entirely unwilling to lead it in the first place – but 
noncompliance in the face of a functioning government and a more or less unified demos would have 
been unacceptable. For his opposition to the campaign, see Thuc. 6.9-14, 21-25. See also Hamel 1998, 
19-21. 
115 Thuc. 4.65.3. 
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Thucydides was another general who was exiled for perceived incompetence; there 
was also the notorious execution of several generals after the battle of Arginousai.116 
It is unclear if there even was a specific legal procedure for dealing with military 
bribery. By c. 330, the Athenians had an eisangelia procedure to prosecute 
treasonous acts in general, which included betraying a city, a ship, or a military force 
(Hyp. 4.8: ἢ ἐάν τις πόλιν τινὰ προδῷ ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικὴν στρατιάν).117 
Also covered were the forming of political clubs or secret meetings aimed at 
subverting the democracy, or taking bribes to give bad advice to the demos, which 
implies that such cases of treachery were usually of a political nature (and carried out 
by politicians or rhetores). The law included a clause against bribery, but it applied 
only to public speakers.118 Pollux preserved the detail that the procedure was also 
aimed at those ‘who go to the enemy without having been sent’, which might refer 
to desertion, but could also refer to political initiatives carried out by private 
individuals without the state’s approval.119 As an example, we might look to Thuc. 
8.98, which relates how the Athenian Aristarchos tricked the (also Athenian) 
garrison at Oinoe into surrender by pretending to speak on behalf of the Athenian 
demos. It appears that the eisangelia was not aimed primarily at troops who turned 
traitors on the battlefield, but at individuals whose (political) actions were perceived 
as harming the interests of the state. One case we know of appears to have involved 
the betrayal of ships: the admiral Leosthenes was condemned to death in absentia 
for letting himself be ambushed by Alexander of Pherai in 362/1, resulting in the loss 
of five ships and the capture of 600 Athenians.120 This is hardly military betrayal in 
any real sense: Leosthenes did not choose to join the enemy or sacrifice his soldiers; 
much like Thucydides, he was punished simply for perceived incompetence. 
                                                          
116 Thuc. 2.65.3, 5.26.5, Xen. Hell. 1.7. 
117 For a detailed discussion of the law, see Hansen 1975, 12-20. 
118 Harris 2013, 190: ‘The law does not define the term ‘public speaker,’ but the Athenians in the fourth 
century made a general distinction between ‘public speakers’ (rhetores) and ‘private citizens’ (idiotai). 
In general, private citizens were those who were not active in politics’. 
119 Poll. Onom. 8.52. Harris 2013, 234 also mentions a sentence from the Lexicon Cantabrigiense which 
states that the eisangelia applied also to those who served in enemy armies, which again points to 
desertion. 
120 Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-3, cf. Hyp. 4.1, Aeschin. 2.21, 124, and Polyaenus, Strat. 6.2.1. 
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The situation in Sparta was similar: although there are several cases that 
involve Spartans taking bribes, they usually revolve around kings and their failure to 
carry through an attack. We do not hear of Spartan generals or troops betraying their 
own city or fellow soldiers on campaign. Thus, Pleistoanax (or one of his senior 
advisors) was apparently bribed by Perikles to halt his invasion of Attika in 446/5; 
Leotychidas was exiled for being bribed not to subdue Thessaly, and was eventually 
handed to the Aiginetans in recompense for hostages he had taken from them; after 
the victory at Sepeia in 494, Kleomenes was prosecuted for accepting bribes not to 
attack Argos, but managed to defend himself; there was also the rumour that 
Sphodrias was bribed by the Thebans to invade Attika in 378 (although this might 
have happened with Kleombrotos’ approval).121 None of these instances reflect a 
significant departure from a normative-moral compliance relationship: greed and 
personal advantage were clearly motivating factors, which points to the existence of 
a calculative mindset on the part of those who were bribed (hence we must always 
emphasise that we are interested in the predominant compliance relationship), but 
it appears that the moral involvement was still strong enough at each point to 
prevent any direct damage to their own polis. Moral orientation towards one’s 
organisation, then, could be seen to act as a safety mechanism: it drew a line 
(protection of one’s city), beyond which one could operate with more or less freedom 
(pursuit of personal gain), but we do not see such a pursuit ever becoming a serious 
threat to the city itself. 
Finally, a few preliminary conclusions: applying the model of a normative-
moral compliance relationship onto civic armies and analysing their behaviour in 
terms of social and task cohesion has yielded the strong impression that Polis armies 
tended to be robustly cohesive and generally loyal to the state and their 
commanders – at least until returning home. However, the intensely competitive 
political climate that existed in most poleis was able to disrupt this pattern by 
redirecting the compliance relationship and allowing political considerations to 
                                                          
121 Pleistoanax: Thuc. 2.21.1, Plut. Per. 22; Leotychidas: Hdt. 6.72, 85; Kleomenes: Hdt. 6.82; 
Sphodrias: Xen. Hell. 5.4.20, 30, Diod. Sic. 15.29.5. 
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override the moral orientation that most citizens had towards their city-state. In the 
next section, we will turn our attention to the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period, 
which appear to have exhibited behaviour and motivations of a very different kind. 
Again, we will attempt to employ compliance theory to make sense of these 
contrasts, and highlight the role of the socio-political system – or its absence – in 
determining individuals’ orientations. 
 
 
2.3 Baggage, Betrayal, and Bloodshed: Disloyalty in Royal Armies 
 
Among its many consequences, the death of Alexander the Great in June 323 left his 
empire’s entire military organisation without a single leading figure. The personal 
bond that the king had shared with his men and commanders and that had in many 
ways governed the layers of loyalty within his army was torn, but not severed: it 
survived Alexander himself and continued to influence the allegiances of his generals 
and soldiers to no small degree, primarily as a legitimising factor for those who 
sought to lay claim to some of the power left behind by Alexander. But during his 
lifetime Alexander had become the fulcrum for his army’s loyalties, and the history 
of the subsequent years shows clearly that at the time of his death there was no 
suitable candidate who could command the same levels of authority and loyalty. In 
the face of this power vacuum, old allegiances were re-shuffled, and the succeeding 
decades were marked by an extremely unstable climate in terms of military 
hierarchy and compliance. Furthermore, the relationship that prevailed between 
generals and their men during the period of the Successors also had a profound 
impact on the various Hellenistic kingdoms that emerged from the ruins of 
Alexander’s empire. The following discussion, therefore, aims to identify the 
parameters that governed this relationship; beyond simply pointing out instances of 
betrayal, the aim will be to connect and compare these instances and assess, if 
possible, the structural dynamics of Royal army loyalty. 
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 Probably the most notorious case of disloyalty that occurred during the 
period of the Successors was the betrayal of Eumenes of Kardia by a Macedonian 
unit of his own men, the veteran argyraspides, or Silver Shields.122 At the battle of 
Gabiene in 316, during which Eumenes’ veteran Macedonian infantry had bested 
their opponents while his cavalry had been driven back, the enemy commander 
Antigonos managed to capture the baggage of Eumenes’ Macedonian troops.123 
According to Polyainos, the baggage contained ‘their wives and children and 
concubines, their slaves and gold and silver, and whatever else they had acquired 
during the campaign with Alexander’.124 This reminds us that the usual translation of 
ἀποσκευή as ‘baggage’ is somewhat misleading; it contained everything a soldier 
possessed, from plunder amassed over years or decades of war, to trinkets and 
equipment, memories of fallen comrades, household items, and of course any wives 
and children a soldier might have acquired during his service. In short, ‘baggage’ was 
a soldier’s world. 125 
 Capturing it, therefore, was crucial: the Macedonians, apparently led by 
Teutamos, one of the commanders of the Silver Shields, opposed Eumenes’ plans 
for another engagement, and began secret negotiations with the enemy. Eventually 
they seized their own general and handed him over to Antigonos, in return for their 
possessions and pledges of safety; then as a whole they joined the enemy army. The 
fate of Eumenes is well known – he was executed. Our sources are unanimous in 
describing the motivations of the troops: the veterans feared for their baggage, 
which as we have seen included their wives and children, in addition to the spoils of 
many decades of campaigning. The desire to secure these overrode any sense of 
                                                          
122 These were originally Alexander’s elite Macedonian hypaspists, 3,000 strong; Arrian mentions the 
name only once, when he describes Alexander’s plans to elevate Asian military units, among them 
ἀργυρασπίδων τάξις Περσικὴ (Arr. Anab. 7.11.3). At what point the name originated is unclear, but 
most likely it was awarded during the Indian campaign (Roisman 2012, 177); see further Roisman 
2012, chapters 7 and 8 for a historical account of their service with Eumenes, and for hypaspists 
generally, Sekunda 2007, 330-39, Sekunda 2010, 454-56, and Bar-Kochva 1967, 54-67. 
123 For the course of the battle and its aftermath, see Diod. Sic. 19.41-43, Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.14, 
Plut. Eum. 16-17, Nep. Eum. 10, Just. Epit. 14.3-4. 
124 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.13. 
125 We are told that Lysimachos once slaughtered some 5,000 Autariatai after they had lost their 
baggage – he feared they might mutiny or desert, being without possessions and barbarians, too 
(Polyaenus, Strat. 4.12.1). On baggage and mercenaries, see Loman 2005. 
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loyalty the men might have felt towards Eumenes, and from an organisational point 
of view it triggered a catastrophic case of noncompliance that led to the death of the 
general and the complete disintegration of his army; in addition, his troops had 
pledged allegiance to the enemy. As far as we know, such an extreme case of 
disloyalty has no equivalent in the armies of the Greek city-states – and this was by 
no means an isolated episode. 
 Eumenes of Kardia was in fact at the centre of several cases of disloyalty, as 
were the Silver Shields themselves. Both Antigonos and Ptolemy had already tried 
earlier to induce them to betray Eumenes; probably in 318, Ptolemy unsuccessfully 
attempted to lure away the commanders of the argyraspides, exploiting the fact that 
Eumenes had been condemned to death.126 Similarly, Antigonos had promised 
Antigenes and Teutamos bribes and positions if they managed to lead their troops 
in a betrayal of Eumenes: he sent men who had personal connections among the 
troops to bribe them, trusting in the effects of social cohesion and the receptiveness 
of a calculative mindset on the part of the Silver Shields. At first it seemed he would 
be successful, as Teutamos was won over; Antigenes, however, managed to 
convince his colleague to remain loyal – and his arguments as reported by Diodoros 
reveal an extremely calculative orientation: 
 
…for he demonstrated that it would be better for him if Eumenes lived, rather than 
Antigonos. The latter, if he grew more powerful, would take away their satrapies and 
install others of his friends instead; Eumenes, on the other hand, being a foreigner, 
would never dare to pursue his own interests, but, being a general, he would treat them 
as his friends and protect their satrapies if they assisted him, and perhaps give them 
others, too. 
(Diod. Sic. 18.62.6-7) 
 
Of course, to what degree this corresponds to Antigenes’ actual views is uncertain, 
and ignorance of the source of this information means caution is advised when 
interpreting it. It might be tempting to dismiss such passages as mere adherence to 
some literary topos of the treacherous mercenary soldier or the greedy Macedonian 
                                                          
126 Diod Sic. 18.62.1-2; Eumenes had been condemned in the wake of Perdikkas’ murder (18.37.1-2). 
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veteran; but we are not dealing with an isolated case found only in one author. While 
the reliability of the details found in passages such as this might be doubted (and 
subjected to the vagaries of a search for the ever-elusive agenda of the original 
source), the cumulative impression gained from our material is too pervasive to be a 
literary construct that bore little resemblance to reality. As it stands, the passage is 
a good example of a purely calculative statement: all things considered, loyalty to 
Eumenes was more advantageous in the long run as it brought a higher chance of 
protecting their current status and possessions and of receiving more in the future. 
The passage also presents Antigonos and the military organisation he embodies as 
one that relies primarily on remunerative power: Antigenes and Teutamos are 
portrayed as making their compliance hinge on the prospective rewards they might 
receive. There was also an element of coercive power in Antigonos’ advances: his 
letters contained the threat of punishment and war if the Macedonians did not hand 
over Eumenes.127 It seems that in this case, Antigonos relied predominantly on 
remuneration, followed by coercion, to achieve his aims. However, there was no 
trace of a question of legitimacy or personal loyalty, factors that might more often 
be of importance in a normative-moral compliance relationship. Nevertheless, 
Diodoros (or his source) might have encapsulated accurately the prevalent dynamic 
of loyalty of the time: we shall obtain a clearer picture by examining other instances 
of disloyalty, with an eye on the potential explanatory power different compliance 
models can offer. 
 Eumenes’ relationship with the Silver Shields and their leaders was indeed 
fraught with mistrust from the start: he was in charge of the Macedonian troops and 
officers who had condemned him to death after the murder of Perdikkas in 321/0.128 
Their initial unwillingness to comply was only overcome after Eumenes’ authority 
had been buttressed by letters from Polyperchon and Olympias herself, and it 
further took the stratagem of holding military council meetings in the presence of 
Alexander’s spirit to secure his command.129 Still, in 319, his enemies sought to 
                                                          
127 Diod. Sic. 18.63. 
128 Diod. Sic. 18.37.1-2, 18.59.4. 
129 Diod. Sic. 18.58-59, Plut. Eum. 13.2, Polyaenus, Strat. 4.8.2, Nep. Eum. 7.1. 
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capitalise on this tension by offering a reward of one hundred talents along with 
other honours for Eumenes’ murder.130 Earlier that same year, at the battle of 
Orkynia, the commander of Eumenes’ cavalry had been bribed by Antigonos to 
defect and join his side during the battle, costing Eumenes the victory.131 It has been 
suggested that Eumenes’ own lack of funds moved the cavalry to treachery, an 
explanation which assumes predominantly calculative orientations among the 
cavalrymen; at any rate, this is a clear example of an army fracturing and turning on 
itself during an engagement.132 In this passage we find the most common Greek 
words for ‘treason’ (προδοσία) and ‘defecting’ (αὐτομολέω): ἔπεισε προδότην 
γενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὴν μάχην αὐτομολῆσαι; the meaning of these seems not to 
have changed much since the time of Herodotos and Thucydides (see section 2.2), 
suggesting that the definition of military betrayal remained more or less static. This 
in turn makes it unlikely that we are simply dealing with a new phenomenon that 
later authors were more willing to comment upon: the different levels of loyalty in 
Polis and Royal armies are not a linguistic illusion, but a structural reality. 
 After his first unsuccessful attempt, Antigonos again tried to bribe Eumenes’ 
Macedonian troops in 317, promising not to appoint new satraps, and to provide rich 
gifts of land and rank for those who wanted them, but gifts and safe passage home 
for those who desired to return. It appears he did not employ any normative 
arguments on the basis of legitimacy, justice, or vengeance (for the death of 
Krateros at Eumenes’ hands, for example) – rather he relied solely on remunerative 
power to entice the troops to join him. Nevertheless, Antigonos’ offers fell on deaf 
ears, and apparently Eumenes commended his men for their foresight: Antigonos 
would only keep his word for as long as he had to – once he was in control of the 
army, its leaders would be executed.133 This last element points to a crucial weakness 
in any framework of military loyalty that is based on a remunerative-calculative 
                                                          
130 Plut. Eum. 8.6, cf. Just. Epit. 14.1.9-14. 
131 His name was Apollonides: Diod. Sic. 18.40.5, Plut. Eum. 9.2 (who preserves that fact that Eumenes 
still managed to capture and hang Apollonides for his betrayal; this is slightly at odds with Diodoros’ 
account; see Roisman 2012, 163-64 with n. 45). 
132 Griffith 1935, 44. 
133 Diod. Sic. 19.25.2-7. 
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compliance relationship: the lack of trust. Where the personal fortunes and even the 
lives of thousands are at stake, the erosion of lasting loyalties through repeated 
betrayal can create such an unstable environment that one act of treachery will be 
answered by another. The Silver Shields are a perfect example of this dynamic: their 
betrayal of Eumenes was felt keenly even by Antigonos, who not long after the 
battle had the unit broken up and dispatched to Arachosia where they were to find 
their deaths in dangerous operations.134 As for Antigenes, his reward was equally 
final: he was thrown into a pit and burned alive.135 Antigonos might have recalled 
Antigenes’ involvement in the murder of Perdikkas – for which he was rewarded with 
a satrapy – and thus rightly feared a similar fate should he find himself in equally dire 
straits as did the regent after his series of defeats in Egypt.136 This is by no means a 
damning judgement of Antigenes or his intentions – which may have been 
honourable – but rather an illustration of the inherent dangers of a calculative 
mindset, especially in a military context.137 
 The betrayal of Eumenes could of course be explained as an anomaly and 
attributed to his ‘Greekness’, which might have made it easier for the Macedonians 
under his command to justify and rationalise their treachery.138 But it was by no 
means the only time that soldiers of Hellenistic Royal armies abandoned their 
commander or switched sides to join a former enemy: hence his perceived otherness 
is an insufficient explanation of the high levels of disloyalty that surrounded him – as 
                                                          
134 Diod. Sic. 19.48.3-4; Plut. Eum. 19.2; Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.15; Just. Epit. 14.4.14. 
135 Diod. Sic. 19.44.1. Compare the fate of Andragathos, who betrayed Amphipolis to Lysimachos, but 
instead of receiving the promised riches he was himself betrayed and executed (Polyaenus, Strat. 
4.12.2, Lund 1992, 99-100). Equally, the pirates who helped betray Ephesos to Lysimachos by turning 
on the garrison were quickly removed by the new garrison commander, who deemed them 
untrustworthy owing to their recent treachery (Polyaenus, Strat. 5.19, cf. Polyb. 18.15.9). 
136 Arr. Succ. 1.35, Diod. Sic. 18.39.5-6; cf. Landucci Gattinoni 2014, 43. Seleukos received Babylonia, 
Antigenes Susiane (Diod. Sic. 18.39.6, Arr. Succ. 1.35). 
137 See Heckel 2006, 291 n. 65 for an assessment of Antigenes’ overall loyalties: he suggests that 
Antigenes might have remained faithful to Eumenes after all, explaining his harsh execution (cf. his 
refusal to be won over in 317: Diod. Sic. 19.12.2-3). Teutamos, whose final fate is unknown, appears 
to have led the negotiations to surrender Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 17.1, cf. Just. Epit. 14.3.11), but Plut. 
Eum. 16.1-2 tells us that Antigenes was part of the plot to murder Eumenes after the battle against 
Antigonos. 
138 On this, see Anson 2014, who concludes that ethnicity was not a major handicap for Eumenes. 
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we will see, the reasons were more structural in nature, and depended ultimately on 
the predominant compliance relationship that Royal armies were cultivating. 
 Eumenes himself acquired a large part of his Macedonian infantry after the 
treachery of Neoptolemos: the latter had planned to join the side of Antipater along 
with the Macedonians under his command, but his plot was discovered; Eumenes 
defeated him and convinced the remaining troops to join his side.139 Similarly, after 
later defeating Krateros and Neoptolemos in battle, the Macedonians who had 
opposed him were spared and swore an oath to fight for him, only to break it during 
the night and withdraw to re-join Antipater.140 This instance contains disloyalty in 
oath-breaking, but the soldiers’ decision to return to Antipater can also be seen as 
‘an example of loyalty rather remarkable in the time of the Diadochs’.141 Whether 
the soldiers were motivated by personal loyalty to Antipater or perhaps an 
unwillingness to serve under the killer of the popular Krateros remains unknown; the 
episode does, however, remind us that motivations are not one-dimensional: 
elements of a moral orientation are visible, and coexisted and at times competed 
with any calculative ones. Another example of this can be found in the behaviour of 
the Macedonians who abandoned Philip III Arrhidaios’ wife, Eurydike Adeia, when 
they met with the forces of Polyperchon, who was acting on behalf of Alexander’s 
mother Olympias: as the two armies were drawn up opposite each other, the 
Macedonians under Philip III transferred their allegiance to Polyperchon, resulting in 
the capture of the king and his wife, and ultimately in their execution.142 This change 
of heart was apparently prompted by respect for Olympias on the one hand, and 
remembrance of the many benefits the men had received from Alexander on the 
other. This might reflect well the complex nature of military loyalty at the time: there 
were many layers to an individual’s loyalties, and many forces pulling in different 
directions. Eurydike herself had only managed to win over the leading Macedonians 
                                                          
139 Diod. Sic. 18.29.4-5 (c. 321). 
140 Diod. Sic. 18.32.2-3. 
141 Roisman 2012, 17. He further states that ’Eumenes surrounded Craterus’s defeated Macedonians 
and exacted from them a pledge to join him’. Diodoros says no such thing: rather, he records that 
Eumenes sent a messenger to them after burying his own dead. 
142 Diod. Sic. 19.11.1-7. 
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with promises of future rewards.143 How unreliable such an arrangement was in the 
face of the shifting sands of Hellenistic loyalties she found out when her army 
refused to fight for her. 
 Soldiers changing sides was a common occurrence, but there were ways of 
securing more lasting loyalty. After the defeat of Alketas, the brother of Perdikkas, 
at the hands of Antigonos in 319, almost all of his soldiers joined the victorious army. 
The ones who remained faithful were his force of 6,000 Pisidians, whose loyalty he 
had previously cultivated by especially honouring them during his campaigns and 
allocating to them half of all the plunder taken, in addition to regular gifts and special 
attention.144  Hence they promised not to desert (ἐγκαταλείψειν) him. This is a clear 
case of remunerative power being applied to great effect: the Pisidians chose to 
protect and defend Alketas even if it meant facing the might of Antigonos again, 
rather than reaping the rewards that might have been theirs had they joined him 
instead. We are told that the younger soldiers among the Pisidians would not give 
in, for which reason the older men, motivated by a desire to save their country and 
prevent unnecessary bloodshed, secretly betrayed Alketas and drove him to commit 
suicide. The younger men eventually retrieved Alketas’ body (after it had been 
mistreated for days) and provided him with proper burial. Their devotion to Alketas 
went beyond what we might normally expect from soldiers who had been secured 
by money alone. It appears that their commitment underwent a shift of balance from 
calculative to moral: they continued to fight and die for Alketas even with no hope 
of reward or payment.145 Remuneration was clearly not everything: compliance 
relationships are merely approximations of a complex and nuanced web of 
motivations and emotions, and it is important not to impose too strict an opposition 
between Royal and Polis armies, or between remunerative and normative power. 
The reality was more layered, and the case of the Pisidian soldiers reveals that Royal 
armies, too, could generate and benefit from moral commitment in their troops. 
                                                          
143 Dios. Sic. 19.11.1. 
144 For the whole affair see Diod. Sic. 18.45-47; cf. Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.7. 
145 It is not quite clear why the divide in loyalty seems to have run neatly along age lines; Chaniotis 
2005, 44-46 and 55 suggests youthful vigour and a martial spirit engendered by training, the 
importance of oaths, and militaristic culture. 
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 Normally, however, soldiers saw no problems in changing sides as 
circumstances dictated; often this would happen after a defeat in battle. Thus, 
Antigonos simply enrolled the troops he captured upon taking Joppa and Gaza in c. 
315 in his own army, and Demetrios Poliorketes incorporated some 16,000 men into 
his and his father’s army after defeating Ptolemy and capturing his ships and 
garrisons.146 In 313, after Lysimachos had defeated an army under the command of 
Pausanias – sent against him by Antigonos – some of the defeated soldiers were 
ransomed, while the rest joined his side.147 In another case, we learn that Antigonos 
allowed the Ptolemaic garrison of Tyre to depart before accepting the capitulation 
of the city.148 In these cases it is not entirely clear how the choices came about. It is 
entirely possible that the garrison preferred rejoining their ‘baggage’ in Egypt, rather 
than go over to Antigonos. 
 Similarly, after Eumenes’ defeat at Orkynia (where Antigonos had bribed the 
latter’s cavalry to defect during the battle), Antigonos captured his entire baggage 
train, whereupon his dismayed soldiers deserted him in large numbers to join the 
enemy: of his original army of 25,000, only some 600 loyal followers accompanied 
Eumenes to take refuge in Nora.149 The powerful influence that their ‘possessions’ 
had on the loyalties of Royal army soldiers is once more apparent: the wish to keep 
and protect one’s baggage usually outweighed feelings of loyalty to a particular 
military organisation. 
 This is not intended as a damning judgement of the soldiers who abandoned 
Eumenes, but part of this study’s effort to properly understand these men’s combat 
motivations and their involvement with their fellow soldiers and commanders, 
without making prior assumptions. In his analysis of this episode, Roisman concludes 
about those who remained with Eumenes in Nora: ‘Their loyalty in spite of the 
devastating defeat and loss of their baggage should puzzle only those who regard all 
                                                          
146 Diod. Sic. 19.59.2 (Antigonos) and 20.52.6-53.1 (Demetrios); cf. Plut. Demetr. 16.2-3. As Roisman 
2012, 168 says, Demetrios probably also possessed their baggage, which would have made changing 
sides a lot more compelling. 
147 Diod. Sic. 19.73.10. cf. IG II² 657 (= Austin 54), 16-23 for defeated soldiers enrolling with the 
victorious army after Ipsos in 301. 
148 Diod. Sic. 19.61.5. 
149 Diod. Sic. 18.40-41, cf. the more favourable tradition reflected in Plut. Eum. 10.1. 
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the veterans as slaves to personal gain and to the satisfaction of simple needs’.150 
Such a statement is problematic on two accounts: firstly, it does not work well with 
his overall point that Eumenes managed to create lasting loyalties between himself 
and his men. We do not know exactly how many Macedonian veterans Eumenes 
possessed at the battle, but the total of c. 600 individuals that afterwards remained 
by his side cannot have included many. The evidence points the other way: the vast 
majority of his men decided to abandon him regardless of his efforts ‘to bind them 
to him by winning battles, by giving them distinctions, honors, and material rewards, 
and by keeping them close to him as his bodyguards’.151 
 Secondly, and more importantly, Roisman seems to imply that those who 
chose their baggage over their general were ‘slaves to personal gain and to the 
satisfaction of simple needs’. This would be a gross simplification of their connection 
to their possessions: after all, we have already underlined that baggage included not 
only gold and silver, but potentially also relatives, lovers, wives, children, slaves, 
trophies, souvenirs, ashes of friends, and other items of personal and sentimental 
value to their owners. Bound up in all these were the memories of years of service, 
proof of participation, valour, and success.152 It is not surprising that soldiers would 
feel an intense bond and responsibility for them: as a whole, they would form a large 
part of their very self-definition (perhaps especially for those who had been absent 
from their homeland for a long time). This attachment was of course not lost on their 
commanders, who at times exploited it. In a way, baggage was to a Royal army 
soldier what the polis was to a citizen-soldier: home, identity, and above all, 
something worth fighting for.153 These are the same ingredients that made up a large 
part of the moral involvement Polis army soldiers seem to have expressed; little 
wonder, then, that the Silver Shields gave up Eumenes, or indeed that most men 
would choose to protect everything they had, rather than risk losing it forever by 
following a doomed commander out of a sense of loyalty and obligation. 
                                                          
150 Roisman 2012, 164. 
151 Roisman 2012, 164. 
152 In the words of Anson 2004, 255 baggage was ‘the ultimate bribe’. 
153 The fates of relatives who were captured along with the ‘baggage’ in warfare could be harsh, and 
included being sold into slavery and exposure to sexual violence (Plut. Eum. 9.6). 
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 The Macedonians, in fact, quickly developed a reputation for changing sides 
to suit their own needs, so much so that Griffith equated them to mercenaries in 
behaviour if not in name, judging by their post-323 performance.154 When 
Polyperchon and his army arrived in Macedonia to reinstate the teenage Herakles, 
son of Alexander and Barsine, Kassander met him with his own army, but apparently 
was reluctant to force the issue, fearing that his Macedonians would defect, as 
switching sides was in their nature.155 We do not know exactly whose opinion is being 
expressed here – that of Kassander, Diodoros, or his source – but expressed it was, 
and that already points to a perceived pattern. Later in the third century this was still 
the case: in 288, Pyrrhos had been elevated to share the kingship of Macedon with 
Lysimachos only after the Macedonians of Demetrios had spontaneously defected 
to him (Plutarch uses μεταβάλλω). Ironically, this was the result of Demetrios’ 
efforts to avoid facing Lysimachos precisely because he knew that his troops were 
likely to defect.156 Similarly, during Pyrrhos’ invasion of Macedon in the 270s, he was 
at first joined by some 2,000 Macedonian infantry who had defected from Antigonos 
Gonatas, and at a later battle, the rest of Gonatas’ Macedonians decided to join 
Pyrrhos, while his Gallic mercenaries died fighting.157 
 Gonatas’ Macedonians chose to abandon him after witnessing their allied 
Gallic mercenaries disintegrate under the onslaught of Pyrrhos’ troops; this points 
to another important factor that can impact soldiers’ combat motivation and 
considerations of loyalties. Success or defeat could be decisive in tipping the balance 
towards compliance or noncompliance, depending on the specific circumstances 
and of course the pre-existing orientations among troops and commanders. Studies 
of modern warfare have shown that defeats – and even a continued absence of 
success – can have extremely detrimental effects on troop morale in general, and 
                                                          
154 Griffith 1935, 39-40. 
155 Diod. Sic. 20.28.1-3: δείσας ὁ Κάσανδρος μήποτε φύσει πρὸς μεταβολὴν ὄντες ὀξεῖς οἱ 
Μακεδόνες. 
156 Plut. Pyrrh. 11.3-6, for a historical overview see Adams 2010, 218-22. 
157 Plut. Pyrrh. 26.3-4, Just. Epit. 25.3.5, Diod. Sic. 22.11.1, Paus. 1.13.2. Cf. Griffith 1935, 63: ‘Antigonus’ 
Gauls, perhaps new to the game, fought bravely and were massacred, while his “infantry” (which can 
only mean the Macedonians themselves) deserted to Pyrrhus’. The exact location of the battle is 
uncertain; see further Hammond & Walbank 1988, 260-62. 
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erode trust in an army’s leadership in particular.158 It is this last aspect that is of 
special interest to this study, as it concerns the relationship between troops and 
generals. As an example, we might turn to the regent Perdikkas’ invasion of Egypt in 
321: it is a prime example of a weak compliance relationship buckling under the 
weight of repeated failure.159 At the outset, we learn that Perdikkas was unpopular 
owing to his harsh and autocratic style of command, which alienated his captains 
and troops alike.160 Such a power dynamic resembles a coercive-alienative 
arrangement, and it is not entirely surprising that it only took a reversal at the hands 
of nature – in the form of a flood that caused a setback in clearing a canal – to move 
some of his philoi to desert him for Ptolemy.161 Perdikkas had to secure his remaining 
commanders’ compliance by remunerative power, i.e. gifts and promises, but we are 
also told that he applied coercive power by severely punishing those whom he 
suspected of plotting to join Ptolemy.162 Nevertheless, the disaffection among his 
troops continued to simmer after Ptolemy inflicted a defeat upon Perdikkas at the 
Fort of Camels, and it finally boiled over after the botched attempt at crossing the 
Nile, a disastrous enterprise that cost Perdikkas some 2,000 casualties, the 
allegiance of his men as their loyalties shifted towards Ptolemy, and ultimately, his 
life.163 His murder at the hands of his own men was the result of the collapse of the 
shaky compliance relationship that had hitherto underpinned his command. We 
have seen him apply elements of coercive and remunerative power in response to 
his men’s orientations, which in turn were more likely to be alienative and 
calculative. Once we add a string of costly defeats to the mix, the eventual betrayal 
and assassination by his troops is relatively easy to understand.164 
                                                          
158 Kellett 1982, 260. 
159 On the whole campaign, see Roisman 2014. 
160 Diod. Sic. 18.33.3. 
161 Diod. Sic. 18.33.2: πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐγκαταλιπόντες ἀπεχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον. 
162 Diod. Sic. 18.33.5, Arr. Succ. 1.28. 
163 Diod. Sic. 18.33.6-34.5 (Fort of Camels); for the crossing of the Nile, see Diod. Sic. 18.34.6-36.5, 
Polyaenus, Strat. 4.19, Strabo 17.1.8, Frontin. Str. 4.7.20, Paus. 1.6.3. The crossing was made worse 
by adverse terrain; the negative effects on morale of difficult terrain and harsh climates are discussed 
in Kellett 1982, 242-5. 
164 Cf. Roisman 2012, 102. He adds that the Macedonian veterans would be relatively unused to 
defeat. Also Chaniotis 2005, 60: ‘military failure was the beginning of many a ruler’s end’. Other 
examples of adverse consequences of defeats: Diod. Sic. 18.74.1, 19.18-20. 
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 This episode suggests that the soldiers of Perdikkas operated with a 
predominantly calculative involvement: compliance was not the right thing to do in 
and of itself, but depended on the distribution of rewards, and the continued success 
of their organisation. Once neither of these conditions was being fulfilled, 
compliance rapidly broke down, resulting in a violent removal of those in charge of 
their organisation – reminiscent of the ‘fragging’ that occurred during the Vietnam 
War. In his analysis of Perdikkas’ invasion of Egypt, Roisman posits without much 
explanation that the invasion, and by extension, the war in general, required ‘moral 
or ideological justification’ for the Macedonian troops, an element which is normally 
a hallmark of moral involvement.165 However, such a statement carries little 
analytical weight without considering what actually motivated the troops in the first 
place. Whether or not a soldier expects his superiors to provide morally and/or 
ideologically sound reasons for a campaign depends entirely on that soldier’s 
involvement; if morally committed, he might indeed require such justification, but a 
calculative mindset might make compliance dependent on any number of other 
reasons, none of which need be moral or ideological in nature. At any rate, we need 
only look to the actual behaviour of the Macedonians: even after deciding that 
Ptolemy had given a good account of himself in the face of the charges that 
Perdikkas brought against him, they still decided to meet him in battle; thus their 
compliance cannot have rested on their campaign being morally justified.166 We 
must not take the motivations of Royal army soldiers for granted; a theoretical 
approach to combat motivation and organisational effectiveness, combined with an 
analysis of the actual behaviour reported in our sources, can help to provide a more 
accurate assessment of these men’s motivations. 
                                                          
165 Roisman 2014, 457, and 2012, 94. 
166 The apparent incongruence of desiring moral justification and fighting against Ptolemy is 
acknowledged in Roisman 2014, 460-61. For the event see Arr. Succ. 1.28. There is some debate about 
how and where any such meeting between Ptolemy and Perdikkas might have taken place; Roisman 
2012, 95-97 with n. 26 assumes there was a meeting, which is not stated as such in our sources. It is 
possible that this exchange was part of a propaganda war; after Perdikkas’ murder, Ptolemy entered 
his camp, publicly justified his acts and distributed supplies and gifts (Diod. Sic. 18.36.6, cf. Arr. Succ. 
1.29 and Paus. 1.6.3), which suggests that he had not spoken directly to Perdikkas’ forces before this. 
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 So far we have seen soldiers changing sides in battles mainly out of fear, 
resentment, desperation, convenience, or feelings of guilt and obligation. More 
common, however, was the addition of a specific incentive to increase the likelihood 
of betrayal. Bribery was wide-spread in this period, and we find that both lower 
participants and organisational elites were relatively receptive to this type of 
influence. Our sources do not tell us exactly why the above-mentioned philoi 
deserted Perdikkas after the failure at the canal; for Roisman the connection 
between this setback and the desertions is only a ‘weak causal link’, and he suggests 
instead that Diodoros knew this as well, which is why he offered the contrasting 
leadership styles of Perdikkas and Ptolemy as explanations.167 Such an assumption 
is unnecessary: we have just discussed the detrimental effects of defeats and 
reversals in conjunction with a fragile compliance relationship, and seen that the 
shift in loyalty was congruent with the specific situation. However, Roisman’s own 
guess as to why the men deserted might be closer to the mark: he suggests that 
Ptolemy bribed them with promises of future wealth and power.168 This is entirely 
plausible: it corresponds to the prevalent compliance dynamic we have observed so 
far, and from later evidence we know that bribery was certainly an important tool in 
Ptolemy’s box.169 In 312 he tried but failed to bribe Antigonos’ garrison commander 
at Tyre, Andronikos, to join his side.170 He was more successful during Antigonos’ 
invasion of Egypt in 306: he sent men on small boats to proclaim to Antigonos’ troops 
on the shore that Ptolemy would pay a premium to any who defected to join his army 
– two minai for soldiers, and a talent for commanders, not inconsiderable sums. 
Antigonos’ men – mainly mercenaries – began to take up the offer and leave him, 
and the exodus could only be stopped by attacking the bribery boats and capturing 
and torturing some of the deserters as an example to others.171 We do not know how 
                                                          
167 Roisman 2012, 97. 
168 Roisman 2012, 98: ‘In this period it was common practice to encourage enemy troops and their 
immediate commanders to desert or betray their generals’. 
169 Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 17-19 suggests that deserters were in fact an important component in the 
early composition of the Ptolemaic army. 
170 Diod. Sic. 19.86.1-2. 
171 Diod. Sic. 20.75.1-3. We are also told that prior to the invasion, Ptolemy placed trustworthy 
garrisons (20.75.1: ἀσφαλέσι φυλακαῖς) in key strategic locations, which suggests he was himself 
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many men deserted in this way, but apparently Ptolemy later wrote to Seleukos, 
Lysimachos, and Kassander, informing them of his victory over Antigonos and 
making special mention of the large number of men who had come over to him.172 
Again we see the positive effect remunerative power had on these soldiers, and the 
coercive measures that were designed to put an end to it. It seems that Ptolemy’s 
incentive-based approach was also adopted by his some of his commanders: one 
Philokles is reported to have bribed the grain controllers of Kaunos to create an 
opening which he swiftly exploited to capture the city.173 
 A situation similar to Ptolemy’s waterborne invitations to join his side is 
preserved in Plutarch and Polyainos: during an engagement between Seleukos and 
Demetrios, Seleukos managed to convince a sizeable part of the enemy army to 
change sides during a battle by appearing without his helmet and promising them 
actual rewards from him rather than potential ones from Demetrios; the defection 
caused Demetrios to flee the battlefield.174 Other examples of bribery in this period 
include Kassander sending his captain Kallas to prevent Polyperchon from aiding 
Olympias who was being besieged in Pydna; Kallas bribed most of Polyperchon’s 
soldiers to defect.175 Peithon, son of Krateuas, paid with his life for his later attempts 
to bribe parts of his army to revolt against Antigonos.176 With promises of land, 
power, Macedonian soldiers, and wealth, Kassander turned Polyperchon towards 
murdering the teenage Herakles.177 During the siege of Rhodes in 304, Demetrios’ 
men attempted to bribe Athenagoras, a mercenary captain sent to the Rhodians by 
Ptolemy – he agreed, but then informed the Rhodians of the plot, leading to the 
                                                          
aware of the danger posed by bribery-induced treachery. Cf. the case of Strombichos, commander of 
Demetrios Poliorketes’ garrison in Athens, who joined them in their revolt and received an honorific 
decree for his services (in 289/8, see IG II² 666, 8-14). We do not know whether he was bribed – 
Chaniotis 2002, 105 suggests the Athenians might not have been as grateful had he been simply 
bought. 
172 Diod. Sic. 20.76.7. 
173 Polyaenus, Strat. 3.16. 
174 Plut. Demetr. 49.2, Polyaenus, Strat. 4.9.3; the date might be c. 285 and the location possibly 
Kyrrhestike. 
175 In c. 317: Diod. Sic. 19.36.6. 
176 Diod. Sic. 19.46.1-4, Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.14. 
177 Diod. Sic. 20.28.2-3. 
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capture of one of Demetrios’ high-ranking Macedonians; for this Athenagoras was 
greatly rewarded by the Rhodians: 
 
They crowned Athenagoras with a golden crown, and gave him a gift of five talents of 
silver, hoping also to elicit loyalty to the demos from the other mercenaries and the 
foreigners. 
(Diod. Sic. 20.94.5) 
 
This case is noteworthy because it involved not two Royal armies (who might try to 
outbribe each other like Ptolemy and Perdikkas), but one Royal army and the forces 
of a polis. In addition to the purely monetary, remunerative prize of five talents of 
silver, the Rhodians also included a golden crown, which recalls the typically 
symbolic rewards citizen soldiers would receive. In fact, the Rhodians had passed a 
decree at the beginning of the siege promising to crown publicly the sons of those 
who fell for the city.178 We may also note that those who were singled out for 
stimulation by rewards and honours were the mercenaries and foreigners – precisely 
those groups who were outside the civic cohesion provided by the socio-political 
system of a polis. The types of power exercised here thus reinforce the general 
impression that citizen armies operated on a different compliance relationship than 
did Royal armies (which would also include many mercenaries and ‘foreigners’). 
 Such was the precarious climate of motivations and loyalties that 
commanders could exploit the prevailing fear of betrayal to cause a rift even 
between apparently loyal troops and their general. When Seleukos was besieging 
Sardis (and its treasury), guarded by Theodotos, he proclaimed a reward of one 
hundred talents to whoever killed Theodotos, which created a level of distrust 
between the latter and his men that was sufficient to force him to surrender the city 
to save his life.179 This illustrates an inherent weakness in any remunerative-
calculative compliance relationship, and shows that Seleukos was well aware of it. 
We have seen several examples of soldiers acting disloyally, but captains and 
generals could be just as unreliable, if not more so. We already learnt of 
                                                          
178 Diod. Sic. 20.84.3-4. 
179 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.9.4. 
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Neoptolemos’ betrayal of Eumenes in joining the side of Antipater.180 Asander, the 
satrap of Karia, first switched allegiance to Antigonos in c. 313 and pledged all his 
men to his command, but quickly changed his mind again and re-joined Ptolemy and 
Seleukos.181 Antigonos’ admiral Telesphoros, jealous of the preferred treatment 
received by Ptolemaios (a nephew of Antigonos), betrayed his master, hired 
mercenaries and established himself at Elis. This same Ptolemaios not much later 
also defected from Antigonos, apparently again out of a real or perceived lack of 
honours and rewards, and joined Kassander; afterwards, in c. 309, he once more 
deserted to Ptolemy, who finally distributed his soldiers among his own army.182 In 
302, Kassander managed to convince two of Antigonos’ generals to defect: 
Dokimos, who handed over Synnada, and Phoinix, who aided in the conquest of 
Sardis (the acropolis of which was being defended by another of Antigonos’ 
captains, who had remained loyal).183 
 Our evidence is limited by the availability of our literary sources, which 
contain records of treachery, plots, and sudden changes of fortune; epigraphic or 
archaeological material, on the other hand, does not always allow us to identify 
betrayal (although honorific inscriptions might highlight a particular act of loyalty). 
When the relatively rich coverage of our sources for the period of the Successors 
peters out towards the beginning of the third century, we are left with an impression 
of a highly volatile dynamic of loyalty. Once our literary sources pick up again 
towards the end of the third century – with Polybios – it appears that little had 
changed. 
 Before deciding to attack Seleukeia in Pieria in c. 220, Antiochos III 
attempted to bribe the governors of the town with gifts and cash; they refused, so 
he corrupted their subordinates, who pledged to deliver the town if Antiochos 
managed to take control of the suburb.184 Soon after, in late 219, Theodotos the 
Aitolian decided to abandon Ptolemy IV and join Antiochos by offering him control 
                                                          
180 Arr. Succ. 1.26, Plut. Eum. 5.2-3. 
181 Diod. Sic. 19.75.1-2. 
182 Diod. Sic. 19.87 (Telesphoros); Diod. Sic. 20.19.2, 20-27.3. 
183 Diod. Sic. 20.107.4-5. 
184 And so it came to pass: Polyb. 5.60. 
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of Koile Syria; he felt inadequately rewarded for his services to the Lagid, whom he 
had grown to dislike.185 This betrayal almost ended up costing Ptolemy his life, if we 
can believe Polybios, who tells us that shortly before the battle of Raphia, 
Theodotos, who knew the king’s habits and daily routine, sneaked into the enemy 
camp in order to assassinate him.186 After Antiochos’ forces had stormed the city of 
Atabyrium, Keraias (one of Ptolemy’s commanders) deserted to Antiochos, who 
treated him so well that others, too, considered the benefits of treason: soon, 
Hippolochos of Thessaly defected as well, along with four hundred cavalry.187 We can 
observe once more the effects of success and defeat on a calculative mindset: as one 
side was seen to be weaker, the likelihood of betrayal increased. It also shows the 
importance for a Hellenistic king to treat those who joined him with respect and 
goodwill, even if they had turned traitors to their former masters, in an attempt to 
entice others to follow suit.188 We might also mention the betrayal of Philip V of 
Macedonia by two of his commanders, who at one point had bribed some of Philip’s 
troops not to press their attack on a city too vigorously at the moment they could 
have taken it, eventually forcing Philip to retreat.189 Lastly, there is the somewhat 
cryptic evidence for acts of treachery among Ptolemy’s generals after the battle of 
Raphia, which forced the king into a second campaign to put down the revolt.190 
 The preceding discussion is by no means exhaustive, but by now the overall 
impression should be clear enough: the period of the Successors was one of 
extremely unstable loyalties, with frequent acts of betrayal carried out both by the 
soldiers and their commanders. More often than not, we were able to identify 
calculative elements as the main driving force behind such acts, which corresponds 
to our overall hypothesis, i.e. that Royal armies operated predominantly on a 
                                                          
185 Polyb. 5.61.3-5 and 5.40.1-3 for his initial reasons; for his service under Antiochos see Polyb. 5.46.3, 
79.4, and 7.16.2. 
186 Polyb. 5.81, cf. 3 Macc. 1.2; this episode might point to a desire on Antiochus’ part to see Ptolemy 
dead, cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 138. On Theodotos and the assassination attempt, see Gera 1998, 13-14. 
187 Polyb. 5.70.10-12; cf. 5.71.11, 79.9. 
188 Other traitorous commanders of the fourth Syrian War: Polyb. 5.61.8-9, 68.5, 10.29.6 (Nikolaos); 
7.15-18 (Lagoras); see further Bar-Kochva 1976, 88. 
189 Polyb. 5.4.8-13, cf. 5.5.10, 5.7.4-5. 
190 Austin 276, lines 23-35; see Winnicki 2001, 139-45, who suggests there were acts of treachery 
among some of Ptolemy’s troops and/or commanders shortly after the battle. 
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remunerative-calculative compliance relationship. The situation did not seem to 
have changed much by the end of the third century – a point to which we will return 
in our discussion of remunerative power in Chapter 5. At the same time, the lines 
between predominantly remunerative and other predominating types of power 
could be blurred, as seen in the case of the Pisidian soldiers who remained loyal to 
Alketas even after his death, or in the coercive threats used by Antigonos to force 
the compliance of Eumenes’ soldiers. For the last section in the current chapter, we 
will turn to the issue of desertion, and assess its wider impact on polis and Royal 
armies alike. To an extent there is some overlap with the material we have already 
discussed, some of which pertained to desertion; to get a clearer picture of the scales 
involved, however, it is advantageous to analyse both sides at the same time. 
 
 
2.4 Desperate Measures: The Problem of Desertion 
 
Compared to the study of modern military history, desertion in ancient Greek armies 
has not received much attention in its own right.191 This might be owing to difficulties 
of definition: what constitutes an act of desertion – as opposed to defection or 
surrender, for example – is not always entirely clear, nor is the ancient terminology 
consistent.192 Herodotos, as we have seen, could use ἔκλειψις to describe desertion 
during a battle.193 But a much more common word is αὐτομολέω, which implies 
leaving one’s own side in order to join the enemy. Alternatively, λιποτακτέω and its 
cognates could also be used to denote leaving one’s ranks, without the motive to 
join the enemy.194 It is thus unclear whether an act of desertion requires the desire 
                                                          
191 Christ 2006 devotes just over one page to the topic (94-95), and there is hardly any mention of 
desertion in Sabin, van Wees & Whitby 2007. Velho 2002 deals largely with the terminology and legal 
aspects of desertion. For modern literature, see e.g. Seidler 1993, or the articles in Bröckling & Sikora 
1998 (covering the Thirty Years’ War up to modern times); on the legal aspects surrounding desertion 
in international law, see Niebergall-Lackner 2016. 
192 For the difficulties of defining desertion in general, see Niebergall-Lackner 2016, 1-4. 
193 Hdt. 6.25.2. 




to join the enemy (what we would normally call defection), or if the simple wish to 
leave one’s own army is the deciding factor. In terms of compliance theory, it matters 
a great deal if a soldier decides to desert because he wants to return to his family, or 
out of fear or exhaustion, compared to a soldier who deserts to join the enemy with 
the expectation to fight against his former organisation in the future, all in the hope 
of higher rewards for his service. 
 This is connected to the notion that often it was not an unwillingness to fight 
that caused men to run: soldiers deserted for better conditions of service, more pay, 
or to escape coercion – hence carefully distinguishing the reasons for desertion will 
be important for revealing the underlying motivations of the lower participants in a 
given army. In addition to these considerations, we should distinguish between 
different types of deserters: citizen-soldiers, allied foreigners, mercenaries, and 
slaves all operated under different compliance relationships, and as such we must 
not group their behaviour together without assessing the potential impact of each 
compliance model on their motivations.195 As we shall see, the Greeks also saw a 
runaway slave as a ‘deserter’ and employed the same terms used to describe a 
soldier deserting an army; this makes differentiating between various types of 
deserters difficult. Furthermore, different types of organisations will provide 
different environments in terms of primary groups and levels of cohesion, which 
could play important roles in one’s motivation to desert. To begin with, it will be 
useful to provide some general insights into the phenomenon and then relate them 
to the subjects of this study: the compliance structures of polis and Royal armies. 
 Shils and Janowitz’s famous study of levels of cohesion in the German army 
of the Second World War observed that deserters were normally those that could 
not be properly integrated into primary groups; the evidence pertaining to the US 
forces of the Vietnam War points to a similar conclusion.196 For the German army, it 
was found that desertion rates were lowest in units with high primary group 
cohesion, and highest in units of mixed ethnicity with a correspondingly lower level 
                                                          
195 For example, Starr 1974 occasionally deals with deserters but does not address who they were or 
how this might have coloured their behaviour after desertion. 
196 Kellett 1982, 100-1. 
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of cohesion – this last element points to the important factor of relative 
homogeneity for the establishment of (social) cohesion, as was pointed out in 
Chapter 1. These results might lead us to assume that highly cohesive primary 
groups are a way of safeguarding against desertion, but this is too simplistic: the 
difference lies in the vital distinction between social cohesion and task cohesion. 
 Shils and Janowitz indicated further that families were a powerful 
contributing factor in soldiers’ willingness to desert, and that often group discussions 
about families led to considerations of surrender or desertion.197 We will return to 
the importance of families later, but for now we may note that a climate of intimacy 
and the sharing of personal information about relatives and loved ones could lead to 
higher levels of noncompliance. In other words, social cohesion without task 
cohesion could be detrimental to overall compliance. This fits well with a more 
recent study of primary groups and combat effectiveness that manages to refine the 
findings of Shils and Janowitz by questioning the clear causal connection they 
posited for primary groups and desertion: citing evidence form the Second World 
War and the Confederate Army of the American Civil War, it concludes that 
desertion was in fact more common among strong primary groups – the bonds 
between the individuals were used to justify and enable desertion, and often such 
groups would desert together (Kier 1998). Noncompliance, then, was the result of 
strong social cohesion without the guiding element of task cohesion: ‘These actions 
hurt combat performance, and they occurred because primary groups did not share 
the goals of the larger organization – not because of the absence of primary 
groups’.198 The importance of the type of motivation present in soldiers for the 
purpose of combating desertion is further underlined by the idea that desertion is 
most effectively controlled not by coercion, but by careful selection and 
socialisation; a strong compliance relationship is a much more elegant solution, 
whereas coercion and deterrence can be seen as symptoms of an underlying 
problem, rather than remedies.199 
                                                          
197 Shils & Janowitz 1948, 289-90. 
198 Kier 1998, 16. 
199 Kellett 1982, 137. 
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 Consequently, the deciding factor is not the level of cohesion in a primary 
group, but rather the predominant type of involvement found within it, which in turn 
determines the goal any cohesion might be devoted to. If the predominant 
involvement were moral, we would expect lower rates of desertion, as the goals of 
the individuals and small groups would be relatively congruent with the goals of their 
organisation; on the other hand, if the predominant type of involvement were 
alienative, we would expect higher rates of desertion, as the respective goals would 
be opposed. In the case of calculative involvement, the degree of compliance (and 
rates of desertion) would depend on the extent to which the organisation is able to 
align the goals of its lower participants with those of the organisational elites, usually 
through the use of material incentives. 
 How are we to apply these findings to the specific historic context with which 
we are dealing? The ancient evidence is both limited and limiting: we have no 
interviews, questionnaires, or large-scale studies of ancient Greek soldiers’ attitudes 
towards combat performance and desertion. This makes it difficult to assess 
individual motivations with any degree of certainty. Usually, our viewpoint is that of 
one individual who is often also far removed in time from the events that are 
described. Thus, we will have to content ourselves with identifying general trends 
and attempting to analyse them against the backdrop of the respective compliance 
relationships we might find in ancient Greek armies. More precisely, if the main 
hypothesis stands – i.e. that Polis armies operated with a predominantly normative-
moral, and Royal armies with a predominantly remunerative-calculative compliance 
relationship – we should be able to predict a rough picture of desertion in those 
armies. In particular, we might expect desertion rates to be lower in Polis armies, and 
higher in Royal armies. 
 Generally speaking, deserters appear to have been a relatively frequent and 
common feature of Greek warfare; in a time of limited methods of gathering military 
intelligence, deserters were a prime source of information on enemy forces.200 This 
                                                          




would have been known by most would-be deserters, and might have been a 
contributing factor in any decision to desert: the opposing side would likely offer a 
warm welcome to anyone wishing to join them, not only because it was a gain in 
relative strength, but also – and possibly most importantly – because of the 
information any such individuals might hold. Such was the allure of military 
intelligence that fake deserters were routinely used in ruses to leak false information 
to the enemy. This situation is borne out by the evidence from Polyainos, whose 
handbook on military stratagems includes many examples of trickery involving 
desertion, utilised both by Polis and Royal armies.201 It is important to note that such 
ruses derived their efficacy from the fact that desertion must have been fairly 
common: the number of ‘real’ deserters compared to fake ones would have had to 
be relatively high, otherwise we would expect kings, generals, and councils to 
eventually catch on and immediately suspect anyone who deserted to their side of 
deceit.202 
 For our purposes, however, the true significance of Polyainos lies in his 
references to real deserters, as these will give us some idea of the relative 
compliance levels in Royal and Polis armies. While his episodes pertaining to Royal 
armies are straight-forward, those pertaining to Polis armies merit closer 
inspection.203 In none of the seven reported instances can we be sure that a citizen 
deserted his own army. At 1.17 we learn of helots who deserted the Spartans; at 
1.43.1, three hundred Syracusan slaves desert to the Athenians; at 1.48.5 we hear of 
a deserter who informed Konon that the enemy would try to capture his ship, but 
the informant’s identity is unknown; at 2.1.15, Agesilaos struggles with high 
desertion rates in his army, and proceeds to hide any masterless shields to conceal 
the scale of the problem – but Plutarch (Ages. 32.7) states explicitly that these were 
disaffected helots and pressed perioikoi; at 2.3.10, we learn that Agesilaos was 
                                                          
201 Polis army fake deserters in Polyainos’ Stratagemata: 1.15, 1.20.2, 1.42.1, 1.43.2, 1.46, 1.48.1, 2.2.4, 
2.26, 5.16.5, 5.33.4. Fake deserters in Royal armies: 4.2.21; 5.44.2. See also Hdt. 6.38.2 and Diod. Sic. 
19.26.3-4. 
202 Cf. Christ 2006, 95: he assumes that desertion might have been common, but does not provide any 
supporting evidence. 
203 Royal army real deserters: Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.16, 4.8.2 (cf. Plut. Demetr. 49.1). 
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informed of an impending night attack by an anonymous deserter; at 2.10.1, 
deserters betrayed the Spartiate Kleandridas’ surprise attack to the Terinaians – 
again they remain unknown, but it is certainly possible that these were helots; 
finally, at 2.25, Agesipolis is forced to post guard dogs around his camp to prevent 
any unwilling allies from deserting and aiding the besieged Mantineians, whom they 
secretly favoured. So far, the impression we get is that Polis armies appear to have 
suffered desertion mainly from those parts of their forces that might not have 
possessed the same type of predominant involvement as the citizen soldiers (moral), 
i.e. slaves and helots on the one hand (alienative), and allied contingents and 
mercenaries on the other (calculative). As it turns out, this impression is supported 
by other ancient evidence. 
 It is clear that the Greeks classified runaway slaves as deserters and placed 
them into the same category as any free citizens who decided to leave their army. In 
the armistice treaty of 423, the Spartans and the Athenians included a clause that 
prohibited the reception of deserters, free or slave, by either side: τοὺς δὲ 
αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε δοῦλον, μήτε 
ὑμᾶς μήτε ἡμᾶς.204 Linguistically, there was no difference between a free citizen and 
a slave once they had committed the act. We can also safely assume that this 
approach was wide-spread and not an idiosyncratic use of the term by Thucydides: 
after all, he reported the contents of a treaty between Athens, Sparta, and their 
respective allies, meaning that the terms had to be clear and easy to understand by 
the majority of Greek communities. The main point here is that when our sources 
use a form of the word αὐτομολέω without specifying exactly who was deserting, 
we cannot be certain if they were free or slaves, and have to take our cue from the 
context of each situation. The second point to note is that regardless of external 
evidence, the terms of the treaty only make sense if we accept that free citizens also 
chose to desert during the war, in addition to slaves or helots. The precise scale and 
relative proportion of the two groups, however, are hard to assess, as we lack reliable 
numbers. Probably the most famous case of desertion where we have an apparently 
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precise number is that of the Athenian slaves who deserted in the aftermath of the 
Peloponnesian fortification of Dekeleia during the Peloponnesian War. According to 
Thucydides, some 20,000 individuals managed to ‘desert’ (ηὐτομολήκεσαν) as a 
result; the number’s accuracy, however, is somewhat controversial.205 The exact 
number is of relatively little importance to this study; suffice it to say that a large 
number of slaves decided to desert. Thucydides makes the connection between 
slaves and desertion apparent several times: helots and deserters are mentioned in 
one breath at 5.35.7, and at 8.40.2 we learn that many Chian slaves deserted to the 
Athenian army in 412/1, and their intimate knowledge of the countryside proved a 
great boon to the Athenian cause – a further reminder of the importance of deserters 
for military intelligence. Thucydides also tells us that numerous slaves deserted the 
retreating Athenian army in Sicily in 413.206 Helots, too, are reported as deserting 
their Spartan masters; on one occasion in 422, the Athenian general Kleon obtained 
intelligence on his opponent Brasidas’ current whereabouts from an otherwise 
unknown deserter. We can infer that the deserter was probably not a Spartan citizen 
from our knowledge that Brasidas’ force mainly contained helots and 
mercenaries.207 
 Mercenaries, in fact, are the other group that our sources present as being 
prone to desertion.208 Aineias Taktikos, who often envisaged cities hiring mercenary 
forces to bolster their defences, repeatedly offers advice to guard against desertion, 
and generally assumes that it was a perfectly normal occurrence during a siege.209 In 
the mercenary context, Xenophon’s Ten Thousand represent an interesting case. As 
we have already noted in section 2.3, it was not unusual for Hellenistic soldiers, be 
they Macedonians or mercenaries, to simply switch sides after a battle, effectively 
                                                          
205 Thuc. 7.27.5. On the desertions to Dekeleia generally and for a short overview of the various 
attempts to deal with the number, see Hanson 1992. 
206 Thuc. 7.75.5, where he uses the word ἀκολούθων, which could simply mean camp follower, so we 
have to allow for the fact that non-slaves deserted too; I follow Hunt 1998, 167 with n. 10 that the bulk 
of them were slaves. 
207 Thuc. 5.2.3, cf. 4.80.5, 83.5-6. Helots deserting: e.g. 4.41.3, 5.14.3. Mistrust towards slaves is also 
expressed in Xen. Hell. 5.1.11 and Thuc. 6.28.1. 
208 E.g. Hdt. 8.26.1, Thuc. 3.73-74, Xen. An. 1.4.3. 
209 Aen. Tact. 22.14, 23.1 and 23.4-5, 24.16, 28.2. 
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exchanging one paymaster for another. The Ten Thousand, however, did not offer 
their services to Artaxerxes II or place themselves in his power in any way. Nor do we 
hear of any large-scale desertions among the Greeks.210 Xenophon might of course 
be withholding details of any potentially dishonourable and treacherous behaviour, 
but the fact that he does include some detail on one group of Greek deserters makes 
it unlikely that he would have deliberately misinformed his audience about other 
significant desertions. The incident occurred after the commanders of the Ten 
Thousand had been betrayed and executed: the Greek army decided to force the 
march back home, but Xenophon tells us that some twenty soldiers under an 
Arkadian lochagos Nikarchos (who had shortly before been seriously wounded) 
deserted the Greek camp during the night, having been bribed to do so by the 
Persians.211 
 The event has been analysed in depth elsewhere, but we can note that if 
Xenophon was right and these were indeed the only Greeks who deserted, the 
overall cohesion of the Ten Thousand must have been relatively strong.212 This was 
in spite of the several obstacles at the time: overall command was shattered, there 
was no clear goal or common purpose (i.e. low task cohesion), and the army 
consisted of many separate companies of mercenaries, all with their own 
commanders, motivations, and internal personal ties (i.e. low social cohesion).213 
The only real unifying factor and potential source of common identity was the army’s 
Greekness. The importance of task cohesion is exemplified by the eventual success 
of the Ten Thousand: the shared goal of returning home was a main contributor to 
the cohesion and effectiveness of the army. Xenophon apparently made the same 
point when the army considered founding a city and was on the verge of breaking 
apart: he called for unity of purpose, and warned that if each struck out on their own, 
they would fail. At this point he also advised that anyone who was caught trying to 
                                                          
210 Some Thracian infantry and horsemen desert (Xen. An. 2.2.7). 
211 Xen. An. 3.3.5. 
212 On the episode, see Hyland 2010: he also discusses the medical circumstances of Nikarchos’ 
survival (240-46), and suggests that bribery was unlikely to be the reason behind their desertion (247-
48). 
213 Precisely these bonds might have been part of the reason behind the desertion of the small group 
under Nikarchos; cf. Hyland 2010, 246. 
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desert the army before they reached safety should be judged as a wrongdoer.214 The 
word he used for desertion was not αὐτομολέω, but ἀπολείπω, which implies that 
he was not imagining anyone wanting to defect to the enemy: desertion in this case 
was simply leaving on one’s own. This seems to have been what Nikarchos and his 
men had planned: we hear nothing more of their fate, but they might have feared 
the destruction of the Greek army (Nikarchos had been with the commanders when 
they were betrayed and killed) and decided to seek safety in quickly setting out on 
their own.215 
 Another possible contributing factor in their decision to desert might have 
been the absence of any punitive measures for desertion, at present or in the future; 
Xenophon might have been hinting at rectifying this with his suggestion to view 
deserters as evildoers.216 In this light, the low numbers of deserters might appear 
even more striking. More importantly, however, Xenophon’s call for harsh 
judgement of deserters echoes how these individuals were seen in a polis context, 
where desertion could be equated with a betrayal of the entire social and military 
structure that the polis represented.217 Civic armies, it seems, managed to set 
individual actions of desertion into the wider context of the socio-political system: 
actions that damaged the army also damaged society, and Xenophon might have 
been trying to cast the Ten Thousand as a quasi-polis on the move, in an attempt to 
harness the normative power such an organisation could exercise to prevent 
desertion. 
 On the whole, then, desertion seems not to have been a significant issue even 
in the case of the Ten Thousand: what started as a mercenary force under a foreign 
employer turned into a relatively unified army, one that in its decision making 
process also began to resemble a polis.218 Nevertheless, the case of the Ten 
                                                          
214 Xen. An. 5.6.33: καὶ ἐάν τις μέντοι ἀπολιπὼν ληφθῇ πρὶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ εἶναι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα, 
κρίνεσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς ἀδικοῦντα. 
215 Cf. Hyland 2010, 250. 
216 Hyland 2010, 249. 
217 Velho 2002, 256: ‘non seulement la désertion remet en cause les fondements de la mise en arme 
de la cité, mais elle constitue également une remise en cause de l'ordre de la πολιτεία - ce sur quoi 
les anciens Grecs insistent particulièrement’. 
218 On this topic see Hornblower 2004. 
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Thousand should not be taken as representative of Greek armies; their situation was 
exceptional, and in addition to the high levels of task cohesion there would have 
been purely practical reasons for the low rate of desertion. 
 Apart from slaves and mercenaries, we find references to deserters without 
indications as to their backgrounds, such as Thucydides’ statement that the 
Spartans were told about the plague in Athens by deserters (τῶν αὐτομόλων), or 
Diodoros’ assertion that Lysander had heard from some deserters (παρά τινων 
αὐτομόλων) that the Athenians were about to sail out of Aigospotamoi.219 In such 
cases we can only speculate as to their identities. Another context for desertion, 
albeit on a larger scale, is that of allied armies. For example, when the Spartan 
general Derkylidas was confronted with the army of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos 
in 397, the Peloponnesians stood firm, but his allies from Priene, Achilleion, and 
other places in Ionia either dropped their weapons and ran, or made it otherwise 
clear they did not intend to fight.220 In a similar episode set two years later, the 
Spartans are once more abandoned by their allies after Lysander suffered a defeat 
(and lost his life) at Haliartos: the Phokians and other allies departed during the 
night.221 At the naval battle of Knidos in 394, the allied squadron on the left wing fled 
the battle once they realised how badly outnumbered they were.222 Again, we learn 
little from our sources as the exact motivations that caused these cases of desertion; 
misgivings about a campaign, financial difficulties, political considerations, or simply 
fear and desperation could all be offered as explanations. Just as with the possible 
examples of treachery on the battlefield discussed above in section 2.2., we can 
observe that desertion in allied armies was carried out by national or polis 
contingents as a whole, preserving the internal cohesion of each force. 
 Individual deserters certainly existed too, but not on a scale to merit much 
mention in our literary sources. Additionally, we must allow for the possibility that 
some of our sources actively sought to downplay the roles of citizen deserters, and 
                                                          
219 Thuc. 2.27.1, Diod. Sic. 13.106.2. 
220 Xen. Hell. 3.2.17. 
221 Xen. Hell. 3.5.21. 
222 Xen. Hell. 4.3.12. Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.61.3: the majority of Dionysios of Syracuse’s Greek allies deserted 
him when it was clear that he would not fight Himilkon in 396. 
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highlight instead acts of desertion carried out by slaves, metics, and other marginal 
members of polis society.223 Nevertheless, there are some passages that make it 
relatively clear that citizens were not above deserting their own polis. During the 
siege of Corcyra by the Spartans in 373, hunger drove many of the Corcyraeans to 
desert to the Spartans. Such was their number that Mnasippos, the Spartan general, 
proclaimed that any who desert to him will be sold into slavery – to no avail: the 
deserters kept coming, and Mnasippos had to drive them back to the city by force, 
where the slaves were barred from re-entering and ended up starving to death 
outside.224 This tragic episode implies that citizens were among those who deserted 
to the enemy, otherwise Mnasippos’ threat of selling them into slavery would have 
been empty (unless we assume only slaves, mercenaries, and metics deserted). As 
so often, we lack any information as to the citizens’ backgrounds, and cannot tell if 
these were soldiers, women, children, or the elderly. At any rate, it seems that the 
Spartan commander viewed them only as extra mouths to feed, and preferred them 
back in Corcyra where their presence would further exacerbate the food supply 
problem. We might expect him to retain any individuals he deemed able of fighting, 
which makes it less likely that there were many soldiers among the deserters. We 
may also note that among those who were sent back, the slaves were denied their 
return, while the citizens – relatives of those inside – were allowed entry. This shows 
once more that slaves were usually outside the socio-political system of a polis and 
did not benefit from any moral commitment present in the citizen body that moved 
them to take back those citizens who had already abandoned them. 
 A similar story is preserved in Lykourgos’ speech Against Leokrates, whose 
namesake he was prosecuting for treason. He mentions a decree passed by the 
Athenians condemning to death those who had deserted to the Spartans at Dekeleia 
when the city was being besieged towards the end of the Peloponnesian War.225 
                                                          
223 On the role of slaves in ancient warfare, and our main sources’ often systematic attempts to write 
them out of their histories, see Hunt 1998. 
224 Xen. Hell. 6.2.15. 
225 Lycurg. Leoc. 120-21; here forms of the verb μεθίστημι are used to describe the act, which can mean 
‘change’ or ‘go over’, but also has connotations of revolt: e.g. Thuc. 1.35.5 (καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι). For a good overview of the legal context of the speech, see 
Harris 2013, 233-41. 
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Again, no details are provided concerning the identities of these deserters, but the 
implication is that they were male citizens who had abandoned the community in 
times of war, and thus could potentially have been soldiers. Nothing is said of their 
motivations; some might have been sympathisers with a pro-Spartan mindset; 
others might simply have been desperate or afraid, like the starving Corcyraeans. It 
appears that the extreme conditions of a city under siege were sufficient to cause 
some citizens to break their ties to their home polis – at least temporarily: the 
passage also refers to some who might be caught returning to the city – an indicator 
that some of the deserters hoped to re-join their community once the crisis was 
over.226 There are other, more or less conclusive sources that seem to mention 
citizens deserting their armies, but few allow us a meaningful degree of certainty 
when it comes to their identities or motivations.227 Nevertheless, in one area of 
ancient military life, citizen desertion appears to have been a comparatively normal 
occurrence: naval warfare. The proclivity of rowers deserting to a different 
(pay)master was well-known, and citizen rowers were not immune to the lure of 
higher and more regular pay. When looked at closely, however, it will be evident that 
for citizens at the least, this did not involve joining the enemy. 
 On the standard Greek warship of the fifth and fourth centuries, the trireme, 
the complement of some 170 rowers was usually made up of a combination of 
citizens, foreigners or metics, and slaves.228 The relative proportion of each group 
varied considerably, but it is clear that desertion plagued each category of rowers. 
According to Thucydides, Alcibiades once advised Tissaphernes to lower the pay of 
the Peloponnesian rowers: apparently this was normal practice at Athens, where in 
addition the men were paid irregularly to prevent them from deserting, as they 
would lose their claim on any arrears.229 Similarly, Xenophon tells us that in 407 
                                                          
226 Which separates them from traitors as such, according to Velho 2002, 240. Whether the Greeks 
made a clear distinction between a soldier who fled during a battle and one that left his city during a 
crisis is uncertain. 
227 E.g. Plut. Phoc. 12-13, and Men. Aspis 24-26 for a fictional case. 
228 For a discussion of the terminology of pay, and the terms of pay for the crews, see Gabrielsen 1994, 
110-25. For an analysis of the proportion of citizens and slaves on Athenian triremes, and the socio-
military implications thereof, see Herzogenrath-Amelung 2017, 55-57. 
229 Thuc. 8.45.2; Gabrielsen 1994, 112-13. 
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Lysander advised Cyrus to pay his crews more, with the explicit aim of inducing the 
rowers of the Athenian fleet to desert and enlist with him.230 The ideas here are 
simple: in the first case, the appeal is to the rowers’ calculative mindset, which will 
prevent them from deserting as they will fear the loss of income. In the second case, 
the application of increased remunerative power is designed to lure the rowers away 
from the enemy fleet. In theory, this type of manipulation should be most effective 
with those individuals whose predominant type of involvement was not moral, i.e. 
whose primary involvement was either calculative (they desert because they want 
higher pay) or alienative (they desert because they want to leave their organisation 
– higher pay is a bonus and provides some security). In the context of ancient Greek 
naval warfare, we might expect that citizen rowers and resident metics would reject 
such power (moral involvement), and that foreigners and slaves would be more likely 
to respond positively to it (calculative and alienative involvement, respectively). 
Who, then, deserted, and why? 
 The evidence pertaining to Athens is, unsurprisingly, the most fruitful. A 
speech attributed to Demosthenes allows us a direct insight into the mechanics of 
naval desertion.231 The speaker, Apollodoros, had taken up his trierarchy in 
September 362, and upon completion of his term had waited at the Hellespont for 
his replacement. As he had no money left to pay his rowers, many deserted his ship 
to either fight on land or to enlist with the navies of Thasos or Maroneia, who offered 
higher pay. The speaker also confirms that the other trierarchs also suffered from 
desertion, although not as much as his ship: the reason was that he had relied not on 
conscripted crews, but had attracted the most competent individuals through higher 
pay, hence these men had no trouble finding employment elsewhere.232 It appears 
that most of these were in fact Athenian citizens, as Apollodoros also mentions their 
audacity to desert without fearing prosecution at home.233 At any rate, their 
                                                          
230 Xen. Hell. 1.5.4. 
231 The speech, Against Polykles, was most likely composed by the speaker himself: Apollodoros, son 
of Pasion (Bers 2003, 19). 
232 [Dem.] 50.14-16. 
233 Although it might not have been within his authority to prosecute them if they were indeed 
volunteers; see Bers 2003, 26 n. 33. 
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desertion was not to the enemy: Thasos and Maroneia were allies of Athens, and 
thus simply offered a secure income in the face of Apollodoros’ inability to continue 
paying their wages. This is a good example of the layered nature of motivations: the 
men’s moral involvement prevented them from joining the enemy for higher pay, 
but the calculative element still made them choose noncompliance (and potential 
prosecution) over lack of remuneration.234 These men, however, were specialists 
who could rely on their experience and skill; the crews of other ships were manned 
by citizens conscripted from the muster rolls, and Apollodoros told the judges that 
most of them remained with their ships in the hope of a speedy return home, which 
illustrates that the compliance relationship functioned for the majority of citizen 
rowers. 
 Desertion among crews was a real problem: we know that many individuals 
took the opportunity of putting into port at the Piraeus to leave their ship; 
replacements had to be hired or lured in by promises of pay and advances.235 In 
another speech, we learn that naval deserters were liable to imprisonment.236 
Thucydides has Nikias write home to the Athenians that his naval strength is 
dwindling rapidly: the slaves are deserting in droves, together with those non-
Athenians who had been pressed into service, while those who had originally 
volunteered in the hope of sharing in the spoils of war were also abandoning their 
ships.237 Naturally, Nikias here might be exaggerating to make his point, and he 
probably deemed it unwise to mention any widespread desertions among his 
Athenian troops. Nevertheless, he only mentions slaves and foreigners, the two 
groups we had earlier identified as being more at risk of desertion than Athenian 
citizens. The slaves and pressed foreigners probably operated under an alienative 
involvement, while the volunteers were calculatively motivated; little wonder both 
parties chose to jump ship as the Sicilian expedition became a desperate fight for 
                                                          
234 [Dem.] 50.16: ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι εὐπορίαν κρείττω εἶναι αὑτοῖς τοῦ μέλλοντος 
φόβου, εἴ ποτε ληφθείησαν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ. 
235 [Dem.] 50.11-12. 
236 Dem. 51.11 (the speech is dated to 359). 
237 Thuc. 7.13.2. 
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survival.238 Slaves especially would have little reason to stick it out with their 
masters, who represented the coercive organisation of the polis: Sicily offered ample 
opportunity to leave the army, and possibly even a chance of freedom for joining the 
right side.239 
 This raises an important point when considering desertion. The possibility of 
desertion, together with the willingness to desert, does not automatically lead to an 
act of desertion: ‘Desertion might be as easy as going to the tavern, but to what end 
if there were no taverns where one was going?’.240 A deserter is someone who is 
unhappy with his current situation, but it is vital to keep in mind the alternatives, 
which might be even worse. Desertion among citizens might have been relatively 
low, but how feasible was it to desert in the first place? One did not simply walk into 
a neighbouring polis and ask for citizenship and a plot of land, after all. Here we 
might recall the Athenians who defected to the Spartans at Dekeleia, only to return 
home at a later stage. The socio-political system of a polis itself was an obstacle to 
desertion: for most individuals, the polis embodied everything: family, friends, 
identity; past, present, and future.241 The normative-moral compliance relationship 
was central to this system, and a reason for the comparatively low levels of desertion 
in civic armies. 
 In terms of opportunities to desert, the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period 
present a stark contrast: we have already observed that kings and commanders vied 
with each other to secure the loyalty of their Macedonian and mercenary troops, and 
that bribery and betrayal were relatively frequent occurrences. Moreover, many 
commanders were switching sides according to the fortunes of war, which was often 
mirrored by the troops themselves. In this climate, with ‘taverns’ everywhere, so to 
speak, desertion was an issue on a much larger scale: once we add a predominantly 
                                                          
238 Cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 122. 
239 Hunt 1998, 95. 
240 Johnston 1992, 181. 
241 Shame and public opinion would also have acted as a deterrent: ‘Il existe donc une relation de 
causalité entre l'opinion publique et l'image du deserteur. Ici, le regard d'autrui est à la fois 
déterminant, puisqu'il impose cette appréhension péjorative et infamante, et déterminé par les 
traditions et les lois - ces dernières étant une normalisation des vœux et des aspirations de la 
communauté des citoyens’ (Velho 2002, 249). 
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remunerative-calculative compliance relationship into the mix, it becomes easy to 
see why soldiers chose to use these opportunities. Some of the instances of 
disloyalty discussed in section 2.3 contain elements of desertion, such as 
Neoptolemos’ attempt to join Antipater, or the mass desertion of the Macedonians 
under Philip III and Eurydike Adeia to Polyperchon. A few more examples will suffice 
to flesh out the picture. 
 In c. 319, one of Eumenes’ Macedonian commanders deserted him with 3,000 
infantry and 500 cavalry, shortly before the arrival of Antigonos’ army. Here we find 
yet another word for ‘defection’ in Greek, as Diodoros uses cognates of ἀφίστημι to 
describe the actions of Perdikkas and the deserters. Eumenes managed to send a 
force after them and capture the ringleaders; the latter were executed, but the 
soldiers were treated kindly and distributed among the army.242 Diodoros did not 
specify who these men were, but it is certainly possible that like their commander, 
Perdikkas, they were Macedonians.243 We hear nothing about issues of payment, 
which is often the case with mercenaries, and it appears more likely that there was a 
problem with Eumenes’ authority over Macedonians troops, which was questioned 
throughout his career. That he was able to simply distribute the men among his 
existing units also suggests they were of a common background. The 500 cavalry, 
however, were more likely to have been ‘recruited locally’.244 The only other detail, 
that he treated them with kindness (instead of punishment or payment), might also 
point towards the fact that these were Macedonians who felt uneasy under 
Eumenes’ command, and had to be tactfully and respectfully handled to secure their 
compliance, something of which Eumenes was certainly capable. 
 Around the same time, Antigonos, too, suffered mass desertion. Some 3,000 
veteran Macedonian hoplites left his army and entrenched themselves in the 
                                                          
242 Diod. Sic. 18.40.2-4. 
243 Diodoros seldom provided detail on deserters, and simply presented them as a normal element of 
warfare that required no further explanation, e.g. at the siege of Rhodes (Diod. Sic. 20.94.1). 
244 Roisman 2012, 161; he refrains from identifying them as veterans, but does not exclude the 
possibility. Anson 2004, 127 suggests the lure of Antigonos’ wealth as a motivation to desert. Cf. 
Billows 1990, 74: ‘the revolt was no doubt a result of Antigonos’s propaganda, for during the winter 
he sent offers of substantial rewards to anyone who would betray Eumenes’. 
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mountains of Cappadocia, from where they plundered Lykaonia and Phrygia.245 
Antigonos responded by ostensibly dismissing one of his commanders, who then 
posed as a deserter himself and was accepted as the leader of the rebels. He led them 
to a plain where the men were surrounded by Antigonos’ cavalry, and forced to 
surrender under the condition that they would return quietly to Macedonia.246 
Unfortunately, we learn nothing explicit about their motivations; according to 
Polyainos, Antigonos was afraid they would join one of his enemies – as we have 
seen, such a betrayal would have been fairly unremarkable at the time – but nothing 
is said about the men’s own intentions. Setting up camp in the mountains and 
plundering the countryside seems to have been the short-term goal, which points to 
a strong calculative element: rather than risk their lives and fight for someone they 
did not believe in or felt a sense of obligation toward, it might have appeared more 
profitable to make their own fortunes.247 That the bond of loyalty had been 
irreversibly shattered is suggested by Antigonos’ condition that they return to 
Macedonia: he clearly did not trust them enough to reintegrate them into his army, 
and far better for them to be removed from the theatre of war where they might join 
one of his rivals. In fact, it appears that mass desertion was precisely what Eumenes 
built his hopes of victory on: the Göteborg palimpsest, which contains a fragment 
from Arrian’s history of the Successors, preserves Eumenes’ proclamation to his 
potential allies after he had been condemned to death by the Macedonians. He 
urged his fellow commanders to unite, informing them that because of the 
plummeting popularity of Antipater and Antigonos, their side would have a constant 
influx of power while their enemies would be weakened over time.248 The implication 
here is that through large-scale desertions and defections, the balance of power 
would shift decisively in Eumenes’ favour. For such a claim to have any traction with 
the commanders whose loyalties Eumenes desperately needed, the scenario must 
                                                          
245 Here it might be noted that the number 3,000 recurs with suspicious frequency, and should not 
always be taken at face value; for the period of the Successors, see Roisman 2012, 155 n. 22, and for 
the issue more generally, see Rubincam 2003. 
246 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.6. 
247 See Roisman 2012, 154-57 for this episode: ‘The most likely reason for the desertion was what the 
rebels are in fact reported to have done afterward, namely, plundering’. 
248 Lines 39-46 in Dreyer 1999, 58. 
93 
 
at least have been a possibility (notwithstanding Eumenes’ need to present his case 
in the most favourable light possible); indeed, this is borne out by the evidence 
presented so far. 
 If the Macedonian troops of the early Hellenistic rulers were prone to 
desertion, so were the large numbers of mercenaries that were employed by them; 
we might recall Antigonos’ attempts to prevent his soldiers from deserting to 
Ptolemy when offered higher pay from approaching boats. The treaty of capitulation 
between the Karian city of Theangela and the local dynast Eupolemos, dated to the 
end of the fourth century, included an amnesty for all those soldiers who had 
deserted to the city from Eupolemos’ army, and for those slaves who deserted 
during war; slaves who had defected during peacetime were to be treated 
differently, although we are not told how.249 The treaty made clear these soldiers 
were mercenaries, and stipulated payments of wages and donatives to some 
companies and their commanders, while granting land to any of the mercenaries 
from Theangela that wished to join Eupolemos. Chaniotis speculates that these gifts 
might have been a reward for forcing the city to surrender in the first place.250 While 
the exact circumstances of the surrender, or the situation in Eupolemos’ army are 
unknown, it appears that there were enough deserters to warrant their inclusion in 
the treaty; we can also observe that runaway slaves were mentioned separately, a 
distinction similar to what we found in the armistice treaty between Athens and 
Sparta of 423. In another case of mass desertion, preserved by Diodoros, we are told 
that in c. 302, some 2,800 mercenaries employed by Lysimachos deserted to 
Antigonos’ camp, where they were not only given gifts by their new master, but also 
received the wages they were owed by Lysimachos.251 Antigonos clearly was well 
versed in the ways of remunerative power: treating such deserters kindly might 
encourage other mercenary commanders (and Macedonians, too) to come over if 
                                                          
249 Austin 40, 10-15; the Greek word used to describe the desertion is a form of παραγίγνομαι, which 
might be a euphemism used in the peace treaty to gloss over the betrayal (e.g. 10-12: ὅσοι δὲ τῶν 
σ[τρατιωτῶν] παρεγένοντο εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τῶν Εὐπολέμου ἐν εἰρήνηι ἢ ἐν π[ολέμωι] εἶναι 
αὐτοῖς ἄδειαν). 
250 Chaniotis 2005, 84, cf. Griffith 1935, 314-15. 
251 Diod. Sic. 20.113.3. 
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they felt inadequately rewarded. In this period, the loss of almost 3,000 troops was 
a serious blow to any army, compounded if they were subsequently added to a rival 
army, increasing the relative power imbalance to around 6,000. Exploiting the 
calculative mindset of these soldiers was thus imperative for any general who 
wanted to ensure the long-term loyalty of his troops and also attract new ones to his 
cause. 
 The problem of desertion was by no means limited to the turbulent decades 
that followed Alexander’s death. A century later, among the more or less established 
Hellenistic kingdoms, we find the same patterns of behaviour among commanders 
and troops of Royal armies. The revolt of Molon during the reign of the Seleukid 
Antiochos III, in the late third century, offers several examples. At the outset, 
Xenoitas, a general loyal to Antiochos and tasked with bringing the rebel Molon to 
heel, was camping at the river Tigris, opposite the enemy army. Polybios informs us 
that numerous deserters swam across the river to join the royal camp, and told 
Xenoitas that loyalty to Molon was faltering and that large parts of the army were 
ready to desert to the king (i.e. Antiochos III), as they had grown to despise Molon.252 
Such promises are reminiscent of the changes in loyalty we witnessed in the 
Macedonian veterans a hundred years earlier; in this case, they remained unfulfilled: 
Molon withdrew his army, either as a ruse or out of genuine fear that his men would 
abandon him.253 Antiochos’ advisors, too, were aware of the weak bond between the 
rebellious troops and Molon: Zeuxis urged the king to force a battle, resulting either 
in a decisive confrontation, or, should Molon refuse the challenge, in the mass 
desertion of his men.254 The implication here is the same as that which had 
underpinned Eumenes’ message to his potential allies: given enough time, the 
soldiers would abandon their commander, out of fear, opportunism, a personal 
dislike for Molon (and a perceived weakness for refusing battle), or a sense of 
allegiance to the rightful king. Which element carried the most weight depended on 
the respective compliance relationships that were at work. Not much later, the 
                                                          
252 Polyb. 5.46.6-8. 
253 Polyb. 5.47.4. 
254 Polyb. 5.51.10-11. 
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desertion of ten soldiers from Molon’s army during a nightly approach caused him to 
call off the attack, as the operation’s secrecy had most likely been compromised.255 
And finally, when the two armies met in battle, Molon’s left wing quickly joined the 
royal army, causing the rapid collapse of the centre, and pushing Molon himself to 
commit suicide rather than be taken alive. 
 According to Polybios, the appearance of Antiochos triggered the betrayal of 
Molon’s left wing.256 This version has been questioned in Bar-Kochva’s analysis of 
the battle. He attributes it to Polybios’ source, which appears to have been hostile to 
Antiochos’ advisor Hermeias, who had argued against the king’s personal 
participation in the battle. Instead, Bar-Kochva suggests that the left wing’s 
surrender was brought about by an encircling manoeuvre, and that it was composed 
of oriental troops who would not have had much personal attachment to the new 
king.257 However, his interpretation rests on the assumption that the left wing was 
somehow forced to surrender in the first place, which is not mentioned in our 
source.258 Polybios states clearly that the left wing went over and joined the king’s 
side, not that it was encircled and/or made to surrender: τὸ δ᾿ εὐώνυμον ἅμα τῷ 
συνιὸν εἰς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν τῷ βασιλεῖ μετεβάλετο πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους (5.54.1). The 
verb μεταβάλλω does not designate surrender, but switching sides: Diodoros used 
it to describe the betrayal of the Thessalian cavalry at the battle of Tanagra in 457, 
and Plutarch chose it for the defection of Demetrios’ Macedonians to Pyrrhos. It is 
entirely possible, given the unstable loyalties of the time, and considering that 
Molon’s troops were already dissatisfied with him and deserting, that parts of his 
army decided to join the royal banner on the battlefield and turn on their erstwhile 
allies – this would also explain the rapid disintegration of Molon’s centre and right 
wing. Furthermore, switching sides during a battle may have been difficult in 
practical terms, but our examples discussed previously in this chapter show that it 
was not unusual. It appears, then, that mass desertion in Royal armies at the end of 
                                                          
255 Polyb. 5.52.11-12. 
256 Polyb. 5.54.1-2, cf. 5.41.7-9 and 47.4-48.9 for advice by Epigenes that foreshadowed this event. 
257 Bar-Kochva 1976, 121-23. 
258 Bar-Kochva 1976, 121. 
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This chapter’s overall goal was to present two contrasting pictures: one of Polis 
armies, and one of Hellenistic Royal armies. 
 For Polis armies, I have shown that military disloyalty was a relatively minor 
problem. There are no clear examples of civic armies on the march turning on 
themselves, of citizen contingents changing sides during battle to join an enemy 
army, or of cases of mass desertion. In the vast majority of cases, Polis armies acted 
as one: this could indeed lead to betrayal and disloyalty, but the targets of such acts 
were not the armies’ own communities, but more often than not other poleis. Hence 
we found examples of allied armies fracturing along political fault lines. This 
cohesion, however, went hand in hand with numerous examples of internal violence. 
Stasis remained a constant threat to the political stability of a community, and often 
caused the various factions to take up arms against each other or to invite a foreign 
army into the city. This political instability was at the heart of civic disloyalty, and it 
was a result of the intense socialisation that occurred within the socio-political 
system of a polis. Thus, we were able to identify political and military disloyalty as 
two sides of the same coin: in a functioning polis, military disloyalty was not normally 
a problem; once the system buckled under the weight of internal political 
oppositions, however, the stake each citizen had in the outcome of a struggle was 
so high that civil war became the only option. Rather than undermining the basic 
premise that citizen armies were generally loyal, then, stasis represented a 
distinctive type of disloyalty that had its roots in the very reasons for normative civic 
loyalty; in Royal armies, however, disloyalty was more closely linked to the prevailing 
utilitarian ethos. It is vital not to mistake the absence of military disloyalty in Polis 
armies for the absence of divisions or mixed loyalties: rather, it points to a 
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compliance relationship – embedded in a powerful socio-political system – that was 
strong enough to contain these divisions.259 I shall show that this compliance 
relationship was a normative-moral one, and that a polis constituted a remarkably 
effective socio-political system. 
 Hellenistic Royal armies, on the other hand, presented a rather different 
picture. Bribery, betrayal, and desertion were comparatively frequent occurrences. 
There were many examples of treachery committed both by commanders and the 
rank and file troops, including switching sides during a battle, turning on one’s own 
army, or joining the enemy while on campaign. It is important to note that such acts 
were carried out by mercenaries and Macedonians, soldiers and generals; this 
suggests that it was not simply an issue of mercenary behaviour, or power struggles 
among commanders: rather, disloyalty seems to have been an almost structural 
problem in these armies, one of which everyone was aware. This led to a climate of 
distrust and uncertainty: loyalty was never a given, but had to be earned, bought, or 
enforced. As I will demonstrate, more often than not it was the latter two options, 
with a prevalence of remuneration to create loyalty. The prevailing dynamic led to 
the consolidation of a calculative mindset on every level of military organisation, and 
to the establishment of remuneration as the most effective way to secure and 
maintain the allegiance of subordinates. This compliance model stands in stark 
contrast to that of Polis armies, and is related to Royal armies’ lack of a strong socio-
political system. This became particularly clear once the soldiers’ baggage was 
involved: the overriding motivation was personal advantage, as there was no 
apparent overlap between the goals of the military organisation and those of the 
individual. An effective socio-political system could help to align these two aspects 
and produce an involvement that equates the benefit of the organisation with that 
of the individual. 
 In the next chapter, we will turn towards funerary practices pertaining to 
Greek soldiers – an area where the socio-political system is surprisingly visible – in 
an attempt to refine further the contrast between Polis and Royal armies. 
                                                          
















In the previous chapter, a contrast was drawn between Polis armies and Royal 
armies, or citizen forces on the one hand, and the armies of Hellenistic warlords and 
kings on the other. In the course of the discussion it became apparent that there is a 
seemingly fundamental difference between these two types of organisations: Polis 
armies were embedded into the established community of the polis, an effective 
socio-political system, while Royal armies, unsurprisingly, were not. They did not 
from the outset have a clearly defined set of social, political, and moral values that 
directed their actions, nor a shared historical vision of the past that spanned 
centuries and shaped their future. It is my contention that this was one of the primary 
reasons for the differences in army loyalty we observed in Chapter 2, and the present 
chapter is an attempt at highlighting one area where the absence of a well-
established socio-political system is particularly visible: the treatment of those who 
died in war. 
 The wider community of the polis played a crucial part in improving the 
loyalty of those who fought for it, as there were things beyond personal safety and 
advantage in which each soldier, as a member of that community, had a stake. The 
fourth century military writer Aineias Taktikos provides us with a list of these 
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fundamental values: ‘shrines, fatherland, parents, and children, and others’.260 In 
Hellenistic times a similar sentiment was expressed by Polybios when he described 
how the Megalopolitans refused to ally themselves with Kleomenes III: they 
‘preferred to lose their lands, their tombs, their sanctuaries, their fatherland, their 
property, in short, everything that is most necessary to people, for the sake of not 
betraying their loyalty to their allies’.261 We find another example in Xenophon, who 
included a short speech delivered in the aftermath of a battle: 
 
Citizens, […] we have shared with you the most sacred sanctuaries and sacrifices and 
the most beautiful festivals: we have danced together, gone to school together, gone to 
war together […] By the gods of our fathers and our mothers, and in the name of our 
common kinship, our bonds through marriage and our friendship, […] cease from 
harming your fatherland. 
(Xen. Hell. 2.4.20-21) 
 
This appeal to common civic values and reconciliation occurs – ironically and 
symptomatically – in the context of the Athenian stasis of 403, but it should not be 
too difficult to imagine similar sentiments existing in most, if not all, other political 
communities of the Greek world. Of course, this is a special circumstance where a 
call for unity is entirely appropriate; we should not imagine that such professions 
were ever routine under more normal conditions. But the fact that this is a speech 
about reconciliation itself does not detract from the value of the appeal: the 
significance lies in the choice made by the speaker about what to focus on to foster 
unity – this would only have worked if there was a general agreement in the first 
place about what held a polis together. The efficacy of such rhetoric depends on each 
particular situation, and it would be naïve to think that it always corresponded to 
reality, but the fact remains that it could only ever be invoked effectively in a force 
composed of citizen-soldiers who shared in a common socio-political past, present, 
and future – a complex that we might call the civic continuum. For more 
                                                          
260 Aen. Tact. Preface 2; his treatise on siegecraft was probably written around the middle of the 
fourth century; see the introduction in Whitehead 2001 for a detailed discussion. Cf. Thuc. 7.69. 
261 Polyb. 2.61.9-10: προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας, τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, 




heterogeneous armies containing elements of varying political identity, ethnicity, 
and military status, other arguments would have had to be made to reinforce loyalty 
and cohesion. In addition to blood-ties, the passage also highlights the importance 
of social ties among the soldiers that extend beyond the experience of shared 
military service. Communal social and religious events such as festivals, the theatre, 
processions, and education are presented as powerful unifying forces that would 
exert their influence for as long as an individual was a member of that society. In this 
chapter, we will see that the socio-political system, as invoked in its major 
constituent parts in the above passages from Aineias, Polybios, and Xenophon, 
played a vital role in informing the type of involvement of its members; conversely, 
its absence left room for other types to develop. 
 In the first part of this chapter (section 3.2), we will discuss the funerary and 
commemorative practices of poleis, in an attempt to identify if and how they bear 
witness to the existence of specific types of power and involvement. The significant 
role played by the socio-political system in these practices will become apparent, 
and will inform the discussion of section 3.3, where the evidence pertaining to Royal 
armies will be examined and contrasted with the situation in a polis. 
 
 
3.2 For the Land of our Fathers: Funerary Practices and Commemoration in Greek 
Poleis 
 
The importance of the socio-political system for shaping an individual’s orientation 
has been discussed in Chapter 1. If harnessed effectively, it can create a powerful 
normative framework into which lower participants are embedded, encouraging 
them to act in ways that accord with, maintain, and perpetuate the socio-political 
system itself. One method used by polis communities to shape their citizens’ sense 
of belonging and identity was commemoration, private and public. This 
encompasses a society’s conception of history, tradition, and values of particular 
importance. For our purposes, it is especially the commemoration of a polis’ military 
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past that is of interest: how were wars remembered, and how were soldiers who died 
in them perceived? To explore this aspect of a socio-political system’s power to 
create normative involvement, we will now analyse commemoration in the context 
of funerary practices. The aim is to identify values and themes that are highlighted 
in order to learn more about the real or imagined motivations for fighting for one’s 
polis. A full study of sepulchral customs, sculptures, and inscriptions, discussing all 
the various expressions and subjecting them to quantitative analysis, would require 
a thesis of its own; what follows are some examples of prevalent ideas and ideals 
that were articulated in Greek funerary practices in general, and that can be found 
on tombstones and in epigrams for Greek soldiers who died fighting (usually for their 
own polis).262 Athens will feature heavily, because of the disproportionately large 
amount of evidence that pertains to it, but material from other poleis is equally 
illuminating and attests to the communality of some of the themes and practices we 
will identify. 
 How people chose to remember and present those who fell in battle can 
reveal their underlying attitudes towards death, war, duty, honour, or the 
importance of family.263 Moreover, the politics of burial and memory can have a 
profound impact on a society in terms of generating collective and/or group identity, 
or reinforcing social stratification.264 Especially on public monuments, ideology and 
a society’s values can be projected, modified, and reinforced. Cultural memory in 
particular is shaped and preserved through communal commemoration of the dead 
and the wars they died in.265 Thus the iconography and didactic tone of war 
memorials of the First World War ‘have been shown to play a key role in the 
articulation and inculcation of common, state-sanctioned values’.266 Modern 
                                                          
262 For an overview of the topic, see chapter 2 in Pritchett 1985, and in particular e.g. Stecher 1981 (on 
funerary epigrams for soldiers and athletes), Hannah 2010 (on the significance of the warrior-
loutrophoroi), and Barbantani 2014 (on Hellenistic soldiers). 
263 Low 2010, 341. 
264 E.g. in Christian burial basilicas, collective identity was reinforced by burial based mainly on 
membership of a certain group, in this case, the specific church (Yasin 2005, 433). 
265 Chaniotis 2012, 44: ‘One of the main functions of the ritualized commemoration of war through 
commemorative anniversaries is to transmit this ‘cultural memory’ to future generations, thus forging 
civic identity’. 
266 Yasin 2005, 434, with n. 8.  
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memorials, however, are not directly related to ancient ones, and the different 
religious and socio-cultural contexts they arose in impose certain limitations to the 
similarities we might identify.267 When discussing the ancients’ funerary and 
commemorative practices, therefore, we need to bear in mind the vastly different 
world to which they belonged. 
 More often than not, the ancients chose the medium of funerary inscriptions 
to relay information about the deceased. Such inscriptions might be found on a 
tombstone, an urn, a casualty list, or a sculpture base, but also in the form of literary 
epigrams; for Classical Attica some 10,000 epitaphs are attested.268 Metrical 
funerary inscriptions are already attested for the seventh century, however, and they 
begin to proliferate and grow more elaborate in the Classical period, especially with 
the development of polyandria, or public war graves; eventually the latter give way 
to a rapidly growing number of private funerary epigrams.269 In length these texts 
vary from just a few words to sizeable compositions. The information provided in 
them varies considerably. For example, compared to previous centuries, the 
epigrams of the fourth century were more likely to contain personal details such as 
age or occupation.270 For our discussion, the focus will be on the Classical and Early 
Hellenistic periods, and on examples drawn from different regions, centuries, and 
socio-political backgrounds. It will become evident that there are certain themes – 
sacrifice for the community, honouring the dead, and exhortation – that unite many 
sepulchral expressions regardless of any other differences, and point to the 
conclusion that Greek poleis adopted a relatively similar approach to the 
commemoration of their war dead. 
 Two early and roughly contemporary examples from Corcyra can serve to 
highlight the importance of the individual context of each inscription when it came 
to deciding what to inscribe: the first one, IG IX.1 868 (late seventh/early sixth 
century), commemorates Arniadas, a soldier who died fighting on the mainland 
                                                          
267 Garland 1985, 118. 
268 Morris 1992, 156. 
269 Tsagalis 2008, 3-4, Day 2007, 29-31. 
270 Breuer 1995, 42. 
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opposite the island. We learn that he fell fighting bravely among the ships, but 
nothing about his provenance, whom he was fighting for or why, or what family he 
belonged to. The second one, IG IX.1 867 (c. 600), is an epitaph for Menekrates, who 
drowned at sea. Presumably because he was a foreigner, we learn that he was a 
proxenos from Oianthea in Lokris, and the names of his father and brother. We can 
add a sixth/fifth-century inscription from Akarnania, an area of Corinthian 
colonisation later noted by Thucydides for its traditionalism, honouring Prokleidas: 
the two verses inform us that the grave stands by a road, and that he died fighting 
for his own land (περὶ τᾶς αὐτο͂ γᾶς θάνε βα<ρ>νάμενος).271 Accounting for such 
differences in detail is difficult; the background of the deceased, their social 
standing, the manner of their death, personal taste, and local customs all played a 
role. Broadly speaking, there seem to have been no rules governing funerary 
commemoration of citizens in general, and of soldiers in particular; the notable 
exception to this rule is of course Sparta, to which we will return below. Because of 
the high degree of variation, we are largely dependent on whatever the inscriptions 
actually preserve for us, and inferences or assumptions about the nature of lost 
material should be treated with caution. This makes it difficult to generalise, which 
should be borne in mind when considering the examples in the following discussion. 
 The above-mentioned epitaph for Prokleidas rewards closer inspection. As 
noted, it informs us that the tombstone stood ἐνγὺς ὁδοῖο (l. 2), presumably so it 
could be seen by as many passers-by as possible. It fulfilled its function as a memory 
marker, both to fellow citizens who might come to mourn, and to non-citizens such 
as metics, envoys, traders, and visitors.272 At the most basic level, it prompts the 
reader to notice the death of Prokleidas and what he fought for: his own land; 
beyond that, it might cause the reader to reflect on the community Prokleidas 
belonged to, and how its members are presented as willing to die for it. If the reader 
was a foreigner, he or she might be imbued with respect, awe, or fear; for a fellow 
                                                          
271 GVI 70 = IG IX.1² 2:214, 3-4. Thucydides (1.5.3) mentions that in Akarnania the custom of carrying 
weapons in public had not yet died out. For the development of the settlement structure in Akarnania 
from Classical to Roman times, see Lang 1994. 
272 Stecher 1981, 16: ‘Das Grabdenkmal will Denk-Mal sein, ein äußeres Zeichen mit dem Zweck, […] 
den Vorübergehenden zum Denken an den Toten zu veranlassen’. 
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citizen, on the other hand, the inscription might evoke pride, sorrow, inspiration, a 
sense of a shared history, and a feeling of belonging and community. For such 
responses it mattered little whether or not Prokleidas was actually motivated by a 
belief that he fought or died in the service of his country. The significance lies in the 
choice to present his death as a noble sacrifice for the community. The exhortative 
character of the inscription should also be highlighted: its last verse (ℎὸς περὶ τᾶς 
αὐτο͂ γᾶς θάνε βα<ρ>νάμενος) evokes the opening lines of a famous poem by 
Tyrtaios: ‘It is good for a brave man to die, having fallen in the front ranks, fighting 
for his fatherland’.273 It appears that the appeal of the warrior ideals of Tyrtaios was 
not limited to Sparta. In the same vein, the choice to include only one detail about 
his death, that it was for his own land, elevates it to something that should be 
emulated by other members of the community Prokleidas fought for. As such it 
represents a normative expression of commitment to one’s community, and 
implicitly encourages compliance. 
 The epitaph of Prokleidas, stating that it stood close to the road, connects to 
another feature of many inscriptions for dead warriors: that the deceased should be 
remembered by foreigners and fellow citizens alike. There are numerous examples 
of this concern. A sixth/fifth-century epitaph from Thisbe in Boiotia mentions 
Phanes, who died fighting in the front ranks and was ‘dear to citizens and foreigners’ 
(l. 1).274 Another inscription from mid-sixth century Attica encourages astoi and xenoi 
to stop and mourn for the young man Tetichos, who has died in war.275 A sixth/fifth 
century sepulchral inscription from Lokris mentions that the fallen man will be 
missed by his neighbours and his people.276 These Archaic private burials emphasise 
the individual, not the community for which he fought: what mattered most was to 
proclaim the warrior’s courage and honour, not to present him as a member of a 
certain socio-political group.277 This should not obscure the fact that such 
                                                          
273 Tyrtaios F 10 West (= Lycurg. Leoc. 107), 1-2: τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα / 
ἄνδρ᾿ ἀγαθὸν περὶ ᾗ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον; cf. Stecher 1981, 27. 
274 GVI 321 = IG VII 2247, cf. SEG 43.215: ἀσστοῖ[ς] καὶ χσένοισι. 
275 IG I² 976 = IG I³ 1194 bis; for the date see Jacoby 1944, 44, with n. 31. 
276 GVI 153 = IG IX.1 307. 
277 For an overview of Archaic burial practices, see Arrington 2015, 27-33. 
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glorification could only take place in a communal context, and the various allusions 
to astoi and xenoi already point to a clear demarcation between one’s own citizens 
and outsiders. What is more, praise and honour could only be achieved in a context 
where the wider community shared those same values to begin with. Thus, these 
inscriptions are evidence of an individual’s desire to be recognised for their virtue, 
and the existence of a community in which this recognition could take place and 
carry meaning. 
 Moving away from private funerary inscriptions, we can add the widely 
known praise for the Spartiates who died at Thermopylai: ὦ ξεῖν᾽, ἀγγέλλειν 
Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.278 In this case, it 
was the foreigner himself who was supposed to spread the news among their fellow 
citizens at home, notwithstanding that there were Spartiates who had survived the 
battle.279 The funerary epigram honouring the Corinthian casualties of the battle of 
Salamis in 480 also addresses the stranger at the beginning.280 These cases reveal 
the importance of spreading knowledge about the fallen soldiers: who they were, 
how they died, and what or whom they fought for. Disseminating such information 
goes beyond a simple concern for glory; in a civic context, making sure that the 
whole community knew about the war dead and honoured them accordingly 
contributed to a shared sense of identity and purpose. It strengthened the citizens’ 
awareness of society’s interdependence, and provided model behaviour to be 
encouraged in subsequent generations. Furthermore, sepulchral inscriptions were 
only one of the many ways in which this could be achieved: ‘burial, lists, epigrams, 
sculpture, dedications, speeches, processions and games’ were different ways of 
remembering, glorifying, and honouring a polis’ dead soldiers.281 Taken together 
they represent a powerful expression of normative power, in that they encourage 
service for the community and reward loyalty to the state with symbolic honours. 
                                                          
278 GVI 4, cf. Hdt. 7.228.2 
279 Hdt. 7.229-32. In 1997, the 700 Thespians who died alongside the Spartans at Thermopylai (Hdt. 
7.222) also received a memorial at the site of the battle, albeit with a much simpler inscription: 
ΕΠΤΑΚΟΣΙO̱Ν ϴΕΣΠΙΕO̱Ν ΜΝΗΜ . 
280 GVI 7 = IG I² 927 = IG I³ 1143; cf. the expanded version in Plut. Mor. 870E. See Petrovic 2007,145-53 
for commentary. 
281 Low 2010, 342. 
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 In fact, it is especially from the context of public funerals and public 
commemoration of the war dead that the socio-political system of a polis derived a 
potent source for moral commitment in its members. The normative-moral 
compliance relationship that, as I am arguing, was predominant in a Polis army, was 
built on a society’s ability to create in its citizens a strong sense of a shared identity 
and history, and a belief in common values. After all, this relationship rested on the 
soldier’s conviction that the goals of his military organisation were aligned with his 
own, and that his compliance ensured longevity and prosperity of his socio-political 
system; in turn the organisation, by public and communal acts of recognition and 
commemoration, exercised a normative influence on its members, directing their 
efforts toward the preservation and welfare of their polis. Combined with private 
motivations such as protecting one’s family and living up to communal military 
ideology, this went a long way towards ensuring that citizen-soldiers would not 
abandon or betray their city in the field. In short, an effective polis was something 
that a morally committed soldier deemed worth fighting, and dying, for.282 
 Probably the most widely-known public commemoration of war dead in 
Classical antiquity took place in Athens.283 The whole process of public burial, the 
laying out of the ashes, and the funeral oration is described by Thucydides.284 It is 
unclear when exactly the practice was established – Thucydides’ statement at 2.34.5 
that only the Marathonomachoi were buried where they fell needs to be qualified, as 
it was the general Greek custom of the time to bury the war dead on or near the 
location of the battle, a custom that probably dated back beyond 600; Jacoby places 
the first logos epitaphios in the year 464.285 For our purposes of assessing how it 
might have impacted on Athenian compliance relationships and army loyalty, the 
exact date of its conception is relatively unimportant, as we are concerned with the 
more general effects of the ceremony once it was already established. 
                                                          
282 For the connection between a glorious public funeral and the concept of the ‘beautiful death’, see 
Velho 2002, 247-48. 
283 The literature on the topic is plentiful; see e.g. Jacoby 1944, Garland 1985, Morris 1987, Loraux 
2006, Low 2012, Arrington 2015. 
284 Thuc. 2.34.1-7. 
285 See Jacoby 1944, 42-47 and 55; the date is accepted by Sehlmeyer in EAH s. v. ‘Burial, Greece’. 
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 The Athenian public funeral is a fundamentally communal event: in 
opposition to the more individualistic Archaic epitaphs that went hand in hand with 
more sumptuous private funerary art, the funeral procession and the public speeches 
strongly emphasised the collective nature of the proceedings.286 The citizen body 
was treated as a single unit, individual glory was subsumed under the achievements 
of the army and the society it represented.287 This is an effective way to foster 
cohesion and a sense of unity and solidarity among the citizens. It is a celebration 
and commemoration of an essential civic duty, to fight for the polis, and of those 
that performed it: significantly, this also included foreign allies and possibly 
‘barbarian’ auxiliaries – already hinting at the fact that the Athenian public ceremony 
was about much more than exclusively celebrating Athenian civic identity.288 For a 
discussion of military loyalty, it is particularly noteworthy that it was not the 
successful performance of this duty that was honoured, but the performance itself. 
This is made explicit by Demosthenes, in a speech he delivered in 330: 
 
…I swear by your ancestors who bore the brunt at Marathon, by those drawn up for 
battle at Plataia, by those who fought from the ships at Salamis and Artemision, and by 
the many other courageous men lying in the public tombs [ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν], 
all of whom the city buried, thinking them all worthy of the same honour, […] not just 
the successful or victorious. 
(Dem. 18.208) 
 
It is clear that what was acknowledged was not victory or any particularly virtuous 
behaviour of the soldiers; rather it was the fact that as citizens they had done their 
duty to the community, fought, and remained loyal, whatever the outcome of their 
efforts.289 In this sense, the praise for the fallen is extended to those who survived; 
the dead become representatives for the entire army, and the achievement worthy 
of praise is not that they have conquered, nor that they have died, nor even that they 
                                                          
286 On social differentiation in funerary practices, see esp. chapters 4 and 5 in Morris 1992. 
287 Osborne 2010, 258-59. 
288 Such groups were at times included in the casualty lists, e.g. IG I³ 1180, 26-27 or IG I³ 1192, 152-53; 
Low 2012, 16-18, with n. 18 on the τοχσόται βάρβαροι. 
289 Cf. Low 2010, 353. For an account of the complexities surrounding a modern-day war memorial 
that is not overtly about victory, see Tritle 2012. 
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behaved courageously or honourably, but rather that they obeyed and did what was 
expected of them.290 This ties together all the names we find on the Athenian 
casualty lists, and it was powerful enough to overcome any distinctions that might 
have been lurking underneath the marble façade of a unified citizen community.291 
At the heart of the matter, then, lay not victory, defeat, or death, but the willingness 
to risk one’s life for the polis. And such willingness depended entirely on the 
compliance relationship, which in turn depended on the types of involvement 
present in a polis’ armed forces, and the type of power that was being exercised over 
them. 
 In this case, there are clear indications of a normative-moral compliance 
relationship. The entire affair was highly symbolic, and replete with references to 
civic ideology, duty, family, and the shared community and history of the polis. 
Public burial by its very nature evoked the image of the polis as one large family, as 
‘the State takes upon itself the duties otherwise appertaining to the family’.292 The 
exhortative character of the spectacle is equally obvious: 
 
Those who remain may pray for a safer outcome, but they must not be less courageous 
in their attitude towards their enemies. […] Strive now to be like these men, and 
believing happiness to lie in freedom and freedom in courage, never look to avoid the 
dangers of war. […] those who have been buried here have been already honoured, and 
the polis will bring up their children until adulthood, at public expense: in this contest of 




Here we see the effective application of normative power – appeals to honour and 
freedom, coupled with promises of further honours for the fallen and that care will 
be taken of their bereaved children – to ensure the continued moral involvement, 
                                                          
290 As argued by Yoshitake 2010, cf. 376: ‘any soldier who died in battle was regarded as most certainly 
qualified to be credited with aretē’. 
291 For elements of tension in the post-411 revolution monument of 409 (IG I³ 1191), see Low 2012, 21. 
292 Jacoby 1944, 38; cf. Arrington 2015, 122, and 30-31 for a family’s treatment of its dead. 
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and thus compliance and loyalty, of those members of the audience who will be 
called upon to fight for the city in the future.293 
 We should also discuss the physical aspect of the Athenians’ public 
commemoration of their war dead, i.e. the polyandria, cenotaphs, and funerary 
casualty stelae. As part of the community’s effort to honour and remember its dead, 
the Athenians erected marble stelae inscribed with the names of the fallen and set 
them up above the mass graves in the Kerameikos district.294 The inscriptions only 
provided the names of the fallen, arranged by the ten Kleisthenic tribes; demotics 
and patronymics were conspicuously absent, which is most commonly interpreted 
as a way to enhance the identification of the dead with the (abstract) polis as a 
whole, not with their individual families or local backgrounds.295 Some lists indicated 
the ranks of trierarch or strategos, and some included foreigners and slaves.296 For 
the fifth century alone, some thirty to forty such monuments are attested; more than 
one stele would be set up as part of the monument if necessitated by the number of 
casualties or the decision to list each tribe on a separate stele.297 The last evidence 
dates to 394, but it is unclear if the practice ceased completely or merely changed in 
form.298 
 The inscribed epigram for the fallen of Poteidaia of 432 provides an excellent 
example of how normative power can be applied to create, encourage, and respond 
to moral involvement. 
 
  
                                                          
293 Cf. Arrington 2015, 111: ‘Repeatedly, Perikles underscores the choice that the dead faced and 
places this choice in the survivors’ hands’. Cf. Pl. Menex. 236e, 247a. 
294 This is usually called the dēmosion sēma (sometimes capitalised) or ‘public (military) cemetery’ of 
Athens, but see Patterson 2006 for a critical view of the term and its meaning in antiquity. 
295 Osborne 2010, 248. For the varied physical dimensions of the lists, see Low 2012, 25-27 and 
Arrington 2015, 95-6: c. two meters tall and several meters wide if erected side by side. Some slabs 
stood on stepped bases. Pausanias (1.29.4) erroneously states that demotics were inscribed, when 
only the phylai were listed. 
296 Arrington 2015, 96, Low 2012, 16-17. 
297 Pritchett 1985, 139; Arrington 2015, 95. 
298 Cf. Low 2010, 343 n. 6, and 2012, 28 (citing S. Dow’s suggestion that perhaps patronymics were 
added to the lists, which would make them a lot harder to differentiate from other lists). 
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ἄνδρας μὲμ πόλις ℎέδε ποθεῖ καὶ δε͂[μος Ἐρεχθο͂ς], / 
πρόσθε Ποτειδαίας ℎοὶ θάνον ἐμ πρ[ο]μάχοις / 
παῖδες Ἀθεναίον· φσυχὰς δ’ ἀντίρρο[π]α θέντες / 
ἐ[λλ]άχσαντ’ ἀρετὲν καὶ πατρ̣[ίδ’] ε̣ὐκλ[έ]ϊσα̣ν̣. 
 
The city and dēmos of Erechtheus misses the men 
who before Poteidaia died fighting in the front ranks, 
children of the Athenians. Their souls they gave in exchange, 
and they gained aretē and brought fame to their fatherland. 
(GVI 20 = IG I² 945 = IG I³ 1179, 10-13) 
 
We see, firstly, how the community is emphasised repeatedly; the fallen were part 
of the ‘city and dēmos of Erechtheus’, which constitutes a three-layered entity: the 
physical city, the people living within it, and more particularly, the people who claim 
kinship with Erechtheus, spanning the arc from the present citizens to the Athenians 
who lived in the distant past. Secondly, that they will be missed establishes the 
emotional bond between those who will visit the tomb and those whom it 
commemorates. The image of a strong and unified citizen body is reinforced by 
addressing the dead as ‘children of the Athenians’: just as the public burial itself was 
a familial duty performed by the community on a grand scale, the Athenians, living 
and dead, chose to represent themselves as one large family. Finally, the soldiers in 
turn are portrayed as having chosen to risk their lives for the city, and as a reward for 
themselves they gained virtue, while for the city of their fathers they gained kleos, 
again stressing the connection between soldiers, city, and family.299 Here the 
ideologies of autochthony, masculine warrior prowess, and the demos as a citizen’s 
family converge to express a powerful message for those citizens that survive: loyal 
service to the state is at the same time natural (as it is one’s family), honourable 
(fighting grants aretē), and rewarded (the dead are sorely missed, and honoured with 
public burial).300 
                                                          
299 See also Arrington 2015, 99; he also highlights the epic connotations of the epigram. 
300 Low 2003, 99 points out that the ‘rituals associated with the funeral itself, together with the scale, 
and iconography, of the monuments, are expensive privileges previously associated primarily with 
the city's rich elite’. 
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 Another epitaph from the middle of the fifth century attests a similar 
approach. The Athenian soldiers who died on the Hellespontine Chersonese and at 
Byzantion are listed on a funeral stele with an epitaph: 
 
ί έσποντον ἀπόλεσαν ἀγλαὸ έβεν / 
βαρνάμενοι, σφετέραν δ’ εὐκλέϊσαμ πατρίδα, / 
όστ’ ἐχθρὸς στενάχεμ πολέμο θέρος ἐκκομίσαντας, / 
αὐτοῖς δ’ ἀθά ἀ ἔθεσαν. 
 
These men lost their shining youth at the Hellespont, 
fighting, and bringing honour to their fatherland, 
so that the enemy groans, harvesting the crop of war. 
They gave themselves an immortal memorial to their virtue. 
 (GVI 18 = IG I² 943 = IG I³ 1162, 45-48) 
 
Again we can observe the close connection between military service and the polis: 
the fallen honoured their fatherland, and for themselves they achieved an undying 
mnēma.301 Individual families are left out: what mattered was the family of the polis. 
The language itself supports the notion that the socio-political system of the polis 
was similar to a large family: most of the texts in this chapter include the word 
πάτρα, reinforcing the image of the land as father to its citizens. Hence, I use the 
translation ‘fatherland’, notwithstanding its modern connotations of nationalism 
and its connection to the Third Reich, because it captures the familial ties inherent 
in the ancient civic imagination of belonging to one’s land in more than a physical 
way. 
 Compare the inscription honouring the Athenian cavalry who fought at 
Tanagra in 457; the date of the epitaph and the precise battle it commemorates have 
been debated, and it appears that it was only set up several years after the events, 
as indicated by the word ποτε in line three. It might also honour those who fought 
at the battle of Oinophyta later that year.302 
                                                          
301 Arrington 2015, 99. 
302 See Wade-Gery 1933 (who also has χαίρετε as ‘farewell’), 78-79, and Petrovic 2007, 197-82 for a 
discussion of the date and a detailed commentary. According to Pl. Menex. 242a-c the dead from 
Tanagra and Oinophyta were the first to be honoured by public funeral, but see Arrington 2015, 39-




⌊χαίρετε ἀριστε͂ες πολέμο μέγα⌋ κ̣ῦδο⌊ς ἔχοντες⌋ / 
⌊κο͂ροι Ἀθεναίον, ἔχσοχοι ℎιππ⌋οσύνα⌊ι⌋· / 
⌊ℎοί ποτε καλλιχόρο περὶ πατ⌋ρίδος ὀ⌊λέσαθ’ ℎέβεν⌋, / 
⌊πλείστοις ℎελλάνον ἀντία μ⌋αρνάμε⌊νοι⌋. 
 
Farewell, champions of war, who hold great glory, 
young men of Athens, excellent horsemen! 
Who once gave up your youth for the fatherland of fair choruses, 
fighting against most of the Greeks. 
(GVI 14 = IG I² 946 = IG I³ 1181)303 
 
Once more the stress is on collective sacrifice for the community, which in turn 
earned the fallen great fame: the men are said to have died specifically for the 
πάτρα, which portrays their actions as morally motivated by patriotism and 
honourable dedication to Athens. Such public efforts are particularly important for 
an assessment of the effects Athens as a socio-political system had upon its citizens’ 
type of involvement: as opposed to private practices, which might be more or less 
representative of wider sentiments, these public and communal expressions of grief, 
honour, and memory reveal society’s underlying motivation to infuse its citizens 
with certain values for certain ends.304 
 There is evidence that these monuments were not merely decorative: 
citizens (and foreigners) might have regularly visited them for various purposes, 
maybe in a similar fashion to the treatment of ancestral graves. Direct evidence for 
such personal interactions is rare, though; private mourning is not often talked about 
in our sources, and the potential diversity in forms and individual approaches to it 
                                                          
for cavalry, cf. IG II² 5222, commemorating the dead of Corinth and Koroneia in 394/3; Pritchett 1985, 
213 suggests these may belong only to the tribe Akamantis. 
303 Cf. Anth. Pal. 7.254, under the heading for Simonides. 
304  The intentionality of commemoration is highlighted by Low & Oliver 2012, 2. Other pubic burials: 
GVI 21, Plut. Nic. 17.4 (Sicilian Expedition); Paus. 1.29.4 (Eurymedon). Diodoros, in a confusing 
section, included what he took to be an inscription commemorating the double victory (11.61.3, cf. 
Paus. 10.15.4), but which almost certainly refers to two separate battles (Wade-Gery 1933, 82-86). A 
potential epigram for those who died at the Eurymedon, GVI 13 (Anth. Pal. 7.258) is discussed in Page 
1981, 268-72. GVI 17 (= IG I³ 1163) was thought to commemorate the battle of Koroneia in 447 (so 
Peek), but Arrington 2012 argues for a connection with the battle of Delion in 424. See Lycurg. Leoc. 
142 for Chaironeia. 
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makes generalisations even more difficult.305 Lykourgos in his speech Against 
Leokrates accused the latter of having selfishly deserted Athens after the defeat at 
Chaironeia in 338; when Leokrates finally returned to Athens seven years later, he is 
said to have gone via the road that led past the public graves, walking past those 
who had gathered there to mourn.306 Even allowing for exaggeration to sway the 
judges, this argument would only have had traction if it was indeed the case that 
relatives and friends visited the public cemetery to read the epitaphs, mourn, and 
remember. In Demosthenes 57, the speaker refers to the public tomb 
commemorating the Sicilian Expedition as evidence for his uncle’s civic status, 
implying that the tombs were accessible and the names legible.307 Lastly, Isokrates 
mentions that non-citizens would attend the public funerals ‘to gloat over our 
catastrophes’.308 This brings us back to an important point we touched upon above: 
like the logoi epitaphioi, the funerary monuments did not commemorate victory or 
success. They recorded defeats more prominently than victories simply by the 
greater size of monuments inscribed with more names.309 Again, it was loyal 
compliance that was remembered here, and it was loyal compliance that was 
encouraged in those who remained, whatever the outcome. 
 Private sepulchral inscriptions, too, exhibit similarities to the public 
monuments.310 A late fifth century Attic epitaph found in Chalandri accompanied by 
a relief showing the deceased warrior, tells us of the many trophies he erected and 
the many enemies he killed; the potentially subversive nature of the monument, in 
that its focus is on the individual’s achievements, not the community’s, has been 
                                                          
305 Low 2012, 32-35. Chaniotis 2012, 48 mentions an honorific decree for Athenian ephebes, dated to 
122/1, that attests a race in armour starting ‘from the polyandreion’ (IG II² 1006, 22: δρό[μο]ν ἐν ὅπλοις 
τόν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ πολυανδρείου). 
306 Lycurg. Leoc. 142; Worthington, Cooper & Harris 2001, 159-61. 
307 Dem. 57.37; the speech is dated to 346/5. 
308 Isoc. 8.87. 
309 Arrington 2015, 104-8: ‘The men did not die victorious, they died fighting’ (108); he argues for a 
prominent element of struggle and danger inherent in the monuments’ overall meaning. This is in 
stark contrast to Roman practice, where victory celebrations such as the triumph were central to the 
commemoration of wars and battles, and centred not on the soldiers, but on the individual general. 
310 According to Arrington 2015, 99 it was in the 430s that ‘private funerary sculpture starts anew’. 
There had been a gap in elaborate private funerary sculpture since c. 500 (Morris 1992, 128-29). 
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discussed by Arrington.311 It is worth noting, however, that the epitaph still calls on 
the fatherland (πατρίς) to witness the soldier's deeds: commemoration and 
individual fame derive their meaning from the context of the civic community, and 
are inextricably linked to it. 
 Funerary sculpture on its own is hard to interpret, as it involves a large degree 
of assumption about the intentions of the sculptor and the commissioner; it is safer 
to attempt to identify recurring themes. For fourth-century Attica, it has been 
argued that private funerary sculpture was united by its main theme of genealogy, 
followed by imagery from the oikos, athletics, or warfare.312 One such example 
comes from Rhamnous: an elaborate family tomb of the latter half of the fourth 
century has been found, containing four generations; the most important theme 
next to the genealogy of the family itself is military service for the city. This focus on 
the military roles of the deceased was not restricted to Athens: similar motifs are 
present in a fourth century tomb from Pallene, which shows Hierokles and his son 
Hieron – equipped as a hoplite – on a stele with a large carved aspis, topped by a 
Corinthian helmet.313 
 It is important to note that warrior figures on sculpted funerary art do not 
necessarily have to depict the deceased themselves, nor do they have to mean that 
the deaths occurred in actual combat.314 Combined with the fact that some reliefs 
blur the lines between citizen and soldier by showing men as soldiers in ‘civilian’ 
dress (i.e. without armour or in clothing unsuitable to combat), this expands the 
importance military service played in people’s imagination: it was a core element of 
a citizen’s expressive identity.315 The importance of military iconography in Greek 
poleis had nevertheless declined by the second century. In a study of the grave stelae 
from Smyrna, almost exclusively belonging to the second and first centuries, it is the 
book-roll that features most prominently in male sculpture; the author connects this 
                                                          
311 Arrington 2015, 230-31. 
312 Bergemann 1997, 13. 
313 Bergemann 1997, 11 with plate 1.1 (Rhamnous), 12 with plate 12.4 (Pallene). 
314 Bergemann 1997, 63-64; he also adduces the epitaph for Aischylos (GVI 47, Ath. 14.627c-d, Plut. 
Mor. 604e-f), which mentions only his military service at Marathon. 
315 Bergemann 1997, 79-80. 
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to changing values in cultural and social terms. Learning and intellectual pursuits had 
gained in prominence at the cost of war, athletics, and heroic nudity.316 A similar 
development had already been observed in epitaphs more generally, where the 
decline of the theme of the heroic dead and their glorious deaths in battle went hand 
in hand with the spread of Roman influence: ‘It belongs to citizens, not to standing 
armies’.317 
 Another private Attic inscription, dated to the early fourth century, attests to 
the importance of the homeland in society’s imagination: it belongs to Glaukiades, 
who is said to have died young, keeping the enemies out of his fatherland (πατρίς) 
before departing for the chamber of Persephone.318 As this is the only detail that was 
included, it is reasonable to suggest that defence of his country did indeed play a 
central role in the soldier’s motivation – or at least, that it was important enough to 
be presented as such on his gravestone. In terms of combat motivation and 
individual involvement, this goes a long way to explain why Polis armies did not 
suffer from the same levels of noncompliance as did their Royal counterparts. 
Moreover, the importance of fighting and dying for one’s own land was not limited 
to Attica. 
 The general theme of glorious service and death for one’s country that we 
have identified in the funerary expressions discussed above was already being 
advocated in the seventh century. The Spartan poet Tyrtaios encouraged the young 
men of his city to be brave and stand their ground next to their fellow citizens. A 
warrior falling among the front ranks 
 
  
                                                          
316 Zanker 1993, 218-20, 228. On the body-language of Hellenistic art more generally, see Masséglia 
2015 (of relevance to the present study esp. chapter 2 on male citizens), who concludes that 
‘Hellenistic stelai are dominated by the narratives of civic activity, […] while the prevailing narrative 
is intellectual study and rhetorical training’ (120). 
317 Lattimore 1942, 240. 
318 IG II² 10998 = GVI 1637 = SEG 58.230: τὸς ἀγαθὸς ἔστερξεν Ἄρης, ἐφίλησε δ’ ἔπαινος, / καὶ γήραι 
νεότης οὐ παρέδωχ’ ὑβρίσαι· / ὧγ καὶ Γ[λ]αυκιάδης δήιος ἀπὸ πατρίδος ἔργων̣ / ἦλθ’ ἐπ[ὶ] 




…brings glory to his city, to his people, and 
to his father. Young and old alike mourn him, all 
the city is distressed by the painful loss, and his 
tomb and children are pointed out among the 
people, and his children’s children and his line after 
them. Never do his name and good fame perish 
[…] as he displays his 
prowess by standing fast and fighting for land and 
children. 
(Tyrt. F 12, 23-34, transl. Gerber) 
 
These lines combine many of the features of funerary epigrams, such as fame, 
memory, the importance of family, and the immortality of one’s glory as it is 
preserved by the community. It should be stressed that what Tyrtaios is imagining 
here can only take place within a civic context: a permanent settlement and an 
established community where the tombs can be pointed out, families and 
neighbours who can mourn and remember, and above all a future worth fighting for: 
one’s children and grandchildren. The same image is presented in the mid-seventh 
century poetry of Kallinos of Ephesos, who equally exhorts his fellow citizens to 
fight, succinctly summing up the reasons to do so: ‘For it is a shining honour for a 
man to fight his enemies on behalf of his land, his children, and his wedded wife’.319 
It is possible to understand this tripartite structure as representing the past (the land 
and its history), the present (the wife), and the future (the children), all underlying 
the citizen-soldier’s motivation for entering combat. However, Tyrtaios’ mention of 
tombs to be admired by the rest of society has more to do with the lives of the heroes 
of epic poetry, whose glory after death was to be made manifest by a visible 
marker.320 The reality of Sparta in the Classical period was markedly different. 
 It was Spartan custom to bury their war dead where they fell.321 Only the 
bodies of kings were transferred back to Sparta for burial, which is described in detail 
                                                          
319 Callin. F 1 (= Stob. Flor. 4.14.12), 6-8: τιμῆέν τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀγλαὸν ἀνδρὶ μάχεσθαι γῆς πέρι καὶ 
παίδων κουριδίης τ᾿ ἀλόχου δυσμενέσιν. 
320 Cf. Hom. Il. 7.87-90, 23.331; also Nagy 1999, 341-42. 
321 Plut. Ages. 40.3; Pritchett 1985, 243, Dillon 2007, 150. See Low 2006, 92-101 for a discussion of 
Spartan burials outside Lakonia: while allowing for complexities and variations in Spartan burial 
customs, she argues that such extra-territorial burials might also have represented a claim to the 
territory they occupied. 
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by Herodotos: the death was announced throughout Lakonia by riders, upon which 
helots, perioikoi, and Spartiates had to attend the public funeral; there was ritual 
mourning, and it is possible that the numbers of attendees ran into the thousands. If 
the king had died in war, an image of him was created and carried on a bier; after the 
ceremony, business was suspended for a certain period.322 In stark contrast to 
Athens, then, where the public funeral emphasised the collective rather than the 
single soldier, at Sparta there was a great public gathering honouring one individual. 
This would undoubtedly have served to reinforce the hierarchy of Spartan society, 
as part of which the cohesion among each group might have been strengthened. 
Communal solidarity and identity were expressed by praising the king and by ritual 
mourning. In its magnitude, the public funeral would also have created a clear 
contrast between royal burials and those of ordinary citizens, even those who died 
fighting for Sparta. According to Plutarch, only those men who died in war, and only 
those women who died while holding religious office, were entitled to a grave 
inscription.323 For all others, funerals had to be simple and uniform, without any 
pomp or luxury: there were no casualty lists, while mourning was regulated and 
limited.324 
 The evidence from Plutarch, centuries later and from a historical context in 
which Sparta was being mythologised, might be suspect at first glance. However, it 
corresponds to the small number of military funerary inscriptions found in Lakonia 
that can be dated to the fifth, fourth and third centuries. And these are exclusively 
of the famous ‘[name] ἐν πολέμωι’ type.325 In this case, a few example suffice to 
illustrate the pattern, e.g. IG V.1 703 from the early fourth century: Αἰνηℎίας / ἐν 
πολέμωι; a small amount of variation is introduced by the inclusion of additional 
                                                          
322 Hdt. 6.58; see also the commentary in Scott 2005, 246-51, who suggests that the images for kings 
fallen in combat might have been introduced for Leonidas, whose severed head the Persians 
apparently kept (250, cf. Hdt. 7.238). See also Plut. Ages. 40.3 (with Diod. Sic. 15.93.6, Nep. Ag. 8.7), 
Xen. Hell. 5.3.19, 6.4.13 (with Diod. Sic. 15.56.1 and Paus. 9.13.10). 
323 Plut. Lyc. 27.2, Dillon 2007. Examples of inscriptions for women: IG V.1 713, 714 (both Hellenistic 
according to Dillon 2007, 152). 
324 Plut. Mor. 238D. Hence the order to the relatives of those who fell at Leuktra in 371 not to mourn 
publicly (Xen. Hell. 6.4.16). See Pritchett 1985, 244-46 for an overview of the evidence. 




detail, as in the case of the soldier and Olympic victor Euryades: Εὐρυάδης / 
ὀλυμπιονίκας / ἐμ πολέμωι (IG V.1 708, third century), or of Eualkes who is said to 
have fallen at Mantineia (IG V.1 1124, possibly after 418).326 It has been argued that 
this Eualkes was in fact not a Spartiate, but a perioikos from Geronthrai, where the 
inscription has originally been found, and that his death occurred in 385.327 If this is 
correct, it would mean that the perioikoi who died fighting for Sparta were not 
categorically excluded from having their tombstones inscribed, which in turn would 
be congruent with the geographical distribution of the finds, which includes perioikic 
settlement areas.328 This would fit well with the evidence from Athens and elsewhere 
for the inclusion of foreigners and slaves on war memorials. In a similar way, then, 
the overriding concern at Sparta could have been to reward and commemorate loyal 
military service, and not primarily to enforce socio-political or cultural hierarchies 
(the two are of course not mutually exclusive). On another level, these stones attest 
both to the communal control of commemorative customs (by conforming to the 
general custom or law), as well as to personal and individual acts of commemoration 
that express a sense of belonging to a community (as the stones were most likely set 
up by the soldier’s relatives).329 
 If I am correct in arguing that funerary practices can have a positive impact 
on a socio-political system’s ability to exercise normative power and to engender 
moral commitment in its members, it might seem surprising that by keeping 
sepulchral expressions to a minimum, the famously militaristic Spartans would 
forego such a chance to enhance their soldier’s combat motivation and loyalty to the 
state.330 As noted above, one of the reasons might have been to honour the kings by 
contrast, and thereby reinforce social stratification; another reason might be the 
                                                          
326 More examples: IG V.1.701-10, 918, 921, 1125, 1320, 1591; IG V.2 251 (second century), SEG 32.397, 
49.390. There has been debate about what exactly these inscriptions signify: if we accept that Spartan 
dead were buried on the field of battle, the most natural assumption would be that these inscriptions 
were placed on cenotaphs. See further Dillon 2007, 157 with n. 11, and Low 2006, 90, who points out 
that we might not be dealing with burial at all, but with commemoration. 
327 Sekunda 2009, cf. Xen. Hell. 5.2.1-7. 
328 Low 2006, 90. 
329 Low 2006, 91. 
330 For the argument against seeing Sparta in overly militaristic terms, see Hodkinson 2006. 
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desire to avoid unequal displays of wealth and mourning, preferring a more 
egalitarian approach that forcibly puts everyone who died in war on the same level. 
Interestingly, this is similar to the Athenian approach: sepulchral customs based on 
a non-individualistic, communal ethos of collective achievement, where loyal service 
for the polis, not the outcome of any such service, was at the heart of 
commemoration. But rather than having grand ceremonies with speeches and 
processions, the Spartans opted for a more subtle, but equally effective method: by 
treating all those citizens who died in war exactly the same, equality was maintained 
and cohesion reinforced, without the risk of causing resentment or envy, or a rift akin 
to that between Athens’ land and naval forces.331 Like so often, though, Sparta was 
an exception in her means, even if the ends were similar to those of other cities; the 
evidence pertaining to other poleis tends more towards Athenian practice, with a 
mixture of public and private commemoration of varying degrees of opulence. 
 Our starting point, again, is Athens: according to Thucydides, at the battle of 
Tanagra in 458/7 the Athenians were supported by 1,000 Argives, and afterwards the 
Athenians erected a funerary monument for the Argive soldiers who fell in the battle 
and set it up in their own city.332 The inscription, IG I³ 1149, has survived in several 
fragments, and recently a new one has been published, for a total of fifteen.333 The 
monument appears to have listed the names of the dead arranged only by the four 
tribes of Argos, without patronymics or other information; it was accompanied by a 
(now lacunose) inscription, written not in the Attic but in the Argive alphabet, that 
had originally been reconstructed to say that they fought for their country – [τοί]δ᾽ 
ἔ̣θ̣[ανον Ταν]άγραι Λακ[εδαιμονίον hυπὸ χερσ]ί, | πένθο[ς δ᾽ ἔτλασαν γᾶς πε]ρ̣ὶ 
μαρνάμ̣[ενοι] – but the editors of the newest fragment have questioned this 
interpretation on the grounds of what they see as a ‘major conceptual obstacle’: the 
battle was fought hundreds of miles from the city of Argos, wherefore it makes no 
                                                          
331 For the danger of not giving proper credit, or causing resentment, envy, or disbelief, see Thuc. 
2.35.2. The navy was conspicuously absent from Athens’ public cemetery (Arrington 2011, 204). 
332 Thuc. 1.107.5, Paus. 1.29.7-9. 
333 For the new fragment’s editio princeps and a general discussion and reconstruction of the 
monument, see Papazarkadas & Sourlas 2012. 
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sense for them to be described as having fought for their land.334 There is no obvious 
reason, however, to assume that ‘fighting for one’s land’ always has to mean that 
the fighting itself took place on that same land: it is entirely possible that the 
meaning is symbolic, i.e. wherever they fought, ultimately they did so to further the 
goals of their own polis. In this particular case, where the Argives were 
commemorated in a foreign city, it might have been an attempt to stress the fact 
that they died not simply for Athens, but for their own land, as a way to justify and 
give meaning to their participation in the battle. What is more, if we remember that 
the Argives were fighting their arch-enemies, the Spartans, it makes even more 
sense that they would elevate this battle to a struggle for their own land. At any rate, 
we can see that the monument embodies loyal service and once again highlights its 
importance over mere victory; the battle of Tanagra was a close defeat, but a defeat 
nonetheless. 
 The Argives set up their own casualty lists at home.335 SEG 29.361 is a list 
dated to c. 400, and like the monument in Athens, it includes the names of the fallen 
soldiers arranged by the four tribes: Hylleis, Dymanes, Pamphyloi, and Hyrnathioi. 
Unlike the monument in Athens, however, this one also details the soldiers’ 
phratries, and in lines 2-5 includes extra information about certain individuals, such 
as the seer or the general. This has prompted some commentators to conclude that 
the ‘democratic egalitarianism of the Tanagra monument has been dissolved’.336 
This fits with a tendency to view funerary monuments primarily as political 
statements, as expressions of either democratic or oligarchic sentiments about 
citizenship, class, and status. This misses the point. These are not strictly mutually 
exclusive: democratic monuments, or oligarchic monuments. They are civic 
monuments, with the primary aim of encouraging loyalty to the polis by honouring 
those that died for it, and reinforcing cohesion and commitment among those that 
might have to do so in the future. There is certainly room for subtle ideological 
                                                          
334 Papazarkadas & Sourlas 2012, 599. 
335 For an overview of Argive burial practices in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, see Dimakis 2009, 
arguing that the importance of kinship that was prevalent in the Classical period gave way to 
displaying status and wealth. 
336 Papazarkadas & Sourlas 2012, 606. 
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messages, with the stress more on individuals or the collective achievement; but 
singling out a general, a seer, or an official on a casualty list does not alter its 
fundamental purpose. In its essence it is still about the collective effort on behalf of 
the polis: the important opposition here is not between democratic and oligarchic, 
but rather between individual and communal. Once we let go of the need to identify 
political elements, democratic or otherwise, we can see such monuments for what 
they are: commemorations of loyalty and celebrations of unity. 
 To reinforce this point, we need only turn to another casualty list, this time 
from oligarchic Thespiai in Boiotia.337 Thucydides tells us that the Athenians inflicted 
such heavy casualties on the Thespian contingent at the battle of Delion in 424 that 
the Thebans were later able to dismantle the Thespian city walls without much 
opposition.338 Parts of a funerary monument commemorating this loss have been 
found, containing the names of 101 soldiers who fell at the battle. Originally there 
were nine stelae, inscribed in stoichedon and probably placed on an enclosure wall 
topped with a lion sculpture.339 The names appear without patronymics or other 
personal information, with the exception of lines 9-10 on stele B, which list two 
soldiers, Tisimenes and Polynikos, as Pythian and Olympic victors, respectively (a 
detail we have already encountered on a Lakedaimonian funerary inscription).340 
The theme here is the same as in the public funerary monuments of Athens and 
Argos: public commemoration of citizen-warriors who died for the community, with 
a focus not on individual achievement or glory, but on the collective effort, 
regardless of the outcome.341 In spite of the similarities shared with the Athenian lists 
(e.g. stoichedon, simple names, absence of patronymics), it is equally clear that this 
is not about democracy: Thespiai was an oligarchic polis, and the battle itself was 
fought against democratic Athens. Thus, as Low has rightly pointed out, these 
features, and indeed the monument as a whole, are not a statement of democratic 
                                                          
337 There was an unsuccessful democratic uprising in 414 (Thuc. 6.95.2); cf. Xen. Hell. 5.4.46. 
338 Thuc. 4.96.3, 133.1. 
339 For a discussion and reconstruction of the monument see Low 2003, 105-7, with figs. 2 and 3. 
340 IG VII 1888, B.9-10. 
341 Cf. Low 2003, 108: ‘it is the whole – the polis – rather than the part – the individual (and 
individuated) citizen – which remains central to the memorial’. 
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ideology.342 What ties these monuments together, and accounts for the similarities, 
is that poleis, as organisations operating on a normative-moral compliance 
relationship, continually needed to create moral involvement and to apply 
normative power, regardless of their political orientations. Public grave monuments 
that honour the fallen and exhort the living are one way of achieving such a 
projection of symbolic power, at the same time rewarding past and encouraging 
future compliance. We see, then, how the application of a theoretical model can help 
to explain the ways in which overtly different political organisations can exhibit 
similarities in the existence and expression of underlying patterns of behaviour. 
Greek city-state armies, unlike the Royal armies of the Hellenistic age, had to be able 
to rely on the moral commitment of their citizen-soldiers, whatever the community’s 
political outlook. There are many more examples of public funerary monuments, 
casualty lists, and sepulchral epigrams that point towards the same conclusion, 
which we will discuss more briefly, arranged in a rough chronological order. This 
evidence reveals that we are dealing with a relatively widespread phenomenon that 
encompasses communities of varying political orientation. 
 A public funerary epigram from Tegea, probably part of a polyandrion 
commemorating the battle against the Spartans, fought near the city around 473 
(and/or the slightly later battle of Dipaia), honours the soldiers who fell there by 
proclaiming that they had preserved the city from being taken, and with their 
sacrifice had ensured its freedom for their children.343 Again we see the close 
connection between military service and service for the community; the 
preservation of the polis and her future, i.e. children, is presented as the central 
motivating factor for the men’s actions. We should also note that the Tegeans 
actually lost this battle, once more underlining the general feature that public 
commemoration of war dead was primarily about rewarding and encouraging loyal 
service, not about celebrating victory. Another funerary epigram, honouring 
Thessalian dead, is preserved in the Greek Anthology under Aischylos; if authentic, it 
                                                          
342 Low 2003, 108-9. 
343 GVI 11 = Anth. Pal. 7.512: οἳ βούλοντο πόλιν μὲν ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθαλυῖαν | παισὶ λιπεῖν (3-4). For the 
dating, see Weber 1917, 549-50, and Stecher 1981, 30; cf. Hdt. 9.35.2. 
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could have commemorated an otherwise unknown action belonging the Persian 
Wars. It, too, presents the dead as having gained glory fighting to defend their 
homeland: Κυανέη καὶ τούσδε μενέγχεας ὤλεσεν ἄνδρας | Μοῖρα, πολύρρηνον 
πατρίδα ῥυομένους.344 
 To return to casualty lists, a late fifth-century example has been found in 
Megara, listing the names of fallen soldiers, from among citizens (arranged by tribe 
and patronymic), foreigners, and potentially slaves (suggested by the presence of 
the name ‘Thracian’ in line 22); it is possible that it once stood near the centre of the 
polis.345 The inclusion of non-citizens on a public monument like this one has 
parallels in Athenian practice, and points yet again to the importance of the 
performance of (civic) duty over any political or ideological message; Low also 
observes that such lists were inclusive rather than exclusive in nature, and go against 
the typical polarising interpretation of Greek civic culture as being based on the 
opposition between citizens and non-citizens.346 A similar casualty list is known from 
Tanagra, and dated generally to the battle of Delion in 424; it consists of four 
columns inscribed with sixty-four names without patronymics, but it includes two 
individuals, Phanodamos and Mynnos, who are marked out as Eretrians.347 After the 
decisive defeat of the Athenians in the battle of Syracuse Harbour in 413, the 
Syracusans erected a public tomb for their own and their allies’ dead, and 
embellished the monument at public expense.348 Unfortunately we do not know 
what this monument looked like or whether it contained lists of names or epitaphs; 
but what matters more is the communal and public act of commemoration in honour 
of those who died in the fighting. 
 Moving into the fourth century, we have examples of casualty lists from 
Thespiai from the beginning of the century, and from Mantineia, IG V.2 271 (mid-
                                                          
344 ‘Dark Moira destroyed also these staunch warriors, defending their fatherland rich in lambs’ (GVI 
10 = Anth. Pal. 7.255, 1-2). Cf. Weber 1917, 547-49 and Wade-Gery 1933, 75. 
345 The monument is discussed in Low 2003, 101-3; for the location, cf. Paus. 1.43.3: εἰσὶ δὲ τάφοι 
Μεγαρεῦσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει. 
346 Low 2003, 102. 
347 IG VII 585, col. I, 16-17 (with the city-ethnic Ἐρετριεύς); SEG 19.337. For a more detailed discussion 
see Low 2003, 103-4, and Vénencie 1960, 611-15 for a new edition. 
348 Diod. Sic. 13.17.5, 13.29.2. 
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fourth century), which lists the fallen arranged by tribes and with patronymics; 
Pritchett saw this as evidence for a ‘public military cemetery comparable to the 
Demosion Sema at Athens’ (144).349 The Arkadian polis of Thelphousa is probably 
responsible for the inscription IG V.2 412, an epigram that honours fallen soldiers 
who fought for their country and died defending the eunomia of their fathers.350 The 
men might have died in an engagement with the Thebans and their allies in 352, 
mentioned by Diodoros (16.39.6), which resulted in a Thelphousan defeat. If so, this 
would be another example of public commemoration centred on the performance, 
not the outcome, of military service as a civic right and duty. The inscription also fits 
the pattern we have seen in comparable material from elsewhere: as expressed and 
enacted by the community, the combat motivation of a polis’ military is usually 
connected to the ancestral land, parents or children, and glory for the community 
and the fallen themselves. 
 More examples can be found in Pausanias’ travel writings: he reported on 
many other public funerary monuments, sadly often without providing much detail. 
He mentioned a common grave for the Argive dead who died during the Sicilian 
Expedition in 415-13, and a polyandrion at Thebes for those who died fighting Philip 
and Alexander, presumably before the city’s destruction in 335.351 Greek poleis of the 
third century, too, continued the practice of setting up public monuments for their 
citizens who died in war. Pausanias, for example, reports on a μνῆμα that stood on 
the road linking Gortys and Megalopolis, and commemorated those who had died 
fighting Kleomenes III.352 He also mentions a tomb outside the city walls of Sikyon, 
for the polis’ citizens who died at the battles of Dyme (226), Pellene (225), 
Megalopolis (224), and Sellasia (222).353 Here we might mention a funerary epigram 
                                                          
349 Pritchett 1985, 141-44. 
350 IG V.2 412, 2 (μαρνάμενοι πάτρας οἵδε περὶ σφετέρας), 6 (εὐνομίαν ῥυσάμενοι πατέρων). 
351 Paus. 2.22.9, 9.10.1. 
352 Paus. 8.28.7: κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐκ Γόρτυνος ἐς Μεγάλην πόλιν πεποίηται μνῆμα τοῖς 
ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς Κλεομένην μάχῃ. 
353 Paus. 2.7.4, 2.8.5, 2.9.1-2. He uses the singular of the word τάφος to describe these monuments; 
Pritchett 1985, 233 considers the possibilities of this being either a cenotaph or a cremation tomb, as 
the sizes of the monuments would have made it relatively easy to discern four distinct monuments, 
had all the bodies been brought back for burial. 
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preserved in the Greek Anthology that is ascribed to Mnasalkas of Sikyon, an elusive 
epigrammatist who is believed to have flourished in the third century BC.354 The 
epigram describes men who won glory by dying in defence of their fatherland, and 
exhorts their fellow citizens to do the same: ἀλλά τις ἀστῶν | τούσδ᾿ ἐσιδὼν 
θνάσκειν τλάτω ὑπὲρ πατρίδος.355 It is tempting to connect the epigram to the 
funerary monument mentioned by Pausanias, but there is no evidence for such an 
interpretation. However, whether or not it was ever inscribed on a public funerary 
monument, the content fits perfectly well with what we have already learned about 
public commemoration of the dead: sacrifice for the community, glory, and the 
importance of their homeland. The last sentence in particular highlights the central 
element of exhortation to future generations, who are called upon to act in a similar 
way when the need arises. For an example from the second century, we can add a 
casualty list from Epidauros, which commemorated the men who died at the 
Isthmus of Corinth in 146, where L. Mummius inflicted the decisive defeat upon 
Corinth and the Achaian League.356 It lists fifty-three Epidaurians with patronymics, 
arranged by four tribes (3-58), and one-hundred-and-three Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ σύνοικοι, also 
with patronymics (59-164). The inscription attests to the longevity of the practice of 
setting up communal funerary monuments. 
 We shall conclude this section on public funerary practices with an inscription 
from Megara, belonging to the fourth or fifth century AD. It is generally accepted 
that this is in fact a later re-inscription of an original dating to the fifth century BC: 
the epigram honours the Megarian soldiers who died in the Persian Wars, and 
mentions the battles of Artemision, Mykale, Salamis, and Plataia. It presents their 
actions as a struggle for the freedom of Megara and Greece as a whole.357 There is 
uncertainty as to what the epigram was originally inscribed on, be it a polyandrion, 
a heroon, or a different type of memorial. The epigram is preceded by a few lines 
informing us that the re-inscription was organised by one Helladios, a priest of the 
                                                          
354 Fowler 1990, 334. 
355 ‘But may any of the citizens who look upon them dare to die for the fatherland’ (GVI 31 = Anth. Pal. 
7.242, 3-4). 
356 IG IV².1 28; Paus. 7.16. 
357 IG VII 53, 4-9. 
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city, that it was originally composed by Simonides, and that the community to that 
day had continued to sacrifice a bull to honour the dead.358 The specific problems 
surrounding authorship, hero cult, and transmission can be ignored for our purposes, 
however: what matters is that the epigram publicly honoured the citizens who had 
died fighting for the polis, and that it could still be used, within the same civic 
context, as a symbolic expression several hundred years later.359 We can only 
speculate about the exact circumstances and motivations behind the re-inscription, 
which might be connected to the rise of Christianity, or to a breakdown in civic unity, 
or simply to a desire to express solidarity or pride. Whatever the case, communal 
sacrifice at a memorial for the dead of the Persian Wars would have created, very 
much like the public funeral at Athens, a powerful source of normative power, as the 
citizens come together to remember, celebrate, and shape their past glories, present 
unity, and future successes.360 
 Let us now turn to private funerary inscriptions that also attest to the 
importance of the polis as a socio-political system in soldiers’ combat motivations. 
The Greek Anthology includes a sepulchral epigram under the heading of the sixth 
century lyric poet Anakreon of Teos. The authenticity of this epigram as a funerary 
inscription, like that of so many from the Greek Anthology, is uncertain, but at least 
there is no obvious reason to deny it.361 It commemorates a man called Agathon: 
‘The entire polis cried out for mighty Agathon, as he lay on the pyre, having died for 
Abdera’.362 We can deduce his death in war from the last two lines, which inform us 
that Ares claimed his life in battle; it appears reasonable to assume he was meant to 
be a (prominent?) citizen of Abdera because of his death for, maybe in defence of, 
the city, and the indication that the entire community lamented his loss, which 
                                                          
358 IG VII 53, 1-3; Pritchett 1985, 176 assumes an annual sacrifice. 
359 For a full discussion of the inscription with detailed bibliography, see Petrovic 2007, 194-208. See 
also Lattimore 1942, 126 with n. 274, and Pritchett 1985, 176, who describes the original monument 
as a war memorial, not a tomb. 
360 For a discussion of the commemoration of the Persian Wars in Simonidean epigrams, see Higbie 
2010. 
361 The authenticity is discussed in Page 1981, 133-34. 




might have been more difficult to achieve for a mercenary or a foreigner. Epitaph or 
exercise, the epigram speaks of sacrifice for the polis, the glory of the warrior, and 
the impact his death had on the entire community. These are all themes we have 
also found in public funerary practices, and all are set within the context of the socio-
political system of the polis, which in this case was what he fought for, where he was 
famous, and within which he was remembered. 
 One inscription that somewhat blurs the lines between an individual’s 
hometown and the place of his commemoration is IG I³ 1353, found in Athens, but 
honouring a soldier from Megara named Pythion; the funerary monument has been 
dated to the period 445-25.363 It tells us that Pythion was an excellent warrior, having 
killed seven of his enemies and broken off seven spears in their bodies, which 
brought fame to his father among his demos; moreover, it boasts of his having saved 
three Athenian tribal units by guiding them back to Athens; the epigram closes with 
a seemingly remarkable statement: ‘Having harmed none of the men on earth, he 
went down into Hades deemed blessed, for all to see’.364 To a modern reader this 
judgement might seem incompatible with his proud claim of having taken the lives 
of at least seven enemy soldiers, but as Crowley points out in his analysis of the 
epigram, killing the enemies of one’s polis was seen as something desirable, and 
clearly did not count as unduly harming anyone.365 So strong was the ideological 
cohesion within a polis-based socio-political system that killing members of another 
polis during a war was encouraged and admired. This adds another layer to the 
exhortative nature of many funerary monuments: on one level, they might have 
encouraged violence against the enemies of the city-state. Pythion’s bloodied 
spears, however, brought glory not only to their wielder, but also to his father, and 
this glory is once more tied to the citizen community. The family, then, could play a 
pivotal role in the commemoration of fallen warriors; as parents, they embody the 
community the men died for, and as children they represent the future and thereby 
                                                          
363 GVI 630 = IG I² 1085 = Fornara 101. 
364 IG I³ 1353, 6-8: οὐδέ{δε}να πημάνας ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων | ἐς Ἀΐδα κατέβα πᾶσιν μακαριστὸς 
ἰδέσθαι. 
365 Crowley 2012, 94. The historical context if probably the revolt of Megara from Athenian rule in 446 
(Thuc. 1.114.1, cf. Plut. Per. 22.1, Diod. Sic. 12.7). 
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give meaning to the soldiers’ deaths – in short, everyone shares in the glory and 
responsibility that a fallen warrior brings. 
 This brings us to another benefit of being a citizen-soldier that would not 
have been as accessible for those serving in the Royal armies: having one’s family to 
organise the burial and necessary rituals to honour one’s memory. An early fifth-
century inscription from Argos can illustrate this: 
 
Ϙοσίνα hυσεμάταν θάψα [π]|έλας hιποδρόμοιο 
ἄνδρα ἀ|[γα]θ[ό]ν, πολοῖς μνᾶμα καὶ | [ἐσ]ομένοις, 
ἐν πολέμοι [φθ]ίμενον νε|αρὰν hέβαν ὀλέσαντα, 
σό|φρονα, ἀε⟨θ⟩λοφόρον καὶ σ|οφὸν hαλικίαι. 
 
Kosina buried Hysematas by the hippodrome, 
a brave man, as a memorial to many, and to those who will be; 
he perished in war and lost his youthful prime: 
a prudent man, victorious and wise among his comrades. 
(GVI 305) 
 
Here the individual responsible for the burial is named; Kosina could have been a 
female relative of the deceased man, or his wife.366 There are several noteworthy 
features in this inscription: Hysematas is glorified as a brave and wise man, and the 
last word, ἡλικία, carries connotations of a military nature, but might also simply 
refer to his fellow-citizens in general. It is not stated what he died for, but it is made 
clear that his tomb shall be a memorial to the present and to future generations, 
which embeds the act of commemoration deeply within the civic context of a stable 
socio-political system, and suggests that those who contemplated his death ought 
to have been inspired to exhibit equally brave and wise behaviour. It is easy to 
imagine that the knowledge of friends and family who would take good care of one’s 
burial and memory after death in battle would have brought great comfort to 
anyone preparing to go out and fight for their polis.367 We have already noted that in 
public funerals, the state temporarily took over the role of the family, but there are 
                                                          
366 For a fuller discussion of the inscription and the Doric capital it was inscribed on, see Daly 1939; he 
suggests the woman was the wife of Hysematas, and connects his death to Kleomenes I’s invasion of 
the Argolid in 494 (168-69, cf. Hdt. 6.67-82). 
367 Lattimore 1942, 224. 
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also examples of private sepulchral inscriptions that express relief at proper burial by 
those left behind: parents might thank their son for a decent burial; a father, mother 
and sister might be buried by the surviving son; and burial by one’s children might 
even be described as a gift from god.368 
 Being buried by one’s family, however, was only the first step: the tombs had 
to be visited regularly, decorated, and various offerings had to be made. Post-burial 
attention to the grave was so important that some people were adopted for this very 
purpose; otherwise the immediate family would have performed these duties. Such 
behaviour was religious in nature, complex, and required preparation to be carried 
out correctly.369 In his study of Greek attitudes towards death and burial, Garland 
devotes a whole chapter to tombs and the visits paid to them; he concludes that ‘it 
mattered in a very real sense if the cult were neglected. […] a stêlê was much more 
than a monument erected to preserve the memory of the dead. Oiled, perfumed, 
decorated, crowned and fed, it was a focus of devotion and an object of adoration’.370 
We find evidence for this kind of attention in the context of IG VII 1888, the Thespian 
casualty list we have discussed above: the remains of offerings made at the 
monument span several decades, with pottery dated to the period of construction, 
followed by a short gap, and then recommencing decades later. In her discussion of 
the monument, Low observes that such memorials are not only tombs, but rather 
‘symbols and sites with which the local community might actively engage over a 
more extended period’.371 Just like the public tombs at Athens, these memorials 
formed a part of every-day life and had an impact on the polis as a whole; hence we 
find messages and expressions, both in public and private settings, that speak to the 
wider community’s values and ideals, and call upon it to remember and emulate the 
deeds of the dead. 
                                                          
368 Friedländer & Hoffleit 1948, No. 79a (end of sixth century, Sicily); SGO 19/11/01 (c. 370, Soloi, 
Kilikia); Lattimore 1942, 53 (no date given, Hassaia, Egypt). 
369 Garland 1985, 104-5, 118-19. 
370 Garland 1985, 119; also chapter seven passim. A fourth or third century epigram from Choma in 
Lykia informs us that Osses had adorned the tomb of his grandfather Osses and his great-grandfather 
Manossas, both of whom died in battle in their old age, with representations of a shield, spear, sword, 
and helmet (SGO IV 17/17/01, cf. Barbantani 2014, 318-19). 
371 Low 2003, 107. 
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 Returning to Attica, we find that remembrance and emulation are at the 
heart of a stele from Salamis carrying an inscription that honours a certain Leon, who 
died defending the island. The epigram closes with an appellation to the onlookers: 
‘Come, young men, emulate your comrade: for he fell remembering the virtue of his 
Mede-slaying fathers’.372 As so often, the precise date of the inscription and the 
events it refers to are uncertain; it appears to belong to either the late fourth or the 
early or mid-third century.373 Leon himself seems to have been a local, judging from 
the mention of his ancestors as those who fought in the Persian Wars. The epitaph 
is a clear illustration of the normative purpose funerary monuments were supposed 
to have: it exhorts his fellow youths to act in the same way in the future, while Leon’s 
death is presented as a loss to his parents, and an honourable sacrifice for his 
community which he died defending.374 The close connection between community, 
family, and soldier is once more underlined, and couched in a message to the rest of 
the polis. The mention of the Persian Wars and the forefathers who fought in them 
represents another way in which symbolic power can be applied, i.e. the creation of 
role-models and the accompanying pressure on their descendants to perform to 
certain standards. Such an approach derives its efficacy from the strength and 
cohesion of a socio-political system that can draw on collective memory and a shared 
history, and combine these with current ideology in order to produce a code of 
conduct that corresponds to society’s values and ideals. 
 Another example, also from the third century and also aimed explicitly at the 
city’s youth, is an inscribed epigram for Chairippos of Aphidna: 
 
  
                                                          
372 IG II² 11960 (= GVI 1466), 5-6: ζηλοῦτ’ ἀλλὰ νέοι τὸν ὁμήλικα· κάθθανε γάρ που | μηδοφόνων 
ἀρετᾶς μνωόμενος πατέρων. 
373 For a discussion of the date, see Taylor 1997, 248-50. In ISE 24, Moretti prefers a later date, 
suggesting the attack under Aratos of Sikyon in 242 (Plut. Arat. 24.3). 
374 It is possible that he was an Athenian cleruch, thus Moretti 1967, 51: ‘È chiaro che il giovane Leon, 
caduto in difesa di Salamina, era un cleruco ateniese: lo provano senza ombra di dubbio sia l’accenno 
ai κλῆροι (v. 3) che quello agli avi uccisori dei Persiani (v. 6)’; more caution in interpreting the word 
κλήροισιν in verse 3 is urged by Taylor 1997, 249. 
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τλῆτε νέοι, πόδα θέντες ἐναντία δυσμενέεσσιν 
θνήισκειν, αἰδόμενοι πατρίδα καὶ γο[ν]έας· 
καὶ γάρ σοι, Χαίριππε, καταφθιμένωι μ[έ]γα κῦδος 
εἰκόνα δημοσίαι τε εἵσατο σῆμα πόλις, 
ἡνίκα Μουνιχίας ὑπὸ τείχεσι δούλιον ἦμαρ 
[ῥ]υόμενος πρὸ φίλης πνεῦμα ἔλιπες πατρίδος. 
 
Have courage young men, as you set foot against the enemy 
to die, in awe of your fatherland and parents. 
For to you, Chairippos, having fallen, belongs great fame 
as the polis set up at public expense an image and a memorial: 
when at the walls of Mounichia the day of slavery 
you warded off, relinquishing your life for your beloved fatherland. 
 (IG II² 5227a)375 
 
The context is an attack on Mounichia, but the precise date is uncertain; one 
possibility is the failed attempt in 287/6 to take advantage of the absence of 
Demetrios Poliorketes to recapture the city, which ended in betrayal and the deaths 
of probably hundreds of Athenians.376 Be that as it may, the normative character of 
the monument is obvious: it calls upon the youth of Athens to emulate the behaviour 
of Chairippos, who lost his life fighting to liberate the community. Twice it mentions 
the importance of the πατρίς, the physical space inhabited by all Athenians; it also 
draws on the power of family and respect for one’s parents to fuel the young men’s 
motivation and readiness for combat. Moreover, the community had come together 
to set up a public memorial for the exemplar Chairippos, to serve as a reminder for 
those yet to come. It is here that a crucial merging takes place between tomb and 
honorific memorial: whatever the original setting and appearance of the monument 
(tomb, cenotaph, statue, etc.), epitaph and honorific inscription are synonymous in 
this context, and serve a singular purpose: generating compliance through the 
application of normative power, which in turn is based on the manipulation and 
allocation of symbolic rewards on the one hand, and on the values and ideology of 
the socio-political system on the other, in order to instil moral involvement with the 
polis as an organisation. The inscription itself acknowledged this duality inherent in 
                                                          
375 For the demotic of the inscription, see Vanderpool, 1970, 45. 
376 Polyaenus, Strat. 5.17.1; for a discussion of the date of the attack, see Oliver 2007, 58-60. 
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the monument: as εἰκών it served as the reward for loyal sacrifice for all to see, as 
σῆμα it embodied, took meaning from, and reinforced society’s values. 
 The theme of fighting and dying for one’s homeland is present in many other 
third-century funerary inscriptions. A pertinent example comes from Thyrreion in 
Akarnania. The epitaph for the soldier Timokritos tells us that for his fatherland he 
went to war against the Aitolians, choosing either to win or to die; his death brought 
much grief to his father, but at least he had always remained true to his good 
education, remembering to the last the words of Tyrtaios, preferring virtue to life.377 
Apart from indicating once more that, at least on the ideological level, fighting for 
the polis played a central role in the combat motivation of citizen-soldiers, the 
epitaph also evokes two aspects we have encountered earlier: the importance of 
family in the (post-)burial context, and the lasting impact exhortative poetry such as 
that of Tyrtaios could have on the expressive habits of Greek citizens. Next, we have 
an early third-century funerary epigram from Krannon in Thessaly, which tells us that 
Ason died fighting for his country and did not dishonour his fatherland or his 
parents.378 Here the injunction to comply is framed in negative terms, viz. Ason died 
having managed not to fail his community. A funerary stele from Thessalian Pherai 
carries an inscription for Kallias, saying that he kept his good faith/loyalty (πίστις) 
and honoured his virtue, and naming Tegea as his home polis.379 Notwithstanding 
the lack of context of Kallias’ death, this short inscription highlights and connects 
three things: loyalty, virtue, and homeland – themes that we have seen lie at the 
heart of the commemoration of soldiers. He might have been a mercenary who died 
                                                          
377 IG IX.1² 2:298 (= GVI 749), 3-8: Αἰτωλῶν γὰρ παισὶ πάτρας ὕπερ εἰς ἔριν ἐλθὼν | ὡγαθὸς ἢ νικᾶν 
ἤθελε ἢ τεθνάναι. | πίπτει δ’ ἐμ προμάχοισι λιπὼμ πατρὶ μυρίον ἄλγος, | ἀλλὰ τὰ παιδείας οὐκ 
ἀπέκρυπτε καλά· | Τυρταίου δὲ Λάκαιναν ἐνὶ στέρνοισι φυλάσσων | ῥῆσιν τὰν ἀρετὰν εἵλετο 
πρόσθε βίου. Friedländer 1942 attributed it to Damagetos and connected the episode to the Aitolian 
attack on Thyrreion in 220 (Polyb. 4.6.2), but since then it has been ascribed to Poseidippos 
(Barbantani 2014, 322). 
378 IG IX.2 466 (= GVI 425): Ἄσων ἐνθάδε κεῖται ὁ Δημοκλέους περὶ πά̣τρας | μαρνάμενος, πρῶτος 
δ’ ἐ̣μ προμάχοισι θ̣ά̣νεν· | [ο]ὐχὶ [κ]αταισχύνα̣ς πατ̣ρίδ’ οὐδὲ γ[ο]ν[ῆ]α̣ς ἑ̣αυτοῦ, | ῥώμην δ’ 
οἰκείαν δεῖξεν ἐν ἡλικίαι. 
379 IG IX.2, 430 (= GVI 1460), third century: σώιζων μὲν πίστιν, τιμῶν δὲ ἀρε̣[τὰν] θάνες ὧδε, 
Κα<λ>(λ)ία Σ<τ>ασαγόρα πατρίδος ἐκ Τεγέας. 
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abroad, in which case his proclamation of his hometown Tegea underscores once 
more the lasting ties to his home polis. 
 Lastly, we might mention two more sepulchral epigrams preserved in the 
Greek Anthology: the first commemorates a soldier called Chaironidas, and 
proclaims that his valour will be missed by his polis of Elis, as he fell in a foreign 
land.380 We do not how or for what he died; the fact that his death occurred abroad 
could point to his service as a mercenary, or he might have fallen during an attack on 
a neighbouring polis. At any rate, even if he was a mercenary, the epigram chose to 
emphasise the bond between the soldier and his polis. And finally, the second 
epigram serves to illustrate the ideal effect normative power could have had on the 
combat motivation of a polis’ youth, as imagined by family and the wider 
community: 
 
Ὧδ᾿ ὑπὲρ Ἀμβρακίας ὁ βοαδρόμος ἀσπίδ᾿ ἀείρας 
τεθνάμεν ἢ φεύγειν εἵλετ᾿ Ἀρισταγόρας, 
υἱὸς ὁ Θευπόμπου. μὴ θαῦμ᾿ ἔχε· Δωρικὸς ἀνὴρ 
πατρίδος, οὐχ ἥβας ὀλλυμένας ἀλέγει. 
 
Thus for Ambrakia did the saviour lifting the shield 
choose to die rather than flee: Aristagoras, 
the son of Theopompos. Do not marvel: a Dorian man 
cares for his fatherland, not for the destruction of his youth. 
 (Anth. Pal. 7.213 = GVI 1604, late third century?) 
 
In these lines we find at work the most important components of the normative-
moral compliance relationship that operated in a Greek polis: the young man fought 
not for riches, but for his polis; he chose death over flight, i.e. the ultimate result of 
compliance over noncompliance. His father is named, and the glory of Aristagoras’ 
actions also shines on his family; and lastly, the reader is told that for a Dorian this is 
perfectly normal, as Dorians care more for their country than their own lives. In other 
words, so effective is the compliance relationship that the needs of the community 
                                                          
380 Anth. Pal. 7.541 (= GVI 1503), third century, attributed to Damagetos. Cf. IG IX.1 871 and 872 (= GVI 
2017), third-century funerary inscriptions found on Corcyra, for two Amphilochian soldiers who died 
fighting against the Illyrians, informing the reader that the city at home will mourn their loss (see also 
Stecher 1981, 46). 
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are presented as naturally overriding those of the individual, and there is a hint that 
the cohesion among the lower participants encompassed not only the Ambrakians, 
but could be claimed for all Dorians. It is important to note, however, that this image 
of combat motivation is an idealised one; as such it is an abstraction of reality and 
cannot account for the myriad of other factors that determine why or how an 
individual chooses to enter combat and fight to the last. Such factors could be any 
combination of social, religious, psychological, personal, or ethical considerations, 
and thus on an individual level they are beyond reach of the modern historian. 
Nevertheless, in our analysis of funerary customs and commemoration, we have 
seen that on the collective level, Greek poleis had recourse to a number of themes, 
and expressed a certain set of values and expectations that allow us to draw some 
more general conclusions about the foundation of citizen-soldiers’ loyalties to their 
organisations. 
 The preceding discussion aimed at finding out how a polis’ treatment of fallen 
soldiers might have impacted on the combat motivation of its citizens, in order to 
help explain the relatively high levels of loyalty and commitment present in Polis 
armies. It has emerged that there are certain factors that seem to play an important 
role in shaping society’s ideas about what was worth fighting and dying for, and 
these were expressed in normative terms through the media of public funerals, 
public and private monuments, and the accompanying inscriptions for groups and 
individuals. As so often, a large part of the evidence pertained to Athenian practice, 
but there is enough material from the Greek world at large, spanning the Classical 
and early Hellenistic periods, to enable us to apply the findings to most socio-
political organisations that we describe as poleis. In this regard, there was also no 
clear difference in the normative content between communities with different 
political outlooks: democratic and oligarchic societies seem to have drawn on the 
same symbols and values to inform their members’ perceptions about warfare and 
society. These shared ideas could be inflected in democratic and aristocratic ways to 
fit the political outlook of each community, but at their heart was the citizen warrior 
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and his moral obligation to fight for his polis, reinforced by the exercise of normative 
power. Three main factors stand out: patriotism, honour, and exhortation. 
 Patriotism played a central role in sepulchral inscriptions: fighting for one’s 
πάτρα, whether in defence or for expansion, is presented as a natural and common 
reason behind the deceased soldiers’ willingness to fight. Usually this was phrased in 
abstract ways, simply stating that so-and-so died ‘for’ the fatherland. I have already 
pointed out the familial elements in the word πάτρα: it is a collective term that 
encompasses not only the physical landscape of the polis, the political community 
that inhabited it, and the personal bonds that existed between the soldier and the 
society he left behind. The term also pertained to a shared history and purpose, a 
feeling of obligation to live up to the achievements of one’s ancestors, and a 
commitment to the community that was rooted in its past, and oriented towards its 
future. We might call this complex the civic continuum. To die ‘for’ everything the 
term πάτρα entails, then, is ultimately about ensuring its perpetuation: citizen-
soldiers had to be morally involved with their polis to let the goals of the wider 
organisation override or replace their own. Compliance and loyalty to the state were 
of the utmost importance if the community wished to survive, let alone prosper. It 
appears that the Greek city-states understood this dynamic, and in response created 
an ideology and a system of honour and rewards that was based on, and conducive 
to, the moral involvement of their citizens. The many expressions of patriotism as 
the foundation of soldiers’ loyalties, and of the notion that the land, the polis, and its 
people formed one family attest to the success of this approach. 
 The second factor, honours, pertains to honouring the fallen on the one hand, 
and to the honour inherent in military service on the other. It was especially in the 
realm of public commemoration of fallen soldiers that we were able to appreciate 
society’s need to acknowledge the service rendered by its fighting members. Public 
funerals, the setting up of stone monuments, the inscribing of the names of the 
dead, and the communal nature of such acts drive home the point that loyal service 
was deemed worthy of recognition and reward. The rewards, however, were not 
primarily material: military service did not make citizens rich, and the relatives of a 
137 
 
fallen soldier could not expect much financial benefit. The rewards were symbolic: 
public honours organised and paid for by the state, eulogies, and monuments; hence 
Plato wrote of fallen warriors as members of the Golden Race who deserved heroic 
honours, while Aristotle included public burial in his list of rewards for honour.381 
Here we need to remind ourselves that such rewards were not handed out for 
success – they were bestowed for loyal service. Compliance lay at the heart of the 
honorific nature of public burial. Many of the texts and monuments discussed above 
are defiant memorials to defeat, yet this does not lessen their efficacy as creators of 
moral involvement, as those looking upon them would have understood that it was 
the fighting itself, not its outcome, that was remembered and honoured. In their 
entirety, the honours awarded to those who died in war must have contributed 
greatly to the central role military service played in a polis. This in turn impacted on 
the value attached to the figure of the warrior, and made compliance even more 
desirable. Thus, a polis possessed a potent circular system honours and compliance 
that rested on the soldier’s underlying loyalty to the socio-political system. 
 Lastly, let us turn to exhortation. In many of the inscriptions dealt with above, 
there was an unmistakeable message to those who read them: encouragement to 
act in a similar way to those who had died. This was essential, as the community 
depended on the continuous loyalty and military service of its citizens. Hence the 
dead were not only honoured, but also held up as exemplars of behaviour that 
benefited themselves, their families, and the rest of society. Ideally, the morally 
committed soldier would have drawn upon these role models to influence his own 
actions, and funerary practices were a prime way of disseminating exhortative 
ideology among the citizen population, as they were public and emotionally and 
symbolically charged. In her analysis of the Athenian casualty lists, Low has noted 
that they served an important honorific function, just like the other lists the 
Athenians set up (e.g. for benefactors or magistrates); as such their purpose was to 
encourage the same commitment in the future.382 This is precisely what 
                                                          
381 Pl. Resp. 468e-69b, Arist. Rh. 1.5.9. 
382 Low 2010, 344-45: ‘Lists function as a means by which the proper performance of civic duties can 
be recognised and by which further services can be encouraged. […] It is the fact of service to the city 
138 
 
Demosthenes was referring to when he concluded one of his speeches with a 
mention of the trophies (τὰ τρόπαια) set up by the Athenians: ‘Reflect, then, that 
your ancestors set up those trophies, not that you may gaze at them in wonder, but 
that you may also imitate the virtues of the men who set them up’.383 This is equally 
true in a funerary context, where the message can be distilled even further: ‘Once 
upon a time these young men did something you should look up to. Given the 
chance, you should do the same’.384 The normative character of (public and private) 
exhortation is clear: the members of society were given instructions as to how to 
behave, couched in terms of adherence to past glories, honourable and masculine 
behaviour, and responsibility for future generations. Again we see the normative-
moral compliance relationship firmly embedded into the civic continuum. 
 
 
3.3 A Far Cry from Home: Funerary Practices and Commemoration in Hellenistic 
Royal Armies 
 
A natural point of departure for a discussion of the funerary practices of early 
Hellenistic Royal armies lies in the campaigns of Alexander himself. How fallen 
soldiers were treated and remembered in the army of Alexander will have set certain 
precedents and expectations for both the generals and the soldiers in the wars that 
were to follow the king’s premature demise; moreover, owing to the long shadow 
the figure of Alexander casts in our extant ancient historiography, we are in fact 
slightly better informed as to how he treated those who died fighting for him when 
compared to the Successors and the early Hellenistic kings. While there is very little 
evidence that pertains to the soldiers’ feelings and actions in terms of burial and 
commemoration – mainly because the literary sources focus on the persons of 
Alexander and his generals – the view from the top allows us to analyse the type of 
                                                          
which is essential and worthy of record; the manner in which that service was performed is of 
secondary importance’ (344). 
383 Dem. 15.35. He delivered the speech in 351 (Badian 2000, 29). 
384 Petrovic 2010, 214. 
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power that was exercised over the army by the organisational elites, which in turn 
enables us to draw parallels with the application of power in a polis setting. This is 
important as it suggests not only what type of motivation might have been 
predominant among the troops, but also what type those in power sought to 
cultivate. It will become apparent that aside from the similarities to polis practices, 
one element in Alexander’s funerary customs loomed comparatively large: material 
rewards. 
 Arrian tells us that after the battle of the Granikos in 334, Alexander saw to it 
that his own dead were buried with due honours, including – highly unusually – burial 
with their arms and armour and other ornaments; in addition, their parents and 
children were exempt from all taxes.385 We learn nothing more from Arrian, but 
Diodoros adds the motive that Alexander did this to heighten his men’s willingness 
to face the dangers of combat.386 While this is probably nothing more than 
speculation on Diodoros’ part, we will see that the manipulations of material rewards 
played a central role in Alexander’s funerary practices. While the burial after the 
Granikos might have been unusual in certain ways, such as the burial with armour, in 
its major elements it follows a certain pattern, one that becomes clearer as we look 
at other examples. 
 Arrian, Curtius, and Diodoros all inform us about the burial of the fallen after 
the battle of Issos in 333. We are told that the day after the battle, Alexander 
conducted a splendid funeral, with the whole army arrayed for the occasion and to 
act as an audience for a speech, in which the king reportedly cited individually all 
those who distinguished themselves during the battle. Arrian states explicitly that to 
show his appreciation for their good service, he honoured each man with a sum of 
money matching his achievement.387 Similarly, Alexander held a magnificent funeral 
and games after the completion of the siege of Tyre in 332, and again handed out 
                                                          
385 Arr. Anab. 1.16.5: καὶ τούτους τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἔθαψεν Ἀλέξανδρος ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις τε καὶ ἄλλῳ 
κόσμῳ. What exactly these ‘other ornaments’ were is unclear; according to Pritchett 1985, 226 this is 
the only known instance of burial with armour during this period. 
386 Diod. Sic. 17.21.6. 
387 Arr. Anab. 2.12.1: καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσει ὡς ἑκάστους ξὺν τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἐτίμησεν; cf. Curt. 3.12.13 and 
Diod. Sic. 17.40.1. 
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monetary rewards to his men according to their achievements.388 After defeating 
the Indian king Poros in battle, burial of the dead went hand in hand with material 
rewards for the survivors.389 Justin’s Epitome informs us that after the pursuit of 
Dareios has been concluded, Alexander gave burial to those who had perished in it, 
and distributed the vast sum of 13,000 talents to his remaining men.390 It appears 
that the public burials organised by Alexander combined the funerary rites and 
honours for the fallen with the handing out of rewards for those who survived. In 
part, this was surely done for practical reasons, as the army was assembled in one 
place already; nevertheless, it established a direct link between military service, 
public burial, and rewards for compliance: if you died, you would receive a splendid 
funeral; if you lived and performed well, you would receive money. Arrian makes this 
explicit when he has Alexander remind his men of this very connection during the 
mutiny at Opis in 324: he had rewarded them with riches and paid off their debts 
without question, while the dead he had rewarded with honourable burial.391 
 These post-battle public burials are the closest we get to the public burials 
we find in many poleis: there were large crowds of people, the atmosphere was 
symbolically and emotionally charged, speeches were delivered and honours 
accorded; in the process, the communities in question would have reinforced their 
cohesion and solidarity, expressed and reaffirmed the fundamental motivations for 
their actions.392 In a polis setting, these occasions were replete with civic symbolism, 
the rhetoric of civic ideology, and normative expressions aimed at maintaining and 
strengthening the socio-political system of the polis. In the case of Alexander’s 
campaigns, which took his troops thousands of miles into unknown territory over the 
course of more than a decade, any socio-political system that could govern the 
                                                          
388 Diod. Sic. 17.46.6; the victory celebrations described in Arr. Anab. 2.24.6 probably included the 
funeral and games. 
389 Diod. Sic. 17.89.3, Arr. Anab. 5.20.1. 
390 Just. Epit. 12.1.1. 
391 Arr. Anab. 7.9.9-10.4. See Curt. 8.2.33-40 for the example of Philip, brother of Lysimachos, who 
was rewarded with a grand funeral for his extraordinary resilience and combat performance. For a 
detailed discussion of the royal funeral practices of the Argeads and the warlords of the Successor 
period, see Alonso 2009. 
392 Cf. Roisman 2003b, 311. 
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parameters for symbolic expressions of power was extremely far-removed, both 
geographically and psychologically. We find that our sources have reduced it to 
burial for the dead, and monetary rewards for the living. For the present discussion 
and the purposes of this chapter, it will suffice to point out that a distinct element of 
remunerative power was woven into the proceedings, one that was absent in a polis 
environment. It is also worthwhile to note that we are not dealing with mercenaries, 
where the application of remunerative power might seem more appropriate; 
Alexander’s focus is on his Macedonians, whose compliance, like that of citizen-
soldiers, could also be secured by other means. What follows in the rest of this 
chapter will seek to analyse how, and if, the experiences of Alexander’s campaigns 
have left any mark on the behaviour of the Hellenistic warlords and their soldiers. 
 The evidence pertaining to the burial of war dead, and to the 
commemoration and post-burial treatment of the deceased is relatively slim; our 
sources often simply record that magnificent burial followed an engagement, but we 
learn very little about the exact rituals involved, the logistic processes behind mass 
cremation or burial, and precisely what happened to the remains. We are also left in 
the dark about acts of commemoration, the setting up of permanent markers, or the 
effect such public burials might have had on the assembled soldiers and their 
leaders. In the case of polis warfare, the most common procedure would have been 
cremation of the dead at the site of the battle followed by public burial back at the 
home polis, although burial on the actual battlefield also occurred.393 The nature of 
a polis meant that there was a permanent and fixed location in which burial could 
take place, and where the community could come together to commemorate the 
dead with rituals and monuments. For the armies of the Successors, however, the 
situation was markedly different. 
 After Perdikkas’ abortive crossing of the Nile in 320, which cost the lives of 
some 2,000 men and followed a series of other setbacks, we are told that it was his 
adversary Ptolemy who collected the bodies that were washed ashore, provided a 
                                                          
393 Boulay 2014, 476: ‘Après un combat, les morts étaient rassemblés et subissaient souvent une 
crémation sur le lieu même de la bataille’. 
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funeral and sent the remains back to Perdikkas’ camp.394 This would have 
highlighted Perdikkas’ own failure to provide proper burial for his fallen.395 There is 
no information as to what happened to the remains once they reached their 
destination. Similarly, we are only told that after Eumenes inflicted a decisive defeat 
on the army of Krateros and Neoptolemos (both of whom perished in the battle) 
earlier in 320, he buried the dead.396 A few years later, in 317, the battle of 
Paraitakene between Eumenes and Antigonos effectively ended in a draw; 
Antigonos, in an attempt to hide his much higher losses from the enemy, quickly 
cremated and buried his dead and departed; Eumenes then arrived and provided a 
magnificent burial for his own fallen (Diod. Sic. 19.32.3: ἐπεμελήθη τῆς ταφῆς 
μεγαλοπρεπῶς).397 And lastly, after the battle of Gaza in 312, we learn merely that 
the defeated Demetrios Poliorketes obtained the bodies of his fallen for burial, some 
500 men including many members of the cavalry and personal friends. The victorious 
Ptolemy, in turn, held a splendid funeral for his own dead.398 According to Polybios, 
a century later, the battle of Raphia in 217 left thousands of dead on both sides; we 
are simply told that Ptolemy IV retrieved and buried his own dead and stripped those 
of the enemy, while Antiochos III had to ask for his dead and bury them under 
truce.399 We can suppose that the (mass) burials, at least on the victorious Ptolemaic 
side, included handing out the rewards that were promised before the battle 
commenced.400 
 We see that burial of the dead was an important duty that had to be carried 
out by both sides after a battle (just as in polis warfare), and that at times, it appears, 
great effort went into organising and staging these events. What exactly we have to 
imagine when we hear that a funeral was ‘magnificent’ is unclear; it is likely, 
                                                          
394 Diod. Sic. 18.36.1. 
395 Roisman 2014, 465-66 for the importance of this duty. 
396 Diod. Sic. 18.32.2. 
397 Cf. Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.10, with Diod. Sic. 19.33-34. 
398 Diod. Sic. 19.85.1-4. 
399 Polyb. 5.86.2-6. 
400 Polybios (5.83.5-6) tells us that as they had no achievements of their own, Antiochos and Ptolemy 
laid greatest stress on the rewards for their men. There is also a tradition that Arsinoe III rode among 




however, that these would have been similar affairs to what we have already seen 
during Alexander’s campaigns. Thus, they probably included speeches, parts or the 
whole of the army drawn up as an audience, and the distribution of rewards. If we 
follow Diodoros and Polyainos and accept that after Paraitakene, Antigonos desired 
to hide the greater number of slain on his side, we have to assume he would not have 
made their graves conspicuous in any way, and probably carried out mass burial 
rather than by groups or individuals. There were no parents or other relatives on 
hand to carry out the funerary rites or to set up a tombstone. Presumably, those who 
could organise it had their ashes conveyed to their homeland, but we have very little 
evidence for the practicalities of such an arrangement. 
 Two pieces of evidence shed some light on these issues, although both relate 
to mercenary service. The first, from Isaios, concerns an Athenian citizen, 
Nikostratos, who died abroad during service as a mercenary, probably in the mid-
fourth century; we learn that Nikostratos died, was cremated, and most likely his 
ashes were returned to Athens for burial.401 The other, more substantial piece, 
comes from Menander’s play Aspis: it preserves a description of the post-battle 
burial procedure following the conclusion of a fictional raiding campaign in Asia 
Minor, in which Kleostratos, an Athenian citizen, had taken part. The dramatic date 
of the play is set in the late fourth or early third century, and as such it might well 
provide a glimpse of the realities of life and death as a (mercenary) soldier in a non-
Polis army during the early Hellenistic period.402 Kleostratos’ slave Daos returns 
home weighed down by plunder (a fact to which we will return below in Chapter 5) 
and disheartening news: he reports that his master was slain in an attack on their 
camp while he, Daos, was absent, and the enemy prevented him from returning to 
the camp for three days. Eventually the enemy dispersed, allowing access to the 
camp and the site of the battle; the bodies were unrecognisable and bloated, so Daos 
had to identify his master by his battered shield. The campaign’s commander, owing 
                                                          
401 Isae. 4.19, 26; for the date, see Edwards 2007, 68. 
402 Menander’s plays were traditionally seen as realistic and representative of every-day life (Arnott 
1979, xxi). In the Aspis, the military background of the story had to be at least believable and relatively 
familiar to strike a chord with his audience. 
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to the fact that they were in enemy territory and had no time to lose, prohibited 
individual cremation as it would take too long to collect all the ashes; instead, he 
ordered all the bodies heaped up, burned, and buried together, allowing for a 
prompt departure.403 
 This detailed description contains many points of interest: barring the 
plotline requiring Kleostratos’ miraculous survival, his body or ashes would not have 
made it back to Athens at all; moreover, there is no indication that the burial site was 
marked in any way, certainly not permanently with a stele or an inscription; no 
mention is made of a ceremony, speeches, awarding of honours, or acts of 
commemoration; even news of his death ultimately depended on the return of his 
slave. It is, ultimately, an example of the meeting and intertwining of the worlds of 
Polis and Royal armies: Kleostratos’ identity as an Athenian citizen is at risk of being 
obscured and forgotten because he died fighting for some warlord in a far-flung 
corner of the world; had he fallen closer to home, fighting for his own polis, his status 
and memory could have been properly honoured and preserved, and integrated into 
the fabric of the civic continuum. As Lape as pointed out, the bloated corpses of the 
men who died are a physical manifestation of this erosion of civic identity: ‘That the 
body of the dead soldier, the thing that should have secured his identity, is disfigured 
beyond recognition concretely renders comic anxieties concerning the displacement 
and dissolution of identity in Hellenistic warfare’.404 The episode also implies that, 
under less rushed circumstances, the commander would have allowed time-
consuming individual cremation and collection of the ashes (presumably so they 
could be sent home for burial).405 The fate Kleostratos escaped might have been in 
store for many a soldier who died on campaign under one of the many warlords of 
the early Hellenistic period (we might think of the soldiers who died at Perdikkas’ 
crossing of the Nile), be he a mercenary or Macedonian veteran. For a positive 
example, we can turn to the honorific inscription for the Athenian poet Philippides, 
                                                          
403 Men. Aspis, 70-79. 
404 Lape 2004, 238. 
405 Pritchett 1985, 229. If the body had been lost, a cenotaph might have been set up at home 
(Pritchett 1985, 258-59). 
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who financed the burial for the Athenian citizens who fell in the battle of Ipsos in 
301.406 Not every family, however, could rely on the intercession of a wealthy 
benefactor to organise the burial of relatives who died on distant battlefields. 
 So far, then, we can see that the burial of soldiers who served in the armies 
of Alexander and his Successors appears to have been markedly different from that 
of soldiers who served in a citizen militia: no lasting commemoration, and a 
centrifugal force that connected many or most men to their original homeland, 
where they might hope their remains would come to rest. The absence of a stable 
socio-political system framing the burial of Royal army soldiers is apparent, and with 
it the absence of the ability to infuse such burial with common norms and values. 
The only notable element we could identify was that of material reward, usually for 
conspicuous service, which points to the importance of remunerative power, an 
element that was lacking in polis burials. As we now turn to examine individual 
funerary expressions, we will see that there was a wide range of themes, defying 
straightforward classification; unlike the funerary practices belonging to the world 
of Polis armies, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the expressive 
motivations of Royal army soldiers based on the funerary material. 
 Writing about the commemoration of war in different time periods, Low and 
Oliver state that in contrast to modernity and the Romans, ‘Hellenistic Greece, for 
example, was interested above all in commemorating its victories’.407 We have 
already seen that such a view has to be qualified by the existence of casualty lists in 
poleis of the Hellenistic period, such as IG IV².1 28 from Epidauros; arguably, casualty 
lists are not war or victory monuments in our modern sense, but for the Greek world 
it seems that the lines between funerary monument and war or victory memorial 
tended to blur.408 This is also true on the private level, where a tombstone or a 
sculpture proclaimed the glory but also the death of the deceased. Epitaphs and 
funerary reliefs were two common ways in which individuals or families 
                                                          
406 IG II² 657 (= Austin 54), 16-20. 
407 Low & Oliver 2012, 9. 
408 Even public and private memory tended to overlap; city-states might provide a public burial, but 
families could still set up their own cenotaphs (Boulay 2014, 476). 
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commemorated soldiers. However, given the prevalence of war in the Hellenistic 
period, both on the polis level and the sphere of large-scale warfare between rival 
kingdoms, it might come as a surprise that military themes are rather rare in 
Hellenistic funerary art. In general, family scenes are much more prominent, along 
with themes such as communal life and civic values.409 This might reflect overall 
preferences for certain aspects of life, and the relative importance of the civic and 
military roles in people’s imaginations, but it casts only faint light on what motivated 
soldiers to go to war in the first place. For example, a funerary relief dated to c. 300 
and showing Macedonian-style cavalry fighting Persian enemies tells us that combat 
scenes were certainly part of the repertoire of sepulchral artists; the motif here 
might recall the campaigns of Alexander or another engagement under the 
command of one of his generals, and it might have belonged to one of the soldiers 
involved in these campaigns.410 We can infer that in death, glorious battle was what 
he chose to associate himself with in his communication through his tombstone, but 
it reveals little enough about his underlying motivations or ideals.411 Once more it is 
to funerary epitaphs that we must turn in an attempt to glean insights into individual 
soldiers’ values and motivations. 
 The main difficulty lies in identifying epitaphs that belong to soldiers who 
fought in the armies of the early Hellenistic warlords and kings, and not to 
mercenaries employed by poleis, or indeed to citizen army soldiers. This is 
compounded by the fact that we do not always learn the provenance of a deceased 
warrior, or their employer, or the conflict they died in: this makes it problematic to 
say with any confidence that a certain epitaph belonged to the army of e.g. Seleukos 
                                                          
409 Pfuhl & Möbius 1979, 306: ‘Der fortwährende Kampf und Sturm der hellenistischen Welt kommt in 
den Grabreliefs auffallend wenig zum Ausdruck – wohl hauptsächlich deshalb, weil die Kriege 
vorwiegend mit fremden Söldnern geführt wurden’; they also suggest that reliefs would have been 
rare for those who fell far away from their homeland, and that if at all, friends of the deceased might 
opt for a cheaper painted stele. For the poleis of western Asia Minor, cf. Pfuhl & Möbius 1977, 44 (point 
out the focus on individuals and families, ‘neben welchen Tätigkeitsbilder in Beruf und Kampf stark 
zurücktreten’); Morris 1994, 82 (‘Relatively few fourth-century reliefs have military themes, however. 
[…] they tend to show family scenes’); and Osborne 2010, 252. 
410 Pfuhl-Möbius 1271, of unknown provenance. 
411 More examples of Greek warrior funerary reliefs of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods can be 
found in Pfuhl & Möbius 1977, 113-16; relevant Hellenistic items are rare: Pfuhl-Möbius 287, 289, 1273, 
1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1393, 1429, 1445. 
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Nikator or Ptolemy IV. Military epitaphs in general became more widespread, but 
also more complex and varied in the third century, making classification even more 
hazardous.412 In addition, there is the danger of dealing with literary epitaphs as 
opposed to ‘real’, i.e. inscribed ones, esp. when using anthologies.413 
 One such epitaph from the Palatine Anthology that might have been 
inscribed is Anth. Pal. 7.232. It was attributed to Antipater of Sidon, but it is more 
likely that it belongs to Anyte of Tegea; hence the date of the epitaph could either 
be dated to the second/first century (Antipater), or to the third century (Anyte).414 
The epigram informs us of the death of Amyntor, son of Philip, who lies buried in 
Lydia; he died in battle, protecting his comrade with his shield.415 It is entirely 
possible that, if this is a real epitaph, Amyntor was a Macedonian soldier in the 
service of Alexander or one of his Successors (or one of the later Hellenistic kings). 
The last bit of information, that Amyntor died defending his comrade, suggests that 
in this particular case, it was not defence of his native land, or the glory of the 
ancestors that the deceased wanted to underline. The trappings of a socio-political 
system that we have observed repeatedly in many epitaphs for citizen-soldiers are 
absent, and in their stead we find the personal bond between two soldiers. Compare 
a second-century epitaph for two Milesian officers: in this instance, we know who 
their employer was – the second-century Seleukid Demetrios I.416 But all we learn 
from their epitaph is their father’s name Menestheus and their military rank of 
hegemones (line 4). This corresponds to the general impression we get of Royal army 
burials, that there was a distinct lack of a socio-political framework. Comradeship 
was possibly given greater value when there was no unifying civic identity to hold 
together groups of soldiers. 
                                                          
412 Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming), discussing also the identity of the authors and the process of 
choosing, collecting, and inscribing them. 
413 Authentic epitaphs for individual soldiers in the Palatine Anthology are relatively rare: Barbantani 
2017 (forthcoming). 
414 For the date and brief discussion, see Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming), who doubts the authenticity 
of a real epitaph in Lydia based on Anyte’s connection to the Peloponnese. 
415 Anth. Pal. 7.232 (= SGO I, 490), verse 4: ἀλλ᾿ ὄλετ᾿ ἀμφ᾿ ἑτάρῳ σχὼν κυκλόεσσαν ἴτυν. 
416 GVI 1286 = SGO I 01/20/35; cf. Barbantani 2014, 311. 
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 In a third-century epitaph, Meletos, a Messenian who was buried in Priene, 
proclaims his homeland, boasts of his prowess in battle, and states that he died 
worthy of his ancestors (προγόνων δ’ ἄ]ξια δρῶν ἔθανον).417 Most likely Meletos 
was a mercenary, recruited either by the Prienians or by one of the many warlords of 
the third century.418 He was buried far from home, yet his focus is firmly on his 
origins: the opening line mentions his homeland Messene, and the last line his 
ancestors, framing his military achievements in between. In contrast to the epitaphs 
for militia soldiers, however, he does not claim to have fought for anything, neither 
family nor country, probably because such claims would not have had much traction 
for a mercenary who fought and died so far from home. We might wonder who, in 
cases such as these, carried out the post-burial rites, paid visits to the tomb, or 
indeed who set it up in the first place. In a polis setting these issues can all be resolved 
relatively easily, but for a soldier of a Royal army, there was little certainty beyond 
death. As the example of Menander suggests, there might not even be individual 
burial in the first place, not to mention any form of permanent marker. Hence, we 
can detect in Meletos’ epitaph a thread connecting him to his homeland and his 
ancestors, an echo of the stable and communal environment a polis could provide 
for its fallen. Below we will encounter an epitaph for Lykos, a citizen of Priene buried 
in Egypt: clearly, there were incoming and outgoing (mercenary) soldiers from 
Priene, which might have influenced how they treated mercenaries that died in their 
service or territory. 
 In this context, a second-century epitaph can be adduced, which points out 
many of the elements that were missing in a burial outside the polis. An inscription 
from Elaia, near Pergamon, was set up for Sotas, a soldier who died fighting against 
the Galatians, and laments that he was buried so far from his parents, his wife, and 
his fatherland.419 As usual we do not know whether Sotas was fighting as part of a 
citizen army, or as a mercenary for a local leader, or a king; that the distance between 
his homeland and his place of death was far enough for him not to be buried at home 
                                                          
417 GVI 799 = SEG 30.1363, line 6; cf. Barbantani 2014, 322 and Boulay 2014, 108. 
418 Boulay 2014, 476. 
419 GVI 754 = SGO I 06/01/01, lines 7-10. 
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could suggest that he was part of a larger expedition, making his employment as a 
mercenary more likely. The last two cases involved soldiers who died far from their 
home polis, but we have an epitaph in which the benefits of a polis’ socio-political 
system come together with military service in a Royal army: GVI 943, an epitaph for 
Antigenes son of Sotimos (dated to after 217), preserves many details regarding his 
death: he was from Demetrias in Magnesia (6-7), and died fighting the Aitolians (4-
5); we also learn that he died near Thebes (13), and the name of his mother, Soso (8). 
It has been argued that Antigenes’ death occurred during the campaign of Philip V 
against Phthiotic Thebes, which is only a short distance south of Demetrias.420 The 
epitaph asserts that neither his fatherland, nor his household, nor his mother wept 
for his death, as he died bravely and gloriously.421 It appears, then, that his death 
occurred while serving in a Royal army, and that he died close enough to Demetrias 
for burial at home, enabling the setting up of a tombstone with an inscription. The 
epitaph mentions several of the elements we find in those of citizen soldiers: the 
importance of family, his ancestral land, and the glory of his death, but just like with 
Meletos, no claim is made to have fought for anything in particular. There are no 
elements of any normative influence on his actions, such as fighting and dying for 
one’s country; only the glory of his death is underlined. This is a rare case where we 
might be able to say with relative certainty how and where a Royal army soldier was 
buried. Antigenes fell close enough to his home polis so that his family could take 
care of his funeral, but the other examples we discussed remind us that many, if not 
most, soldiers who fought in the wars of the Successors and the Hellenistic kings did 
not enjoy such a luxury, their place of death being on one of the many far-flung 
battlefields of the period, which could have meant mass burial and/or cremation, and 
little chance of individual epitaphs to commemorate their sacrifice. 
 Another funerary inscription that bridges the gap between polis and Royal 
army soldiers is that commemorating the death of the Bithynian officer Menas.422 
                                                          
420 For text and commentary, see Cairon 2009, 233-38; cf. Polyb. 5.99-100. 
421 GVI 943, 6-9: Μάγνης δὲ δόμος καὶ πατρὶς ἔπολβος / ἡ Δημητριέων οὔ με κατωικτίσατο, / υἱὸν 
Σωτίμου τὸν γνήσιον· οὐδέ με Σωσὼ / μήτηρ. 
422 GVI 1965; SGO I 09/05/16; Pfuhl-Möbius 1269. 
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He was commemorated with a relief showing him in combat, and with two epitaphs 
on the same stone. We learn that he fell fighting valiantly at Kouropedion (lines 2, 6, 
16), and the inscription states explicitly that he fought for his fatherland and his 
parents (lines 11-13). The exact date of his death, or the engagement he fought in 
are unknown, and the suggestions range from 281 to the 150s.423 That the epitaph 
claims he fought for his ancestral land and parents implies he was no mercenary; 
Barbantani characterises Menas as ‘a representative of the wealthy Bithynian 
Hellenized ruling class’.424 I have included his example here as it reveals the 
importance of the socio-political system in shaping people’s perceptions concerning 
what is worth fighting for: just as in polis epitaphs, the stress on the fatherland and 
the assertion that his death was in service of it and his family points to some form of 
normative influence on the expressive motivations of Bithynian soldiers. This 
influence would most likely have its origins in Menas’ identity as a Bithynian and a 
member and defender of his homeland’s independence and status.425 The soldiers 
of the Successors, operating in a form of socio-political limbo, lacked this influence, 
and were thus more amenable to other types of power and involvement. 
 Next, we will discuss several epitaphs in connection to Egypt, some of which 
are rather late, but still provide useful information for assessing the burial practices 
of Royal army soldiers; moreover, they allow a glimpse of the effects that settling 
soldiers as kleruchs might have had on the way the fallen were portrayed in 
sepulchral inscriptions. First, a short inscribed epitaph in two elegiac distichs, found 
in modern Abu Qir (ancient Herakleion-Thonis) and dated to the early or middle 
Ptolemaic period in its newest edition, tells us of the death of the soldier Lykos, son 
                                                          
423 That Menas died in the famous last battle of the Successors in 281 is very unlikely; see Dumitru 
2011, 467-72, who suggests an unknown battle in the third century, possibly part of Bithynia’s ongoing 
conflicts with its neighbours: ‘Ménas n’était pas un mercenaire, car il combattait «pour sa patrie et ses 
illustres parents», et donc l’unité d’infanterie légère qu’il commandait a dû participer a une bataille 
qui aurait pu décider du sort de la Bithynie’. For an image of the stele and translations of the epitaphs, 
see Chaniotis 2005, 204-6; Bar-Kochva 1974 argues for a smaller skirmish in the mid-second century. 
424 Barbantani 2017 (forthcoming). 
425 For a short overview of the many attempts to conquer and control Bithynia, see EAH s. v. ‘Bithynia’, 
1138-40; for the identity of Hellenistic Bithynia, see Scholten 2008 and Michels 2009. For the region 
under Rome, see Bekker-Nielsen 2008 (esp. 21-29 for pre-Roman Bithynia). 
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of Lykiskos, naming his homeland as Priene and boasting of his courage.426 It is 
possible that Lykos was a mercenary in the service of the Ptolemies, or one of the 
soldiers who was offered land and settled in Egypt. At any rate, it appears that he 
died too far from home for burial in Priene; notwithstanding his settlement and 
burial in Egypt, he still chose to name Priene as his πάτρᾱ. Again, we find no trace 
of a cause or other elements of belonging to a wider community; the end of the first 
line is lost, but among the editors’ suggestions is συνέταιρος (comrade), which raises 
the possibility that Lykos was buried by one of his fellow soldiers. If so, it would 
emphasise the absence of the polis network of friends and family, and set in its place 
the military organisation that Lykos was a member of. 
 The second example dates to the early second century, and was found in 
Koptos (modern Qift): the inscription proclaims the deaths of Ptolemy and his son 
Menodoros, both of whom died in the same battle.427 The epitaph further states that 
they died bestowing gifts on their fatherland (πάτρα), and that Ptolemy had been 
gymnasiarchos during his lifetime (lines 9-10). We do not know who exactly these 
two men were; according to Fischer-Bovet, no kleruchs are attested for Koptos, 
although at least in the second century there were kleruchs and garrisons in 
neighbouring settlements.428 Their names, the fact that Ptolemy was a hegemon of 
the ‘Macedonian’ troops (lines 1, 5), and his lifetime role as gymnasiarch point to the 
conclusion that they were of Greco-Macedonian origin, but this cannot be said with 
certainty: Egyptians adopted Greek names, and by the second century it appears 
that the gymnasia, the socio-military organisations originally imported by Greco-
Macedonian immigrants, also adopted Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian members.429 If 
Ptolemy and Menodoros were indeed non-Egyptians, it is noteworthy that they 
identified themselves with Egypt, called it their fatherland, described their sacrifice 
as gifts for it, and were seemingly well integrated into the socio-cultural world of 
                                                          
426 The epitaph is discussed in detail in Clarysse & Huys 2003. 
427 GVI 1149; text and translation in Barbantani 2007, 111-12. 
428 Fischer-Bovet 2014, xxiii: kleruchs are attested for Diospolis Parva and Hermonthis, both within 
fifty km of Koptos. 
429 Although this might have been extremely rare; on the gymnasia and other military associations, 




their homeland. This recalls the expressions of loyalty we observed in the epitaphs 
of citizen soldiers, and that we find it in this example might have its reasons in the 
very fact that through settlement in Egypt, Ptolemy and his son were over time, or 
over generations, integrated into the socio-political system of their new home, 
providing a social, religious, cultural, and political framework similar to that of a polis 
community; in other words, something worth fighting for. 
 Two other late examples from Egypt show how powerful the effect of a stable 
socio-political system could be: GVI 1151 is an epitaph for an aristocratic soldier, 
Apollonios, son of Ptolemy, from Apollinopolis Magna (Edfu), who probably died 
around 103-101, in the so-called War of the Sceptres. His epitaph, composed by a 
local poet called Herodes, is long and elaborate, and was inscribed in Greek verse 
and Egyptian prose, pointing to the dual identity of the deceased.430 The inscription 
mentions his illustrious father, and how Apollonios wanted to emulate his 
achievements by going to war for his ‘beautiful fatherland’ (line 9: πατρίδος καλῆς); 
unfortunately he died fighting bravely, ‘keeping his sweet loyalty’ (line 13: γλυκερὰν 
τηρῶν ἅμα πίστιν) – he further laments that he was unable to attain his 
homecoming and see his children again, whom he had left behind, and was 
ultimately buried by his father. This epitaph is replete with familiar expressions: 
fighting and dying for the glory of one’s family and fatherland, the importance of 
family, military prowess, the connection to children, burial by a close relative – all of 
these themes we have encountered before, in the sepulchral customs of militia 
soldiers. For this study it is particularly noteworthy that the text explicitly states that 
Apollonios maintained his loyalty, as if there were any reason for doubting it. After 
two hundred years, the relative stability of the Ptolemaic kingdom seems to have 
had a positive effect on the loyalty of at least some of its troops and commanders, 
who were able to express their allegiance and bonds not only to the friends and 
family they left behind, but also their (father)land itself. 
 Our last inscription from Egypt is even later, dating to the first century 
(possibly the year 31), and belongs to Diazelmis, a mercenary captain from Apamea 
                                                          
430 Barbantani 2014, 303-4, with text and translation. 
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in Bithynia.431 He proclaims his strong loyalty to the rulers of Egypt (line 8: ζαμενῆ 
πίστιν), and asserts that while Apamea was his πάτρᾱ, Egypt was the land that 
nurtured him (13-14), and where his grandchildren cared for him in his old age. In 
terms of military loyalty, this is an ideal scenario: a mercenary captain comes to 
settle in Egypt, develops ties of loyalty to the land and its rulers, and has a family in 
the third generation; in this case, the ties to his new home, that also became the 
home of his descendants, are portrayed as strong enough to override the connection 
to his birthplace. 
 In contrast, we have an epitaph for another mercenary captain, Praxagoras 
from Crete, who served the Ptolemies in the third century: his short epitaph tells us 
his fatherland, the names of his parents, his own name, the name of is employer (an 
unknown member of the Lagid house), and his military rank.432 He was buried not in 
his homeland, but in Kition on the southern coast of Cyprus (modern Larnaka), 
possibly because this is where he served during his employment. Here the bond 
between Praxagoras and Egypt is markedly weaker, and at the heart of the epitaph 
are his own background and the honour of his service under the Ptolemies. We may 
note that again, there is no indication as to what or whom he fought for, or any 





One aim of this chapter was to explore what the funerary practices of Polis armies 
on the one hand, and of Royal armies on the other can tell us about the types of 
power and involvement that were present in these organisations. Another was to 
demonstrate the importance of a stable and pervasive socio-political system for the 
maintenance of an effective normative-moral compliance relationship, and to show 
that ultimately, its absence both weakened the bond between lower participants 
                                                          
431 GVI 1153, cf. SEG 54.1759; see also Barbantani 2014, 309-10 for text and translation. 
432 GVI 1076. 
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and organisational elites and allowed for the establishment of other types of 
compliance relationships, in our case a remunerative-calculative one. 
 Regarding the first aim, we can conclude that for Polis armies, there was a 
prominent and powerful normative element interwoven with public burials and 
public commemoration of the war dead. Civic ideology infused the proceedings, and 
revolved around the themes of sacrifice for the polis and glorification of the 
community’s past, present, and future. To this end, poleis often prioritised 
communal achievement over individual glory, and promoted a spirit of willing 
compliance with society’s demands: public ceremonies contained a distinct 
exhortative component, couched in normative directives encouraging future service 
by promising symbolic rewards. In the analysis of private funerary expressions, it 
became apparent that they often corresponded to such normative power, and 
exhibited many elements suggesting the presence of moral involvement. Love for 
the land of one’s fathers, sacrifice for one’s friends and relatives, but also for the 
abstract notion of the community’s past and future glories, and a conscious 
commitment to one’s ancestors and descendants all played a central part. For the 
soldiers of the Hellenistic Royal armies, the situation was less clear: we noted that 
beginning with the public burials of Alexander’s campaigns, there was a much closer 
association between burial, commemoration, compliance, and remuneration. 
Private burial practices of Royal army soldiers were more difficult to assess, owing 
to the varied nature of the evidence and the general lack of context for most of the 
material – what was present was just as significant as what was absent, especially 
when compared to the evidence pertaining to citizen-soldiers. Proclamations of love 
for a homeland, sacrifice for others, or the glory of one’s ancestors were largely 
lacking; in their stead, we found expressions of longing for home, prowess in battle, 
and personal honour. To argue from this for a calculative involvement would be too 
much, but it is possible to posit the weakening, if not the absence, of moral 
elements.433 
                                                          
433 There are in fact epitaphs that mention the financial benefits of soldiering; one example, from the 
very late Hellenistic or early Imperial period, is preserved in Anth. Pal. 7. 678, an epitaph for one 
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 But we should not insist on too strong a division between the two models, as 
there were several interesting links between them: the public burials of Alexander’s 
army mirrored those of polis communities, and played equally on the soldiers’ 
personal affection for their king and on their desire to acquire material rewards. We 
also saw how Menander could dramatise some of the fundamental tensions and 
fears that accompanied citizen-soldier who enrolled with a Hellenistic warlord, as 
their civic identity was at risk of being lost, physically and metaphorically. Citizen 
soldiers enlisting as mercenaries to fight in the wars of the Hellenistic kings also 
revealed other shared values and motivations between Polis and Royal armies: a 
calculative mindset was, to a degree, present in both organisations, tempered or 
fuelled in each case by the existence of absence of other normative influences, such 
as the socio-political system of the polis. 
 As for the second aim, it is notable that most factors that contributed to the 
normative-moral elements in polis burial customs were related to the socio-political 
system of the polis itself: the permanent framework provided by the city-state 
surrounded its soldiers from birth until death, and it is not surprising that we find it 
represented in the funerary and commemorative practices of a polis community. 
The civic continuum – in the form of a shared history; common religious, socio-
cultural, and political norms and values; a clearly defined ethnic and geographic 
identity; and a responsibility for the future survival of the society as a socio-political 
unit – made moral involvement much more likely, and much more sustainable when 
compared to the situation in a Royal army, where these elements were weaker, if 
not absent. It was only slowly, as the Hellenistic kingdoms grew more stable and 
could look back on a continuum of their own, that we find expressions like those that 
reflect the normative structure of a polis. As I will show in Chapter 5, this lack of a 
strong socio-political system was partly made up for by the application of a different 
type of power: remuneration. First, however, we need to turn to the third type of 
power that Royal and Polis armies might have used to generate compliance, i.e. 
                                                          
Soterichos; the short poem (five lines), describes how he completed his military service and left his 
children great wealth (he also points out that he never gained wealth unjustly). 
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coercion. The next chapter will demonstrate that neither army possessed a coercive 
apparatus effective enough to maintain high levels of compliance; consequently, the 
predominant type of power that was applied had to be either normative or 
remunerative. By now it should hopefully be clear that Polis armies tended towards 














Before discussing the reward systems in Polis and Royal armies, and analysing them 
for what they can tell us about the predominant type of power that was applied, it is 
necessary to deal with the third type of power that might sustain a compliance 
relationship: coercion, or the use of punishments and force to secure obedience. 
 By way of setting the scene, we may turn to a report submitted to the British 
House of Parliament in 1836 regarding the use of corporal punishment in the 
military, entitled Report from His Majesty's Commissioners for Inquiring into the 
System of Military Punishments in the Army. The investigation included interviewing 
dozens of soldiers, from Privates to Major-Generals, and among those questioned 
was Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. He was asked whether he believed 
abolishing corporal punishment would ‘have the effect of producing a better class of 





A. I do not think it would. I do not see how you can have an Army at all 
unless you preserve it in a state of discipline, nor how you can have a state 
of discipline unless you have some punishment. […] There is no 
punishment which makes an impression upon any body except corporal 
punishment. 
 
Q. Supposing the power of corporal punishment had not been in your 
hands at that time, could you by any other means have established that 
discipline in the Army? 
 
A. No, it is out of the question. 
(Archibald et al. 1836, 324-25) 
 
The causal connection here is simple: physical punishment is required to maintain 
army discipline, and Wellington seems unable to imagine an army that can operate 
in the field without it. For him, punishment equalled discipline. His statement that 
no army could be disciplined without physical coercion makes most sense if we 
assume that the majority of the soldiers under his command are more or less hostile 
towards their superiors, and that conditions of service were such as to make 
unquestioning obedience to the organisational elites (the officers) something to be 
actively or passively resisted. In other words, Wellington presided over an 
organisation where the predominant type of involvement from the lower 
participants (the soldiers) was alienative. In this light, his insistence on coercion 
makes perfect sense: as we have seen in Chapter 1, coercive power is the only type 
that creates a congruent compliance relationship when paired with alienative 
involvement. But what about the alternatives? What if the lower participants in an 
army were in fact predominantly morally involved, or calculatively? In those cases, 
coercion should quickly lead to a breakdown of compliance. It is the task of the 
present chapter to investigate this dynamic in Polis and Royal armies. 
 We will examine if and how Polis and Royal armies used coercion to generate 
compliance; it should quickly become clear that neither army could rely on an 
effective coercive apparatus to keep its soldiers under control. As a consequence, 
compliance had to be secured predominantly by other means, which will be explored 




4.2 Compliance and Coercion in Ancient Greek Armies 
 
Before turning to the armies of Greek poleis and Hellenistic kingdoms, it might be 
useful to have a brief look at other armies to see how coercion could be used as an 
effective means of control over an organisation’s lower participants. From 
comparatively recent history, the widespread mutinies in the French army during the 
First World War can serve as a good example. After the failed Nivelle Offensive in 
April/May 1917, more than half of all front line infantry divisions experienced mutiny 
and incidents of noncompliance. Philippe Pétain was given special powers from the 
government to put down the rebellions: the government and civic institutions would 
completely remove themselves from the military sphere, allowing for quick trials and 
executions. In one instance, some 700 men from a battalion mutinied, but were 
eventually convinced to surrender; as punishment, and to prevent any future refusal 
of service, five men from each company were selected for execution.434 The harsh 
reprisals were an attempt to combat the lax approach that had prevailed previously: 
a contributing factor to the quick spread of the mutinies appears to have been the 
knowledge among soldiers that there was no real threat of punishment, as court 
martials were only very rarely held and allowed for easy appeals.435 Pétain combined 
the coercive approach to discipline and obedience with improvements of service 
conditions, such as extended and more frequent furloughs and recovery periods; 
relying on coercion alone might have aggravated the precarious situation. 
 The successful suppression of the mutinies reveals how coercive power can 
be effectively applied to ensure compliance, but it also suggests that a recourse to 
harsh treatment is suitable only in the short term, hence the changes to the men’s 
routines. We may also note that the reprisals went hand in hand with a strict 
separation between the civic and military spheres, giving Pétain full control over the 
situation. This implies that there are certain coercive methods which require the 
army to possess its own legal system without interference from civic officials, or that 
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certain methods might be unacceptable in a civic setting. Later on it will be shown 
that in a polis, where there was no meaningful distinction between the military and 
the civic realms to begin with, there was correspondingly less room for effective 
coercion. This link between a strong overlap of ‘army’ and ‘society’ and the relative 
absence of coercion ultimately has its roots in the normative values of a given socio-
political system: as we will see, a polis managed to do largely without coercion 
precisely because there was no clear separation between the military and the civic. 
 Looking at armies closer in time to those of the ancient Greeks, the Persians 
offered a ready model that the Greeks themselves viewed as overly coercive. How 
accurate such claims were is highly debatable, but at the very least they might offer 
a glimpse into how some Greeks saw themselves.436 The contrast is a clear one: while 
the Persians apparently had to be forced into combat with a whip and harsh 
punishments, Greek soldiers were free citizens who chose to fight of their own will, 
in obedience to their community and laws, not to a single commander or king. 
Herodotos emphasised this dynamic in his description of the Persian Wars: at 
Thermopylai, the Persians are described as being driven forward with whips, while 
after the defeat at Salamis, some of the unsuccessful captains were beheaded for 
accusing others of incompetence.437 Contrast this with the picture Herodotos has the 
exiled Spartan king Demaratos paint for Xerxes: the Spartans fight as free men, and 
they fear their laws more than Xerxes’ soldiers fear their Great King.438 Rhetoric 
aside, the implication is clear: Xerxes’ coercive power cannot create the same level 
of commitment as that created by the normative influence of Spartan law and 
tradition. This is of course an idealised picture and reality was certainly more 
complex: out of all the Greeks, the Spartans might have had the strongest coercive 
elements embedded into their compliance relationship. But on an ideological level, 
the contrast still points towards the secondary roles that punishment and fear played 
in Greek armies, compared to personal freedom and choice. 
                                                          
436 On this theme generally see Hall 1989 (esp. chapter 2), and Harrison 2011. 
437 Hdt. 7.223, 8.90. 
438 Hdt. 7.102-104. 
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 The Roman military offers another point of comparison. Today, the 
punishments meted out to offending soldiers are usually seen as excessively 
brutal.439 The decimatio, or execution of one in ten men from a unit who had 
disgraced itself in combat, has taken on a modern meaning that has inverted its 
actual effect: to ‘decimate’ something is more likely to mean destroying nine parts 
out of ten, rather than one. Another famous example is the fustuarium, the clubbing 
or stoning to death of a soldier who was caught absent or sleeping on guard duty.440 
Deserters, too, were dealt with swiftly and routinely executed – the same fate could 
await those who fled the standard, as the power over life and death lay with the 
general.441 However, while the existence of such punishments is widely known, it is 
unclear how often they were enforced in practice, and the recorded instances of such 
harsh treatment of Roman soldiers are relatively few and far between. Livy himself 
asserted that mild punishments were in fact a hallmark of Roman military 
discipline.442 
 Usually the Roman army is presented as a stark contrast to Greek armies: the 
legions were highly disciplined and enforced harsh punishments, which led to high 
levels of professionalism; the Greeks, on the other hand, adopted a hands-off 
approach, where punishments were lenient and rare, leading to correspondingly 
lower levels of professionalism, so that Greek armies are most often called ‘amateur 
armies’.443 While to some extent the contrast is justified, there is a danger here of 
equating the concepts of discipline and punishments, or to assume that punishments 
                                                          
439 Pickford 2005, 123-28 argues that the severity of the punishments was designed to instil fear, and 
consequently compliance. 
440 Polybios (6.37-38) preserved a detailed description of these methods. For punishments in the 
Roman army generally, see chapter 4 in Phang 2008. Cf. Frontin. Str. 4.1.16. 
441 Phang 2008, 118-21. 
442 Livy 1.28.11, cf. Cic. Clu. 128. For an argument in favour of a more balanced view of Roman 
discipline and punitive measures, see Kiesling 2006, 233-45; for an overview of the historical 
development of military discipline from Homeric to Roman armies, see Chrissantos 2013. For the 
rarity of the decimatio, see Pickford 2005, 128-33, and for its uses during the Roman Republic, see 
Goldberg 2015. 
443 Thus part three in van Wees 2004 is called ‘Amateur Armies’; for the ‘amateur’ view of hoplite 
warfare in general, see Anderson 1970, 90; Pritchett 1974, 175; Hanson 2000, 203 and 212; van Wees 
2004, 87; Lendon 2005, 100, and Hunt 2007, 128–9. For the contrast between Roman ‘professionalism’ 
and Greek ‘amateurism’, see Kiesling 2006, 226. 
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are inherently necessary to maintain discipline.444 In this chapter’s introduction we 
observed how the causal link between corporal punishment and discipline was seen 
as implicit by Wellington – but his viewpoint was firmly that of a member of an 
organisational elite confronted with widespread alienative involvement from the 
lower participants. From an analytical perspective it is important that we separate 
discipline and punishment, to create space for alternative ways of generating 
compliance. Coercion can certainly be a tool to secure compliance, but it is by no 
means the only, and certainly not the most effective one. The crucial point is that 
coercion is by nature reactionary – it is a response to a real or perceived transgression 
committed by an organisation’s lower participant.445 Transgressions are of course 
more likely if those over whom power is exercised display a calculative (primary 
concern for personal welfare) or alienative (hostile towards superiors) orientation 
towards their organisational elites. Hence, high levels of coercion point to precisely 
those two types of involvement, whereas low levels suggest the presence of a 
predominantly moral involvement in the lower participants. Discipline, then, can be 
achieved through various methods besides punishment, including the allocation of 
rewards, which is why this chapter focuses on both to determine the causes of 
transgressions and how organisations reacted to them.446 We will now examine how 
important a role coercion played in the citizen armies of Greek city-states. 
 As noted above, Sparta was somewhat notorious for its harsh military 
discipline, compared to the rest of the Greek poleis – but clear evidence for Spartan 
coercive measures is surprisingly hard to come by.447 The very few recorded 
instances mostly involve Spartan commanders and soldiers from foreign armies or 
mercenaries. Thus, in 411, some Syracusan and Thurian sailors serving in the 
Peloponnesian fleet demanded their pay from their Spartan commander Astyochos, 
but were sharply rebuffed; Astyochos was about to strike the captain of the Thurian 
contingent when he was assailed by the sailors and had to seek refuge at an altar. 
                                                          
444 Kiesling 2006, 233. 
445 This is true even if coercion is applied as a preventative measure or a deterrent, as it requires an 
earlier transgression in order to be effective – otherwise it would be viewed as gratuitous. 
446 Chrissantos 2013, 313. 
447 Hornblower 2000, 59, cf. the examples collected in Pritchett 1974, 239-43. 
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We hear nothing of any reprisals against the men who wanted to attack their 
commander-in-chief, but Thucydides does stress that most of the sailors were free 
citizens.448 In a similar episode preserved in Xenophon’s Anabasis, we are told that 
the Spartan commander Klearchos broke up a dispute between his own men and a 
soldier belonging to another company, whom he struck as a punishment, believing 
him to have been in the wrong. Soon after, Klearchos was attacked by the comrades 
of the man he struck, being pelted with stones and even an axe. Only the arrival of 
Cyrus prevented the dispute from escalating further.449 
 This same Klearchos was using his bakteria – the Spartan officer’s staff – to 
strike those whom he deemed slacking in their efforts when building bridges or filling 
in ditches, but this caused little resentment as he himself set an example by lending 
a hand and working hard.450 Towards the beginning of the march up-country, 
however, Klearchos had tried to force his men to continue following Cyrus against 
their will, and again ended up almost losing his life to stones thrown by his men. 
Realising that coercion would not work, he turned to normative arguments: he 
regained their goodwill by invoking their past exploits and bonds of kinship and 
brotherhood, even calling the army his πατρίς.451 This is a striking example of an 
attempt at invoking the normative bonds of family, fatherland, and a shared past, 
the power of which we have discussed in Chapter 3, to generate compliance and 
loyalty: Klearchos is effectively trying to motivate a Royal army (albeit one serving a 
non-Greek monarch) by appealing to the very factors that made Polis armies so 
loyal. Here, then, the two models intersect: stranded and directionless, it is the ad-
hoc creation, however short-lived, of a socio-political system and a civic continuum 
that serves to unite the Greeks in Asia. 
 There is also the potentially apocryphal story of Kallibios, made harmost of 
Athens after the city’s surrender to Lysander: he struck an Athenian, who decided to 
                                                          
448 Thuc. 8.84.1-3 (τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων καὶ Θουρίων ὅσῳ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἦσαν τὸ πλῆθος 
οἱ ναῦται), cf. 8.35.1. The attack was not necessarily an attempted stoning, as pointed out by 
Hornblower 2000, 57.  
449 Xen. An. 1.5.11-17. 
450 Xen. An. 2.3.10-11. On the background of the bakteria in general, see Hornblower 2000, 58-68. 
451 Xen. An. 1.3.1-6: νομίζω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ εἶναι καὶ πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους. 
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fight back, but Kallibios received no support from Lysander in the matter, and was 
censured by him for not understanding how to govern free men (φήσας αὐτὸν οὐκ 
ἐπίστασθαι ἐλευθέρων ἄρχειν).452 Like the evidence for Greek attitudes towards 
Persian military discipline, this statement in Plutarch might be invented or 
exaggerated, but it nevertheless fits with other, more contemporary material. 
Finally, in 372, we learn that the Spartan Mnasippos, in charge of the siege of Corcyra 
and in command of a mercenary force, used his staff and his spear to strike two 
lochagoi to coerce them into sending their men into battle; Xenophon’s own 
comment on this incident is illuminating: such actions were bad for morale and led 
soldiers to resent their commander, which was highly detrimental to combat 
effectiveness.453 
 A few points are worth nothing here: all these examples involved the use of 
coercion in order to generate compliance, and in all but one case, those on the 
receiving end reacted with violence of their own, leading to life-threatening 
situations for the Spartans in charge. Furthermore, in each case it was the 
commander himself who had to administer the punishment: there appears to have 
been no clear procedure, let alone special personnel, for carrying out disciplinary 
action beyond on-the-spot beatings or reprimands.454 These two points suggest that 
there was a deeply rooted objection to the use of force by Greek commanders, 
especially if he was not of one’s own polis. Thucydides and the story preserved in 
Plutarch also lay special emphasis on the free status of those soldiers who resisted 
punishment, which hints at an ideological component in this objection: using force 
on a free citizen might have been unacceptable because it went against the very 
foundation of the compliance relationship that was in place in civic armies.455 After 
all, a morally committed soldier was not supposed to be beaten to motivate him to 
comply. In the case of Astyochos, as Hornblower has argued, the violent reaction of 
                                                          
452 Plut. Lys. 15.5. 
453 Xen. Hell. 6.2.19: οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἀθύμως ἔχοντες καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτὸν συνεξῆλθον πάντες: ὅπερ 
ἥκιστα εἰς μάχην συμφέρει. 
454 Kiesling 2006, 230. 
455 Kiesling 2006, 233: ‘Corporal punishment was almost unheard of in classical Greece because it was 
antithetical to the Greek's self-image as a free man’. 
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the soldiers probably had less to do with their being sailors, and more with the fact 
that they were outraged at being treated like helots.456 We might object to this 
preliminary conclusion, however, by pointing out that all the above cases involved 
Spartan commanders chastising foreign soldiers and mercenaries: it is therefore 
possible that punishments were acceptable in Greek armies if administered by one’s 
own general belonging to the same polis. What evidence, then, is there for the 
punishment of citizen soldiers by their own military authorities? 
 Once more, Spartan evidence is illuminating, and serves to highlight the 
complex nature of combat motivation: there is more than one way to apply coercive 
power, and choosing the right one depends on the nature of the respective 
compliance relationship. Therefore, it might come as no surprise that physical 
coercion is only rarely attested: one possible case is preserved by Frontinus, who tells 
us that Lysander once punished a soldier who left the ranks without permission while 
on the march; the man protested that he had not left with the intention to pillage, 
to which Lysander retorted that he would not even tolerate him to appear to be 
pillaging.457 We are not informed who the soldier was – he could have been a 
Spartiate or a perioikos, as his protest makes it less likely he was a helot. The Latin 
word Frontinus used is castigabat, which the Loeb translation renders as ‘flogged’, 
but it could just as easily be translated as ‘chastised’ or ‘reprimanded’: this would 
make more sense given the impromptu context and the immediate verbal defence 
by the soldier. At any rate, this is no reliable evidence for corporal punishment in the 
Spartan army.458 What evidence we have suggests that those who broke ranks 
without permission were not beaten, but publicly shamed; Xenophon tells us as 
much when he relates the punishment of the harmost Derkylidas (we are not told his 
offence), who was forced to stand holding his shield. Such a chastisement, he claims, 
was normally reserved for those guilty of ataxia, hence it was deemed highly 
dishonourable among the Spartan elite, who naturally prided themselves on their 
                                                          
456 Hornblower 2000, 72. 
457 Front. Str. 4.1.9. 
458 Interpreted as such by Kiesling 2006, 232, although more as an exception to the rule that even 
Spartan military discipline was not as harsh as is usually assumed. 
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military discipline.459 It is noteworthy that Xenophon stresses not the brutality or any 
physical ordeal imposed by this sentence, but the shame that came with it. Rather 
than focusing on physical punishments in Greek civic armies, then, we should take 
our cue from the normative power structures that have been outlined in previous 
chapters: punishments were more likely to be primarily symbolic in nature. And 
nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the so-called ‘tremblers’.460 
 Those Spartiates who displayed cowardice in battle were subjected to a wide 
range of punishments. They were debarred from holding office, had to give up their 
seats even to juniors, make way for others in the streets, and wear shabby clothes to 
signal their inferior status, in addition to having to cut off half their beards and go 
about unkempt. They were shunned in society, given the least honourable place in 
the chorus, and fellow citizens were tainted by association with such individuals and 
their families. We are also told that others were entitled to strike them if they refused 
to comply with these regulations, and that they could not legally buy or sell 
anything.461 The exact scope of these degradations is unknown, and it is equally 
uncertain which ones were in force at any one time, and for how long; but taken 
together, there are several striking features that stand out. 
 Firstly, these are all obviously symbolic, not physical, punishments: the two 
are of course not mutually exclusive (e.g. standing with one’s shield might also have 
been a physical ordeal), but the predominant element in this case is clearly the 
symbolic one.462 The intention was not primarily to cause harm or to coerce 
physically, but rather to inflict extreme dishonour, or ἀτιμία. In addition, there are 
some very real legal penalties, such as restriction to hold office and curtailed rights 
of sale. As Kamen has pointed out, the word itself (τιμή) encapsulated the double 
meaning of being deprived of honour as well as offices.463 It is important to bear 
                                                          
459 Xen. Hell. 3.1.9: ὃ δοκεῖ κηλὶς εἶναι τοῖς σπουδαίοις Λακεδαιμονίων: ἀταξίας γὰρ ζημίωμά ἐστι. 
460 For an in-depth analysis of these ‘tremblers’ (Plut. Ages. 30.2: τοῖς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καταδειλιάσασιν, 
οὓς αὐτοὶ τρέσαντας ὀνομάζουσιν), see Ducat 2006, who examines both the origins of the practice 
and the exact terminology surrounding it. 
461 See Hdt. 7.231-32; Thuc. 5.34.2; Xen. Lac. 9.4-6; Plut. Ages. 30.2-3. On the penalties for cowardice 
more generally, see MacDowell 1986, 44-46. 
462 Cf. Ducat 2006, 26, who calls these punishments ‘actual and symbolic’. 
463 Kamen 2013, 78. 
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these two dimensions in mind – the symbolic and the practical – when assessing 
coercion in Greek armies: while corporal punishment was largely absent, Greek laws 
and customs found several ways of inflicting real harm, financial, personal, and 
political, on those that did not live up to prevailing military standards. Yet the 
overarching theme seems to have been social exclusion and public humiliation. It 
was this very dishonour that according to Herodotos caused the two Spartiate 
survivors of Thermopylai to commit suicide: one by a hurling himself into the enemy 
lines at Plataia, the other by hanging himself out of shame.464 We cannot be certain 
as to the historical accuracy of Herodotos’ report about these two individuals, but it 
highlights the crucial roles that shame and dishonour played in punishing 
misbehaviour. A comparable case comes from Sicily: Diodoros informs us that in 
Katana, there once was a law that forced deserters or those who shunned military 
service to sit in the agora for three days, dressed as women.465 He elaborates that 
this was more effective than death penalties elsewhere, because of the shame it 
brought the transgressors. 
 Secondly, the efficacy of such punishments is predicated directly on the 
degree to which each individual has internalised and accepted Spartan society’s 
norms and values. The symbolic power inherent in dishonouring someone, for 
example by making him give up his seat for a junior, is derived from everyone’s belief 
that to do so is shameful: the act is a symbol for one man’s inferiority and 
humiliation; what is more – and this is crucial – this punishment is partly self-
inflicted. In stark contrast to the classic case of a nineteenth-century soldier being 
forcibly tied to a post and flogged, a Spartan soldier became complicit in carrying 
out his own sentence.466 The intense socialisation that took place within the socio-
political system of the polis ensured that most members accepted and reinforced its 
core normative content; hence the relative absence of physical punishment when 
compared to symbolic methods and more formal legal restrictions of civic rights. 
                                                          
464 Hdt. 7.233-32. 
465 Diod. Sic. 12.16.1-2. For public shaming in Greek poleis, see Dickenson 2017, 27-28. 
466 Ducat 2006, 26: ‘[…] he shows that he subscribes to the very standard that excludes him from 
society, and collaborates in administering his own punishment’. 
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 This brings us to the last observation: the power of the socio-political system 
is further highlighted when we consider more closely the evidence from Xenophon, 
who tells us that a κακός, or coward, had to explain to his female relatives why they 
could not find husbands.467 The dishonour attached to the individual who committed 
a ‘military’ offence spilled over onto his relatives: this is a powerful reminder that we 
should not be too eager to classify organisational or institutional elements of Greek 
poleis as either ‘military’ or ‘civic’. There was no clear distinction between these two 
concepts, and separating them like Pétain did in 1917, when the French government 
withdrew civic norms and institutions from the military sphere to allow him to deal 
with the mutinies as he saw fit, would have been unnatural and counterproductive in 
a polis. To be sure, Greek political imagination was clearly able to separate them 
where necessary, as shown, for example, by the Athenian custom of appointing their 
generals by election rather than lot; but this is more akin to the exception that proves 
the rule. Generally, it was alignment of civic and military that was sought after: 
Sparta’s coercive measures relied on the convergence of military and civic norms and 
values, and the more the two were aligned, the more effective the symbolic means 
that could be used to enforce them.468 Like physical punishments, however, even the 
ἀτιμία imposed upon ‘tremblers’ appears to have been extremely rare, as was 
concluded after Ducat’s comprehensive analysis of the evidence: ‘One of the most 
striking features of this atimia is the very scanty extent of its historical reality’.469 
 Ultimately, the evidence for physical coercion to secure compliance from 
Spartan soldiers is thin, which fits with Hornblower’s more general suggestion that 
violence between Spartiates was indeed rare and unusual.470 Spartan society found 
other ways to achieve this goal – the efficacy of which depended on the degree to 
which each member was morally involved with the socio-political system of the 
polis. In other words, Sparta’s compliance model was based on normative power and 
depended on the moral commitment of its lower participants. 
                                                          
467 Xen. Lac. 9.5. 
468 Cf. Pritchett 1974, 245: ‘Discipline in the army […] differed little from that of a citizen’. 
469 Ducat 2006, 47. 
470 Hornblower 2000, 73. 
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 Before we turn to the situation in Athens – which is the only other polis for 
which we have a meaningful amount of evidence – we might briefly consider the 
views of one military man who had experience of both the Athenian and the Spartan 
systems: Xenophon. The Anabasis provides evidence that coercive measures in 
terms of physical punishment were certainly part of a Greek soldier’s life: in the army 
of the Ten Thousand, men were beaten for indiscipline and dereliction of duty – by 
Xenophon himself, as we will see. This might lead us to conclude that coercive power 
was applied across the board in other Greek armies, or that the rhetoric of civic 
freedom and equality was merely a veneer for more or less harsh disciplinary 
methods. However, once we take into account the fact that the Ten Thousand were 
not an army of a single polis under the influence of one socio-political system, but 
mercenaries, and combine this with a close examination of how such coercive 
measures were framed and justified, it will become apparent that even in a 
mercenary army deep in enemy territory, coercion was not the norm. 
 Xenophon preserved an example of a truly coercive general, who appears to 
have relied primarily on physical coercion to motivate and discipline his soldiers. In 
his short biography of Klearchos, we learn that he was keen to punish his men 
severely and in anger, and believed that force was necessary to maintain an effective 
army: a man had to fear his general more than the enemy. Xenophon explains that 
those under Klearchos’ command followed him unwillingly, either because a polis 
had assigned them to him, or because of personal constraints and desperation; in 
fact, their alienation went so far that apparently many would desert him once an 
immediate danger was overcome. Klearchos, then, was seen as an effective 
commander, but his soldiers complied out of a mix of fear and compulsion.471 
Xenophon presents this image of his colleague as exceptional: it was precisely his 
use of coercion that set him apart from other generals. Unsurprisingly, Klearchos’ 
approach created a calculative and alienative orientation in his soldiers, leading 
them to follow his orders while resenting his person and weighing up the benefits 
and drawbacks of serving under him. 
                                                          
471 Xen. An. 2.6.6-15. For Xenophon’s views on acting in anger, see Hell. 5.3.5-7. 
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 As for Xenophon’s personal views on physical coercion, we are lucky to have 
his own statements on the matter. After their generals had been murdered, 
Xenophon spoke at an assembly of the army to strengthen the men’s resolve for the 
long march home. Towards the end of his speech, he impressed upon them the 
gravity of their situation and the importance of obedience, and called for everyone 
to subscribe to a more rigorous approach to discipline and punishment – invoking 
the example of Klearchos: 
 
If someone refuses to comply, we have to pass a vote that whoever of you 
happens to be present punishes him with the general; in this way the 
enemy will be deceived the most: for on that day they will see not one 
Klearchos, but one thousand, who will not suffer anyone to be a κακός. 
(Xen. An. 3.2.31) 
 
His appeal confirms what we have observed elsewhere: there was no clear procedure 
for punishments, and the general had to rely on others to back him up in 
administering any coercive measures. It speaks volumes about the generally 
normative orientation of the majority of his audience – who came from a Polis army 
background – that Xenophon and the generals had to call a vote on punishments for 
noncompliance in the first place. At any rate, Xenophon believed that extraordinary 
circumstances justified extraordinary measures, hence his resort to more coercive 
methods. Later in his narrative, he reports a speech he himself gave in defence of his 
behaviour while in command, which had included striking soldiers who disobeyed. 
Again he invoked the extreme situation they found themselves in, and his 
justification for his violent behaviour was not that as a general he had the right to 
administer punishments as he saw fit: rather, he portrayed his actions as those of a 
well-meaning parent who punishes his son for his own good. What is more, 
Xenophon explicitly makes the point that he would not use violence under normal 
circumstances.472 It is thus abundantly clear from the attitudes preserved in the 
Anabasis that Xenophon viewed physical coercion as a last resort, that it was not the 
                                                          
472 Xen. An. 5.8; cf. Kiesling 2006, 231: ‘Xenophon neither claimed the authority of rank nor insisted 
that an officers' blows lacked the insolence inherent in hubris’ – a clear indication that there was no 
institutional framework for coercive measures that he could rely on for his defence. 
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norm in a Greek mercenary army, and that every act of violence had to be justified 
on its own merit, and not against the backdrop of any institutional framework: 
coercion was not supposed to be a central element in an army’s compliance 
relationship. This conclusion might be somewhat surprising, considering that Greek 
mercenary armies in particular have been presented as more disciplined, more 
professional, and consequently more prone to harsh punishments than citizen 
armies.473 Once more we see the dangers of equating punishment and discipline 
without establishing the precise causal link between the two. 
 What, then, about other civic armies? Spartan and mercenary forces are 
hardly representative of the various Greek militaries at large; nor is Athens, for that 
matter, but here at least there exists evidence of a more structured way of dealing 
with noncompliance by coercive means, in the form of the Athenian judicial system. 
What evidence there is, however, confirms our earlier findings: coercive power 
existed, but was only rarely applied. 
 The exact legal situation in Athens is unclear, and it is far beyond the scope 
and purpose of this chapter to disentangle the various complexities and 
contradictions. Nevertheless, we know of several legal actions to prosecute acts of 
military noncompliance: the λιποταξίου γραφή for desertion of the ranks, and the 
δειλίας γραφή for cowardice; in addition, there were procedures for avoidance of 
draft (ἀστρατείας γραφή), for desertion of the army (λιποστρατίου γραφή), and 
for throwing away one’s shield (γραφή τοῦ ἀποβληκέναι τὴν ἀσπίδα). The exact 
scope and dividing lines between each of these procedures are uncertain, and there 
seems to have been a degree of overlap for some offences.474 At any rate, 
                                                          
473 ‘Exemplary punishments to enforce orders and obedience were rarely imposed, except perhaps in 
the case of mercenaries’ (Chrissantos 2013, 316). 
474 The law for cowardice (δειλία) encompassed ἀστρᾰτεία, λῐποτάξιον, and abandoning one’s 
shield (MacDowell 1978, 160). On the λιποστρατίου γραφή in general, and its exact meaning and 
scope, see Hamel 1998b: she argues that ἀστρᾰτεία and λῐποτάξιον were probably not 
interchangeable (362-85), and – based on Lysias 14.5 – that λῐποτάξιον meant specifically to retreat 
from your taxis during battle because of cowardice (376); the passage from Lysias states explicitly 
that the procedure applies to desertion while others are still fighting (μαχομένων τῶν ἄλλων), 
which would distinguish it from fleeing the battlefield in a rout. Hence Hamel further suggests that 
λῐποτάξιον did not refer to desertion from the army (385-97), which would have been prosecuted 
with a λιποστρατίου γραφή. 
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prosecutions had to be initiated by private individuals, the judges were those who 
had served on the respective campaign, and the court was convened by the board of 
generals – the penalty on conviction was a temporary or permanent imposition of 
total atimia (loss of citizen rights), which included ‘being deprived of the rights to 
take part in the Assembly or Council; to serve as juror, act as prosecutor in public and 
private suits, and give evidence; to hold magistracies; to enter sanctuaries; and to 
enter the Agora’.475 Failure to secure one fifth of the votes, however, resulted in 
atimia and a fine for the prosecutor. Because these charges had to be privately 
brought, and because of the difficulties in securing a conviction (the potential bias of 
the judges, the problem of proof), actual cases were rare: Christ concluded that there 
was little risk of being prosecuted for cowardly behaviour.476 It is possible that these 
private actions were used mainly for prosecuting powerful political players and their 
associates, and not the average citizen-soldier.477 Still, even the threat of 
disenfranchisement for noncompliance could exert a certain amount of pressure to 
obey: rhetoric, at least, would have us believe that the laws against indiscipline and 
cowardice made Athenian soldiers fear the punishment more than the enemy, 
pushing them to fight harder for their πατρίς.478 We see, then, that coercive power 
could take on a normative tint: the punishment was exclusion from the benefits the 
polis’ socio-political system brought, and it was the very belief in the values of the 
polis that was supposed to drive a soldier to avoid being deprived of them. These 
benefits, of course, also had a material dimension, such as the right to trade, to own 
property, and more generally to partake in the economic prosperity of one’s home 
polis; citizens valued these, hence some penalties brought restricted access or 
complete exclusion from this sphere of material gain. Nevertheless, according to 
Andokides, those convicted of military offences in Athens were not deprived of any 
of their property; this indicates that the overriding concern was not economic harm, 
                                                          
475 Kamen 2013, 71; Christ 2006, 118-19, cf. Lys. 14.5, 15.1-4, see also Hamel 1998a, 63. 
476 Christ 2006, 119-21. 
477 Crowley 2012, 107. 
478 Aeschin. 3.175: ἵν᾽ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ζημίας φοβούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς 
πολεμίους, ἀμείνων ἀγωνιστὴς ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὑπάρχῃ. 
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but religious and socio-political exclusion.479 Just as in Sparta, the effectiveness of 
punishments as deterrents depended on the extent to which the individual members 
of the polis subscribed to its core norms. Relying on the moral commitment of its 
citizens, Athens had no need for physical coercion: atimia – the loss of civic rights – 
as a punishment for military offences underscores once more the immediate 
connection between the ‘military’ and the ‘civic’, and the ways in which normative 
power could increase levels of loyalty without relying predominantly on compulsion. 
 Going beyond the legal apparatus for ensuring compliance, there is very little 
to suggest that physical coercion – in the form of corporal punishment – ever played 
a significant role in Athenian armies. Aristotle listed the coercive powers an Athenian 
strategos possessed in the field: he could punish ἀταξία with imprisonment, a fine, 
or a dishonourable dismissal from the army.480 The exact procedure for each of these 
options is unknown. There is only one example for such a dismissal, preserved in a 
court speech; the defendant recalled how the prosecutor, Simon, once suffered this 
penalty for beating up his taxiarch after arriving late for a campaign, probably the 
battle of the Nemea River in 394 – the defendant adds that Simon was the only 
soldier in the entire army to be dishonoured like this.481 As far as we can tell he 
received no punishment beyond being publicly censured by the generals as an 
insubordinate criminal (Lys. 3.45: δόξας ἀκοσμότατος εἶναι καὶ πονηρότατος); we 
have to infer that he was also sent home. 
 In his commentary on the passage in question, Todd expressed disbelief that 
‘a system of military discipline could credibly operate on the premise that the 
offender was simply sent home without further penalty’.482 Similarly, while 
acknowledging the intense shame attached to such a dishonourable discharge, van 
Wees remarked that ‘shame does seem a comparatively mild penalty for such 
extreme insubordination’, and wonders how it was possible that the generals had to 
resort to this measure only once, even though they commanded thousands of 
                                                          
479 Andoc. 1.74. For atimia in Athens, see chapter seven in Kamen 2013. 
480 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.2: κύριοι δέ εἰσιν ὅταν ἡγῶνται καὶ δῆσαι τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ ἐκκηρῦξαι καὶ 
ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν: οὐκ εἰώθασι δὲ ἐπιβάλλειν. 
481 Lys. 3.45; for the battle see Xen. Hell. 4.2.14-23. 
482 Todd (2007), 342. 
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men.483 These scholars make two assumptions that we have already shown to be 
problematic: firstly, Todd equates discipline with punishment without first 
demonstrating that the former is contingent on the latter. His statement rests on the 
implicit belief that the Athenian citizen army maintained compliance through 
coercive means – indeed, if that were the case, we would surely expect Simon to 
suffer much harsher treatment for assaulting a superior officer. What Crowley has 
demonstrated for Athens, however, and what this thesis hopes to show for the rest 
of the Greek poleis, is that civic armies did not rely predominantly on coercive power 
and instead mainly exerted normative power.484 Hence, Todd’s disbelief rests on a 
false premise, and disappears once the parameters of power and involvement are 
analysed more closely – which brings us to the second assumption, implicit in Todd, 
but explicit in van Wees: judging the severity of ancient punishments by modern 
standards. It is impossible to quantify the measure of shame felt by an ancient Greek 
individual who suffered from social exclusion and stigmatisation for committing a 
military offence – but it would be unwise to dismiss such sanctions as ‘mild’ simply 
because they did not involve corporal or capital punishment, or because they are a 
far cry from more recent examples of military discipline, such as flogging soldiers for 
not marching correctly, or routinely executing deserters. We should not 
underestimate the impact of social degradation on ancient soldiers – bearing in mind 
that Greek culture was a shame culture, which would have amplified any impact 
beyond what we might expect nowadays (recall the suicides of the survivors of 
Thermopylai).485 In addition, moral commitment on the lower participant’s part – 
expressed as a firm belief in the intrinsic worth and righteousness of the socio-
political system that the military organisation embodies – would further enhance 
this impact, as the individual was being punished not by something hostile (which 
                                                          
483 Van Wees 2004, 109. 
484 Cf. Crowley 2012, 105-7. 
485 Chrissantos 2013, 315; cf. Eckstein 2005, 484: ‘[…] for a Greek male, the loss of citizen rights may 
well have seemed a penalty worse than death’. He goes on to describe accurately the essence of moral 
commitment and the vital connection between military service and civic rights: ‘The polis – the 
political community of free men – meant all to them; they were soldiers of the polis, and their defence 
of the political community lay at the heart of their legitimate right to vote in the assembly’. 
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might be more easily dismissed or rebelled against), but by the very standards of 
behaviour he is committed to and has pledged to uphold. 
 This is not to say that there was no physical coercion or punishment 
whatsoever in an Athenian army. Hamel has suggested that in the late fifth and early 
fourth centuries, the strategoi might have been empowered to impose the death 
penalty on certain acts of noncompliance.486 The most commonly cited cases to 
support this argument, however, are not entirely compelling. Xenophon tells us that 
in 410, before the battle of Kyzikos, Alkibiades proclaimed that anyone caught 
sailing across from Prokonnesos to Kyzikos would be punished by death.487 No such 
punishment was recorded, and rather than reflecting actual law or custom at the 
time, it is more likely that Alkibiades was issuing an informal threat to prevent 
desertion by foreign sailors and slaves. What is more, the power of the threat would 
have been magnified precisely because this would have been perceived as an 
extreme and unusual measure, at least by the free members of the army. We know 
from a court speech that a slave could indeed be executed for military offences: in 
Lysias 13, the speaker recalls that during the Sicilian Expedition, a brother of the 
defendant Agoratos had been executed by Lamachos for fire-signalling to the 
enemy.488 At the time, both Agoratos and his brother were slaves, so the incident 
only shows that slaves could be executed for treason – this is what Alkibiades might 
have had in mind in the previous episode.489 Lastly, there is the infamous story 
preserved in Frontinus, who recorded that Iphikrates once speared (transfixit 
cuspide) a sleeping sentry.490 Whether or not he meant to imply that he actually killed 
the soldier, this behaviour was obviously extraordinary: Frontinus continued that 
Iphikrates had to justify his act to others who rebuked him for such cruelty. 
Moreover, the incident might be apocryphal (the same story was told about 
Epameinondas, see Front. Str. 3.12.3), and if accurate, the sentry in question might 
                                                          
486 Hamel, 1998a, 60. 
487 Xen. Hell. 1.1.15. 
488 Lys. 13.64-67. 
489 Agoratos was awarded citizenship several years after the event; the speech might have been 
delivered around 399 (Todd 2000, 138-40). See also Hornblower 2004, 255 and Crowley 2012, 106 with 
n. 13. Cf. Xen. Hell. 6.2.33 for a probable use of fire signals to announce the arrival of an enemy fleet. 
490 Front. Str. 3.12.2. 
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have been a mercenary serving under conditions different to those of a citizen 
soldier. There is certainly nothing in these examples that allows us to conclude that 
Athenian citizen soldiers had to fear the death penalty for indiscipline, or even 
corporal punishment in general for acts of noncompliance. 
 What evidence we possess points strongly in the opposite direction: coercion 
appears not to have been a significant factor in ensuring the compliance and loyalty 
of Athenian soldiers.491 The same holds true for Sparta, and for the mercenary 
experience as portrayed by Xenophon. Detailed evidence on other poleis’ 
mechanisms for dealing with disobedience is hard to come by; Polybios might be 
offering a criticism of the general Greek lack in effective punishments when he 
describes at length how efficiently the Roman army dealt with noncompliance – just 
as he extols the Roman way of making camp when compared to the haphazard 
methods of his fellow Greeks.492 We might also mention that the Argives had a 
designated location for military trials, which suggests that they adopted a similar 
approach to that of Athens, based not so much on physical punishment as on legal 
procedures resulting in fines, disenfranchisement, or exile.493 Furthermore, it is 
evident from such legal proceedings involving large parts of the citizen population 
that poleis viewed military punishments as a responsibility of the community, not of 
individual generals.494 Noncompliance was a breach of trust between one’s fellow 
citizens, and not between a commander and his men: this makes it easy to 
understand the limited coercive powers of Athenian strategoi, who acted as mere 
representatives of the will of the body politic, where the real authority lay. This in 
turn might lead us to expect that in Royal armies, where power was highly 
concentrated in the hands of the king or one of his generals, coercion played a much 
                                                          
491 On punishments for indiscipline cf. Hornblower 2004, 254: ‘[…] my point is that the precise 
mechanisms are elusive and do not seem to have included corporal punishment’, and Kiesling 2006, 
229: ‘Indeed, the evidence for summary punishment of any kind by commanders, let alone corporal 
punishment, is thin’. 
492 Polyb. 6.37-42; on this contrast see also Eckstein 2005, 489-90 (he also includes an overview of 
military discipline in ancient Chinese and Indian armies, 492-96). 
493 Thuc. 5.60.6; as noted by Hornblower (CT ad loc.), the impromptu stoning of Thrasylos at the place 
for public trial only underscores the irregularity of the act. 
494 Kiesling 2006, 228-29. 
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greater role; as we will see, this was not the case. From what we can tell, coercion 
was equally insignificant in Royal armies – although there is evidence that by the end 
of the third century at the latest, the types of punishments were of an entirely 
different character. 
 If the evidence for enforcing military discipline in Greek Polis armies is 
patchy, the situation for Hellenistic Royal armies in general is even worse: there is no 
detailed information as to laws and customs imposed by the various organisations, 
and we lack significant literary descriptions that might shed light on any systematic 
approach to punishing noncompliance, or on any socio-cultural reasons 
underpinning such approaches.495 To a degree, this might simply reflect reality: 
physical coercion and harsh discipline seem not to have been at the heart of 
Hellenistic compliance models, hence they do not surface much in our sources. 
Furthermore, the intense competition among the Hellenistic warlords might have 
been a limiting factor: kings wanted to attract soldiers, not alienate them.496 
Nevertheless, the topic has to be treated with care: based only on a few examples, it 
is extremely difficult to draw wide-ranging conclusions about armies that operated 
in a vast geographical context over the course of several centuries. To avoid fruitless 
speculations and a host of inferences, I will limit the discussion to the only substantial 
piece of evidence available: the Macedonian army regulations of Amphipolis. 
 The fragmentary inscription in question is a military code of behaviour found 
in Amphipolis, and dated to around 200, to the reign of Philip V of Macedon (r. 221-
179).497 It allows us a glimpse of how an established Hellenistic kingdom attempted 
to secure compliance from its soldiers by prescribing expected behaviour and – most 
importantly for our purposes – the accompanying penalties for noncompliance. This 
point is worth stressing: we are not dealing with a historian’s personal views, or 
relying on reported incidents that might or might not be representative of actual 
                                                          
495 For the dearth of knowledge about the workings of Greek military discipline when compared to 
the Roman army, see Pritchett 1974, 232-33. 
496 Compare an assessment of coercion during the Roman Civil War: ‘Not surprisingly the period of 
the Civil Wars provides little evidence of severe discipline; generals competing for the loyalty of their 
soldiers were more likely to offer rewards than threaten punishment’ (Kiesling 2006, 241). 
497 ISE II 114 = SEG 40.524 = Austin 90. The arrangement of Austin is followed here. For the date, see 
Juhel 2002, 401-2. 
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practice; the Amphipolis regulations offer a direct insight into the power dynamic 
between the organisational elites and the lower participants of the Macedonian 
Royal army, and as such are of the utmost importance for analysing its compliance 
relationship. How long before the date of the inscription these regulations were in 
place is unknown, as is the degree to which they are representative of the other 
Royal armies of the Hellenistic period.498 Nevertheless, the regulations point in a 
clear direction, one that is congruent with the conclusions of the preceding chapters: 
Royal armies ensured loyalty and obedience predominantly by remunerative means. 
 The surviving sections of the code can be roughly divided into two parts: one 
regarding punishments for misbehaviour, and the other regarding the correct 
distribution of war booty. We will discuss the regulations for booty in Chapter 5; for 
now, it is the punishments that concern us. The code is more or less straightforward: 
a sentry caught sitting or sleeping by the tetrarch, or company commander, shall be 
fined one drachma for his offence, whereas not reporting the offence also incurred a 
monetary fine. Furthermore, soldiers and officers who are caught without certain 
items of equipment shall be fined a certain amount of money for each missing item: 
for example, three obols for a sarisa. All offences had to be reported directly to the 
king, and the code refers to written regulations (κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα) that had to 
be adhered to.499 In addition, monetary rewards appear to have been promised to 
those who reported individuals who forage or destroy crops without permission – 
the relevant fragment (B2) is heavily restored, but the idea of monetary incentives 
for denunciation would certainly fit well with the rest of the extant regulations. 
                                                          
498 Chrissantos 2013, 318-19 suggests that the regulations were in place before the date of the 
inscription. Livy, in his short summary of the reforms enacted by Philip V, does not mention any 
reforms of the army, which suggests that the code was already in use (Livy 39.24.1-4). 
499 The relevant section of the code are as follows. Fine for sitting or sleeping sentry, and for failure to 
report: Fragments A1 (τὸν συγκαθήμενον ἢ κα|[θεύδον]τα φύλακα{ι} ζημιούτωσαν οἱ τετράρχαι 
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην | ἀ̣τ̣α̣ξ̣ί[α]ν δραχμῆι) and A2 ([- -ἐὰν μὴ παραδείξωσι τῶι βασι]|λεῖ τοὺς 
ἀτακτοῦ⟨ν⟩τας, ζημιούσθωσ{θ}αν δωδεκαίοις); fines for missing equipment: B1 ([- -]γεῖν τοὺς μὴ 
φέ[ρο]ντάς τι τῶν καθηκόντων αὐτοῖς ὅ|πλων ζημιούτωσαν κατὰ γεγραμμένα· κοτθ[ύ]βου̣ | 
ὀβολοὺς δύο, κώνου τὸ ἴσον, σαρίσης ὀβολοὺ⟨ς⟩ τρεῖς, μα|χαίρας τὸ ἴσον, κνημίδων ὀβολοὺς 
δύο, ἀσπίδος δρα‖χμήν· | Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡγεμόνων, τῶν τε δεδηλωμένων ὅπλων | τὸ διπλοῦν, καὶ 
θώρακος δραχμὰς δύο, ἡμιθωρακίου δραχμήν). 
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 The picture that emerges from the Amphipolis military code is a clear one: 
the Macedonian Royal army took no recourse to corporal punishment – not even in 
cases such as dereliction of sentry duty – which as we have seen could incur the 
severest punishments in other ancient militaries. What is more, the penalties that 
are imposed, on regular soldiers as well as on officers (ἡγεμόνες), are entirely 
monetary in nature. Soldiers are fined for sleeping on duty, for losing equipment, 
and for disobeying commands from their officers. Instead of coercion, then, the 
Macedonian kings relied on the allocation and manipulation of material rewards to 
generate compliance in their men: fines for noncompliance were coupled with 
monetary rewards for denunciations. In other words, the predominant power 
exercised over the lower participants in the Hellenistic Macedonian Royal army 
appears to have been remunerative. Contrast this with the situation in Athens, 
where military offences were punished with atimia, but the property of those 
convicted was left untouched. This reflects differences in the primary purpose of 
punishments in Royal and Polis armies: material penalties in the former, symbolic 
ones in the latter. 
 Evidence for physical punishment of regular Macedonian soldiers is rare; 
corporal and capital punishment existed, but we hear of them mostly in the context 
of court politics: to take an example from Philip V’s reign, dealing with the conspiracy 
around Apelles eventually led to a summary execution of Leontios, one of the 
conspirators, but began with imposing a hefty fine on two others, Megaleas and 
Krinon (who were imprisoned until payment).500 The summary execution did not 
reflect usual practice, however: it was prompted by fears of a mutiny, which required 
quick and decisive action.501 Inasmuch as the Macedonian army is at all 
representative of the military organisations of the other Hellenistic kingdoms, the 
evidence for Royal armies follows the pattern of Polis armies: corporal punishment 
was not the norm, and appears to have been at odds with the prevailing compliance 
                                                          
500 Chrissantos 2013, 318. For the entire affair see Polyb. 5.4.8-13, 5.15-16; also HCP I, 550-52 and 
Hatzopoulos 1996, 299-300. 
501 Polyb. 5.27.8. 
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model: if Royal army soldiers were predominantly calculatively involved, coercion 





To sum up: the overall impression we get of ancient Greek military discipline is that 
coercion never served as the predominant type of power that was applied to ensure 
compliance. Here we need to emphasise that coercion can take several forms, such 
as physical, economic, or social coercion. Corporal punishment clearly falls into the 
first of these categories, and it is evident that Greek poleis lacked – or better, chose 
not to employ – a sophisticated coercive apparatus. Pritchett concluded his study of 
Greek military discipline with the following statement: ‘A more or less rough-and-
ready system of summary justice was resorted to by the Greek hegemon’.502 From 
the preceding analysis it appears that any such system was neither rough nor ready: 
generals had extremely limited recourse to corporal punishment of any sort; nor was 
it summary: quite the opposite, as the most elaborate means of punishing military 
offences were subject to court proceedings overseen by the general, but again the 
results were not physical coercion. Instead they relied on symbolic punishments, the 
efficacy of which depended on the power of each particular socio-political system 
(and shame culture more generally). These punishments generally shared the 
elements of social, political, and economic exclusion and stigmatisation, targeting 
the core areas of interaction between individual and community. As such they were 
coercive measures of sorts, but they drew their strength not from physical violence, 
but from the offender’s personal connection with the polis. The difference is 
important, as physical coercion can be applied to great effect regardless of the 
victim’s type of involvement with his or her organisation, whereas symbolic coercion 
depends on the moral commitment of those that are punished to be truly effective. 
                                                          
502 Pritchett 1974, 245. 
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Royal armies also seem to have preferred the exercise of remunerative over 
coercive power, using material rewards and fines instead of the whip. This use of 
largely economic sanctions suggests that the lower participants in Royal armies were 
motivated primarily by personal benefit, hence their organisational elites targeted 
this area to punish noncompliance. As with Polis forces, the type of punishment is 
revealing as to the underlying motivating forces of those in charge and those over 
whom power is exercised. 
Having established that coercion was not the predominant type of power 
exercised in Royal and Polis armies, it remains to show how the ways in which these 
armies chose to punish transgressors can help us understand the motivations of the 
soldiers who fought for them. For the power that punishes may also reward, and it is 
in this context that we gain valuable insights into the workings of the compliance 
relationships of Royal and Polis armies: punishments and rewards and intrinsically 
linked, and together they represent one of the best access points for assessing the 
basic power structures of military organisations. The next chapter will explore this 
aspect in more detail: if not primarily through coercive power, then how did Polis and 

















One particular difficulty for studying the individual combat motivations of soldiers 
who lived and fought thousands of years ago is the lack of direct evidence. What 
material we have often comes from historiography, courtroom speeches, and 
private or public inscriptions, all of which have their own genre-specific limitations, 
conventions, and agendas. The soldier’s own voice is almost impossible to hear. One 
way of getting closer to the everyday realities of ancient life is through comedy: 
rather than gods, kings, and heroes, the genre, especially New Comedy, often 
revolved around the more mundane struggles of ordinary citizens, offering glimpses 
into the day-to-day lives of ancient Greeks.503 Of special interest for the purposes of 
this chapter is a fragmentary comedy by the Athenian New Comedy playwright 
Menander, from the second half of the fourth century, as it appears to shed some 
light onto the combat motivations of a few private individuals, set in a period where 
most other sources concern themselves only with the level of grand international 
politics. 
 The play in question is the Aspis; at its heart is Daos, a slave of the Athenian 
citizen Kleostratos. The latter had enrolled in a mercenary expedition to Asia Minor, 
                                                          
503 On the uses of comedy for social history generally, see Lape & Moreno 2014 (pages 349-52 on 
Menander specifically; see also Arnott 1979, xxi). 
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and the play opens with Daos’ lamentations over the death of his master in the 
aftermath of a successful raid in Lykia: 
 
I thought you’d come back safe and rich in honour 
From your campaign, and afterwards you’d live  5 
Your future years in style. You’d have the title 
Of General or Counsellor of State, 
And see your sister, for whose sake you went 
Campaigning, married to a man you felt 
Was right, upon your glad arrival home.  10 
(Men. Aspis 4-10, transl. Arnott) 
 
We learn what had prompted Kleostratos to risk his life abroad: the prospect of 
honour and money, which he had apparently planned to use primarily in order to 
furnish his sister with a respectable dowry, but also to support himself in his old age. 
Daos had managed to escort back his master’s plunder: two talents in coin from the 
sale of his booty, plus a large quantity of precious cups and a group of slaves.504 This 
is an impressive haul, and more so for a seemingly ordinary citizen who went to war 
to make his fortune. And while we have to allow for dramatic exaggeration on 
Menander’s part, it still reveals audience expectations: service with a Hellenistic 
warlord was a shortcut to riches. The exact date or location of the plundering raid 
are unknown; inconclusive attempts have been made to connect the events of the 
play with a specific historical incursion.505 What seems accepted, however, is that the 
details are representative of the wars of the Successors of the late fourth century. 
 It seems that for a Greek citizen it was necessary to serve in the armies of the 
Hellenistic warlords to gain wealth – service in a citizen army did not provide the 
same opportunities. This in turn might be connected to the different compliance 
relationships at work: remuneration played a central role in Royal armies, and the 
prospect of profit was a credible one even for an ordinary infantryman. A citizen 
army, on the other hand, did not present the chance to gain wealth on the same scale 
as a Royal army. As I shall show, this goes hand in hand with the predominant type 
                                                          
504 Men. Aspis 34-37. 
505 E.g. Treu 1976, who suggests the very similar events of Athenaios’ campaign against the 
Nabataians in 312 BC (under orders from Antigonos), reported in Diod. Sic. 19.94-95. 
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of power that was applied in Polis armies, i.e. normative power: rewards tended to 
be symbolic rather than material, while the bulk of the spoils of war were placed at 
the disposal of the community, not individual soldiers or generals. 
 Finally, we will analyse an aspect of material rewards handed out by 
Hellenistic warlords that bridged the gap between normative and remunerative 
power: settling soldiers. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to highlight the structural 
differences in the reward systems of both types of army, while at the same time to 
trace the efforts made by generals and kings to combine the most effective elements 
of each type of power in order to secure the lasting loyalty of their soldiers.506 
 
 
5.2 The Fruits of Loyalty: Rewards in Civic Armies 
 
If the preceding discussion has shown that the loyalty and compliance of citizen-
soldiers was not secured by coercive means, it remains to show that remuneration, 
too, played no central part in a polis’ compliance relationship. Once we can exclude 
coercive and remunerative power, the argument that Polis armies relied primarily on 
normative power will be significantly more compelling. Remuneration, in the 
context of ancient Greek warfare, usually fell into one of two categories: direct 
payment for military service in the form of a wage, or indirect payment in the form 
of booty. A wage would normally consist of a ration allowance (σιτηρέσιον) and a 
daily payment (μισθός), combined into gross pay.507 Booty was naturally less 
predictable, and by no means guaranteed: it was contingent on success, and the 
exact amount would vary in each case. As we shall see, neither of these two types of 
remuneration was sufficient by itself to generate loyalty and compliance in citizen-
soldiers: pay tended to be low and irregular, whereas booty became the common 
property of the polis. There was little real wealth to be gained by the ordinary soldier. 
                                                          
506 The importance of public recognition and rewards, material and non-material, in more modern 
armies is discussed in Kellett 1982, 201-13. 
507 The exact terminology for military pay is somewhat unclear and can vary from polis to polis. 
Pritchett 1971, 3-29 has collected a substantial amount of evidence and discusses the various usages. 
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 To begin with direct payment: the exact levels of military pay varied with 
each city-state and according to the specific circumstances of the time. While 
detailed information for individual poleis is rare, a clear general picture emerges. 
Pritchett, in his comprehensive analysis of military pay in the fifth and fourth 
centuries, is straightforward in his conclusions: in the fifth century, a citizen-soldier 
would not expect remuneration for military service beyond sustenance – bearing the 
bulk of the cost himself. Payment beyond sustenance, he claims, is a development 
of the fourth century and connected to the increased use of mercenaries and longer 
campaigns from home.508 Pritchett explains this by referring to the citizen’s 
commitment to the polis; military service was as much a duty as it was a right and a 
privilege: ‘The citizen identified his own interest with that of the state. His patriotism 
was shown no less in devotion on the battlefield than in financial sacrifice’.509 We 
might think of the vast private outlay in preparation of the Athenian Sicilian 
expedition (Thuc. 6.31.3), or the simple fact that citizen-soldiers usually paid for their 
own equipment.510 In terms of compliance theory, the citizens’ moral commitment 
to the polis meant that remuneration was not essential to their willingness to comply 
with its demands. 
 For Athens, we have good evidence for wage levels. Thucydides wrote that 
the hoplites besieging Potidaia were paid a drachma per day, plus a drachma for one 
servant.511 That soldier and slave were paid the same strongly suggests that the 
payment was primarily for subsistence, not compensation for services rendered. 
While there appears to have been no minimum or standard wage, the gross pay 
(misthos plus siteresion) for soldiers averaged around one drachma per day for the 
fifth and fourth centuries.512 Considering that this would have been paid only for 
                                                          
508 Pritchett 1971, 27-28. 
509 Pritchett 1971, 27; see also Pritchett 1974, 110-12. 
510 Trundle 2004, 61, and van Wees 2007, 276-8, who speaks of a ‘moral obligation’ to buy hoplite 
equipment. 
511 Thuc. 3.17.4, which according to Loomis 1998, 40 is ‘earliest explicit evidence for a daily wage for 
soldiers and sailors’. 
512 According to Loomis 1998, 55-58: he suggests that before 433, gross pay would have been roughly 
four obols to one drachma per diem; for 433-412 he sees the standard rate as one drachma per diem; 
from 412 to the end of the war, it had apparently fallen to three obols per diem; for the fourth century, 
he postulates a gross pay of at least one drachma per diem. 
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days of active duty, which would be largely restricted to the summer months, the 
scope for amassing any form of wealth was small, especially as the gross pay 
included a ration allowance. For comparison, average slave prices in the Classical 
period ranged from 200 to 500 drachmas – based on military income alone, it would 
take a soldier years to save up enough to buy a slave at the lower range.513 No 
wonder, then, that Kleostratos enlisted with a Hellenistic warlord to secure his 
fortune: serving in the citizen army would never have allowed him to acquire several 
slaves in so short a time.514 
 The fictional case of Kleostratos brings us to the second category of 
remuneration: indirect payment through the spoils of war. Our sources contain so 
many references to citizen-armies ravaging their enemies’ countryside515 and 
sacking their cities516 that we could be tempted to view the acquisition of plunder as 
one of the main aims of inter-polis warfare, enabling individual soldiers to acquire 
significant levels of private wealth. To begin with, we should not underestimate the 
desire to cause economic damage to one’s enemy, but there are other factors to be 
considered: firstly, the quantity of plunder obtained in raids and sieges varied 
greatly, and only rarely amounted to huge sums; secondly, any plunder usually 
became public property; and thirdly, unless individual soldiers were able to acquire 
private plunder by deceit, their share of the booty normally was nothing more than 
their gross pay. We will discuss these three factors in turn. 
 Unlike the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period, which were often 
accompanied by a large camp following that included the wealth and possessions of 
thousands of individuals, accumulated over years of campaigning, Polis armies 
tended to operate on a much smaller scale, both in terms of numbers of combatants 
and campaign length. They were not normally on the move with great amounts of 
valuable property that could be captured by an enemy, unless of course an army was 
                                                          
513 For slave prices, see Scheidel 2005, 11. 
514 See Crowley 2012, 107-9 for a more detailed discussion of the Athenian case, with a clear 
conclusion: ‘Athens, quite simply, did not pay her troops enough to secure their compliance’. 
515 Examples: Thuc. 1.108.2, 2.55.1, 2.93.4-94.3, 3.26.3, 4.87.2-88-1, 5.115.2, 6.7.1, 6.95.1, 7.49.2, 8.3.1; 
Xen. Hell. 6.2.5-6. 
516 Examples: Thuc. 2.56.5, 2.80.7, 3.102.2, 4.130.6, 5.54.3-55.2, 5.83.3, 8.28.3-4 (cf. 8.36.1), 8.41.2; 
Xen. Hell. 1.6.13-15, 2.1.19 (cf. 2.1.25); Diod. Sic. 14.15.2-3, 14.53.1-3, 15.46.5-6, 15.79.3-6. 
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intercepted on a return march after having acquired significant plunder.517 It is the 
poliorcetic context that provided the greatest prospects: capturing a city with its 
property and inhabitants could mean a windfall after a successful sale of the plunder 
and enslavement of the captives. In 415 the Athenians under Nikias captured the 
small town of Hykkara, and managed to sell its inhabitants (around 7,500 people) 
into slavery for 120 talents, a welcome addition to their war chest.518 But the 
limitations in siege technology meant that most poleis were relatively safe behind 
their walls; in addition, maintaining a siege was expensive and unpopular owing to 
the protracted and dangerous nature of the undertaking.519 Hence the normal 
reaction to an invading army was to gather all moveable property inside the city 
walls, leaving the attacker with little choice beyond burning crops, cutting down 
trees, and destroying farm buildings – there was rarely an opportunity to acquire 
large amounts of booty.520 
 At least not in typical inter-polis warfare: it is no coincidence that the 
character Kleostratos enlisted for a campaign in Asia Minor. There are several 
references to Polis armies acquiring plunder when operating within the Persian 
Empire, but this was hardly a frequent occurrence, and the normal rules still applied: 
the spoils of war would become public property, and were often sold to pay the 
troops’ wages. Thus, in 395 when Herippidas managed to capture the camp of 
Pharnabazos, he brought the plunder back to camp, and forced his allies to hand 
over their spoils too, so that it could be sold by the officials in charge of the booty 
(the λαφυροπώλαι).521 Indeed, there was a long tradition of Greek soldiers 
                                                          
517 Aineias Taktikos advised to ambush a retreating army that had managed to capture plunder in a 
surprise attack, as it would be slowed down because of it (16.11-12). 
518 Thuc. 6.62.3-4 (Gabrielsen 2003, 393 for the number of inhabitants); see also Diod. Sic. 11.81.4-5, 
82.5, Xen. Hell. 4.3.21. See Rawlings 2007, 151 for the sale of captives. 
519 Van Wees 2004, 144-45, who also points out the lack of central organisation and specialist 
engineers necessary for maintaining long sieges. However, there are examples that might suggest a 
more balanced picture, such as the Peloponnesian siege of Plataia in 429 (Thuc. 2.75-8, 3.20-3). 
520 Van Wees 2004, 122: ‘Invaders were thus largely reduced to vandalising immovable property, 
rather than taking booty’. On small-scale raiding of Classical poleis, see van Wees 2004, 123-26. 
521 Xen. Hell. 4.1.22-25; for more examples, see Hdt. 9.80-81, Diod. Sic. 11.33.1-2; Diod. Sic. 13.64.4 
(cf. Xen. Hell. 1.2.4-5 and 1.2.17). According to Diodoros, at the outset of Agesilaos II’s campaign into 
Persia, a large crowd eager for plunder gathered to follow the army (Diod. Sic. 14.79.2, see Xen. Hell. 
3.4.22 for the dangers of individual plundering); for plundering during the campaign itself see Xen. 
Hell. 3.4.12, 3.4.24. For other large crowds of camp followers intent on plundering, see Polyb. 3.82.8; 
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marvelling at Persian wealth, going back to the Persian Wars, and continuing into 
the campaigns of Alexander that saw the prolonged exposure of his troops to the 
fabulous treasures of the Achaimenids: as we will see, this affected the men’s 
expectations and motivations, and thereby their involvement with their 
organisation. For now, suffice it to say that the ten to twenty thousand talents of 
debt accumulated by Alexander’s army has no parallel whatsoever in the warfare 
between Greek city-states.522 
  More importantly for the soldiers of these city-states, any plunder that 
individuals acquired would normally become public property, to be used either at the 
discretion of the generals or the public authorities at home. There appears to have 
been no standard procedure regarding the immediate disposal of booty; apart from 
dedications (usually a tithe), some or all of it might be sold while still on campaign, 
to pay for supplies and military wages, or it might be transported back to the home 
polis and sold there, the proceeds being used for public works or to cover other 
communal expenses.523 The Athenian case is reasonably clear: booty eventually 
became the property of the state, but the generals appeared to have had the options 
of using it to pay their men’s wages or to award prizes for acts of valour.524 
 In the fourth century and beyond, when mercenary service became more 
widespread and distant theatres of operation required longer campaigns and thus 
more money, using plunder to pay the troops became more common – especially 
when commanders were sent out with insufficient funds to begin with, requiring 
them to obtain plunder to pay and feed their men.525  The Athenians sent out 
Timotheos with a fleet of fifty or sixty triremes, but furnished only thirteen talents, 
relying on him to levy money from allies and sell any spoils to pay his troops.526 While 
this process represents a shift of power from the public authorities to the individual 
generals, at its heart this is still public control of plunder: the general, as a 
                                                          
the Seleukid army was particularly known for this (e.g. Justin Epit. 38.10 with Bar-Kochva 1976, 11; 
see also Polyaenus, Strat. 8.61, Athen. 13.593e, I Macc. 3.41, and Bar-Kochva 1976, 100). 
522 Roisman 2012, 40; cf. Arr. 7.5.3, Just. Epit. 12.11.1, Diod. Sic. 17 Contents, 17.109.3 
523 For the tithe on war booty, see Pritchett 1971, 93-100. 
524 Crowley 2012, 108-9; Hamel 1998a, 44-45; cf. Pritchett 1971, 85 with n. 6. 
525 Pritchett 1971, 87, and Hamel 1998a, 46. 
526 Isoc. 15.109-11, Xen. Hell. 5.4.63, Diod. Sic. 15.47.2-7. 
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representative of the community, is responsible for providing his men’s gross pay, 
but nothing more. There is no indication that citizen soldiers had greater chances of 
acquiring private wealth than before, but some states developed more sophisticated 
ways of controlling and distributing the spoils of war. 
 We know that the Athenians kept written records of the booty that was 
brought back by their generals, and that strategoi could be made to render an 
account of the plunder they took while in command.527 There are numerous 
examples of generals conforming to this rule and delivering their plunder to the 
Athenian demos for inspection, and indications that noncompliance could lead to 
imprisonment.528 The Spartans had similar laws, requiring their commanders to 
surrender all captured spoils to the community; generals were usually accompanied 
by at least one λαφυροπώλης, a dedicated officer charged with overseeing the 
distribution and sale of any booty.529 According to Xenophon it was to him, and not 
to the king, that all captured plunder was to be delivered.530 This was another feature 
of public control over plunder: it was not for the king to distribute as he wished, akin 
to a Homeric basileus or a Hellenistic monarch, but rather the community took 
charge of the spoils and ensured they could not be used to create personal links 
between general and soldier – such bonds were based on remunerative power and 
might undermine the normative elements in the Spartan compliance relationship.531 
And just as in Athens, the Spartans severely punished any attempt to gain private 
wealth from the spoils: after the victory at Aigospotamoi in 405, Gylippos was sent 
by Lysander to deliver the plunder to Sparta; he stole some of it, but was found out 
by the ephors, fled into exile, and was condemned to death in absentia.532 Lysander 
                                                          
527 Dem. 20.77-80: ἀναγνώσεται γεγραμμένας ὑμῖν τάς τε ναῦς ὅσας ἔλαβεν καὶ οὗ ἑκάστην, καὶ 
τῶν πόλεων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὸ πλῆθος; to Hamel 1998a, 45 n. 11, this passage 
‘suggests that, at least in the fourth century, the Athenians kept careful records of the booty which 
Athenian generals brought to Athens’. See also Lys. 28.5, 19.50-51. 
528 Pritchett 1971, 85-87. See e.g. Dem. 20.77, 24.11-13; Plut. Cim. 9.2-4; Diod. Sic. 12.44.3, 12.73.3, 
13.68.3, 15.35.2; Thuc. 5.3.4; Xen. Hell. 1.2.13-14. In 406 the general Erasinides was accused of 
withholding funds that rightly belonged to the demos, leading to his imprisonment (Xen. Hell. 1.7.2). 
529 Pritchett 1971, 90-92, who points out that sales of captives in Sparta are extremely rare, owing to 
the helot system and the resulting low demand for slaves. 
530 Xen. Lac. 13.11; cf. Hell. 4.1.26, Ages. 1.18, An. 7.7.56, and Plut. Ages. 9.5. 
531 Harris 2015, 87 sees this dynamic as a measure to prevent tyranny. 
532 Diod. Sic. 13.106.8-9, Plut. Lys. 16-17.1, cf. Mor. 217b. 
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himself might have had this example in mind when he delivered all the remaining 
funds (almost five hundred talents) and booty he had acquired to Sparta after the 
ultimate capitulation of Athens.533 
 As plunder captured by citizen armies became public property, the uses it was 
put to were also of a public nature: the spoils from the victory at the Eurymedon were 
used to finance public buildings in Athens, while the Thebans built a grand stoa in 
their marketplace, complete with bronze statues, from the proceeds of selling the 
booty captured after the battle of Delion; after defeating the Athenians on Sicily, the 
Syracusans spent the money from their spoils on their temples; we also have a 
fourth-century inscription from Tegea regarding the construction of public works, 
stipulating that any interruption or destruction caused by war will be paid for after 
the generals have held a sale of booty.534 Overall, then, it should be evident that war 
booty belonged to the community, not the general or the individual, and that it was 
the community that decided how to use any wealth gained from war. Polis armies 
provided little scope for (lawful) personal enrichment. 
 This is not to say, however, that ancient warfare offered no prospect of 
private looting at all. Taking a city, pillaging a countryside, or looting a battlefield 
naturally offered opportunities for individual soldiers to secret away personal loot. 
Aineias Taktikos advised attacking armies that had taken to looting one’s 
countryside, as the soldiers would be isolated and vulnerable.535 This was of course 
known to ancient generals, who had to keep their men from becoming too dispersed 
in their quest for loot.536 But when Aineias wrote of armies ‘weighed down with 
plunder’, it is more likely that he is thinking of captured livestock, wagons of supplies, 
and of course captive slaves and citizens, rather than of individual soldiers so 
burdened with personal loot as to slow down their march.537 And the more 
cumbersome – and more valuable – type of booty would of course become public 
                                                          
533 Xen. Hell. 2.3.8-9. 
534 Diod. Sic. 11.62.1-3, Plut. Cim. 13.6 (Athens); Diod. Sic. 12.70.5 (Thebes); Diod. Sic. 13.34.4-5 
(Syracuse); IG V.2 6, 9-12 (Tegea). 
535 Aen. Tact. 16.5-8. 
536 Diod. Sic. 11.61.6-7. 
537 Armies accompanied by large numbers of livestock: e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.2.26, cf. 4.5.5-8 and 4.6.4-6. 
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property. Crowley correctly identified the dilemma facing a citizen-hoplite: if he 
plundered on his own, he was vulnerable to attacks, but if he plundered with the 
army, the loot would go to the state.538 This explains why, after the destruction of 
the Athenian expeditionary force on Sicily in 413, so many Athenians were secretly 
taken prisoner: their captors wanted to keep them for themselves rather than 
surrender them to the state, which they knew was expected of them.539 Warfare 
invariably provides unscrupulous individuals with a chance at self-aggrandisement 
at the expense of the common good, and the ancient world was no different in this 
regard. The more power a citizen wielded, the greater the potential for personal gain 
from military activity – hence generals and politicians were often those who profited 
the most from war.540 But the crucial point remains: such behaviour was perceived 
as unfair, and it was not the normal expectation of the average citizen-soldier to 
acquire wealth by fighting for his polis: the spoils of war belonged to the community. 
 Nevertheless, Polis army soldiers certainly benefited from successful military 
operations and official sales of booty: on the one hand, the proceeds paid for public 
projects and allowed the state to spend more lavishly on the welfare of its citizens, 
and on the other, the soldiers often received their pay as a result of selling plunder.541 
An example of this dynamic is preserved in Thucydides’ description of the Athenian 
soldiers’ expectations on the eve of the expedition to Sicily: the mass of the citizen-
soldiers hoped not for a mountain of plunder, but to gain payment for the present, 
and an everlasting supply of wages for the future; the word he uses for ‘wages’ is 
μισθοφορά, which refers strictly to military payments, not to booty or other forms 
of remuneration.542The implication is that the spoils of war would go to the 
                                                          
538 Crowley 2012, 108-9: ‘Clearly, for the Athenian hoplite, there was little prospect of acquiring wealth 
while on campaign’. Compare Hdt. 9.80 for a similar story, and Xen. Hell. 6.2.23 for the temptations 
of taking captives. 
539 Thuc. 7.85.2-4; Crowley 2012, 108 n. 32 calls this outright ‘peculation’. 
540 E.g. Lys. 19.28-29; Thuc. 2.65.7 (cf. 6.15.2); Ar. Vesp. 684-85. 
541 A few examples: Diod. Sic. 13.64.4, 13.69.5, 15.47.7, (cf. Xen. Hell. 6.2.36 and Polyaenus, Strat. 
3.9.55), 16.57.2 (cf. Hamel 1998a, 45); Xen. Hell. 3.1.28, 3.2.26, 5.1.24; Isoc. 15.111 (cf. [Arist.] Oec. 
1350b). For more examples see, Dreyer 1999, 51. 
542 Thuc. 6.24.3: ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὅμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ 
προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν. See CT ad loc.: ‘The profit motive for 
ancient wars is rarely stated as frankly as this […]’, and Pritchett 1971, 23-24. 
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community, which in turn would ensure a steady flow of payments for the soldiers. 
In other words, the benefit of the state (or organisational elites) was perfectly 
aligned with the benefit of the individual citizens (or lower participants) – as we have 
seen, this is a hallmark of any effective normative-moral compliance relationship. 
 Military wages naturally represented a form of remunerative power, but they 
did not constitute the predominant element in a Polis army’s compliance model. 
Remuneration, especially on the low level that we find in citizen armies, was not a 
prerequisite for loyal military service, but a result of it: citizens received pay because 
they fought – they did not fight because they received pay. It might even make more 
sense to view military pay as recompense rather that reward. This is a crucial 
distinction between a predominantly morally involved individual and one whose 
involvement is predominantly calculative: the latter’s compliance is contingent on 
the likelihood of being rewarded, while the former’s compliance rests on the 
commitment to the organisation and the belief that acting in accord with its 
demands is the right thing to do in and of itself. In the context of Polis armies, we 
can illustrate this point by taking a closer look at how communities went about 
rewarding their soldiers in real terms, i.e. beyond daily wages and ration money. 
 The most salient feature of civic rewards for loyal military service is their 
predominantly symbolic nature. There was a large spectrum: respect and approval 
from one’s family and fellow citizens, a sense of self-worth and validation of one’s 
own place in society, proof of one’s manliness and courage (which were equated in 
ancient Greek: ἀνδρεία), prestige for oneself and one’s relatives, public eulogies and 
perks, awards for ἀριστεῖα, and of course public funerals for the fallen, along with 
monuments, memorials, and honour for one’s family and public care for any war 
orphans.543 Some of these rewards were of more overtly material character, such as 
bringing up one’s children at public expense or receiving a crown for acts of valour; 
others were entirely symbolic, such as eulogies or seats of honour at festivals. But all 
of them shared an intrinsic symbolic element, derived from the personal connection 
between citizen and polis. This relationship has already been explored in our 
                                                          
543 Crowley 2012, 119-21. 
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discussion of funerary practices, which highlighted the prominent role of the socio-
political system in generating combat motivation, compliance, and loyalty to the 
state. Over the next pages we will discuss another aspect of this relationship: how 
did polis communities reward and encourage military loyalty? This subject is vast and 
complex, as it touches upon most of the intersections between concepts like private 
and public, citizen and state, military and civic, history and memory, and the past, 
present, and future of the civic continuum. We will therefore limit ourselves to 
analysing significant examples from the Classical and Hellenistic periods that 
illustrate some of the central elements of the normative-moral compliance 
relationship of citizen armies. 
 In Chapter 2 we recalled how the Samians fractured at the Battle of Lade in 
494: most of the fleet sailed away, leaving only eleven ships loyal to the Ionian 
cause.544 The Samians later decided to reward and commemorate their loyalty by 
setting up a stele in the agora, inscribed with the eleven trierarchs’ names and 
patronymics.545 This recalls the funerary practices we observed in Chapter 3, but as 
Pritchett has pointed out, this was not a funerary monument, but a war memorial.546 
The act is closer to the commemoration of Harmodios and Aristogeiton in the 
Athenian marketplace; as such it was intended to reward and immortalise the loyal 
and courageous actions of the eleven trierarchs and their crews. There was no doubt 
a political dimension to the erection of the stele, but nevertheless, we may note that 
the reward for loyalty was public symbolic recognition. 
 A similar case involves Thasos, where we find another example of public 
recognition that combines sepulchral customs with commemoration and reward: by 
around 360, the Thasians had set up a public honorific list to be inscribed with the 
names and patronymics of those who died fighting for the city. The inscription that 
mentions this list also contains details regarding the public funeral that accompanied 
this act of commemoration: individual private burial is prohibited (4); the names and 
patronymics of the deceased warriors will be inscribed (7-8); their fathers and sons 
                                                          
544 Hdt. 6.13-14. 
545 Hdt. 6.14.3. 
546 Pritchett 1985, 165. 
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are invited to a public sacrifice in honour of the dead and receive seats of honour at 
the funeral games (9-14); war orphans who are of age are awarded greaves, a 
breastplate, a dagger, a helmet, a shield, and a spear (17-20); finally, poor war 
orphans will be supported by the public until they come of age (28-31).547 The 
significance of the funerary elements in such proceedings has already been 
discussed in Chapter 3, so here we can focus on the other features: the rewards for 
sacrificing their lives for the polis were a mix of two components, one symbolic 
(public funeral and recognition, honorific inscriptions, prestige for relatives), the 
other material (panoplies and financial support for orphans). 
 The Rhodian demos used a similar combination to motivate its citizen-
soldiers to fight when the city was under siege by Demetrios in 305. According to 
Diodoros, the citizens passed a decree promising public burial for all those who died 
during the siege, financial support for their parents and orphans, dowries for any 
unmarried daughters, and crowns and panoplies for any sons upon reaching 
adulthood.548 Two points are worth noting here. Firstly, neither the Thasians nor the 
Rhodians promised any monetary rewards to their soldiers, or at the least, neither 
the inscription nor Diodoros make any mention of cash payments or donatives. This 
suggests that material rewards for fighting men were not seen as necessary for 
generating compliance and combat motivation. Secondly, the material rewards that 
were being promised were not for those who actually did the fighting, and they were 
triggered by death in battle, not by courageous or successful actions. Any material 
benefit a soldier might derive from serving in the civic army was indirect: his parents 
and any orphaned children were financially supported, but only if the soldier died 
fighting.549 Like the honorific casualty lists discussed in Chapter 3, the polis rewarded 
loyalty over success – fighting over prevailing. 
 The symbolic and material rewards, then, can be divided between those who 
fought and died for the city (who received the symbolic rewards), and those who 
                                                          
547 SEG 57.820. For the most recent edition, see Fournier & Hamon 2007, who include a French 
translation, a commentary on the newest fragment, and a discussion of the historical background. 
548 Diod. Sic. 20.84.3-4. 




were left alone and vulnerable by the deaths of their relatives (who received the 
material rewards). And at the heart of this system lay the community, not any 
individual: it was the state treasury that paid for the expenses of a public funeral and 
financial support for the elderly and any orphans. Thus, loyalty was at the same 
diffused and focused: diffused as there was no one person – certainly no one general 
– who was responsible for rewarding the soldiers, and focused because the polis 
itself became the centre of gravity for loyalty, by embodying everything a citizen 
might fight for and acting as the source for any rewards he might receive. This stands 
in stark contrast to Royal armies, where the focal point for loyalty was the individual 
warlord, who had near absolute power over the allocation of rewards, a theme we 
will explore further in section 5.3 below. 
 A core function of these civic rewards was exhortation. The focus on the 
glorious memory of the dead, in combination with the material rewards for their 
relatives and, most importantly, their descendants, was not wholly altruistic. They 
served a clear normative purpose: to inspire loyalty and compliance in future 
generations by pointing to the honour that accompanied loyal military service, and 
allaying existential fears of those with limited means, assuring them that their 
dependents will be taken care of should they die fighting for the city. A powerful 
example of this effect is preserved in a speech by Aischines, who described the 
process of awarding panoplies to war orphans in the theatre: 
 
The herald would step forward and present the orphans whose fathers 
had fallen in war, young men adorned in full armour, and he would 
proclaim that most noble proclamation and the one most exhortative of 
virtue: that these young men, whose fathers had fallen in war and had 
become courageous men, have been raised by the demos from youth, and 
now, clad in full armour and going each their own way, with good fortune, 
the demos invites them to seats of honour. 
(Aeschin. 3.154) 
 
The passage encapsulates the material and symbolic nature of civic rewards by 
stressing both the public expense of bringing up these orphans, and the public 
honour awarded to them by the spectacle and special seats for the theatrical 
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performances.550 Aischines also captured the normative spirit of the proceedings, 
pointing out that the proclamation was supposed to inspire the audience as well as 
the recipients of the armour. Lastly, the ceremony created and strengthened 
societal cohesion by drawing on the civic continuum: the actions of those who had 
fallen in the past were celebrated and rewarded, while those who received the 
rewards in the present were supposed to gain inspiration for the future, ideally 
behaving in ways similar to those of their fathers, perpetuating the cycle of 
exhortation and emulation that underpinned a polis’ compliance relationship. 
 Similarly, Thucydides had Perikles remark on the nature of civic rewards. At 
the end of his funeral oration, he points out that the dead have received their public 
burial, while the living will be brought up at public expense – this in turn leads to 
better citizens: ἆθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι 
πολιτεύουσιν.551 Aristotle suggested that awarding panoplies and bringing up 
orphans at state expense was relatively normal and occurred in many other cities.552 
In its essence, the custom is similar to that of public funerals, which we also found in 
many Greek city-states: by discharging the familial duties of burial for the fallen 
soldiers and taking care of their parents and children, the state took on the role of 
the family.553 As a related example, we might mention that throughout the Classical 
and Hellenistic periods, poleis (or rich benefactors) often ransomed back citizens that 
had been captured in war or by pirates, a well-known custom among the Greeks and 
something that was normally done by their relatives.554 These represent important 
ways in which the internal cohesion of the citizen body, at times approximating 
familial levels, reinforced the effects a normative-moral compliance relationship: 
loyalty was directed not to a paymaster, but to one’s family and fellow-citizens. 
                                                          
550 In Athens, the orphans were awarded their panoply at the Greater Dionysia, which drew its 
audience from the entire Greek world (Papillon 2004, 153 n. 46) – this would certainly have added to 
the symbolic nature of the proceedings; cf. Isoc. 8.82. 
551 Thuc. 2.46.1: ‘For where the prizes for virtue are greatest, there also the best men are citizens’. 
552 Arist. Pol. 1268a. See also [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 24.3, and Diog. Laert. 1.55, who ascribed the custom to 
Solon. 
553 This same idea is expressed in Pl. Menex. 248e-49c. 
554 Cf. Polyb. 9.42.5-8.On the ransom aspect of piracy, see Gabrielsen 2003, 392-95. 
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 Another method of rewarding citizens for fighting was the erection of 
honorific monuments or inscriptions. Just as with the examples discussed above, and 
the funerary material analysed in Chapter 3, exhortation played an important part in 
such forms of recognition.555 We are fortunate to have an example that not only 
encapsulates many of the crucial features of civic rewards for loyal service, illustrates 
the complex relationship between polis and individual, but also stems from the 
Hellenistic period and sheds some light on practices of communities beyond the 
usual suspects like Athens and Sparta. The polis in question is Akraiphia, east of Lake 
Kopais in Boiotia, and the citizen in question is the cavalry commander Eugnotos. He 
was honoured with a bronze equestrian statue and an inscription on its base that has 
luckily survived more or less intact. John Ma has dealt with the inscription and its 
historical and socio-cultural background in great detail, wherefore I shall limit myself 
to providing the necessary context and some comments on how the monument as a 
whole reflects a polis’ reward structure and, by extension, its compliance 
relationship.556 The monument honoured Eugnotos, who died commanding the 
cavalry during one of the battles that occurred as a consequence of Demetrios 
Poliorketes’ conquest of Boiotia in 293.557 Most likely it was set up on the acropolis 
or in the agora, after a decree had been passed in the assembly.558 The inscription 
reveals that the statue was dedicated by the community but paid for by two of 
Eugnotos’ female relatives, his wife and daughter.559 It also relates how Eugnotos 
fought bravely against the armies of the king (i.e. Demetrios), fell in battle as was 
becoming a leader, and was eventually returned ἀσκύλευτον, that is without his 
armour being stripped as a trophy – a recognition of his valour by the enemy. The 
inscription closes with a clear exhortation to the youth of Akraiphia: 
 
                                                          
555 Check internal reference. 
556 See Ma 2005, with text and translation. 
557 Ma 2005, 144-45 places it in the context of the two subsequent revolts against Demetrios (Plut. 
Demetr. 39-40, 46.1, cf. Polyaenus, Strat. 4.7.11); for Eugnotos’ death he suggests the battle against 
Antigonos Gonatas in 291, and further that Eugnotos might have been federal hipparch (153); he 
dates the monument itself to c. 285-75 (169). 
558 Hardie 2003, 29. 
559 GVI 1603, 13-14. See Perdrizet 1900 for the editio princeps. 
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ἀλλά, νέοι, γί[ν]εσθε κατὰ κλέος ὧδε μαχηταί, 
ὧδ’ ἀγαθοί, πατέρων ἄιστεα [ῥ]υόμενοι. 
 
Now, young men, become glorious fighters, 
Become brave men, guarding the city of your fathers. 
 (GVI 1603, 15-16) 
 
While this may sound like some of the funerary material we encountered previously, 
it is important to bear in mind that Eugnotos’ monument was not a tomb, and his 
inscription not an epitaph. This was a public statue to honour, commemorate, and 
reward the loyal service of a citizen-soldier. More than that, it is a call to arms for the 
following generations of Akraiphians, in the hope they emulate the deeds of 
Eugnotos and bring further glory to their city and their families. Once again we see 
how polis communities managed to weave together rewards for military service with 
exhortative expressions of patriotism and civic ideology to form a normative 
framework for the behaviour of its soldiers.560 What is more, the intricate 
relationship between state and individual is here presented as a co-operation: the 
demos ratified and dedicated the monument, but it was paid for by Eugnotos’ 
relatives. It is at the same time a celebration of Eugnotos as a citizen and of the 
Akraiphians as a community, and as an act of public policy it constitutes a clear 
expression of normative power.561 The monument also reminds us of the immediate 
context of Eugnotos’ glory: the civic continuum and the socio-political system of the 
polis. The efficacy of the reward is predicated on the existence of a shared past and 
future, and on communal belief in civic ideology. Hence the inscription mentions the 
‘burial mounds of his ancestors’ (προγόνων ἤρια, 12) and encourages the future 
citizens to live up to Eugnotos’ example; furthermore, it portrays his death as a 
sacrifice for the common good of the polis, his actions as those of a lone saviour 
acting in defiance of the ‘numberless army of the king’ (βασιλῆος χεῖρας 
                                                          
560 Cf. Ma 2005, 151, who characterises the inscription as ‘ideological and political in effect. [It 
imposes] the high standards of Eugnotos’ heroism as normative’. Stecher 1981, 41 argues that the 
main purpose is praise of Eugnotos, but exhortation appears as an equally strong motif, especially as 
it forms the last verses of the epigram. 
561 Ma 2005, 153 argues that this is not Hellenistic familial encroachment on prerogatives of the civic 




ἀνηρίθμους, 1-2). The contrast between the individual citizen and the mighty army 
of a Hellenistic warlord is intentional, and served to define and unite the polis 
community in opposition to the faceless horde of a Royal army. The actions of 
Eugnotos – and those of the citizen cavalry he was leading – were informed by their 
moral commitment to the polis, and were commemorated and rewarded by 
permanently integrating them into the polis’ own narrative of resistance and 
sacrifice.562 The ideological significance of such public rewards for loyal service is 
underlined by the fact that more than a century after the statue was erected, when 
all those involved were long dead, conscription lists were added to the monument, 
emphasising the longevity of such normative acts of public recognition: Eugnotos 
and his cavalry were still part of the military culture of Akraiphia.563 
 In this context, we should mention the second-century BC honorary decree 
for Apollonios, son of Attalos, a citizen of Metropolis who died fighting for the 
Romans (SEG 53.1312). He led a detachment of young soldiers during the so-called 
War of Aristonikos (133-129). The demos voted him a bronze statue in the agora 
along with the inscription (lines 37-40), and the names of others who fell during this 
war were also added (47-56). The inscription frames Apollonios’ efforts in highly 
patriotic terms: he fought for his fatherland, his fellow citizens, and for their freedom 
– his reward was a glorious death, and he and his men proved themselves worthy of 
the ancestral glory.564 It also mentions explicitly to arrange the return of his remains 
so they could be properly buried at home (42-45). The many parallels to the case of 
Eugnotos are striking, which might seem remarkable considering that the two 
incidents are separated by more than one hundred and fifty years. They suggest, 
however, a structural similarity in the methods of rewarding loyal military service in 
a civic army, regardless of the fact that Apollonios and his men had fought for – and 
might have been directly commanded by – the Romans. 
                                                          
562 Ma 2005 notes that the monument as a whole has to be read within the history and culture of 
Boiotia: ‘This culture taken as a continuum, is the context in which the epigram embeds the statue: 
the military history of Boiotia rather than royal narratives of victory’ (168-69). 
563 Ma 2005, 173. 
564 SEG 53.1312, 32-33. See Boulay 2014, 481-84 for further discussion, and for the text with German 
translation and historical commentary, see Dreyer & Engelmann 2003. 
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 In fact, such rewards were common across the rest of the world of the Greek 
city-states: individuals, and sometimes the soldiers they led, were publicly honoured 
for their military service, whether they survived or not. Thus the Larisans honoured 
their cavalry and its commander who fought against Perseus in 171 with a festival 
and games; the contest was interrupted in the first century but re-established under 
Augustus.565 Like the monument for Eugnotos, the festival apparently played an 
important role in civic life long after it had been created.566 Another cavalry 
commander who was honoured with an equestrian statue was Nikasichoros of 
Opous in Eastern Lokris, whose πίστις was singled out for praise in the last verse of 
the honorific epigram: πίστις ἐπεὶ πάντων κοίρανος ἁγνοτάτα.567 Looking to the 
fourth century, we can add Chabrias, Iphikrates, and Timotheos, who were rewarded 
with public statues by the Athenian demos for their military achievements.568 The 
first general to be honoured in this way, however, was Konon, for his victory at 
Knidos 394 – indeed, he was the first individual to receive a bronze statue since 
Harmodios and Aristogeiton.569 Civic honours for military service could even be 
awarded to non-citizens: around 322 the Samians honoured Naosinikos of Sestos 
with citizenship for aiding them in their war against the Athenian cleruchs on their 
island while they were in exile, while in 318 the Athenians rewarded Euphron of 
Sikyon and his descendants with citizenship for supporting Athens in the Lamian 
War.570 This habit continued well into the Hellenistic period: in the first half of the 
                                                          
565 Chaniotis 2012, 47; cf. IG IX.2 531-33, SEG 53.550. 
566 Chaniotis 2012, 47: ‘The military overtones and the exclusive participation of citizens of Larisa 
suggest that this celebration was aimed at forging local identity and transmitting the values of the 
citizen-warrior to the young men’. 
567 IG IX.1 270, 10: ‘for loyalty is the purest leader of all things’; dated to 265/45 or after 229. See 
commentary in ISE 84 for more detail. Barbantani 2014, 311 categorised the epigram as an epitaph, 
but Geffcken 1916, 69 (no. 175) listed it under ‘Ehreninschriften’. 
568 Aeschin. 3.243: Chabrias for the victory at Naxos in 476 (Xen. Hell. 5.4.61, Diod. Sic. 15.34.3-35), 
Iphikrates for destroying a Spartan μόρα at Lechaion in 390 (Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-18), and Timotheos for 
his naval successes (Xen. Hell. 5.4.63-66). See also Paus. 1.3.2. 
569 Dem. 20.69-70, Pritchett 1974, 12-14; according to Lycurg. 1.51, setting up statues of generals was 
a distinctly Athenian habit. 
570 IG XII.6 1.43; Syll.³ 317, IG II² 448, Harding 123A (see Chaniotis 2002, 102 for historical background). 
For more examples, see Ma 2005, 154, who rightfully calls the ‘civic epigram commemorating locally 
important military events’ an ‘understudied genre’. 
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second century, Apollonia Pontike honoured an allied general with a golden crown 
and a bronze statue for leading her citizen army against a hostile neighbour.571 
The above examples are all explicit about whom they honour and why, which 
seems to reflect the changing attitudes surrounding the relationship between states 
and individuals over the course of the fourth and third centuries, of which the rise of 
euergetism is but one facet.572 Earlier, however, some poleis appeared more 
reluctant to publicly reward individuals for their military service, for reasons that 
were similar to those of the Spartans for not allowing their kings to control the 
distribution of plunder: the aim was to avoid elevating one individual’s power or 
prestige over that of the community. One example are the so-called Eion epigrams 
from Athens.573 They commemorate the capture of the Persian fortress of Eion by 
the Athenian forces under Kimon in 476/5 after a difficult siege.574 Returning to 
Athens, the leading men of the army asked for a reward, and were given the special 
honour of being allowed to set up three herms, each bearing an inscription 
commemorating their victory – on the condition that they did not inscribe their own 
names. The explicit reason for this, we are told by Aischines, was that the demos 
wanted to prevent the victory, which rightly belonged to all Athenians, from being 
appropriated by the generals.575 And so it happened – the second of the three 
inscriptions is of particular interest for our purposes: 
 
ἡγεμόνεσσι δὲ μισθὸν Ἀθηναῖοι τάδ᾽ ἔδωκαν 
ἀντ᾽ εὐεργεσίης καὶ μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν. 
μᾶλλόν τις τάδ᾽ ἰδὼν καὶ ἐπεσσομένων ἐθελήσει 
ἀμφὶ περὶ ξυνοῖς πράγμασι δῆριν ἔχειν. 
 
  
                                                          
571 IGBulg I² 388(2), 34-37. 
572 On the reluctance of the demos to honour individuals too conspicuously, see Domingo Gygax 2016, 
175-79. 
573 Aischines mentions the Stoa Poikile and the absence of the name of Miltiades as another example 
(3.186), claiming that the demos declined his request of having his name added. As Carey 2000, 228 
n. 213 points out, however, Miltiades would not have been alive to make any such request. 
574 Hdt. 7.107, cf. Thuc. 1.98.1. 
575 Aeschin. 3.183. 
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The Athenians gave to the generals this reward, 
for their service and great courage. 
Someone seeing this in times to come will be the more willing 
to fight for the common good. 
(Plut. Cim. 7.4)576 
 
We see the same combination of normative and exhortative elements that we 
observed in other types of civic rewards and in the public funerary material discussed 
in Chapter 3. Sacrifice for the community is presented as a worthy cause, and the 
reward for loyal service is public recognition by that same community – the rewards 
are thus ensconced by the socio-political system of the polis itself, which not only 
grants them, but also imbues them with meaning. It is equally telling that the 
generals had to specifically ask for a reward in the first place – presumably there 
would not have been any herms at all had they not pushed for public recognition; 
these inscriptions should be seen as an exceptional honour for Kimon and his 
generals. Plutarch confirmed this, and added for comparison that when Miltiades 
had asked for an olive crown, he was rebuffed and reminded that the victory at 
Marathon did not belong to him alone.577  At any rate, we hear nothing about any 
monetary rewards for the generals or their soldiers: instead, the polis offered 
exclusively normative and symbolic honours, with a clear desire to highlight the 
communal achievement over any individual glory, and to subsume the success of the 
army under that of society at large.578 
 This development, from a reluctance to honour individual generals by name 
and with special prizes in the fifth century, to a habit of voting certain commanders 
bronze statues for their exceptional achievements, is remarkable, but it is important 
to note that the type of rewards remained the same: it is still a non-monetary 
rewards largely concerned with civic honour. What changed was the probability of a 
                                                          
576 Quoting here the text from Plutarch, which according to Page 1981, 257 is considered better than 
that found in Aischines (3.184, cf. Dem. 20.112). For further discussion see Page 1981, 255-59, who 
follows Jacoby in changing the order of the three epigrams, placing the mythological content at the 
beginning; also Petrovic 2013, 201-8 for a discussion of the wider context of this and other epigrams 
found in Greek orators. 
577 Plut. Cim. 8.1. 
578 Christ 2006, 113. 
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general being singled out for personal rewards, but these were still of a 
predominantly symbolic nature. Together with the other rewards we have 
discussed, such as public burials, care for orphans, or honorific inscriptions, they 
constitute a significant part of the repertoire of civic rewards for loyal military 
service. Nevertheless, poleis also awarded other, more overtly monetary prizes to 
their soldiers, which will be discussed next. 
 So far we have often dealt with rewards for generals and soldiers who had 
died during active service, but of course there were also times when ordinary 
soldiers, having survived an encounter with the enemy, received rewards beyond 
their daily wage and ration money. As we will see, however, this often happened 
under extraordinary circumstances, does not seem to have followed any clear 
regulations, and ultimately did not play a crucial part in generating compliance from 
citizen-soldiers. This type of remuneration actually shared the relative weakness of 
coercive elements in a Polis army’s compliance relationship, as argued by Eckstein: 
‘And if Greek systems of enforcing military discipline through punishment appear 
somewhat lax by our standards, so, too, their systems of military rewards for acts of 
special valour appear lackadaisical and haphazard’.579 While he is correct in his 
overall assessment, we may note again the explicit comparison to modern standards 
of rewards and punishments, which as we have seen carry little analytical weight 
when applied to the ancient evidence. The same careful approach must be taken 
when assessing rewards: it does not matter if a reward seems trifling to us today – 
what matters is the socio-cultural context in which it was bestowed, and from which 
it gained its meaning. 
 Probably the most common, and the most elusive, type of reward for military 
service was the so-called aristeion award. The terminology is not entirely clear, as 
the terms ἀριστεῖα and ἀνδραγαθία are both closely connected to awards for 
conspicuous valour in battle. Pritchett has collected most of the evidence pertaining 
to their usage, and included a list of references to the historical instances of such 
                                                          
579 Eckstein 2005, 484. 
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awards in Herodotos, where they appear most frequently.580 Still, the overall picture 
remains incomplete, and many details are obscure, such as the exact role of the 
generals in deciding who won the award, how similar the custom was across 
different city-states, or how the award changed over time. Here we will mention a 
few cases that illustrate the general nature of such rewards – focusing on awards for 
individual soldiers rather than for entire cities.581 Broadly speaking, Greek poleis 
sometimes awarded soldiers who had shown exceptional courage on the battlefield 
special prizes: these could be crowns of precious metal, public honours such as a 
eulogy, or a private share in the booty.582 
 In Athens, it appears that the usual reward for valour was a crown and a 
panoply. Alkibiades received this prize for his behaviour during the siege of 
Potidaia.583 According to Eckstein, this had to be voted by the assembly and the 
wreath was not of precious metal, but of laurel: ‘Not much, one would think. Once 
again, as with punishments for cowardice, it appears that what counted for the 
Classical Greeks in the rewarding of acts of extraordinary valour was mostly the good 
opinion of one's fellow citizens’.584 In other words, not the monetary value was 
important – hence his feigned disappointment at the laurel – but the symbolic value 
that the crown conferred, marking the recipient out as worthy of admiration and 
honour among his fellow citizens. This effect would be intensified if the assembly 
was directly involved in voting on the crown for military valour – exposing the 
recipient to a wider audience than those present after a battle. Plato advised to 
honour extraordinary valour on the battlefield with an olive wreath, to be dedicated 
to a martial divinity along with an inscription, serving as proof of the recipient’s 
bravery.585 It seems that originally, crowns for military valour were not of precious 
metal, and thus entirely of symbolic value; this stems from their origin in the 
                                                          
580 Pritchett 1974, 276-90, after noting our ‘profound ignorance about such a matter as the aristeion’ 
(276). 
581 As was done after during the Persian Wars (e.g. Hdt. 8.93). 
582 Pritchett 1974, 289. 
583 Plut. Alc. 7.3: στεφανοῦν ἐκεῖνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν. See Verdegem 2010, 156-58 for an 
analysis of the Plutarch’s sources for this passage. 
584 Eckstein 2005, 484. 
585 Pl. Leg. 943c. 
206 
 
stephanitic contests, where athletes received such vegetal wreaths, which could be 
kept by them, but were usually dedicated to a divinity.586 Just as in the sphere of 
military discipline, Herodotos was keen to paint a stark contrast between Greek and 
Persian also on the topic of military rewards: thus the Persians were shocked that 
the Greek athletes competed for olive wreaths, and not for money.587 However, by 
the end of the fourth century there seems to have been a shift towards granting 
crowns of gold, which thus carried a significant material value in addition to any 
symbolic elements: in a speech delivered in 330, Aischines laments that a century 
earlier, olive crowns were highly prized, whereas in his day, even the golden ones 
were commonplace.588 Both Herodotos and Aischines likely exaggerated the 
contrast in order to awe their audiences, but there might have been a kernel of truth 
in each of their statements. According to Blech, there is no evidence for Athenian 
awards of gold crowns in the period from c. 408-340, and only a few instances of 
vegetal variants; he explains this by the demos’ reluctance to single out individuals 
for special honours.589 
 Other evidence, however, suggests that not the assembly, but the generals 
were responsible for deciding who received the crown and panoply: Isocrates tells us 
that Alcibiades received the award directly from the generals, whereas Plato relates 
that the generals were urged to award the prize to this person or that, implying that 
they possessed at least a considerable influence on the final decision, if not sole 
authority in the matter.590 Indeed, Aischines suggests that both were possible: he 
relates that for his gallant conduct in the battle of Tamynai in 348 he received a 
crown on the spot, and another from the demos on his return to Athens.591 Whether 
or not there was a fast rule, then, it seems that both the generals and the assembly 
                                                          
586 Blech 1982, 114. 
587 Hdt. 8.26, cf. Blech 1982, 151. 
588 Aeschin. 3.187. 
589 Blech 1982, 155-56. 
590 Isoc. 16.29, Pl. Symp. 220e, Ath. 215c-16c. See Hamel 1998a, 67-70 for more detail: she suggests 
the decision lay with the generals, but it is unclear whether they also nominated the candidates, or 
merely judged those who nominated themselves (or were nominated by others). 
591 Aeschin. 2.169: καὶ τὴν ἐν Ταμύναις μάχην ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλέκτοις οὕτως ἐκινδύνευσα, ὥστε κἀκεῖ 
στεφανωθῆναι καὶ δεῦρο ἥκων πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου. 
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could reward their soldiers for outstanding achievements on campaign. And some of 
these rewards were of a more obviously monetary nature than the public honours 
we discussed earlier: the taxiarchs who defended Athens against Kassander in 304 
received golden crowns for their bravery – κατὰ τὸν νόμον – while a sailor was 
granted a crown of olive leaves and tax benefits for serving courageously on a 
trireme.592 Another case involves olive wreaths only.593 How common such awards 
were in Athens or elsewhere is extremely difficult to estimate, but as they were 
bestowed for acts of conspicuous valour only, they must have been rare. Whether or 
not the monetary value eventually outweighed the symbolic one is difficult to 
decide, as we do not know if they were usually sold, or had to be dedicated, or were 
simply kept at home. Nevertheless, the shift from plant to gold still speaks of an 
increased importance of the material aspect, and points to the complexity inherent 
in such rewards. 
 The practice of rewarding acts of bravery with special prizes was customary 
throughout Greek armies.594 One example from Tegea, dating to 218, honours two 
soldiers for their efforts in the successful defence against the Spartans with a public 
honorific inscription to be set up in the agora, in the hope of inspiring others to fight 
equally bravely.595 We even have an example of the outright promise of cash rewards 
by a general before a battle, something that was exceedingly rare in Polis armies: in 
424/3, the Spartan Brasidas offered a reward of thirty minai to the first man to scale 
the walls of the Lekythos fort near Torone.596 Pritchett mentions this as an award of 
an aristeion, but there are several features that make this case unrepresentative.597 
Firstly, the sum itself: three thousand drachmai is a substantial amount, which has 
prompted attempts at emending the text; secondly, this is the only time Thucydides 
mentions any such awards in his history; lastly, Brasidas was leading a force of 
                                                          
592 See IG II² 500, 27-31 (taxiarchs): τοὺς ταξιάρχους τοὺς ἐπ’ Εὐξενίππου ἄρχοντος καὶ 
στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς χρυσῶι στεφάνωι κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς εἰς τὸν 
δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων; and IG II² 276, 9-13 (sailor, dated to before 336). 
593 IG II² 238, fragment B, 2-5. 
594 Hamel 1998a, 64. 
595 IG V.2 16, cf. Polyb. 5.17.1 and Walbank 1957, 552. 
596 Thuc. 4.116.2. 
597 Pritchett 1974, 289. 
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Peloponnesian mercenaries and armed helots, not a citizen army.598 Promising a 
cash incentive to mercenaries is understandable, as the compliance relationship in a 
mercenary force was predominantly remunerative-calculative – it is not surprising 
that Thucydides’ only mention of monetary incentives occurs in the context of hired 
troops serving with a general from a different polis.599 The inscription from Tegea 
seems to be much more in line with usual civic rewards. 
 Xenophon preserves an example similar to that found in Thucydides: in 379/8, 
the Thebans and Athenians proclaimed some form of prize for the first to scale the 
Theban acropolis, which was being held by Spartan forces.600 The word he used for 
these prizes is κήρυγμα, which does not allow us to specify what the awards 
consisted of, but judging on the context of other uses of the word, a crown of some 
kind is more likely than a cash reward.601 Cases of ἀριστεῖα awards for ἀνδραγαθία 
are also found in Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenians in 413, and in Rhodes 
after the siege by Demetrios Poliorketes in 304.602 
 Our sources also refer to distributions of plunder after a battle without 
providing any details as to why this occurred, what the plunder was, or how much 
each individual received. According to Diodoros, the Athenian general Myronides led 
a citizen force and captured Tanagra in 457, after which he plundered the 
countryside ‘and divided the booty among his soldiers, providing them with 
abundant plunder’.603 Similarly, Diodoros tell us that Alkibiades in 411 sacked Kos 
and acquired a significant amount of booty, which he distributed among his men, 
quickly causing him to rise in their esteem.604 Comparing both these episodes to 
their portrayal in Thucydides, we find no mention at all of any distribution of 
                                                          
598 On the amount see Pritchett 1974, 289 n. 55, citing Gomme’s commentary for the suggested 
emendation. For the composition of Brasidas’ force, see Thuc. 4.80.5, with CT ad loc. 
599 Cf. Diod. Sic. 11.76.2 for an equally large amount of money handed out to six hundred soldiers by 
the Syracusans in c. 461; Green 2010, 77 n. 96 suggests these might have been mercenaries. Another 
general who promised prizes before battle was Iphikrates (Polyaenus, Strat. 3.9.31, cf. 3.9.35, 51). 
600 Xen. Hell. 5.4.11. 
601 E.g. Aeschin. 3.33-36. 
602 Diod. Sic. 13.34.4-5 (Syracuse) and 20.100.1 (Rhodes). 
603 Diod. Sic. 11.82.5: καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις διελὼν τὰ λάφυρα πάντας ὠφελείαις ἁδραῖς 
ἐκόσμησεν. 
604 Diod. Sic. 13.42.3: πολλῶν δὲ συναχθέντων λαφύρων, τοῖς τ᾽ ἐν Σάμῳ στρατιώταις καὶ τοῖς 
μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ διελόμενος τὰς ὠφελείας ταχὺ τοὺς εὖ παθόντας εὔνους ἑαυτῷ κατεσκεύασεν. 
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plunder.605 Diodoros displays a clear tendency for making explicit that soldiers 
received plunder after battles, by making generic mention of a distribution of 
spoils.606 It is of course possible that he is retrojecting something that was more 
common in his own time and the earlier Hellenistic period – warlords rewarding 
soldiers, often mercenaries, for military service with monetary incentives and 
donatives – into the fifth century, supposing that generals behaved the same 
regardless of what army they led. Alternatively, his sources might simply have been 
more willing to mention rewards than Thucydides: as we noted above, his 
mentioning Brasidas’ promise of extra reward is the only such occurrence in his 
history. Assuming that the information in Diodoros is correct, however, these 
instances represent clear cases of remunerative power being applied in Polis armies, 
and can be supplemented with a reference from Xenophon. He relates that in 406, 
Kallikratidas took Methymna on Lesbos, after which his soldiers divided up all the 
χρήματα among themselves, while Kallikratidas collected all the captives.607 These 
three cases all occurred after a city had been sacked, which naturally meant that 
booty was widely available. Moreover, Alkibiades had obvious reasons to ingratiate 
himself with the Athenians in 411, whereas Kallikratidas was still waiting for funds to 
pay his crews and allied troops, for which reason allowing his soldiers to divide 
among themselves all the moveable property might have been a way to alleviate his 
lack of money.608 
 It appears, then, that there were certainly (special?) circumstances under 
which citizen-soldiers were able to obtain private booty, either by plundering 
themselves or after a distribution of spoils ordered by the general. As so often, we 
cannot be certain as to how common this was, or if the amounts obtained thereby 
were significant enough to affect the nature of a civic army’s compliance 
                                                          
605 Thuc. 1.108.2-3, 8.108.1-2. 
606 E.g. Diod. Sic. 11.33.1-2 (cf. Hdt. 9.80-81), 13.64.4, 15.21.2. 
607 Xen. Hell. 1.6.14. It is not entirely clear how the soldiers would monetise large amounts of non-cash 
plunder; one option would be to try and sell it. A sacred regulation from Samos (IG XII.6.1 169, dated 
to 245/4) mentions masterless mercenaries trading in the precinct of the Heraion (see Koenen 1977). 
608 Compare with the soldiers of Eteonikos lodged on Chios in 406, who in the absence of payment 
and ration money lived off the land and even performed paid labour to survive – only when starvation 
and winter were threatening did they contemplate taking Chios by force (Xen. Hell. 2.1.1). 
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relationship. Overall, the impression is that they were not: we have observed that 
poleis kept a careful guard over the collection and distribution of spoils to make sure 
the community remained in control, and the instances we know of potentially 
involved unusual situations. We should not imagine a perfectly static environment 
though, as the general developments in Greek warfare over the course of the fourth 
century, most prominently the increasing use of mercenaries, had an impact on the 
behaviour of commanders and soldiers, and thus also on the types of power and 
involvement that existed in citizen armies. The innovative approach of Iphikrates, for 
example, involved a stronger element of remunerative power, as he promised prizes 
before battle and offered each individual who distinguished themselves a special 
part of any plunder. On top of that, he also honoured such soldiers with seats of 
honour at festivals and assemblies.609 He seems to have preferred a more balanced 
reward system, combining his experience as a mercenary commander with that of 
leading citizens. 
 We opened this chapter with the figure of Kleostratos, the fictional Athenian 
citizen who enlisted with a Hellenistic warlord to make his fortune serving as a 
mercenary in Asia. Ultimately, he achieved his goal, amassing a small fortune and 
managing to return alive. The aim of the current section was to show that Polis army 
warfare offered very little scope for gaining personal wealth, as campaigns were 
short and limited, armies did not usually carry large quantities of belongings and 
plunder, and because any spoils would normally become public property. This left 
the ordinary soldier with his daily wage and ration money only, plus anything of value 
he managed to secret away, and any extra rewards handed out by the general. Apart 
from monetary rewards, however, poleis recognised loyal military service, regardless 
of the outcome, with a variety of public honours and rewards that were 
predominantly of symbolic value: honorific inscriptions, public funerals, public care 
and prestige for orphans, awards for outstanding behaviour on the battlefield, 
eulogies, or seats of honour at public events. This reflects the overall structure of the 
compliance model of Polis armies: a normative-moral compliance relationship does 
                                                          
609 Polyaenus, Strat. 3.9.31. 
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not require monetary incentives to motivate the lower participants to follow their 
organisation’s directives. This is not to say that money played no important part in 
motivating citizen-soldiers: the promise of profit lured the Athenians to Sicily, and 
many soldiers risked their lives plundering on their own to increase their financial 
gain from campaigning.610 The main point is rather that in Polis armies, the 
predominant type of power exercised was normative, not remunerative: this 
explains the powerful exhortative elements we identified in most of the civic rewards 
for military service, and the ideological emphasis on sacrifice for the common good. 
That there was overlap between some of the material discussed in this chapter, as in 
the case of Eugnotos of Akraiphia, and the funerary material from Chapter 3, 
illustrates the strong connection between rewards, commemoration, and 
exhortation in civic power structures. 
 Kleostratos, then, seems to fit in well with the wider evidence for polis based 
warfare and the dynamics of plunder and rewards for service in a civic army: citizen-
soldiers did not fight to gain wealth, nor even to earn a living – the campaigning 
season was too short, and the amounts of private plunder too small. The main 
beneficiary of polis warfare was the polis itself, as the majority of spoils became 
public property and thus allowed the state to finance itself. In less abstract terms, 
the benefit of the polis was also the benefit of the individual, which is a cornerstone 
of a normative-moral compliance relationship, as it helps to align the goals of the 
organisational elites with those of the lower participants. The benefits for army 
loyalty are equally obvious: Polis armies had much less of a problem with disloyalty 
than Royal armies precisely because their soldiers’ compliance was not based on a 
calculative orientation: the rewards were a consequence, not a precondition, of loyal 
service. In the next section, we will explore in more detail the nature of the 
compliance relationship in Royal armies by looking at their reward structures and the 
ways in which they promoted – or compromised – army loyalty. 
 
 
                                                          
610 E.g. Xen. Hell. 1.2.4-5, 3.4.22. 
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5.3 The Spoils of War: Rewards in Royal Armies 
 
In Chapter 4 we demonstrated that coercion did not play a significant role in 
generating compliance either in Polis or in Royal armies. It remains to be shown that 
the predominant type of power exercised in Royal armies was remunerative, by 
analysing the structure of incentives and rewards for loyal military service. While the 
focus will be on the armies of the Successors and the Hellenistic kings of the third 
century, we will begin with the army of Alexander III, because the soldiers’ and 
commanders’ experiences under Alexander influenced their behaviour in the 
subsequent decades. 
 Alexander employed an effective mix of symbolic and monetary rewards to 
motivate his troops. We have seen in Chapter 3 how public burials in his army went 
hand in hand with the distribution of money to those who had distinguished 
themselves in combat. Arrian tells us that after Issos, the funeral of the fallen was 
accompanied by a speech in which the king mentioned by name each individual who 
had performed extraordinarily in the battle.611 For the king to mention a soldier by 
name in front of the assembled army, recounting his deeds of valour, must have 
been an exceptional honour all by itself, deriving most of its effect from the symbolic 
value of royal public recognition of one’s ἀνδρεία.612 In a similar symbolic vein, 
Plutarch records that Alexander rewarded his veterans with seats of honour at the 
theatre, and the right to wear crowns, akin to civic honours.613 He also awarded 
valuable golden crowns to those who distinguished themselves in battle and to those 
who simply were of higher rank.614 But he usually topped these rewards off with gifts 
of money, apparently varying the amount to fit each achievement.615 Another good 
example of the combination of symbolic and monetary elements are the so-called 
Elephant Medallions, which were struck in small quantities after the battle of the 
                                                          
611 Arr. Anab. 2.12.1, cf. Curt. 3.12.13, Diod. Sic. 17.40.1. 
612 See Carney 1996, 25, with n. 39 for more examples. 
613 Plut. Alex. 71.8. 
614 Arr. Anab. 7.5.4. 
615 Arr. Anab. 2.12.1: καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσει ὡς ἑκάστους ξὺν τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἐτίμησεν. 
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Hydaspes river and probably awarded to some veterans as aristeia prizes.616 The 
medallions were at the same time symbolic commemoration and mark of honour, 
but also a decadrachm’s worth of silver (plus added value for being rare). Alexander 
also handed out pure cash rewards at many occasions, e.g. after the siege of Tyre, 
the defeat of Poros, and the conclusion of the hunt for Dareios, at which he 
apparently distributed the fabulous sum of 13,000 talents to his army.617 
 Already we observe an overtly monetary element in Alexander’s reward 
structure, one that was generally absent in Polis armies, and one that over the course 
of his campaigns became firmly embedded in his army’s compliance relationship. 
This was no innovation: Philip II had also handed out gifts to his men for exceptional 
service, such as after the siege of Olynthos in 348.618 By definition, such gifts did not 
apply to the entire army, and by themselves might not be powerful enough to have 
a significant impact on the men’s motivations and expectations. But there were 
other royally sanctioned ways in which the soldiers of Alexander’s army could 
acquire personal wealth: he would often let his men plunder cities and territory at 
will to gain their good opinion and whet their appetite for further riches, a practice 
that was enthusiastically adopted by his Successors.619 He also offered cash prizes to 
his men before battle. Twelve talents were promised to the first to scale the Sogdian 
Rock – everyone would receive money as well, down to three hundred gold darics for 
the last to make it to the top.620 These sums tower above the half talent offered to 
the mercenaries of Brasidas. The episode conveys the difference in sheer scale of 
money involved in Royal warfare when compared to Polis warfare. But while 
Brasidas was offering money to mercenaries, Alexander was motivating his own 
Macedonians, men who, like citizen-soldiers of Greek poleis, already received wages 
                                                          
616 See Holt 2003 for an in-depth treatment of these medallions, and esp. 146-48: he dates their 
striking to 326/5 and calls them ‘rare commemorative medallions, or aristeia – valuable rewards for 
distinguished military service’ (147). 
617 Diod. Sic. 17.46.6, Arr. Anab. 2.24.6 (Tyre, cf. 2.18.4 for rewards for zeal in constructing the mole); 
Diod. Sic. 17.89.3, Arr. Anab. 5.20.1 (Poros); Just. Epit. 12.1.1 (pursuit of Dareios). 
618 Diod. Sic. 16.53.3: τοὺς δὲ ἀνδραγαθήσαντας τῶν στρατιωτῶν κατὰ τὴν μάχην ἀξίαις δωρεαῖς 
τιμήσας. 
619 Roisman 2012, 33; e.g. Diod. Sic. 17.70.1 (330/29), 17.94.1-4 (326/5), 17.104.6 (326/5). 
620 Arr. Anab. 4.18.7; in Curtius’ version (7.11.12), Alexander offers ten talents to the first man, and one 
talent less for the following nine, for a total of fifty-five talents. 
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for their military service – this is a significant intrusion of purely remunerative power 
into the compliance relationship between king and soldier. 
 The importance of payment in the Macedonian royal army can also be 
gleaned from the nomenclature in the rank and file: the man in the ninth rank in each 
file was called a διμοιρίτης or ‘double-pay man’, while the soldiers at the rear of each 
half-file of eight men were called δεκαστάτηροι, or ‘ten-stater men’.621 This trend 
held true for the mercenaries fielded in Hellenistic Royal armies more generally: the 
average daily pay of c. four Attic obols that was given to citizen infantry had doubled 
by the time of the Successors (pay for cavalry also doubled to sixteen obols).622 Pay 
for regular soldiers in Royal armies also appears to have been higher than that for 
citizen troops. Although precise numbers are very difficult to arrive at, Griffith 
concluded that the hypaspists in Alexander’s army received misthos of one drachma 
per day, while Aperghis argues for an average of about one drachma in the period of 
Antiochos III – this is significantly more than the one drachma of Polis army troops, 
which covered both misthos (wage) and siteresion (ration allowance).623 These 
dimensions support the notion that military pay was of higher importance for the 
compliance relationship in Royal armies than it was in Polis armies. But in the 
absence of reliable figures, and of evidence for wage levels over the centuries, we 
should not make too much of them. 
 The version of Alexander we meet in Curtius’ account outright encourages 
his troops to follow him into India by proclaiming that the campaign is a hunt for 
riches and plunder – evidence of the tradition that the Macedonian army eventually 
turned into a force of predominantly calculative orientation.624 Indeed, Plutarch, 
Curtius, and Polyainos all preserve that Alexander was forced to burn some of his 
army’s plunder on its way into India, as the baggage train and the men themselves 
                                                          
621 Sekunda 2007, 330-31. 
622 Serrati 2007, 465. 
623 Griffith 1935, 297-98. Note that this was before the influx of large amount of coinage in the wake 
of Alexander’s campaign caused a rise in general wage levels: in 303, it is probable that a citizen 
hoplite received at least two drachmas per day; composite pay fell again to six to eight Attic obols a 
day by the end of the third century (Griffith 1995, 300-305). See Aperghis 2004, 201-3 for military pay 
in the Seleukid army. 
624 Curt. 9.2.27. 
215 
 
had grown so burdened with booty as to slow down the campaign.625 The king also 
abandoned some of his own possessions – but there was of course hope of acquiring 
more wealth in the future. 
 Alexander’s Macedonians managed to ramp up the colossal amount of 
twenty thousand talents of debt by the time they returned to Susa in 324.626 In yet 
another powerful demonstration of remunerative power, the king paid off his men’s 
debts.627 So well-known was the chance of acquiring wealth on Alexander’s 
campaigns that Theophrastos had one of his stock characters, the boastful man, 
brag about the many gem-encrusted cups he brought back from his campaigns in 
the east.628 We should note that Theophrastos is not primarily accusing him of being 
a liar – only that he was boasting of things he did not in fact achieve: a real veteran, 
it is implied, would indeed have returned with plentiful booty. In a day-to-day 
context, clearly, serving with Alexander was synonymous with acquiring personal 
wealth – something that we have seen was not at all common in Polis armies. The 
literary example of Kleostratos, whose expedition is placed in the late fourth century, 
suggests that at least during the period of the diadochoi, the perception had not 
changed: successful military service in a Royal army was rewarded with personal 
wealth. 
 One obstacle remains before we can move on to the discussion of rewards in 
Hellenistic Royal armies. We have already shown that coercion appears not to have 
been a cornerstone in the compliance models of Royal armies; and just as we have 
shown that remuneration played no significant part in Polis armies, so now do we 
have to demonstrate that normative power, and its corresponding moral 
involvement, were of relatively limited importance for generating loyalty in the 
armies of the Hellenistic warlords. One obvious objection to the argument of this 
chapter is the existence of personal bonds between Hellenistic soldiers and their 
                                                          
625 Plut. Alex. 57.1-2, Curt. 6.6.14-17, Polyaenus, Strat. 4.3.10. 
626 Ten thousand according to Curtius (10.2.8-11). 
627 Arr. Anab. 7.5.1-3, Roisman 2012, 40-42; cf. Just. Epit. 12.11.1, Diod. Sic. 17 Contents, 17.109.3. A 
similar situations arose with the soldiers of Sulla, who racked up a lot of debt on their Asian 
campaigns, which was later exploited by Catilina (Phang 2008, 156). 
628 Theophr. Char. 23.3: ὡς μετ᾽ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐστρατεύσατο, καὶ ὡς αὐτῷ εἶχε, καὶ ὅσα 
λιθοκόλλητα ποτήρια ἐκόμισε. 
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kings: after all, in the immediate aftermath of Alexander’s death, it was not the 
individual with the deepest pockets who was placed on the throne, but the 
legitimate successors of the Argead line, Philip III Arrhidaios and eventually the 
young Alexander IV. It seems that the men’s loyalty was governed by moral concerns 
about legitimate authority and personal affection for the memory of Alexander, and 
not by calculative considerations of immediate and future risks and rewards. 
 The issue of how loyal the Macedonian veterans were to the Argead line has 
recently been addressed in detail by Roisman, who ultimately expressed the view 
that ‘the troops’ loyalty to the Argead house was above reproach’.629 If he is correct, 
the soldiers’ attitude would imply a strong moral involvement, based on the personal 
attachment to the Macedonian royal line. This attachment would be mainly 
symbolic because the majority of the soldiers would have little personal interaction 
with the various members of the Argead house, which in turn would suggest an 
effective use of normative power, strong enough to directly influence the decisions 
of thousands of individuals. However, Roisman does not adequately scrutinise the 
underlying reasons for this supposed universal loyalty to the Argeads. There is strong 
evidence against any predominantly moral reasons for the alleged loyalty of the 
Macedonian veterans. 
 The question of Alexander’s succession touched upon above naturally 
involved decisions about what to do with his material legacy: a large quantity of 
booty was stored in Babylon, and exerted a powerful influence over the proceedings 
in the royal chamber.630 Upon Perdikkas’ hesitation to pick up Alexander’s ring as a 
sign of accepting the succession, Meleager seized the initiative and urged the 
soldiers to take matters into their own hands: 
 
  
                                                          
629 Roisman 2012, 156. 




‘By God, if Alexander left us this man as king in his stead, then I think that 
this one alone of his instructions should not be carried out. Why then are 
you not running to loot the treasure chests? For surely it is the people who 
are heirs to these riches of the king.’ So saying he burst through the 
soldiers, and the men who had made way for him as he left proceeded to 
follow him to the plunder they had been promised. 
(Curt. 10.6.22-23, transl. Yardley, adapted) 
 
This speech, like the others Curtius wrote, has of course to be read with some 
caution.631 We do not know for certain what source he was using for this episode, but 
Kleitarchos, who apparently drew on eye-witness accounts, is a reasonable 
suggestion.632 The much shorter accounts in Diodoros and Justin (probably based on 
Hieronymos of Kardia) make no mention of it, but Justin’s version does describe the 
troops as being solely bent on riches and plunder, which might hint at this incident 
in Hieronymos or indeed a different source shared with Curtius.633 I would therefore 
follow Roisman in accepting the essentials as reported by Curtius. What matters 
most for our purposes, however, is the way Meleager went about securing the 
allegiance of the infantry: with promises of money. 
 The troops’ response is easily explained within the framework of a calculative 
orientation. The looting appears plausible if the soldiers feared that the rewards to 
which they had become accustomed during Alexander’s reign, and to which they felt 
entitled in the future, were in danger of being withheld, or diminished. The situation 
in Babylon was after all an unusual one, the premature death of Alexander leaving 
the empire and the army without clear leadership; in addition, Alexander’s role had 
transcended that of the traditional Macedonian monarch, so in cultural, 
constitutional, and traditional terms the position to be filled was a novel one. It is 
thus easy to understand how in this vacuum the soldiers responded most readily to 
remunerative power: with the question of the succession still unresolved, there was 
                                                          
631 Roisman 2012, 62: ‘For Curtius’ speeches, the prudent scholar will accept as historically valid only 
the speaker’s identity and his core argument’. For speeches in Curtius generally, see Baynham 1998, 
46-56, arguing for their overall artistic purpose. For an exploration of the various layers of meaning in 
Curtius’ text, encapsulating Roman, Greek, and Oriental experiences, see Spencer 2005. 
632 Heckel 2006, 318 n. 417; Roisman 2012, 67. 
633 Just. Epit. 13.1.8; Diod. Sic. 18.2.1-3; cf. Roisman 2012, 66-68 for a discussion of this episode’s 
credibility. Elsewhere Meleager is presented as jealous of the lavish gifts Alexander bestowed upon 
others (Curt. 8.12.15-17, Plut. Alex. 59.5). 
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as of yet no organised legitimate authority that could – at least in the eyes of most 
of the infantry – effectively apply either normative or coercive power.634 
 What we do see, however, are attempts – more or less sincere – by the 
soldiers to present their motivations and behaviour in moral terms: hence the 
invocation of the honour and legitimacy of the Argead house and Arrhidaios’ right to 
rule simply by virtue of his being a son of Philip II. Such efforts shed some light on 
the complicated situation the men found themselves in, and indicate the existence 
of moral elements in their predominantly calculative involvement. Curtius and Justin 
present the decision of the troops to support Arrhidaios as resting mainly on the fact 
that he was an Argead and, naturally, the next in line.635 But they had been just as 
ready to enjoin Perdikkas to pick up Alexander’s ring moments before; it was only 
with the proposals of Meleager that they switched their support to Arrhidaios and 
became actively engaged in the proceedings, which culminated in a brawl and even 
bloodshed.636 The importance of this veneer of legitimacy should not be 
underestimated, however: it shows that the Macedonian soldiers were not solely 
concerned with material rewards, but also with a concern about tradition, justice, 
and loyalty to the Argead house. Nevertheless, other episodes reveal that this 
attachment to the Argeads was certainly not ‘beyond reproach’ – it was situational 
and, ultimately, calculative. 
 At some point in 322/1, Alexander’s half-sister Kynane journeyed from 
Europe to Asia in defiance of Antipater, accompanied by her daughter Adeia, whom 
she planned to marry to Philip III Arrhidaios.637 She was met and opposed by 
Perdikkas’ brother Alketas who commanded an unknown force of Macedonian 
soldiers; in a confused series of events that might have involved armed conflict 
between Kynane’s retinue and Alketas’ soldiers, Kynane was killed.638 We are told by 
                                                          
634 This can also be seen in the soldier’s ignoring the herald’s order not to attend the meeting in the 
first place (Curt. 10.6.2). 
635 Curt. 10.7.2-3, 5-7, 10, 12-15; Just. Epit. 13.3.1. Arr. Succ. 1.1, as summarised by Photios,  is too 
compressed to tell whether Arrian made the troops’ attachment to Arrhidaios explicit, and only 
mentions that he was proclaimed as Philip, as does Diodoros (18.2.2). 
636 Curt. 10.7.16-21. 
637 Arr. Succ. 1.23; Heckel 2006, 101. Her mother was the Illyrian princess Audata-Eurydike. 
638 Arr. Succ. 1.22. 
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Arrian that eventually the indignation of the army forced Perdikkas’ hand and he had 
to allow the marriage between Adeia and Arrhidaios to placate the soldiers’ anger at 
Kynane’s death.639 Our accounts of this episode are sparing with details, but 
Polyainos strongly implies that even though the Macedonians under Alketas were at 
first hesitant in the face of a relative of Alexander, in the end there was a battle 
between Kynane, who was badly outnumbered, and Alketas.640 We certainly know 
that Kynane was not averse to fighting, having had military training and experience 
of commanding armies; according to Polyainos she once engaged in single combat 
with an Illyrian queen.641 It is therefore entirely possible that she was killed in a battle 
as she tried to force her way past Alketas’ army, having already successfully 
outmanoeuvred Antipater.642 This would make the loyalty that Alketas’ 
Macedonians felt towards the Argead royalty appear in a different light. The 
subsequent anger at her death is not incompatible with such a scenario: most likely 
as the news of her death spread, the mood in the majority of the army turned sour, 
but this does not mean that Alketas’ Macedonians had no hand in her killing. 
 A related later episode involved Kynane’s daughter Adeia, now married to 
Philip III Arrhidaios and called Eurydike. At the meeting of Triparadeisos in 320, she 
used her position to stir up the assembled soldiers and direct their discontent against 
the guardians of the kings, Peithon and Arrhidaios. She might have forced them to 
resign, upon which the soldiers elected Antipater sole guardian in absentia; another 
version has the frustrated guardians oppose her until the arrival of Antigonos and 
Antipater.643 Adeia continued to cause trouble even after the arrival of Antipater, 
and Arrian reveals the cause for the discontent among the army: they demanded 
their pay. Being disappointed by Antipater the soldiers turned riotous, fired up by a 
speech given by Adeia. Antipater, Antigonos, and Seleukos all tried to calm them, 
                                                          
639 Arr. Succ. 1.23. 
640 Polyaenus, Strat. 8.60. Based on this passage Carney 1987, 498 wrote that Kynane ‘won the army 
over by reminding them of her relationship to Philip and Alexander and of Alcetas’ failure to honor it’. 
In fact Polyainos makes no mention of her winning anyone over, he reports only that Alketas’ men 
hesitated briefly out of shame or awe (αἰδεσθέντες τὴν γνώμην μετεβάλοντο). 
641 Cf. Ath. 13.560 f. 
642 Roisman 2012, 91. 
643 Diod. Sic. 18.39.1-3; Arr. Succ. 1.31.. 
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but were set upon and only barely escaped with their lives; eventually the rebellion 
was put down with the aid of the cavalry.644 
 Here we see how an effective application of symbolic normative power by 
Adeia, who most likely invoked her Argead descent and her marriage to Alexander’s 
brother to win over the restless soldiers, could cause severe disruption to an 
organisation that relied predominantly on remunerative power, which in this 
instance could not be applied because there was no cash to hand. The Macedonians’ 
loyalty to Adeia and Philip III filled the gap temporarily and served to put pressure on 
Antipater, but ultimately it was short-lived and self-serving: Antipater and 
Antigonos were confirmed in their command, a large group of mutinous soldiers was 
sent to Susa to obtain more funds, and Adeia is not heard of again until she 
resurfaces in Europe.645 Parallel to the behaviour of the men at Babylon in 323, the 
Argead line proved a powerful ally for as long as the remunerative power of the 
organisational elites remained weak, but in the end it was not a moral involvement 
that carried the day, but the men’s utilitarian approach to obtaining their pay: 
whoever could provide it would receive their loyalty and compliance. 
 The case for the Macedonian veterans’ unswerving loyalty to the Argeads is 
further weakened by that fact that some of them actively fought against them: 
before Perdikkas was assassinated at the Nile, he had sent Alketas and Neoptolemos 
north to serve under the command of Eumenes; Neoptolemos, who commanded a 
sizeable number of Macedonian veterans, refused, and secretly plotted to defect 
with his army and join Krateros and Antipater.646 Eumenes detected this treachery 
and subsequently defeated him in battle, upon which the Macedonians took an oath 
to serve Eumenes and joined his side.647 
                                                          
644 Arr. Succ. 1.32-33; Diod. Sic. 18.39.3-4; cf. Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.4. For this episode and for Adeia’s 
career in general, see Carney 1987. 
645 Arr. Succ. 1.38. 
646 Diod. Sic. 18.29.4; Plut. Eum. 5.1-2; Arr. Succ. 1.26. Exactly how many Macedonians were under 
Neoptolemos’ command is uncertain, but it is likely that they numbered several thousands. Diodoros 
wrote that the force was noteworthy (18.29.4: ἔχων Μακεδονικὴν δύναμιν ἀξιόλογον), and as 
Neoptolemos was operating in embattled Armenia this seems reasonable (Roisman 2012, 120). 
647 Diod. Sic. 18.29.4-5; Plut. Eum. 5.3. 
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 The veterans here knowingly opposed the authority of the regent Perdikkas 
and the two Argead kings Alexander IV and Phillip III. It is improbable that they were 
unaware of whose side they were joining by fighting Eumenes, or that Neoptolemos 
somehow misled them. Most likely Neoptolemos convinced them to join his 
defection to Krateros and Antipater in opposition to Perdikkas and the kings. The 
fact that they defeated the opposing phalanx in combat testifies to their 
commitment to this new policy, and it was only when being surrounded by Eumenes’ 
cavalry and the capture of their baggage that they laid down their arms and joined 
the side of Eumenes. In keeping with our earlier findings, the veterans’ loyalty to the 
Argead line was not based on a moral involvement with the royal house. Rather we 
should see it as a situational response where support for the Argeads coincided with 
the men’s personal motivations, which were largely calculative and based on the 
accumulation and retention of material rewards. This is nicely illustrated by the fact 
that once the baggage was captured, the men changed sides, which was the safest 
option (protecting their belongings and dependents), and also the most lucrative 
one, as there was hope of future plunder. The Macedonians could present their 
defection as a return to the legitimate authority of the regent and the kings. This 
would satisfy both of the elements that that we have identified in their compliance 
patterns: the predominant calculative one because it secured payment and potential 
rewards, and the weaker moral one because it meant they were once more fighting 
for their Macedonian royal family and the legacy of Alexander. 
 A few years later, the veterans again revealed the double nature of their 
attachment to the Argead line. In 317, the aforementioned Adeia-Eurydike, now 
based in Macedon with her husband, made a bid for power and opposed the return 
of Olympias, who in turn was supported by Polyperchon’s troops and the army of the 
Molossian king. Waiting in vain for her ally Kassander, Adeia confronted the enemy 
army on her own, at which point her Macedonians promptly deserted and joined 
Olympias, ‘respecting the honour of Olympias and remembering the benefits they 
had received from Alexander’.648 Justin reports a similar outburst of emotions and 
                                                          
648 Diod. Sic. 19.11.2; Arr. Succ. 1.27; cf. Ath. 13.560f. 
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guilt on the part of the Macedonians, which led the commentators on his text to 
describe the veterans as ‘changing sides at decisive moments for emotive 
reasons’.649 This is certainly part of the explanation, especially once we note that 
according to Diodoros, Adeia resorted to bribes, payments, and promises of future 
rewards to convince the Macedonians to fight for her in the first place; in this case, 
then, the attachment to Olympias as a higher-ranking Argead made Adeia’s soldiers 
forgo these rewards. But the military reality has to be taken into account as well: we 
lack numbers for either army, but Polyperchon’s forces combined with the royal 
Molossian army probably considerably outnumbered Adeia’s troops, who lacked the 
support of Kassander (whose army was occupied in the Peloponnese). This might be 
another case where loyalty to the Argead house served as a moral mantle for 
essentially calculative behaviour, as once more the safer option aligned with 
following the wife of Philip II and mother of Alexander, who was also at the head of 
a powerful army; this would fit well with the behaviour of the Macedonians at other 
times. 
 Based on this brief analysis, then, it should be reasonable to call into question 
assertions of the veterans’ unswerving loyalty to the Argead house: the application 
of compliance theory reveals a different picture, where the tension between moral 
and utilitarian considerations has to be viewed in the context of a primarily 
remunerative organisational environment. More often than not, the soldiers’ 
calculative involvement carried more weight. This in turn suggests that the 
predominant compliance model was in fact a remunerative-calculative one, which 
we will explore in more detail in the rest of this section. 
 Just like citizen-soldiers, those fighting in Royal armies received direct and 
indirect payment for their service, i.e. military pay, and plunder, respectively. In 
terms of military pay, however, we can discern different attitudes: unlike Polis 
armies, where gross pay was generally a consequence of military service, in Royal 
armies it played a more central role in motivating men to comply. Whereas we know 
of no instances of largescale violent mutinies by citizen soldiers over military pay, 
                                                          
649 Just. Epit. 14.5.8-10; YWH 204. 
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such cases are clearly attested for the Royal armies of the Hellenistic period.650 We 
have already mentioned what happened at Triparadeisos in 320, where the 
Macedonian army erupted into rioting over arrears of payment, and even threatened 
the lives of their commanders, Antipater, Antigonos, and Seleukos.651 The revolt 
could only be put down with force and immediate action to procure funds for the 
army: Antigenes and some three thousand mutinous soldiers were dispatched to 
Susa to obtain the required cash.652 Evidently, remuneration acted more as a 
precondition for compliance and loyalty, and the absence of effective remunerative 
power quickly led to the complete disintegration of the army’s compliance 
relationship: the troops refused to obey, rioted, and threatened their organisational 
elites with violence unless they could re-establish effective power structures, which 
they did by promising to procure the money post-haste. It was in this moment of 
weakened organisational compliance structures, as we have noted, that Adeia-
Eurydike chose to make her bid for the loyalty of the troops, presumably by 
combining promises of money with invocations of her Argead descent and the 
memory of Alexander. Arrian recorded another incident the following year, but our 
summary is too reductive to be certain of the details; we only know that Antipater’s 
army rebelled once more because of non-payment. He resorted to false promises to 
pay them in order to convince the soldiers to continue their march to Abydos. Once 
there, he was forced to secretly cross the Hellespont by night, together with the two 
kings, leaving the army behind, stranded and unpaid. The next day, the army crossed 
as well, perhaps accepting that for now, the only hope of payment lay in patience.653 
                                                          
650 Polyaenus, Strat. 3.9.59 preserves that the troops of Iphikrates – possibly mercenaries – refused 
service and called a meeting over non-payment: a very different response to that of the Macedonian 
veterans. 
651 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.6.4 records that Antipater was nearly stoned to death, but was saved by 
Antigonos, who assuaged the phalanx troops with a speech supporting Antipater. Diod. Sic. 18.39.1-
4 mentions only the revolt, but not the explicit cause. For a detailed reconstruction of the episode, 
see Roisman 2012, 136-44; for a source-critical analysis of Diodoros and a comparison to Arrian, see 
Landucci Gattinoni 2014. 
652 Arr. Succ. 1.32-33, 38. These soldiers were almost certainly the argyraspides (Roisman 2012, 141-
42, with n. 57, Waterfield 2011, 103). 
653 Arr. Succ. 1.44-45. 
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 The absence of minted gold and silver that sparked these rebellions 
underlines the immense importance of coinage for the compliance structures of 
Royal armies. Already under Alexander, most of the bullion he captured was melted 
down and minted into coins, causing such a proliferation of his coinage that local 
currencies quickly lost importance.654 This trend continued under the Successors, 
resulting in a ‘colossal influx of large denomination silver coinage into the local 
economies of Asia Minor, as a direct result of expenditure by demobbed mercenaries 
and veterans flush with cash’.655 Beyond providing a warlord with the necessary 
upkeep for his army, however, these coins served another purpose: to proclaim the 
extent of the remunerative power of whosoever issued the coins, and to remind 
those who received them of the source of their livelihoods. Hence we find the head 
of practically everyone who aspired to be anyone among the Hellenistic warlords and 
kings on the coins they minted. This would act as a symbol of power on several levels: 
in dynastic terms, it would reinforce a sense of continuity and thus provide a soldier 
with the sense of being part of a greater socio-political system. This might have a 
normative influence on the compliance relationship, as it helped to cultivate a 
kingdom’s identity, and thus also the identity of those who fought for it. On a related 
note, it would also heighten the legitimacy of whoever minted the coins, either 
because they might want to be seen as a reliable source of payment, or because they 
claimed legitimacy from the past, as did Ptolemy, the first to place the image of 
Alexander on his coinage.656 
 Additionally, the warlord’s remunerative power was advertised via the 
circulation of the coins as they were being spent by his army – potentially attracting 
new soldiers, but at the very least proclaiming his access to money and his 
willingness to spend it on his troops. Indeed, preparing for war and paying troops 
appear to have been the primary occasions for minting large quantities of coins in 
the first place, emphasising the importance of the images on them: if soldiers were 
among the first to handle a new series of coins, it seems reasonable that they were 
                                                          
654 Serrati 2007, 464. 
655 Thonemann 2016, 531. 
656 Waterfield 2011, 49. For the image of Alexander on ancient coins, see Dahmen 2007. 
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also the main target audience for any political, dynastic, or ideological messages 
that appeared on them.657 Coinage, then, could be used to enhance both the 
remunerative and normative power of the issuing authority: it was the physical 
representation of the organisational elites’ ability to fulfil their end of the bargain by 
providing payment, while at the same time it could act as a vehicle for other, more 
subtle messages of ideological or political nature, for which the lower participants 
were a captive audience. Nevertheless, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess any 
direct normative impact coins might have had on the loyalty of Royal army troops; 
our sources simply do not record how individual series were received. Instead, they 
focus on those instances where compliance broke down because coinage could not 
fulfil its primary purpose: to exert remunerative power. 
 Cases of noncompliance over payment were not confined to the aftermath 
Alexander’s death, nor were they restricted to mercenaries; Philip II had to deal with 
the malcontent of his unpaid Macedonians, and the armies of the Hellenistic 
kingdoms were equally prone to payment-related breakdowns of their compliance 
relationships.658 Early in his reign, Antiochos III found himself unable to confront the 
revolt of Molon, as the army he had gathered in Apamea, both mercenaries and 
military settlers, refused to serve because of arrears of pay. Only the financial 
intervention of Hermeias, a powerful courtier, resolved the situation, but the young 
king was forced to accept certain conditions in order to obtain the money, including 
the dismissal of his trusted advisor Epigenes.659 Polybios adds that Hermeias’ 
standing with the majority of the troops rose sharply as a consequence. This 
illustrates the inherent weaknesses of any predominantly remunerative power 
structure: it is perpetually at the risk of failure unless a sufficient supply of money 
can be guaranteed, and in its absence is left wide open to exploitation and 
destabilisation. Another example might be connected to the betrayal of Ptolemy IV 
                                                          
657 De Callataÿ 2000, 355-62, demonstrating a spike in minting coins whenever Mithridates VI of 
Pontus prepared for war; similarly, the money coined by the Seleukids was spent nearly exclusively 
on their military, with a spike in coinage in the course of the campaigns of Antiochos III (Reger 2003, 
346, Aperghis 2004, 189, 236-42). Cf. Diod. Sic. 16.56.5-6 for a Classical example. For the religious 
symbolism of the images, see Smith 1988, 39-41. 
658 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.6. 
659 Polyb. 5.50.1-7. 
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by some of his troops after the battle of Raphia in 217. The details are obscure, but 
the so-called Raphia decree mentions a short-lived rebellion that Fischer-Bovet has 
connected to difficulties in paying the troops in the wake of the immense 
expenditure incurred in the preparation for the Raphia campaign.660 This rebellion 
came after a series of betrayals before the battle, which suggests that Ptolemy was 
facing a crisis of loyalty. In this context, the payment to his soldiers of 300,000 gold 
coins (roughly a thousand silver talents) mentioned in the decree can be viewed as 
an attempt to reinforce the waning loyalty of his army.661 
 Hellenistic warlords and kings were certainly aware of the pitfalls of relying 
on remunerative power to generate compliance in their soldiers. In Chapter 2, we 
explored the frequent use of bribery to cause defections among enemy armies. 
Ensuring a steady flow of income, and thus a steady flow of payment for one’s 
troops, was paramount. Antigonos seems to have internalised this lesson quickly: 
before his march into Cappadocia in 302, he paid his troops three months’ wages in 
advance, and carried an extra three thousand talents for emergencies.662 His 
foresight was rewarded: soon a large contingent of Lysimachos’ troops defected to 
Antigonos – precisely because they had not been adequately paid. We are told that 
Antigonos not only covered their arrears, but also honoured them with gifts, 
proclaiming to everyone the extent of his remunerative power, while at the same 
time destabilising the compliance relationships of his enemies.663 In the long term, 
of course, he was also negatively affecting the loyalty of his own men, who, once his 
money had run out, might equally join the side of another competitor. The dangers 
of not paying one’s troops are further highlighted by a treaty between Eupolemos, a 
                                                          
660 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 88-89. For a discussion of the decree and the consequences of the betrayal, 
see Winnicki 2001, who suggests that the revolt prevented Ptolemy from capitalising on his victory, 
hence the terms after Raphia were relatively favourable for Antiochos III (139-45). 
661 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 88. She further argues (89-92) that the mutiny after 217 was not primarily an 
Egyptian uprising caused by arming them (cf. Polyb. 5.107), but more likely ‘the result of a military 
mob looking for more rewards and encouraged by the military officers and the elite who saw in them 
an opportunity to bargain with the king’. Polybios seems to have conflated the immediate uprising 
after Raphia with the ‘Great Revolt’ of 206-186, possibly for dramatic purposes. For the decree itself, 
see Austin 276. The payment is mentioned in lines 29 (demotic) and 20-22 (Greek). 
662 Diod. Sic. 20.108.2-3. 
663 Diod. Sic, 20.113.3. 
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Macedonian local dynast in Karia, and the city of Theangela, following its 
capitulation after a siege: Eupolemos promised to pay the troops of Philippos, 
Demagathos and Aristodemos – almost certainly mercenary captains – the four 
months’ wages they were owed by their former employers, plus a donative for 
Aristodemos and any soldiers who joined Eupolemos’ service.664 The treaty of course 
makes no mention of any betrayal, but as Chaniotis has suggested, it is entirely 
possible that Eupolemos was paying the men’s wages and a donative to Aristodemos 
in return for them forcing the city to surrender in the first place.665 
 Eumenes of Kardia, too, knew of the importance of keeping his troops, 
Macedonians and mercenaries, well supplied with military pay: Plutarch preserves 
how he furnished his troops with ample pay by selling to them property that had yet 
to be acquired (by force) from various places within reach of his army.666 He adds 
that this created so much goodwill among his men that soon after, when leaflets 
appeared in his camp promising a reward of one hundred talents and other honours 
for the assassination of Eumenes, his Macedonians formed a personal guard around 
him.667 Apart from fitting well with the general picture of betrayal and disloyalty that 
characterises the period of the Successors, this episode also reveals that at its best, 
remunerative power was indeed able to foster personal bonds between the elites 
and the lower participants. At the same time, the ultimate fate of Eumenes is an 
equally suitable illustration of the unreliable and short-lived nature of the bonds 
created in this way. Faced with the same problem of how to provide his troops with 
wages, Demetrios Poliorketes, according to an anecdote preserved by Polyainos, 
simply hired more troops, for the plain reason that a larger army is more capable of 
acquiring plunder, and thus the means to pay its soldiers (thereby anticipating Tilly’s 
and Wallenstein’s destructive maxim of war feeding itself by almost two thousand 
years).668 
                                                          
664 See Austin 40 for the treaty. Eupolemos appears as a subordinate of Asander, satrap of Karia, in 
314 (Diod. Sic. 19.68.5). 
665 Chaniotis 2005, 84. 
666 Plut. Eum. 8.5-7. See Dreyer 1999, 52-53 for a discussion of this episode; he suggests a form of 
auction to the highest bidding captain. 
667 Cf. Just. Epit. 14.1.9-11, who is alone in adding that Eumenes wrote the leaflets himself. 
668 Cf. Livy 34.9.12: bellum se ipsum alet. 
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 The upshot of all this is that military pay in Royal armies was more than 
simply a wage plus ration money: it played a central role in motivating large parts of 
a warlord’s army to comply, and this effect was not limited to mercenaries, where 
we might expect it the most. The Macedonian contingents, too, began to view 
payment as a precondition for service. The consequences of non-payment, as we 
have seen, were desertion, betrayal, and violent mutiny. Viewed in the light of a 
remunerative-calculative compliance relationship, this behaviour is perfectly 
understandable: compliance was contingent on payment, and once a lower 
participant felt that his services were no longer adequately compensated, he could 
simply withhold them. He might feel particularly justified when payment was owed 
to him for services already rendered, practically putting the commander in debt to 
his men.669 Military pay, then, became a crucial tool in generating compliance, if not 
loyalty: especially in the context of frequent cases of defection and betrayal, 
remunerative power grew into the primary method of binding soldiers to their 
military organisations.670 Moreover, the importance of payment affected all 
echelons of an army, from the ordinary infantryman to high-ranking officers; thus, a 
reason to fight for Ptolemy II was his reputation as a good paymaster for free men, 
while officers could expect higher pay during conflicts to convince them to remain 
loyal.671 In extreme cases, military pay could even be used to placate disgruntled 
soldiers who were threatening noncompliance for moral reasons, such as after the 
death of Ptolemy IV and the murder of his wife Arsinoë III: one of the conspirators, 
                                                          
669 Cf. Dreyer 1999, 52: ‘Wenn nun aber gegenüber den Soldaten und Söldnern, die loyal zu sein 
hatten, der Feldherr/König seine Verpflichtung nicht einhielt, dann entfiel die ihrige. Sie konnten ihre 
Dienste anbieten: nahm [er] diese in Anspruch, hatte er für den ausstehenden Sold und ihre 
Vorleistung (an Loyalität) aufzukommen’. 
670 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 167: the constant danger of betrayal meant that ‘rulers were ready to offer the 
best deals they could in order to obtain loyal soldiers and immigrants’. 
671 Theoc. Id. 14.58-59: εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἄρα τοι δοκεῖ ὥστ’ ἀποδαμεῖν, / μισθοδότας Πτολεμαῖος 
ἐλευθέρῳ οἷος ἄριστος. Griffith 1935, 281-82 argued that the Ptolemies were usually particularly 
efficient in paying their soldiers. For high pay for officers, e.g. Polyb. 13.2.3, and Fischer-Bovet 2014, 
72: payment to high-ranking individuals ‘could be very high during conflicts to prevent them from 
joining the enemy’. 
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Sosibios, ordered the troops, who were personally attached to Arsinoë and outraged 
at her murder, to be given two months’ pay in advance to keep them quiet.672 
 Direct payment, then, in the form of military wages and donatives, was a key 
component in the compliance model of Royal armies. What about indirect payment? 
The above-mentioned examples of Eumenes and Demetrios, who used plunder to 
pay their troops, already showed that the lines between payment and plunder could 
at times be blurred. But to appreciate fully the role played by the spoils of war in 
Royal armies, and to understand how the fictional character of Kleostratos knew he 
would acquire personal wealth by serving with a Hellenistic warlord, we need to look 
in more detail at how plunder was used as a reward and incentive to generate 
compliance and loyalty in Royal armies. 
 The episode we discussed in the introduction to this thesis, regarding the 
Greek settlers’ rebellion of 323, already revealed some of the importance of plunder 
for the relationships between the Successors and their soldiers. It suggested both 
that the elites were aware of the positive effects of remunerative power (hence 
Perdikkas’ orders to distribute the booty among the Macedonians), and that the 
lower participants responded decisively to the incentive of material gain (hence the 
killing of the Greeks). In this light it appears understandable that our sources 
repeatedly reference occasions where commanders explicitly promised plunder to 
their soldiers to motivate them for battle. Krateros, facing the army of Eumenes in 
321/0, fired up his Macedonian phalanx by promising them free reign to plunder the 
enemy’s baggage should they be victorious.673 This being the only detail of Krateros’ 
pre-battle exhortation that Diodoros chose to record, we might wonder why he (or 
his source?) was being so selective, but there is no apparent reason for rejecting it. 
Roisman suggested that Krateros might have intended to exempt the belongings of 
Eumenes’ Macedonians from the general looting, in the hope of easing their 
integration into his own army; he adds that the promise of plunder ‘demonstrated 
                                                          
672 Polyb. 15.25.11. It is telling of Polybios’ bias against the soldiers that he does not comment much 
on their personal attachment to Arsinoë, but instead points out their greed (τὸ λυσιτελὲς ὁρμῆς 
αὐτῶν). 
673 Diod. Sic. 18.30.2-4. 
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Craterus’ concern for his soldiers’ welfare’.674 The first point seems reasonable: it 
corresponds to their behaviour at other times, and underlines once again that 
changing sides after a battle was unremarkable for Macedonians, contributing to 
their reputation of being fair-weather fighters.675 Roisman’s second point, however, 
might be a little naïve: while it seems probable that Krateros cared for the personal 
wellbeing of his men, the promise of plunder might not have been an act of altruism. 
More likely, it was a calculated exercise of remunerative power, designed to act as 
incentive and reward for loyalty and dedication in the upcoming struggle. In a similar 
fashion, before the battle of Gaza in 312, Demetrios Poliorketes promised to yield 
the plunder (τὰ λάφυρα συγχωρήσειν) to his soldiers, which included mercenaries 
and two thousand Macedonians.676 As it turned out, Demetrios’ army was beaten, 
and the retreat towards Gaza turned into a chaotic scramble as members of his 
cavalry deserted the army to recover their own property which was stored in the city, 
ultimately allowing the pursing Ptolemy to take the city by surprise.677 This episode 
emphasises once more the immense importance soldiers ascribed to their ‘baggage’, 
and that it played a central role in motivating their actions. Generals could promise 
it as valuable loot, and it could cause men to abandon their commander if it was 
threatened. In the case of Eumenes, famously, it led them to betray him to his death. 
 The practice of offering plunder as incentives and rewards for loyal military 
service continued well into the third century: according to Polybios, Antiochos III 
promised his officers and soldiers δωρεὰς μεγάλας καὶ στεφάνους before launching 
his attack on Seleukeia in Pieria around 220.678 At the battle of Raphia, too, money 
played a significant role in motivating the armies to combat: both sides, it seems, 
promised abundant material rewards to their soldiers should they win the battle.679 
Polybios remains vague on the content on their speeches, and it is unlikely that he, 
or his source, knew exactly what was said. Nevertheless, the most prominent 
                                                          
674 Roisman 2012, 128. 
675 Cf. Diod. Sic. 20.28.1-3. 
676 Diod. Sic. 19.82.4. 
677 Diod. Sic. 19.84.7-8. 
678 Polyb. 5.60.3. 
679 Polyb. 5.83.5-6: μάλιστα δὲ τὰς ἐξ αὑτῶν εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπίδας ἐπιδεικνύντες. 
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element is clearly that of material reward for loyal service, which corresponds 
perfectly with what we know of the behaviour of the Hellenistic warlords of the 
preceding century. The hazy picture in Polybios, therefore, might represent a very 
clear and real focus on remunerative power that prevailed in the armies of the 
Ptolemies and Seleukids at the time. Moreover, his claim is strongly supported by a 
passage in 3 Maccabees, which makes the use of monetary rewards at Raphia 
explicit: we are told that queen Arsinoë III enthused the Ptolemaic army by promising 
a reward of two minai to each soldier should they win the day for the king.680 Such 
behaviour might easily be the origin of Polybios’ imprecise statement, as it 
manifestly reveals how material rewards were used to motivate troops to combat 
and to remain loyal. It is perhaps no coincidence that almost a century earlier, the 
same amount was promised by Ptolemy I as he bribed the soldiers of Antigonos to 
join his side.681 
 Promising payments after battles, then, appears to have been a common 
method of generating compliance and encouraging loyalty in one’s army. As larger 
battles were comparatively rare, however, and military payment only went so far, 
warlords and kings had to look for other ways of maintaining loyalty. Invariably they 
turned to plundering enemy territory and sacking enemy settlements. The latter in 
particular became an attractive option, especially as the advances in poliorcetics 
allowed the sieging and storming even of heavily defended walled cities, something 
that was only rarely achieved in preceding centuries. In comparison to Classical Polis 
armies, Hellenistic Royal armies thus had access to a potent source of revenue to 
support their remunerative power structures. A few examples will suffice to illustrate 
the general picture. 
 In 322, after a short but bloody siege of a fortified city in Isauria in southern 
Asia Minor, Perdikkas gave the captured city over to his Macedonians for looting. 
According to Diodoros, the inhabitants chose self-immolation rather than surrender, 
but nevertheless Perdikkas’ troops found πολὺν ἄργυρόν τε καὶ χρυσὸν in their 
                                                          
680 3 Macc. 1.4; also Fischer-Bovet 2014, 89. 
681 Winnicki 1992, 440 with n. 20. For the bribes, see Diod. Sic. 20.75.1-3. 
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sack of the city.682 There is no indication that the soldiers had to turn in their plunder 
or that an official distribution of the spoils took place. 
 Eumenes, too, used plunder to reinforce the loyalty of his men, especially 
after setbacks.683 In the aftermath of Perdikkas’ murder, Eumenes was declared an 
outlaw by the Macedonian assembly in Egypt; Justin tells us that to test his men’s 
loyalty, he allowed those who wished to leave, and then went on a long plundering 
campaign in Aiolia.684 Considering his precarious situation, it is understandable that 
he would have doubts as to the loyalty of his troops, especially regarding his 
Macedonians. Providing the army with plunder was thus an effective way to reassure 
his men that he was still able to provide remuneration and success in return for their 
compliance. Similarly, after his negotiations with Kleopatra ended in failure and 
Eumenes was asked to leave Sardis, he launched a series of surprise attacks, 
collecting booty for distribution among his men.685 Once more, it seems that plunder 
was employed as a means to legitimise his command in the face of a potential crisis 
of loyalty. However, the constant use of plunder to motivate and reward Royal army 
soldiers meant that at times, their calculative involvement might lead them to refuse 
compliance if it meant losing out on a chance to acquire more wealth. After his 
defeat in Orkynia in 319, Eumenes in his retreat came upon the exposed baggage 
train of Antigonos’ army; fearing that his men would start plundering and be slowed 
down for the march, he secretly sent a message to his enemy informing him of the 
imperilled baggage, while ordering his men to prepare for an attack. When it became 
clear upon advancing that the enemy had retreated to a more secure position, 
Eumenes feigned disappointment and continued his march.686 As Roisman has 
pointed out, the decision not to capture the baggage might have been a mistake in 
                                                          
682 Diod. Sic. 18.22. On this episode see also Roisman 2012, 88-89; he suggests that Perdikkas might 
have been moved to generosity by the arrival of Peithon and his booty-laden troops. For a similar act 
of self-immolation under siege, see Hdt. 1.176. 
683 Roisman 2012, 146-47. 
684 Just. Epit. 14.1.1-6. 
685 Arr. Succ. 1.40-41, Plut. Eum. 8.4. 
686 Plut. Eum. 9.3-5, Polyaenus, Strat. 4.8.5. Cf. Aen. Tact. 16.4-8, and Polyb. 2.26.5-8 for armies 




the long run, but the incident reveals that Eumenes could not be certain of his men’s 
compliance should he order them to ignore the opportunity for plunder – hence he 
had to resort to trickery.687 This is the direct result of the predominantly calculative 
orientation of his troops: compliance was contingent on material rewards, and could 
be withheld if these rewards were not handed out. 
 As a consequence, plundering countryside and sacking cities to maintain the 
loyalty of one’s troops became a necessity for leaders of Royal armies, which is why 
we encounter this behaviour in nearly every Hellenistic warlord we know of. In 313 
Ptolemy I went on a plundering campaign on Cyprus, and in upper Syria and 
Kilikia.688 Diodoros, perhaps retrospectively, adds the motive that Ptolemy intended 
to fire up his army for the upcoming struggle with Demetrios. On another occasion 
Ptolemy appears to have distributed prisoners to his army as a reward for their 
participation, to be used as slaves. Our source, the so-called letter of Aristeas (§14), 
claims that Ptolemy was forced into this by his soldiers, who outright demanded the 
prisoners as a reward. While the exact circumstances are obscure, and the overall 
reliability of the letter is questionable, Winnicki accepts the distribution of the slaves 
as probable, and points to other occasions where the Ptolemies had handed out 
rewards at the successful conclusion of a campaign, such as the large amount of gold 
after Raphia.689 It is easy to imagine a situation where the absence of ready coin 
might have forced Ptolemy to hand out prisoners instead. Another example is 
furnished by Demetrios Poliorketes, who allowed his army, including some five 
thousand Macedonians, to plunder the citadel of Babylon after its capture in 312.690 
 Such acts of remunerative power by commanders and kings were not limited 
to the turbulent years of the diadochoi, where the absence of a clearly defined centre 
of authority might have moved the various warlords to garner favour with their 
troops by any means possible. A century later, when the larger kingdoms were more 
                                                          
687 Roisman 2012, 167. 
688 Diod. Sic. 19.79.4-7. It is likely that this army included his Macedonian contingent, as they were 
present in the subsequent campaign into Koile Syria (19.80.4). On this plundering campaign see also 
Winnicki 1991, 151-52. 
689 Winnicki 1991, 153 with n. 19. 
690 Diod. Sic. 19.100.4-7. 
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or less established, plunder still played a central role in the compliance models of 
Royal armies. The usurper Achaios faced a mutiny of his army in 220, as the soldiers 
realised that their newly-styled basileus was actually leading them against Antiochos 
III, τὸν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχοντα βασιλέα.691 Fearing a wide-spread 
revolt, Achaios led them backwards and raided Pisidia, handing out the plunder to 
his men to regain their loyalty. This episode is remarkable for several reasons: firstly, 
material gain appears yet again at the heart of a Royal army’s compliance 
relationship, as Achaios was eager to reinforce his position by exercising 
remunerative power in the hope of tipping his army’s calculative involvement back 
in his favour. Secondly, the reason why compliance broke down in the first place 
seems to have involved concerns of a moral nature on the side of the soldiers: they 
had misgivings about fighting their ‘original and natural king’, as if this somehow 
contravened a law of nature. If Polybios is correct in identifying this as the cause of 
their mutiny, it would appear that by 220, the Seleukids had managed to exert 
sufficient normative power over their armies to make them see Antiochos as the 
‘real’ king, by law and nature. 
 The positive effects of such a normative-moral element are immediately 
obvious: the men refused to fight directly against their rightful king. We might 
question why they followed Achaios in the first place, if they really had no intention 
of supporting his revolt against the king; the simplest answer would be that their still 
predominant calculative orientation led them to seek short-term gain under 
Achaios, as long as this did not conflict with their moral orientation towards 
Antiochos. This incident suggests that the structural stability brought about by the 
establishment of the various Hellenistic kingdoms helped to combat the volatile 
climate of loyalty that prevailed a century earlier by strengthening the moral and 
normative elements of the kingdoms’ compliance relationships. That Achaios was 
able to gather his rebel army in the first place, however, reveals that ultimately, 
loyalty was still not guaranteed; that he then secured the continued allegiance of his 
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men by distributing plunder reminds us that the remunerative and calculative 
components in the compliance relationship of his army were still firmly in place.  
 Antiochos too offered his men the opportunity to plunder. After the lengthy 
siege of Sardis in 214, the town was thoroughly sacked and many of its inhabitants 
put to the sword. Like Perdikkas’ sack of Isauria, the loot might have been intended 
as a reward for enduring the arduous conditions of the siege.692 At the battle of 
Thermopylai in 191, Antiochos’ army began to fall apart as its baggage train came 
under attack from the rear, causing the lines to falter and retreat to defend their 
possessions.693 This indicates that the troops’ compliance hinged on the safety of 
their belongings, which illustrates the tension that lies at the core of a remunerative-
calculative compliance relationship: the goals of the individual lower participants 
were not wholly aligned with those of the organisational elites, and when the two 
came into conflict, the soldiers followed their own agenda. 
 Philip V of Macedon was another Hellenistic king who used material rewards 
to create and maintain the loyalty of his troops. Towards the end of 219, after 
successfully campaigning and plundering in the Peloponnese, Philip gathered all his 
forces at Heraia for a distribution of the spoils of war, and Polybios records several 
occasions where large sales of booty were held under his auspices and the authority 
of official booty collectors.694 It is perhaps telling that the only official regulations 
regarding the handling and distribution of plunder in a Royal army most likely stem 
from the reign of Philip V. We have already discussed the Amphipolis regulations in 
the context of coercive power, and noted that the prescribed punishments were all 
of monetary nature – a strong indicator that the predominant type of power 
exercised in this army was remunerative, and that the predominant involvement of 
the troops was calculative. But the regulations go much further in their attention to 
remunerative power, under the heading Εὐταξίας τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὠφελιῶν: 
 
  
                                                          
692 Polyb. 7.18.9-10. 
693 App. Syr. 4.19. 
694 Polyb. 4.80.16, 4.77.5, 5.16.5 (τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν λαφύρων οἰκονομίας τεταγμένοις), 5.24.10. 
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(B1) [If] anyone brings booty to the camp, [the] generals taking with them 
the speirarchs and tetrarchs [and] the other officers, and together with 
these the [attendants] in sufficient numbers shall go to meet them at a 
distance of three stades in front of the camp, [and they shall not allow] 
those who captured the booty to keep it. And should any insubordination 
[of this kind] take place, the [generals], speirarchs, tetrarchs and chief 
attendants shall pay a sum equivalent [to what each of them owes?] 
(ISE II 114 = SEG 40.524, transl. Austin 90) 
 
Despite the fragmentary state of the inscription, it is clear that booty – and the 
remunerative power it embodied – was of the utmost importance to the proper 
functioning of the army: the regulation covers both private plundering and large-
scale raiding operations, and makes it abundantly clear that all booty had to be 
surrendered and accounted for.695 Ultimately, this booty would become the 
property of the king, who would then hold a sale and distribute the proceeds to his 
army.696 It is this fact that explains the strict approach to plunder: in an organisation 
that relies predominantly on remuneration to generate compliance in its members, 
money is the single most important manifestation of organisational control. Without 
it, the compliance relationship collapses. Hence the Amphipolis code includes 
punitive measures should the officials fail to deliver everything that the soldiers 
brought in. There is a clear economic reason for such sanctions, as pointed out by 
Juhel: ‘For the king, war, through plundering expeditions, was obviously an essential 
economic activity’.697 Simply put, if his subordinates embezzled funds, the king 
lacked the means to maintain his rule.698 But there is another dimension to these 
sanctions: plunder was at the heart of a Royal army’s compliance relationship 
because it represented the most direct form of remunerative power. A king had to 
maintain his position as the exclusive source of this power, otherwise the loyalties of 
those under his command would be diverted to whoever could provide an equal or 
greater source of remuneration. Worse still, if the soldiers were left entirely to their 
own devices in securing their share of the plunder, without depending on a greater 
                                                          
695 Juhel 2002, 405. 
696 Juhel 2002, 405-8. 
697 Juhel 2002, 411. 
698 Chaniotis 2005, 65. 
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authority for its distribution, the bonds between them and their king would be 
severely weakened. Taking control of all booty was therefore an attempt to 
monopolise the ability to exercise remunerative power, because this monopoly was 
the foundation of a king’s ability to create and maintain the loyalties of his armies.699 
 After all, Philip V himself knew how important it was to ensure that his 
soldiers received their fair share of plunder. In 218, Leontios and his supporters, as 
part of their attempts to destabilise the rule of the king, stirred up resentment 
among the peltasts and the Royal agema by claiming that they were not getting their 
rightful share of plunder. This seems to have worked, for we are told that the troops 
began rioting and threatened to loot the tents of the king’s close friends, and even 
the Royal apartments. Philip had to intervene personally to put an end to the 
disturbances.700 Whether or not the king’s opponents were right in their claims, the 
events that followed reveal once again the crucial role that remunerative power 
played in the compliance model between the men and their king: the mere 
intimation that some of them were not being adequately rewarded led to an 
immediate breakdown of the compliance structure. Loyalty, it appears, had to be 
bought. 
 It would be naïve to think that commanders at the time were unaware of the 
inherent problems of a compliance relationship that was based predominantly on 
remuneration; the frequent cases of disloyalty and noncompliance would have made 
this more than apparent. Measures were taken, therefore, to ensure that symbolic 
rewards were allocated as well, as a recognition of acts of valour of otherwise 
conspicuous behaviour on the battlefield. Like the aristeia awards in Polis armies, 
these could be entirely symbolic, such as an honorific title, or they could be a 
                                                          
699 This system was certainly not perfect: Polybios’ description of the fair and orderly looting routine 
of the Roman army (Polyb. 10.16) carries with it not only admiration of Roman efficiency, but also a 
hint of censure of Greek practice. Compare Erskine’s assessment of Polybios’ book 6: ‘Polybius is 
concerned to explain Roman success, but more than this he is explaining to Greeks and to himself 
why the Greeks failed’ (Erskine 2013b, 231); he suggests that Polybios is contrasting Roman efficiency 
with the ‘basic laziness’ of the Greeks (241). 
700 Polyb. 5.25. It is possible that this episode is connected to the establishment of the Amphipolis 
code, perhaps to ensure a more regulated and transparent approach to the distribution of plunder in 
order to prevent such riots in the future (see Juhel 2002, 401-2 for more detail; also Loreto 1990, who 
suggest a date between 241-200). 
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combination of both symbolic and material rewards, such as a crown of precious 
metal. Once more, the Amphipolis code sheds some light on the matter: a 
fragmentary sentence seems to stipulate that those soldiers who had received a 
crown shall also receive twice the share of the plunder.701 It is likely that the crown 
here refers to an award for bravery or something similar, and in the light of the 
preceding discussion it makes perfect sense that the Antigonid army would combine 
such a symbolic reward – unless the wreath itself was of precious metal – with a more 
obviously material element, i.e. an extra share of the booty. Loyal service, in other 
words, led to even higher monetary rewards. Antiochos III, too, handed out crowns 
for conspicuous martial prowess.702 
 In other cases, the symbolic component was clearly dominant. An inscription 
honouring a late second-century garrison commander (phrourarch) in the service of 
Ptolemy IX Lathyros mentions the honorific acclamation (ἐπισημασία) he received 
from the king.703 The details of this award are unknown, but it shows that the 
Ptolemies found ways of rewarding their soldiers for exceptional behaviour that 
went beyond simply paying them more. In this context we might mention the 
honorific titles bestowed on deserving members of the Ptolemaic army. For the 
cavalrymen of the Ptolemaic military settlers two such titles have been attested for 
the second century: οἱ συγγενεῖς/ἀδελφοὶ τῶν κατοίκων ἱππέων; the honorific 
positions of ‘brothers’ or ‘relatives’ (of the king) express a privileged status and might 
have been awarded for exemplary actions during military service.704 Unfortunately, 
the origins of these titles are obscure, as are the preconditions for their award, or 
even when exactly they were introduced; the fact that they do not appear to have 
been hereditary makes them more exclusive.705 One Glaukias was among those 
                                                          
701 SEG 40.525, frg. A, col 3.1-3: χετο στέφανος διπλῆν λαμβάνειν τὴν μερίδ[α τῆς ὠ]|φελίας. As 
Chaniotis 2005, 94 has pointed out: ‘Such distinctions presuppose a close observation of the behavior 
of soldiers by their officers’. 
702 E.g. Polyb. 5.60.3. 
703 SEG 28.1479, line 9 (115 BC); see Scheuble 2009, 43-45 for a brief discussion, who notes that the 
inscription is unusual in primarily honouring the phrourarch himself, and not the king. 
704 Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 76: ‘‘[E]s scheint sich um Ehrentitel zu handeln, die der König für besondere 
Verdienste an einzelne Katökenreiter verlieh und die ein besonderes Nahverhältnis zum König zum 
Ausdruck bringen sollten’. 
705 For further discussion see Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 76-79. 
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bearing this title, but we do not know how he gained this distinction.706 It is possible 
that beyond the symbolic value of the title, a crown or headband was awarded as 
well: a second-century epitaph we discussed in Chapter 3 mentions Apollonios, 
whose father Ptolemy received a μίτρα, his prerogative as a συγγενής of the king.707 
This is uncertain, however, as we simply do not know enough about the exact 
procedure that governed these titles. 
 The evidence pertaining to the Egyptian katoikoi hippeis brings us to the end 
of this section on the rewards for serving in a Royal army. We have seen that 
Hellenistic warlords used remunerative power at every corner to establish and 
maintain an effective compliance relationship with their soldiers. In contrast to Polis 
armies, payment, plunder, and special rewards were all designed to motivate Royal 
army soldiers to combat, and in the case of the Antigonids, monetary fines were 
even prescribed as punishments for noncompliance – a clear indicator that the 
orientation of the lower participants was predominantly calculative, for only then 
would such sanctions be truly effective. The case of the Egyptian katoikoi hippeis, 
however, reminds us that the Hellenistic world was far from static: change was a 
constant factor, and the evidence from second-century Egypt reveals that the 
Ptolemaic compliance relationship might have undergone change, too. The men in 
question were members of the cavalry arm of the Ptolemaic military settlers. As such 
they were somewhat different from the more or less vagabond Macedonian 
contingents who fought for the early Hellenistic rulers, and from the hosts of 
mercenaries adrift in the sea of conflict that surrounded the Hellenistic political 
landscape. In terms of their compliance relationship, military settlers might have had 
more in common with members of a Polis army. In her study of the epigraphic 
evidence left behind by the Ptolemaic military settlers who served in the cavalry, 
Scheuble-Reiter concludes that their overriding purpose was to profess one’s loyalty 
to the Royal house.708 That these expressions of loyalty occur in the context of 
                                                          
706 Cf. Legras 2011, 204: ‘Glaukias appartient à un groupe qui a obtenu cette distinction soit à titre 
collectif lors d’un fait d’armes exceptionnell’. 
707 GVI 1151, 3-5, see Barbantani 2014, 303-6 for a more detailed discussion. 
708 Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 291: ‘Als Angehöriger des ptolemäischen Heeres sah man es offenbar als 
seine oberste Pflicht an, seiner Königstreue öffentlich Ausdruck zu verleihen’. See 288-89 for an 
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military settlements might be significant: it is possible that one of the desired effects 
of settling soldiers was to cause a shift in the compliance relationship from 
remunerative-calculative in the direction of normative-moral. Before we conclude 
this chapter, therefore, we will look at the settling of soldiers in the various 
Hellenistic kingdoms in more detail. 
 
 
5.4 The Missing Link: Settling Soldiers 
 
Earlier in this chapter we mentioned the revolt of Achaios against the rule of 
Antiochos III, and how his troops refused to comply and forced him to turn back once 
it became evident that he was intending to fight the king, whom the soldiers saw as 
their ‘natural and original’ king.709 This display of loyalty is somewhat surprising, 
especially as so far, the men had been seemingly content to follow Achaios on 
plundering raids and help him establish a dominion of his own: they witnessed his 
assumption of the diadem, which even the least politically astute must have 
recognised as a challenge to the authority of Antiochos III. Why, then, this sudden 
refusal to fight their ‘rightful’ king? Polybios, our only source for this event, does not 
provide any details, but the answer might lie in the fact that Achaios’ troops included 
a large proportion of soldiers from the katoikiai of Asia Minor: Seleukid military 
settlers.710 Similarly, the earlier revolt of Molon in 221/1 was eventually foiled by the 
mass desertion of Molon’s troops once they came face to face with Antiochos III.711 
This is supported by earlier reports that loyalty to Molon was dwindling and that 
many were ready to abandon him.712 Once again, we might ask ourselves how this 
display of loyalty to Antiochos is to be reconciled with the original betrayal of 
                                                          
example of a monumental dedication by a group of katoikoi hippeis, probably darting to mid-third-
century Hermopolis. 
709 Polyb. 5.57.6-8, Chaniotis 2005, 64. 
710 According to Bar-Kochva 1976, 41, the total of manpower of the military setters in Asia Minor was 
around 6,000, and he argues that Achaios included most of them in his army. 
711 Polyb. 5.54.1-2. 
712 Polyb. 5.46.8. On the revolt see above, Chapter 2. 
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following a usurper. And, once again, we might note that the majority of Molon’s 
troops were drawn from the eastern military settlements.713 It appears, then, that 
there was a connection between loyalty to the Seleukid house and being a military 
settler. 
 Indeed, this connection has been noted before: in his study of the Seleukids’ 
use of mercenary soldiers, Griffith noted that the ‘Macedonians’ in the Seleukid army 
generally remained loyal to the rightful heir to the royal house, and specifically that 
the men who followed Achaios but would not fight Antiochos ‘must be the Graeco-
Macedonian κάτοικοι’.714 Bar-Kochva suggests that at the Battle of Magnesia in 189, 
the Thracians were chosen to guard the important baggage because of their firm 
loyalty as military settlers.715 Fingerson sums up the Seleucid settlement program as 
follows: ‘In short, the κάτοικοι provided a loyal source of troops that served in the 
campaigns against prospective rivals and garrisoned strategic locations of the 
Seleucid Empire’.716 Equally, Mittag, referring to the soldiers under Molon, explains 
the ‘high degree of loyalty of these troops to Antiochus III’ by pointing to their origins 
as being military settlers.717 Yet none of these authors actually demonstrate how 
being a military settler might make a soldier more loyal to the Royal house that 
nominally controlled the territory on which he was settled, or why it should make 
him more open to believing in a ‘natural’ king as opposed to a usurper. Rather than 
taking the causal link between katoikiai and loyalty for granted, we should seek to 
understand it, and also test it against evidence to the contrary. 
 It does not appear that the primary reason for this is of an ethnic dimension: 
while we might expect that the Macedonian elements of the Seleukid kingdom 
found it easier to accept and show loyalty to a Macedonian ruler, the vast majority 
of military settlers of Asia Minor were not Macedonians, but Greeks, Jews, and 
Persians – these were the troops who refused to fight for Achaios.718 For the military 
                                                          
713 Mittag 2008, 49. 
714 Griffith 1935, 168 n. 2 (italics in the original). 
715 Bar-Kochva 1976, 51.  
716 Fingerson 2007, 110. 
717 Mittag 2008, 49. 
718 Cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 45. See also Fingerson 2007, 115-20 for the inclusion of Persian troops in the 
Seleukid military settlement structure. 
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settlers in the east, it appears that the predominant element was indeed of Graeco-
Macedonian origin, which was certainly part of the reason for their loyalty to the 
Seleukids (and for ultimately abandoning Molon).719 Military settlers of Thracian 
origin, however, do not have any obvious ethnic reason for supporting the Seleukids. 
The ethnicity argument, then, only goes so far, and only applies to some of the 
katoikoi. What all these soldiers have in common, however, is their status as military 
settlers. Thus a more rewarding approach, I believe, lies in analysing these soldiers’ 
compliance relationships, and in particular how being a military settler might impact 
a soldier’s type of involvement. 
 Before doing so, however, the larger question of the military nature of the 
Seleukid foundations has to be briefly addressed. In simple terms, the Seleukids 
offered land, kleroi, to settlers in return for military service, and tended to settle 
groups of such military settlers together, possibly preferring ethnic homogeneity to 
avoid friction within the communities.720 These kleroi were usually passed on to the 
sons of the settlers, who also had to perform military service.721 Land was used as a 
reward and an incentive for loyal military service, and generally fits the remunerative 
power model we have observed in Royal armies. Bar-Kochva identified four types of 
military settlement: the katoikiai of Lydia and Phrygia; the komai, Iranian villages in 
western Media; phrouria or garrison fortresses; and lastly the poleis of northern Syria, 
Mesopotamia, and eastern Media.722 To what extent each of these were purely 
military in nature, and how exactly any military duties of such settlers were defined, 
has caused a long debate that cannot be dealt with here.723 Moreover, the exact 
                                                          
719 Bar-Kochva 1976, 44-45: ‘The Greco-Macedonian element was dominant among the settlers in 
northern Syria and Mesopotamia, which provided more than half of the phalanx force […]. The 
settlers of the Greek cities in eastern Media, who probably served in the Seleucid phalanx, were of 
Macedonian descent as well. […] the majority of the settlers in the cities remained virtually Greco-
Macedonians’. 
720 Fingerson 2007, 111; Cohen 1972, 88-89 (his article describes the founding of a military settlement 
in the first century, which might provide glimpses into earlier practice). For the many city foundations 
of Seleukos I Nikator, see App. Syr. 57. 
721 Bar-Kochva 1976, 41, 46-47. He suggests that at least one son had to serve, as long as the land and 
family was looked after in his absence. Upon the father’s death the son would return to his kleros and 
join the reserve force.  
722 Bar-Kochva 1976, 37. 
723 Bar-Kochva 1976, 7-53 argues for a strong military nature for these settlements and suggests the 
Seleukids took up the practice after Ipsos in 301 (72), against which generally see Cohen 1978 (esp. 
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proportion of military settlers to ‘regular’ soldiers, the economic dimension of 
colonisation, their role in spreading Hellenism, or the legal processes of transferring 
kleroi all have little direct bearing on our current purpose: it is sufficient to 
acknowledge that military settlers existed, that the Seleukids at times employed 
them in their armies, and that somehow these men gained a reputation, in modern 
scholarship at least, for being particularly loyal to the Seleukid royal house. 
 As we have seen, Royal armies generally relied on remunerative power to 
keep their soldiers loyal, and at first glance granting land as an incentive or a reward 
for military service seems to fit well with this model. The prospect of being rewarded 
with a parcel of fertile land to farm and to pass on to one’s heirs probably motivated 
many individuals to enlist with a Hellenistic warlord, especially if there was a 
shortage of good quality land at one’s home polis.724 In these terms, it is a relatively 
straightforward remunerative-calculative agreement which ensures that the army of 
a warlord or king has access to a pool of settled soldiers. But there is a further 
dimension to this exchange: the act of settling down in a distinct location, with a 
view of living there permanently with one’s family (or intending to start one there), 
could have a profound impact on a Royal army’s compliance relationship. It provided 
the settler with something that he lacked in comparison to his Polis army 
counterpart: a relatively stable socio-political system. In Chapter 3 we explored how 
a strong socio-political system could translate into public displays of patriotism, and 
professions of loyalty to one’s polis, family, and communal history and ideology. This 
in turn went hand in hand with the predominantly normative-moral compliance 
model we observed in Polis armies, and the concurrently high levels of loyalty in civic 
armies. Settling soldiers, then, could have been an attempt to provide one’s troops 
                                                          
51-52) and 1991, who argues that there is not enough evidence for the military obligations of the 
katoikoi, also pointing to the later date of many of the colonies’ first attestations. However, he seems 
to be mainly concerned with the issue of any legal obligation to serve in the army tied to the kleroi 
themselves; what matters more for our purposes is that he accepts that military settlers regularly 
fought in the Seleukid army: ‘Undoubtedly, a military colonist was required to serve, if called’ (1978, 
51). Aperghis 2004, 96 points out that katoikiai are only attested in Asia Minor, and thus doubts their 
empire-wide importance in military terms (although he does not take into account other types of 
potential military settlements). Fischer-Bovet 2014, 82 with notes 15 and 16 provides a brief overview 
of the debate and points to further literature. 
724 Chaniotis 2005, 81-82. 
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with a supporting framework similar to that of polis communities: a permanent 
home, a sense of belonging, and a communal identity. In other words, something 
worth fighting for, resulting in a combat motivation that transcended calculative 
considerations in favour of moral ones. 
 John Ma has argued that the Hellenistic kingdoms were not simply unrooted 
political entities sustained mainly by the person of each individual monarch, but 
rather that each of them possessed a distinct socio-political identity that the 
inhabitants could subscribe to. As examples he names the close affiliation of 
Pergamon with the Attalids, of the Macedonian poleis with the Antigonids, or of the 
cities in northern Syria with the Seleukids.725 It is no coincidence that settlements 
play a large role in his assessment: the concepts of nationality and communal 
identity are closely tied to the idea of home.726 We have already seen how central a 
role the πάτρα played in the sepulchral customs of Greek poleis, and how the civic 
continuum, i.e. the notion of a shared past, present, and future, was related to a 
distinct physical space. All these elements helped to shape civic cohesion, and 
ultimately, contributed to the high levels of loyalty in Polis armies.727 
 Consequently, founding (military) settlements can be viewed as attempts by 
the Seleukids (and other Hellenistic rulers) to create a stronger socio-political system 
of their own, including a shared history and form of communal identity. This in turn 
could lead to a stronger bond between their soldiers and the kingdom they were 
fighting for; it could also strengthen feelings of loyalty to the individuals who 
represented that kingdom – the royal family and high-ranking officials.728 
 A strong indication of the Seleukids’ awareness of this dynamic is the fact 
that they did not establish any military settlements in Palestine, but rather chose 
                                                          
725 Ma 2013, 74-75. 
726 Pye 1971a, 113: ‘Yet in all versions of patriotism there are expressions of deep felt ties to one’s 
homeland. Associations with childhood haunts and memories of natural surroundings are apparently 
universally important in contributing to the most elementary feeling of national identity’. 
727 The connections between politics, loyalty, and physical space appear to be relatively resilient, cf. 
Pye 1971a, 114: ‘Loyalty to a location is fundamental to modern politics, and while certain forms of 
social and economic modernization may seem to lead to ever more universalistic commitment this is 
not the pattern for political development’. 
728 Fingerson 2007, 110. 
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only to install garrisons in strategic locations. The area was close to the Ptolemaic 
sphere of influence and consequently changed hands several times during the wars 
that were waged to control it. As Bar-Kochva has suggested, any military 
settlements would also change sides, and with them the vital sources of military 
manpower they represented.729 Garrisons, on the other hand, could be retreated 
back to Seleukid territory, as they had no intrinsic connection to the land they were 
defending. The underlying assumption is that once soldiers were settled, they would 
refuse to leave their lives, lands, and families behind in order to continue serving 
their nominal king. This strong connection to one’s home and the unwillingness to 
abandon it was one of the main sources for the moral commitment in Polis army 
soldiers. Royal armies able to harness it effectively would benefit from a stronger 
moral element in their own troops’ involvement, which is generally superior to the 
prevailing calculative orientation: it was less open to corruption and required fewer 
incentives to generate compliance. However, there was a flip side to this model. Just 
as with primary groups who turned into defensive groups and placed their own 
benefit over that of their organisation, a military settlement with too strong a sense 
of identity and cohesion might end up looking to its own advantage rather than that 
of the kingdom it was part of. 
 A good example is the case of the military settlers of Magnesia by Sipylos, a 
polis nominally under Seleukid rule. During the Laodikeian (or Third Syrian) War in 
the middle of the third century, the katoikoi of Magnesia revolted and supported 
Ptolemy III. Hostilities ensued with neighbouring Smyrna, which had remained loyal 
to Seleukos II, and eventually the affair ended with Smyrna effectively annexing 
Magnesia through a sympoliteia treaty, which survives in the epigraphic record.730 
From the inscription it is clear that some of the katoikoi had received their land from 
Antiochos I several decades before, yet still they decided to betray their king and join 
Ptolemy III.731 Military settlers appear not to have shown unshakeable loyalty, then: 
                                                          
729 Bar-Kochva 1976, 36. 
730 For the inscription, see OGIS 229 (= Bagnall & Derow 29). For further discussion see Ma 1999, 49-
50, Chaniotis 2002, 104 and Fingerson 2007, who also discusses the inclusion of Persian troops in the 
treaty. 
731 OGIS 229 III, 100-1. 
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given the chance, it seems, they exhibited the same independent spirit that was 
characteristic of polis communities. The polis of Smyrna, incidentally, was no 
different: according to Ma’s analysis of the treaty with Magnesia, the Smyrnaians 
had acted independently and entirely out of self-interest, ‘to carry out the take-over 
of a royal military colony, to extend the city's territory into Lydia’, all the while veiling 
this power grab in language that evoked their constant loyalty to Seleukos II.732 In 
fact, Smyrna later resisted Antiochos III in the hope of preserving its 
independence.733 In the face of such self-interest and disloyalty, it is no wonder that 
the Seleukids were wary of conferring polis status to their military foundations, as 
the socio-political system that would then grow around them might also encourage 
the civic community to use this cohesion in order to further its own goals rather than 
those of the royal house.734 The Seleukids, once more, seem to have been aware of 
this potentially problematic issue, and generally refrained from granting full civic 
rights if possible: the katoikiai of Lydia and Phrygia were relatively small and not 
given polis status.735 
 The level of trust the Seleukids placed in their military settlers can be gleaned 
from the composition of the phalanx, arguably the core of their army and the most 
important tactical element on the battlefield: according to Bar-Kochva, the phalanx 
was recruited exclusively from the settlers, as were other important units.736 Yet the 
record of the settlers’ loyalty is somewhat mixed: we have seen how the katoikoi 
from Magnesia revolted from Seleukos II, and how the soldiers of the usurpers Molon 
and Achaios included many military settlers, even though they eventually refused to 
                                                          
732 Ma 1999, 50 and 235. He also points out that we should not misunderstand such an exploitation of 
the ‘language of loyalty’ for abject submission on the part of Hellenistic poleis, as the ideology of civic 
autonomy still held sway (50). 
733 Livy 33.38, cf. Ma 1999, 50. 
734 Bar-Kochva 1976, 43: ‘The reluctance of the Seleucid kings to grant polis status to the military 
settlements may account for their relatively small size: the larger they were the more courage they 
would have had to press for and develop municipal institutions, with all the attendant implications 
regarding their loyalty’. 
735 Bar-Kochva 1976, 38-39. He also argues that in contrast to the katoikiai, the military settlements 
east of the Tauros were organised as poleis, to spread Hellenism and stabilise Seleukid rule. 
Nevertheless, the administrative distinction between poleis at katoikiai was not always clear-cut 
(Musti 1984, 199-200). 
736 Bar-Kochva 1976, 40. 
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fight against their ‘rightful’ king. This points to a successful attempt of instilling 
loyalty to the royal house, but at the same time it reveals that calculative 
considerations were still powerful enough to outweigh any moral commitment to 
the ruling monarch. Another interesting case is that of the Kyrrhestai. The region of 
Kyrrhestike was in northern Syria and named after Kyrrhos, almost certainly an early 
Seleukid foundation.737 The territory also contained military settlements, and some 
6,000 katoikoi were stationed there, many of them of Macedonian descent.738 
Polybios tells us that before Antiochos III could face the revolt of Molon, he had to 
deal with a widespread mutiny among his assembled troops over arrears of pay 
(another reminder of the dangers of a remunerative power structure). The influential 
courtier Hermeias offered to provide the money from his own funds, on the 
condition that his rival Epigenes be dismissed; Antiochos accepted, which 
apparently caused the troops to favour Hermeias as their new paymaster, but also 
triggered a mass defection of the military settlers from Kyrrhestike, who apparently 
had supported Epigenes.739 Their sedition lasted long enough for the usurper 
Achaios to place his hopes in them joining his side after his invasion of Syria – 
ironically, his plans of using these settlers’ disloyalty were foiled by the eleventh-
hour loyalty of the katoikoi in his own army. Eventually, the rebel Kyrrhestai were 
defeated and surrendered.740 
 The details of this episode are slightly obscure, as Polybios characteristically 
does not provide much information on the motivations of the common soldiers. The 
reaction of the 6,000 Kyrrhestai to the elevation of Hermeias seems a little extreme, 
even more so in the light of the aforementioned assertions about the steadfast 
loyalty of the Seleukid military settlers to the person of the king, whom they were 
also abandoning. Mittag has pointed out that Antiochos could not have had many 
military settlers in his army: Molon was controlling those from the east, and Achaios 
                                                          
737 Although Bar-Kochva 1976, 112 suggests it might have been founded by Antigonos 
Monophtalmos. 
738 HCP I, 581. 
739 Mittag 2008, 49 n. 17 and 18. 
740 For the whole episode, see Polyb. 5.50 and 57.4. For their status of military settlers, see Mittag 
2008, 49 and Bar-Kochva 1976, 30-31. 
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those of Asia Minor; with the defection of the Kyrrhestai, only a few could have been 
left.741 It might be a possibility that the Kyrrhestai refused compliance in the face of 
what they might have perceived as a veiled coup by Hermeias, who had now gained 
the goodwill of Antiochos’ mercenaries by providing their pay, and had removed his 
prime political opponent (he had Epigenes falsely accused and executed soon after). 
Polybios also adds that most of the king’s councillors now feared Hermeias.742 In this 
light, the defection of the katoikoi might have been an act of support for Antiochos, 
and a move to distance themselves from the mercenaries. Apart from this largely 
conjectural explanation, all we can say is that the katoikoi from Kyrrhestike, like 
those from the other parts of the Seleukid dominion, appear to have had a 
somewhat ambivalent attitude when it came to loyalty to the Seleukid royal house. 
More often than not, however, it seems that the practice of rewarding soldiers with 
land in return for faithful service paid off; and the Seleukids were of course not the 
only ones who desired to strengthen the loyalty of their soldiers. The Ptolemies, too, 
settled many of their troops in the hopes of securing their lasting allegiance. 
 While the first secure documentary evidence of military settlers in Ptolemaic 
Egypt, in the form of a loan contract papyrus, dates to the reign of Ptolemy II 
(specifically 274/3), the practice of granting land to soldiers was not a Ptolemaic 
innovation, but might go as far back as the third millennium.743 Much later, it might 
already have been the first Lagid who saw the long-term benefits of settling soldiers, 
or kleruchs, in his territory. After the battle of Gaza in 312, where Ptolemy captured 
some 8,000 of Demetrios Poliorketes’ men, we are told that he ‘sent the captured 
soldiers to Egypt with the orders to distribute them among the nomes’.744 They could 
have been used as state slaves, but as Scheuble-Reiter has pointed out, the prisoners 
were relatively experienced infantrymen who formed the Antigonid phalanx at the 
battle, and were thus a valuable military asset; moreover, many of them would have 
been mercenaries (around 8,000 of Demetrius’ 11,000-strong phalanx were 
                                                          
741 Mittag 2008, 49. 
742 Polyb. 5.50.9-14. 
743 Scheuble-Reiter 2014, 496, and 2012, 18-24; Fischer-Bovet 2014, 199-200. 
744 Diod. Sic. 19.85.4: ὁ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος τοὺς μὲν ἁλόντας στρατιώτας ἀποστείλας εἰς Αἴγυπτον 
προσέταξεν ἐπὶ τὰς νομαρχίας διελεῖν. 
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mercenaries), and thus probably not too unwilling to find a new paymaster, 
especially if a plot of land was involved in the bargain.745 In Chapter 2 we have seen 
that it was perfectly normal for defeated soldiers, be they Macedonians or 
mercenaries, to change sides after a battle. This is precisely what Demetrios 
expected to happen in 306 when he wrested Cyprus from Ptolemaic control: in the 
early stages of the campaign, he took captive some 3,000 men. As usual he 
incorporated them into his own army, but then something unexpected occurred: 
many of them escaped to re-join the Ptolemaic forces on the island, ‘because their 
possessions (τὰς ἀποσκευὰς) had been left in Egypt with Ptolemy’.746 Demetrios 
was unable to stop them from running and had to forcibly ship the remainder off to 
his father in Syria. That ‘baggage’ is not an entirely adequate translation of 
ἀποσκευή has been pointed out already: it also included a soldier’s household, i.e. 
family, slaves, and all material wealth. Scheuble-Reiter has argued that these 
soldiers probably were those whom Ptolemy dispatched to Cyprus in 314, which 
makes it very likely that their ‘baggage’ that was left behind in Egypt was their 
families and homes.747 This suggests the possibility that Ptolemy I granted kleroi for 
soldiers to settle on relatively early in his rule of Egypt, even if it was not yet as 
systematic as under his successors Ptolemy II and Ptolemy III.748 
 Whether or not we can identify these soldiers as some of the first kleruchs of 
Ptolemaic Egypt, the incident nevertheless reveals the powerful effect of a 
connection to land and family: the captive soldiers escaped, almost certainly at the 
risk of their own lives, to rejoin their former army and ultimately, to return to their 
households. For Ptolemy, who himself had bribed many of his enemies’ troops and 
was no stranger to being betrayed by those under his command, the voluntary return 
                                                          
745 Scheuble-Reiter 2014, 495, with n. 94. 
746 Diod. Sic. 20.47.4: διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀποσκευὰς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καταλελοιπέναι παρὰ Πτολεμαίῳ. 
747 Scheuble-Reiter 2014, 494-95. We know that later there were military settlers on Cyprus itself, 
possibly to safeguard the important timber and metal production that provided revenue for the 
Ptolemies (for more details on the military administration of Cyprus, see Mehl 1996, 223-34, and 247-
48, where he points out that Cyprus was a relatively stable possession with loyal governors). 
748 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 120 and 201. It is also important to note the extremely uneven distribution of 
evidence from the first century of Ptolemaic rule: some nomes are abundant with material, while 
others entirely elusive (Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 11-16, cf. Fischer-Bovet 2014, 121). 
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of soldiers could have highlighted the positive effects of providing his men with 
something to fight for beyond simple remuneration, which could after all easily be 
provided by any of his rivals. In other words, a shift from a calculative mindset based 
on the receipt of plunder and payment, towards a moral commitment to something 
akin to ‘home’, could be effected by providing his troops with land to settle on. What 
is more, the land would fulfil both remunerative and normative functions: it was a 
form of reward for loyal service, and also encouraged the same through the creation 
of a rudimentary socio-political system similar to that of polis communities. 
 As with the military settlers of the Seleukid kingdom, modern scholars have 
readily posited that one of the main reasons for the Ptolemies’ efforts in handing out 
kleroi to their soldiers was to strengthen their loyalty.749 Scheuble-Reiter stated 
explicitly that being a military settler made you less open to bribery than someone 
who was not settled: ‘Im Gegensatz zu den rastlosen, oftmals von einem Kriegsherrn 
zum anderen wechselnden Söldners war ein Soldat, der in Ägypten mit seiner 
Familie von den Erträgen seines Landes lebte, für Bestechungen des Kriegsgegners 
weniger empfänglich’.750 Against the background of the constant betrayals that 
plagued the Hellenistic military organisations, especially in the decades after 
Alexander’s death, this would have been a significant advantage, and might support 
the idea that rulers started early on to grant land to their troops in the hopes of 
securing their lasting allegiance. But again, none of these authors explain exactly 
why or how being a military settler made one more loyal – perhaps because the 
causal connection is assumed to be obvious: if a soldier had land and a family at a 
fixed location, he would be less willing to abandon them to join another army. But 
this is only a partial answer. 
 We have already seen that thousands of the Seleukid katoikoi could be 
brought to serve a usurper’s purpose or revolt outright against royal rule. All by itself, 
being settled does not automatically make a soldier loyal, because the basic 
                                                          
749 Bar-Kochva 1976, 47; Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 25: ‘Durch das ihnen zugewiesene Stück Land bauten 
die Soldaten aber auch eine Bindung zu ihrer neuen Heimat und somit zum ptolemäischen König als 
obersten Feldherrn auf’; Fischer-Bovet 2014, 199. 
750 Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 25. 
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compliance model – remunerative-calculative – that caused the frequent cases of 
disloyalty in the past was still in place, farm or no farm. An effective increase in 
loyalty could only be achieved by transforming the compliance relationship to a 
normative-moral one, and it is in this context that being settled provides its greatest 
benefit. Our analysis of Polis armies has shown that a powerful socio-political system 
was one of the primary factors in creating and maintaining the predominantly moral 
involvement of citizen-soldiers. For a soldier in a Royal army, being given land to live 
on was among the first steps towards the establishment of a socio-political system 
of any kind, and formed the beginnings of a moral commitment built around a 
communal identity, a shared history, and a personal connection to the physical land 
one was inhabiting. Combined with normative elements such as the growth of ruler-
cult, a sense of ‘national’ identity as part of a distinctive kingdom, and the increased 
political and economic sophistication of some of the military colonies, it becomes 
possible to see the underlying processes that could lead to the strengthening of the 
moral and normative elements in a Royal army’s compliance relationship, and thus 
to increased levels of loyalty. These processes and their various interactions are 
naturally highly complex, but they share as their nucleus the socio-political unit of 
the military settlement. 
 Given the potential benefits to be derived from settled soldiers and their 
increased sense of belonging, it is understandable that the Ptolemaic administration 
took care to ensure the stability and longevity of their military foundations, as well 
as reinforce the bond between the recipients and the king who granted the land. 
Kleruchs had to swear an oath after taking up their plots, administered by officials in 
the name of the king. The exact contents of this oath are unknown, but as these were 
military settlers, it might have been similar to the oath sworn by the army upon the 
accession of a new king, and thus designed to strengthen the sense of obligation and 
loyalty to the royal house.751 Another step towards a strong social structure was to 
make the plots effectively hereditary, encouraging long-term settlement and 
                                                          
751 The oath for the kleruchs is mentioned in a letter between two Ptolemaic officials, dated to the 
middle of the third century (P.Cair.Zen. II 59254, see Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 45 for the date). For the 
oath upon the accession of a new king, see Polyb. 15.25.11 and Fischer-Bovet 2014, 168 with n. 46. 
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providing an additional stimulus for remaining loyal: a father could pass his land on 
to his son, which gave him a strong stake in the continuous wellbeing of his 
community, and, by extension, of the Ptolemaic kingdom.752 
 Most importantly, however, retention was linked to military service: ‘klēroi 
remained in the hands of cleruchs and their heirs on the condition that one of them 
was related to the army’.753 This, together with the fact that before c. 218/7, the royal 
administration could confiscate kleruchic land while the settler was on campaign or 
otherwise absent, reminds us of the remunerative-calculative relationship that 
underpinned this arrangement; the kleroi were a form of remunerative power, and 
naturally influenced soldiers’ considerations as to where and for whom they should 
fight. Just as with booty, the remunerative power that land represented was a well-
guarded resource: officially each military kleros remained property of the king, who 
thus maintained at least nominal control over it.754 On top of these efforts to ensure 
the settlements’ permanence, their internal unity was to be maintained by settling 
soldiers in ethnically homogenous groups, where possible; and homogeneity of any 
kind, as we have seen in Chapter 1, is vital for the development of high levels of 
cohesion. This seems to have been done especially in the third century, so that the 
non-Egyptian background of the katoikoi hippeis contributed to their own cohesion 
and group identity.755 
 Not only ethnicity, but military function also was taken into account when 
settling groups of soldiers, as settlement names such as Thraikôn or Hippos suggest. 
From her study of the papyrological evidence pertaining to the military settlements, 
which very often features individuals of the same ethnicity, military unit, or 
geographic location on one document, Scheuble-Reiter has concluded that the 
                                                          
752 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 229-30, who also mentions cessions of kleroi to other soldiers, or a split 
between brothers. When exactly the plots became hereditary is uncertain; Stefanou 2013, 121-123 
suggests the second century, for the second half of which she also has identified a decrease in new 
kleruchs. For a letter mentioning both the hereditary nature of kleroi and their transmissibility, see 
Bagnall & Derow 123 (dated to 142). 
753 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 232. 
754 Müller 2006, 133. 
755 Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 326-28. Against the idea of ethnic differentiation in Ptolemaic settlements 
generally, see Müller 2006, 136. 
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majority appear to have been close-knit communities who were relatively distinct in 
social, economic, and military terms.756 This corresponds to the existence of 
gymnasia in many of the settlements in the Fayyum and the Herakleopolite nome, 
participation in which would require the settlers to live close by to come together for 
socio-cultural exchange and military exercises.757 Taken together, all the above 
factors would enhance the cohesion of a military settlement, and strengthen the ties 
that bound the settler to his land, his family, his king, and, crucially, his army. 
 As always, there was a flip side to this effect: creating a strong socio-political 
system in the form of military settlements would also lead to stronger local identities 
and eventually a desire for more independence, as was the case with some of the 
Seleukid settlements. The Ptolemies, it appears, were similarly reluctant to create 
fully independent poleis, and instead opted for a more diverse approach, founding 
communities with various administrational structures that all depended on a central 
authority.758 There was tension between the military settlers and the rulers that 
granted their kleroi: as an expression of remunerative power, the offer of land was 
designed to bind the recipient to the king and his army; but as an attempt to create 
the right circumstances for the growth of moral commitment in their men, it could 
lead to the development of a desire for more autonomy in social, political, and 
economic terms. For an example of this tension we might mention the series of 
letters from Tyriaion, a military settlement under the rule of the Attalids, which 
record the answers of Eumenes II to the settlers’ request for full polis rights, 
complete with a gymnasium, a council, and their own laws: dated to the first half of 
the second century, the king’s reply grants the creation of polis structures, but is 
replete with reminders of the do ut des-character of this agreement, and leaves no 
doubt that the polis will owe lasting gratitude and loyalty to Eumenes in return for 
his benefaction.759 It seems that in this case at least, the loyalty of his subjects still 
                                                          
756 Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 27-32. 
757 Fischer-Bovet 2014, 242; see 280-90 for more detail on the social interaction centred on the 
gymnasia, where she argues that its integrating effects were extended, at least from the middle of 
the second century, also to those of mixed, and of non-Egyptian background. 
758 Müller (2006), 139-40. 
759 SEG 47.1745 (= Bagnall & Derow 43). 
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depended to a large degree on the predominantly remunerative-calculative power 
structures we have observed in the military organisations of the Hellenistic 
kingdoms: ‘an unstable mixture of legality and power, benefactions and 
expectations, threat and trust’.760 
 From the perspective of military loyalty and compliance theory, the act of 
granting land to one’s troops in return for continuous service in the army resembles 
a relatively straightforward application of remunerative power, intended to trigger 
a positive response based on the calculative involvement of the lower participants. 
The short-term benefits appear to have been real and apparent: military settlers had 
a much stronger incentive to remain loyal to their original employer, who was now 
also their landlord, and had virtual possession of their belongings and families to 
boot. In this light, the decision of the captured Ptolemaic soldiers who deserted 
Demetrios to return to their ‘baggage’ in Egypt can be readily compared to the 
decision of the Silver Shields to betray Eumenes in return for their ‘baggage’: in both 
cases, their families and possessions were in effect being held hostage, to be 
redeemed in the first case by loyalty, in the other, by treachery. Military setters, in a 
sense, were given a permanent location for their ‘baggage’, and thus a permanent 
connection to the power that controlled that location. Over time, the cultural, social, 
political, and economic development of their settlement could lead to the creation 
of a socio-political system akin to that of a more typical Greek polis, which in turn 
favoured the growth of moral involvement with the settlers’ military organisations. 
The Hellenistic military settlement, then, could be viewed as a quasi-polis, designed 
to recreate the environment that sustained the powerful normative-moral 
compliance relationship of citizen-armies. A quasi-polis only, though, because a king 
did not want his settlements to develop the fierce spirit of independence and 
autonomy that generally characterised the poleis of Greece, lest they forgot the 
ultimate source of their safety and prosperity. 
 Overall, the evidence reviewed here supports the general picture that has 
emerged in the previous chapters: against the backdrop of frequent betrayals and 
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uncertain loyalties, it is not surprising that Hellenistic warlords looked for ways to 
ensure their men’s allegiance beyond payment and plunder. A personal stake in the 
welfare of their kingdom, it appears, is what they saw as the missing link in their 
compliance model: hence the task was to align the benefit of the lower participant 
with that of his organisation, which as we have seen was a hallmark of Polis armies. 
Settling soldiers served this purpose well, as it created a permanent physical home, 
a socio-political system with which to identify himself, and, finally, a motivation to 





This chapter set out to analyse the respective reward structures in Polis and Royal 
armies. What we have found generally corresponds to and reinforces the conclusions 
from the previous chapters: allowing for certain areas of overlap, the two types of 
military organisation utilised different ways to motivate their men to combat and to 
generate lasting loyalty in their troops. These differences derive primarily from the 
predominant compliance structure that was in place in each organisation. 
 For Polis armies, we have seen that the rewards for loyalty and compliance 
were largely symbolic in nature, and that the warfare carried out by poleis offered 
relatively few opportunities to the regular soldier for personal enrichment. 
Moreover, what material wealth there was to be had usually became public property, 
underlining once more the powerful effect of a cohesive socio-political system that 
placed the community at the heart of loyalty. This effect was enhanced by ensuring 
that any rewards that were handed out were given by the polis community, not by 
individual generals. The focal point for loyalty was always in the abstract: not 
individual commanders, not individual governments, but the citizen body as a whole. 
We may recall the granting of weapons and armour to war orphans, set in a public 
and highly symbolic context, where the community took on the role of the orphans’ 
families. This act was equally an honour and reward for the fallen as it was for the 
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survivors, who were to be inspired by the example of the dead. The symbolic element 
in these proceedings would be further highlighted by the notion that not all war 
orphans would have been destitute, unable to support themselves or to buy their 
own equipment. More important than the material aspect of gifting weapons, 
clearly, was the symbolic one: the polis came together to reward those who fell in 
the past, honour those who were entering adulthood in the present, and inspire 
those who were to fight in the future. 
 In contrast to this model, the analysis of Royal armies revealed that the 
predominant element in their power structure was the remunerative one, and that 
this was met primarily with calculative involvement from the lower participants. This 
was reinforced again and again, whether by official regulations as in the case of the 
Antigonids, or by repeated distributions of plunder as rewards and incentives for 
compliance. Loyalty was largely bought, and whereas poleis usually strove to 
prevent strong bonds between individual commanders and their men for fear they 
might threaten the political equilibrium at home, Hellenistic kings and warlords were 
eager to be seen as the only source of such remunerative power – precisely because 
of the bonds it fostered between troops and paymaster. 
 There was a related way in which these personal bonds were created and 
reinforced: ruler cult. This topic is too complex to be dealt with adequately within 
the scope of this thesis, but is easy to see that the concept of divine kingship could 
have an important impact on a Royal army’s compliance model.761 It added another 
layer to the already highly personalised relationship between the king and his 
soldiers: he was not only their king, general, and paymaster, but also their divinely 
sanctioned ruler upon which their continued wellbeing depended. Personal loyalty 
to the king was to be strengthened by worshipping not only him, but also his family, 
as divinities, underlining the concept that there was a continuum of divine rule to 
which the soldiers were subjected. This is a clear addition of a normative element to 
the otherwise predominantly remunerative power structures in Royal armies; just as 
                                                          
761 On ruler cult generally, see Small 1996, Chaniotis 2003, part two in Iossif, Chankowski & Lorber 
2011, and Erskine 2014. On ruler cult and cities, see Habicht 1970. On the Ptolemaic cult, see Pfeiffer 
2008 and Müller 2009. 
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the king’s image on coins was designed to remind his army where their remuneration 
came from, so the proliferation of ruler cult was designed to make the military more 
loyal by turning compliance into more than a commodity.762 On a symbolic level, acts 
of disloyalty were elevated to transgressions against a divine power, and thus 
acquired a normative dimension that transcended any contract of service. For 
examples of the positive effects of this approach we can turn to Egypt: the 
epigraphic evidence pertaining to garrison commanders reveals that their 
expressions of loyalty to the king were almost exclusively made through dedications 
to the ruler.763 Military settlers, too used ruler cult to profess their loyalty: a group of 
katoikoi hippeis from Hermopolis dedicated a sanctuary to Ptolemy III and his wife 
Berenike, and most of the dedications of the katoikoi hippeis open with 
proclamations of allegiance to the royal house.764 Such close ties between the army 
and the king were supposed to cement the position of the king as the sole focal point 
for the loyalty of his troops. 
 Plunder, however, was still the most valuable resource, and whoever 
controlled it held considerable sway over the loyalties of the troops. This explains 
the strict regulations of the Macedonian army regarding the surrender of plunder to 
the general, and also helps to understand why the courtier Hermeias was able to turn 
the opinion of the troops in his favour simply by providing their pay. It also explains 
why Philip V would often personally oversee the distribution of plunder to his men, 
and show particular largesse to his officers.765 It was perhaps partly in response to 
the uncertainties such a compliance model imposed on the loyalties of the troops 
that settling soldiers became a common strategy.766 Military settlements could 
                                                          
762 EAH, s. v. ‘Ruler cult, Greek and Hellenistic’: ‘The main purpose of these cults was to ensure the 
loyalty of their subject peoples and soldiery and to unify the kingdom’. 
763 Scheuble 2009, 43-45: ‘Es hat fast den Anschein, dass die Kommandanten der oftmals vorgeblich 
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764 See Scheuble-Reiter 2012, 288-91. 
765 E.g. Polyb. 4.77.5, 4.80.16, 5.14.8, 5.24.10. 
766 Economic factors played their part too: the Ptolemaic settlers had to pay a tax that might have 
been unique to them (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 221-25), while Ma 2013, 69-70 argues that the Attalid 




provide the stability that roving armies lacked, and the nascent socio-political 
systems they embodied might provide the soldier with a real stake in the welfare of 
his king and kingdom, and consequently make him less likely to betray or abandon 
them. That the Seleukid military settlers at times rose in revolt against their king, 
but ultimately refused to fight against him directly, reminds us of the complex nature 
of compliance relationships: different types of power operated simultaneously, as 
did conflicting types of involvement. Thus Alexander’s extremely charismatic style 
of leadership was coupled with generosity and abundant material rewards, while his 
veterans could express sincere loyalty to the Argead line as well as oppose it directly. 
What wider conclusions we may draw from this dynamic will be the subject of the 











1. General Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I set out to investigate the dynamics of loyalty in ancient armies 
generally, and in particular to explain the reasons behind the differing levels of 
loyalty we find in the citizen forces of the Greek poleis and the large armies led by 
Alexander’s successors and the leaders of the developing Hellenistic kingdoms. 
 In Chapter 2 we observed that acts of disloyalty were rare in Polis armies, 
while Royal armies were seen to have suffered from frequent cases of treachery and 
noncompliance. I suggested that this was a consequence of two fundamentally 
different ways of generating compliance: Polis armies predominantly applied 
normative power to their members, who in turn were predominantly morally 
involved. Royal armies, on the other hand, relied primarily on remunerative power, 
and their members were primarily calculatively involved. One of the main reasons 
for this was the integration of Polis armies into a powerful socio-political system that 
infused their compliance relationships with intense social and political interaction, 
high levels of personal involvement with their state and their society, and a strong 
and comprehensive civic ideology that framed military service as a moral right and 
obligation. As an example of the effects of this integration, Chapter 3 presented the 
evidence for funerary practices in both types of armies. For Polis armies it was 
evident that the core themes found in soldiers’ epitaphs and public burials and 
commemoration were love of the ancestral land, sacrifice for the common good, and 
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the glory that attended death in battle. Often there was a strong exhortative 
element to these expressions of civic ideology, and an explicit sense of belonging to 
a wider past, present, and future, which I called the civic continuum.767 This socio-
political immersion, based on a clearly defined socio-political identity, facilitated the 
application of normative power and reinforced the moral involvement of citizen 
soldiers, resulting in high levels of compliance and loyalty. Royal armies did not enjoy 
the same benefits, and the central themes found in civic funerary material are 
absent: nor do we find in their stead expressions of sacrifice for, or belonging to, 
other abstract socio-political entities, such as a kingdom or an army. Rather, the 
bonds in Royal armies existed between the army and the general, who sat at the 
head of the remunerative power structures that prevailed in Royal armies. 
 Having indicated the two main types of power used in Polis and Royal armies, 
i.e. normative and remunerative, Chapter 4 demonstrated that the third type, 
coercion, did not play a significant part in either organisation. This has previously 
been identified as a shortcoming, as it was seen as a cause of indiscipline, especially 
in the case of Polis armies, who exhibited rather lax standards by comparison with 
modern armies, or indeed the Roman military.768 I have stressed the problems with 
this approach: discipline and punishment are not causally linked. The absence of 
harsh discipline and physical coercion in Polis and Royal armies is a direct result of 
their compliance relati0nships, which did not rely on coercive power. Simply put, 
they had no need for it.769 In the final chapter, I then argued that the reward systems 
in both types of army were a strong reflection of their respective compliance 
relationships: Polis armies did not make much use of remunerative power, relying 
instead on the symbolic value of the rewards they bestowed for loyal service. The 
public and communal context of these rewards, such as public burials and 
ceremonies, emphasised once more the importance of the socio-political system in 
shaping the type of power and involvement. In Royal armies, remuneration was 
shown to have been at the heart of the compliance structure: kings took steps to 
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control the distribution of plunder, and manipulated the allocation of material 
wealth as incentive and rewards for compliance. This led to a volatile military 
climate, as remuneration was concerned mainly with compliance, not loyalty. Hence 
the many cases of betrayal and noncompliance that characterised the warfare of the 
Successors and the Hellenistic kingdoms. In his influential article, ‘Hellenistic Kings, 
War, and the Economy’, Austin outlined the central importance of money and 
plunder for the maintenance of the Hellenistic monarchies, but noted that works on 
Hellenistic armies said little about it.770 I hope that this thesis has made this picture 
much clearer: remunerative power, in the form of money, military pay, and plunder, 
lay at the core of the compliance structures of Hellenistic Royal armies – without it, 
both the army and the monarchy would have disintegrated. 
 
 
2. Conflict and Convergence 
 
There are, however, several areas of overlap between the compliance models of 
Royal and Polis armies. It is worth repeating that the predominant types of power 
and involvement that characterised these armies are just that: predominant. Most 
organisations work with elements of all three types of congruent compliance 
relationships, and we witness this in the case of ancient armies.771 
 Citizen soldiers were of course also motivated by prospects of plunder and 
personal gain, and even if the yields were generally on a small scale, we should not 
underestimate their value. Similarly, the strength of the socio-political system in 
generating moral involvement from its members could also have coercive effects: 
peer supervision, shame culture, and various legal penalties were soft forms of 
forcing compliance. Moreover, we should not assume too romantic an image of civic 
cohesion and loyalty to the state: the frequent eruptions of stasis demonstrate that 
citizens were more than able to kill each other in the intense struggles for power 
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within the polis. Public and private expressions of unity and exhortation to sacrifice 
personal interest for the common good, then, can be seen to mask the deep divisions 
underneath the façade of citizen solidarity. This highlights the effectiveness of a 
polis’ compliance relationship: that citizen communities could send out thousands 
of soldiers who would not betray each other in the field or join their enemies’ 
enemies speaks volumes about the levels of task cohesion a normative-moral 
compliance structure could create. The same point can be made about the absence 
of physical coercion. Hornblower concluded his article on the ‘army as polis’ in 
Xenophon’s Anabasis with asking how Greek civic armies managed to fight or win 
battles at all, considering their ‘informal and even anarchic attitudes’; his own 
suggestion points in the right direction: ‘It would have to do with civically generated 
cohesiveness and determination not to let one’s fellow fighters down, as attested by 
the Athenian ephebic oath and other evidence, not just Athenian but Spartan too, 
and Greek generally’.772 I hope to have provided this ‘other evidence’, and to have 
revealed that we are, indeed, not dealing with an exclusively Athenian or Spartan 
phenomenon, but one that pertains to all civic armies that operated within the socio-
political framework of the polis. 
 Royal armies, too, exhibited elements of other compliance relationships that 
should caution us to posit a simplistic ‘Royal vs. Polis army’ dichotomy. Beyond 
simply paying their men to maintain compliance, Hellenistic warlords and kings 
sought ways to innovate and create new forms of identity that would bind their 
soldiers to them more permanently. In the system of military settlements we can see 
an approximation of polis structures, a royal attempt at providing the trappings of 
polis life – ideally without the elements of autonomy and independence – in order to 
place the loyalties of their troops on a firmer footing. On a larger scale, the use of 
cult to elevate the power and legitimacy of the ruler, and the forging of kingdom-
wide identities that emphasised stability and success, helped provide a Royal army 
with some of the normative benefits that the socio-political system of the polis 
bestowed on civic armies. Erskine has shown how the grand processions of Ptolemy 
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II (in the early third century) and Antiochos IV (c. 166) emphasised the legitimacy and 
universal power of these monarchs, and how they evoked ‘a tradition going back to 
the civic processions (pompai) of the classical poleis, now transferred to the new 
world of the Hellenistic monarchy’.773 The figure of the legitimate king himself 
acquired enough normative force as to command the loyalties of entire armies, an 
example of which we saw in the revolt of Achaios. Combined with the remunerative 
power kings wielded, and the personal charisma some of them possessed, the scale 
and effectiveness of Royal armies becomes readily understandable.774 
 
 
3. Future Directions 
 
The findings of this thesis could be enhanced and supported by investigating in more 
detail some of the larger topics that informed the present analysis. The phenomenon 
of stasis needs to be better understood, especially its relationship to military history 
more generally. As we have seen, treating civil war in purely political terms ignores 
the fact that the citizens who killed each other in a coup also stood their ground next 
to each other while on campaign. The close connection between the civic and 
military realms of polis life might have been an important underlying cause for the 
fierce internal violence that stasis entailed.775 Another area that needs further study 
is that of funerary epitaphs for soldiers: the evidence collected here is by no means 
exhaustive, and a systematic analysis of the epigraphic material, particularly in the 
case of the more dispersed material for Hellenistic soldiers, might lead to more 
refined results. Other Royal armies, too, such as the Macedonian army of the Archaic 
and Classical periods, or the Achaimenid military system, could be discussed in terms 
of their compliance structures, potentially revealing yet more complexities in the 
combinations of different types of power and involvement. Finally, modern theories 
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of military organisation and combat motivation should not be dismissed out of hand: 
the present work, I hope, shows how beneficial they can be to aid us in better 
understanding the structural causes behind certain phenomena that our sources 
might simply put down to soldiers’ greed or the personality of an individual leader.776 
 The dynamics of loyalty in Polis and Royal armies were determined by a 
complex combination of social, political, economic, and personal factors. It would be 
impossible to understand every single one of them in its entirety, but having 
discussed several of them in detail, we can say that citizen armies displayed 
remarkably high levels of loyalty, whereas Royal armies suffered frequent 
noncompliance. The one single most important cause of this difference was the 
socio-political system that enveloped a Polis army and allowed a normative-moral 
compliance relationship to flourish. Royal armies had to find other, more pragmatic 
ways of generating compliance and fostering loyalty. Both armies, however, shared 
one feature: at the heart of loyalty, ultimately, lay the personal emotions, beliefs, 
and actions of the individual soldier. Inasmuch as the deepest personal motivations 
of these men lie beyond the grasp of modern historiography, this study will always 
be incomplete. 
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